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As climate change has become a pressing global political issue, academic interest in the 
negotiations within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
has grown. However, whilst the outcomes, and levels of parties’ influence, have produced 
much scholarship, a lacuna remains on parties’ strategies. Specifically, strategies used by 
coalitions have been understudied. This thesis contributes with an investigation of strategies 
used by AILAC, a group of Latin American states co-operating to advance ambitious global 
climate action, between 2013 and 2018. As a relatively new coalition, AILAC has received 
little scholarly attention, with limited study assessing its positions and contributions towards 
the Paris Agreement. This thesis examines AILAC’s strategy choices and the reasoning behind 
them through a governmentality theoretical lens. Primarily a theory of power, it sees relations 
between actors as processes, questioning how actors interact with each other, making it a 
natural fit for the study of strategies and an attractive alternative to rational choice theories 
overlooking processes. To determine AILAC’s strategy use, the thesis employs Critical 
Discourse Analysis. CDA uncovers evidence of strategies within AILAC’s UNFCCC 
submission texts and interviews with AILAC delegates, providing insights into influences on 
AILAC’s strategic decision-making. It finds AILAC overwhelmingly preferred less aggressive 
strategies such as constructive proposals, persuasion, and coalition-building over more 
aggressive strategies like exerting moral pressure, demands, and threats. This primarily resulted 
from power relations between AILAC and its negotiating partners; while AILAC is resource-
poor vis-à-vis material power, it is rich in power/knowledge, allowing it to use less aggressive 
strategies with a reasonable expectation of success where more aggressive strategies reliant on 
material power would likely fail. The thesis also finds influence on AILAC strategies from 
various other factors; e.g. AILAC’s bridge-building identity reinforces the attractiveness of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The UNFCCC negotiations have been the object of considerable scholarly attention over the 
last 20 years as responding to the threat of climate change has become one of the biggest 
challenges of the 21st Century. Research has revealed just how complex the UNFCCC as a 
negotiating arena has become, with a multitude of highly technical issues being negotiated by 
196 state parties and the input of civil society and private businesses (Carter, 2015). The 
negotiating landscape is yet more complex as a result of the presence of numerous and 
overlapping negotiating coalitions (Stephenson et al, 2019), and the number of coalitions has 
increased markedly in the last decade or so (Blaxekjaer and Nielsen, 2014). Despite the 
prominence of coalitions in the negotiations, they remain relatively understudied as 
negotiating actors, and in particular the strategies they use and their reasons for doing so have 
been overlooked in the literature. One such coalition is AILAC, a bloc of 8 Latin American 
countries which formed at the end of 2012 (Edwards et al, 2017). 
 This thesis aims to make a novel contribution to existing research by examining the 
strategies of AILAC between 2013 and 2018 in the UNFCCC and the influences on its 
strategic choices. Studies on coalitions’ strategies in the UNFCCC are rare, as are studies on 
the participation of AILAC (Edwards et al, 2017). The thesis aims to make a further 
contribution to existing literature by utilising a governmentality perspective on social 
relations as the lens through which AILAC’s strategy use is understood, adding to climate 
governmentality studies of the UNFCCC which have so far focused largely on alternative 
areas of climate governance, and on discourses as their primary objects of analysis rather than 
actors themselves when the negotiations have been studied. Furthermore, it breaks new 
ground in its use of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a methodological framework by 
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applying its analytical techniques to primary data from AILAC submissions to the UNFCCC 
and interviews with AILAC delegates and triangulating these with insights from Corpus-
Linguistic Analysis (CLA). It argues that AILAC preferentially uses less aggressive strategies 
over more aggressive options, chiefly as a result of the power dynamics operating within the 
UNFCCC, but that other factors such as the bloc’s bridge-building identity, timings, and 
delegation dynamics influenced AILAC strategy choice and deployment of different 
strategies. 
  This introductory chapter begins by setting out the aims of the research and 
defining the key terms used within them. The following two sections demonstrate the novel 
contributions the thesis makes, both in relation to the background context of the literature and 
in the context of the empirical reality of the UNFCCC negotiations themselves. The chapter 
then presents the research questions, and provides a brief overview of the theoretical and 
methodological approaches used in the thesis. The final section presents a chapter-by-chapter 
outline of the rest of the thesis and a short summary of the main findings and conclusions. 
 
1.1 Research Aims and Definition of Terms 
 
The main aim of this thesis is to elucidate the strategies used by the AILAC bloc within the 
multilateral climate change negotiations of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), and to explain their reasons for choosing these strategies, from 
2013, immediately after AILAC’s establishment in 2012 at COP18 in Doha (Edwards et al, 
2017) until 2018 inclusive. Such an analysis of AILAC’s strategic decision-making has not 
been carried out before. Coalitions in the UNFCCC have not garnered a great deal of research; 
most of that which has been carried out on coalitions’ participation examines either their 
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formation and maintenance of cohesion, processes of their internal dynamics and potential 
fragmentation, or analyses of their negotiating success. In addition, the sparse analysis of 
strategy choice within the UNFCCC, whether by blocs or individual state parties, largely 
focuses on identifying which strategies were used and how they were deployed rather than the 
reasons for their selection, while that which does examine influences on strategy choice does 
not do so for individual actors. Part of the aim of this thesis, in explaining AILAC’s strategy 
choices as well as identifying them, is to add to the small number of studies which identify 
drivers of the strategies as well as the strategies themselves of individual blocs (see Betzold, 
2010; Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012; Oculi and Stephenson, 2018). Furthermore, this thesis 
aims to make a novel contribution in applying a governmentality theoretical perspective of 
social interactions to analyse strategy choice in the UNFCCC negotiations, and by employing 
Critical Discourse Analysis - incorporating Corpus-Linguistic Analysis - as a methodology by 
which to analyse the deployment of strategies by a specific actor. 
 
1.1.1 Definition of Terms 
 
It is therefore important to begin by defining the key terms within this aim. AILAC - the 
Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean1 group within the UNFCCC - is 
composed of 8 states: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, 
and Peru. AILAC is a coalition, defined by Hamilton and Whalley ((1989:547); in Narlikar 
(2003:29)) as “any group of decision-makers participating in…a negotiation and who agree to 
act in concert to achieve a common end.” Within the sub-divisions of coalitions, AILAC is a 
 
1 The AILAC acronym derives from the Spanish-language version of this name: the Asociación Independiente 
de América Latina y el Caribe (AILAC, 2014f) 
22 
 
bloc; according to Narlikar (2003:31-32), blocs are “characterised by the fact that they combine 
only ‘like-minded’ states…bloc-type coalitions may utilise pre-existing similarities with other 
states. The noteworthy characteristic is the conscious restriction of membership to states 
sharing the same set of ideas or identity”. These can be distinguished from alliances, which are 
issue- rather than identity-based: “temporary coalitions of self-interested states who come 
together for instrumental reasons in response to a specific threat” (Wendt, 1994:386; in 
Narlikar, 2003:31). AILAC can be seen to fall into the bloc category given the geography of 
its member states, their shared Latin American identity (Watts and Depledge, 2018) as 
exemplified by AILAC’s name, and the similarity of their economic profiles as small-to-
medium economies invested in economic liberalisation and the removal of trade barriers 
(Edwards et al, 2017; Watts and Depledge, 2018). This thesis, unless specifically 
differentiating between blocs and alliances, will therefore refer to AILAC interchangeably as 
a bloc or a coalition given the applicability of both terms. 
A strategy “usually refers to the overall pattern of behaviour of a negotiator or 
delegation”, as opposed to a tactic, which is used “to refer to a move within an overall 
negotiation plan or strategy” (Bailer, 2012:535). It is also important to distinguish between a 
bloc’s strategy and its positions; these should not be read as equivalent. This thesis will take a 
bloc’s position as signifying the stance it takes on any particular issue of the climate 
negotiations – that is, what the bloc “thinks” about an issue. By contrast, a strategy is a medium 
through which a bloc seeks to further its aims - whether to put forward a viewpoint, present a 
suggestion, or effect a behavioural change in another party – in accordance with its positions 





1.2 Research Aims in Context of Existing Literature 
 
Two main strands of literature provide the background to this thesis’ contributions to research: 
the study of coalitions within the UNFCCC negotiations, and the study of strategies within 
international negotiations. 
 
1.2.1 Coalitions in the UNFCCC 
 
Firstly, relatively little research has been conducted on the participation of coalitions within 
the UNFCCC. Although Dupont (1994:152) states that “coalition analysis is a key to explaining 
processes and outcomes of multilateral negotiations”, until the early 2010s coalitions’ 
participation within the UNFCCC lacked recognition in the literature and remained relatively 
understudied, with much of the focus of research remaining on individual states and “theorising 
conditions for a global climate change agreement” (Carter, 2015:207). This is despite the fact 
that coalitions were evidently an integral part of the UNFCCC, helping to make negotiations 
logistically possible in a forum of 196 individual state participants by reducing the number of 
voices at Conferences of the Parties (COPs) and Subsidiary Body meetings (SBs) (Carter, 
2015). While the initial 1992 division by the UNFCCC of parties into Annex I and non-Annex 
I categories (depending respectively on their status as a developed or developing state and 
subsequent attribution of historical responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions) still holds 
(Carter, 2015), parties have organised themselves into smaller coalitions. To date, 23 
participating coalitions have been identified (see Table 1, below). 
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Table 1: Coalitions in the UNFCCC Negotiations2 (Sources: Blaxekjaer and Nielsen 
(2014:3); Carter (2015:209); ABU (2019)) 
Annex I Non-Annex I Both Annex I and Non-
Annex I 
Economies in Transition 
(EIT) 
African Group of Negotiators (AGN) Durban Alliance (DA) 
European Union (EU) Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) Environmental Integrity 
Group (EIG) 
Umbrella Group (UG) Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (ABU) High Ambition Coalition 
(HAC) 
 Independent Association of Latin America and 
the Caribbean (AILAC) 
 
 Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our 
America (ALBA) 
 
 Brazil, South Africa, India, and China (BASIC)  
 Central American Integration System (SICA)  
 Central Asia, Caucasus, and Moldova (CACAM)  
 Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF)  
 Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN)  
 G77 & China  
 League of Arab States (LAS)  
 Least Developed Countries (LDCs)  
 
2 Blaxekjaer and Nielsen and Carter include the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action (CD) as a coalition; 
whilst this is a group of 40 states, in practice the CD serves as a space for discussions within and outside the 
UNFCCC rather than an entity speaking with one voice on behalf of its members (Cartagena Dialogue, 2010; 
Herold et al, 2011, 2012) 
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 Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs)  
 Mountainous Landlocked Developing Countries 
(MLDCs) 
 
 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) 
 
 Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS)  
 
Between 2009 and 2014, 7 new coalitions were established (Blaxekjaer and Nielsen, 2014), 
as “growing dissatisfaction with the sub-optimal progress in the overall UNFCCC 
negotiations [saw] a swing towards the forming of new alliances (both formal and informal)”, 
and led states to explore new options when they felt misrepresented by their memberships of 
existing coalitions (Goulding, 2015:194).This reorganisation of the UNFCCC’s membership 
prompted calls for the academic literature to provide a revised understanding of the 
negotiation dynamics within the UNFCCC (Blaxekjaer and Nielsen, 2014). To a certain 
extent, these calls were heeded; however, the lion share of coalition scholarship mirrored 
Dupont’s (1994) identification of the 3 main areas of coalition studies within trade research, 
namely coalition formation and maintenance, internal workings and potential fragmentation, 
and judgements of coalition success, while overlooking the strategies they use in multilateral 
negotiations. 
Firstly, research was carried out into coalitions formation and the processes involved 
in maintaining coalitions’ cohesion throughout the negotiations. Blaxekjaer and Nielsen 
(2014) investigate formation of coalitions since COP15 in Copenhagen in relation to the 
principle of common-but-differentiated responsibility (CBDR) and the Annex I/non-Annex I 
divide (or “firewall”) in the UNFCCC, while Carter (2015) examines how a Pacific voice was 
brought to bear on the UNFCCC through the establishment of the PSIDS coalition, and the 
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benefits thereof for them. Kasa et al (2008) and Najam (2011) argues that the basis of the 
G77 & China’s coalition maintenance is the shared Global South identity of economic 
underdevelopment of its members, while Happaerts (2015) attributes the G77’s stability to 
the dominance of the BASIC coalition in determining the coalition’s positions while other 
sub-coalitions within it such as AOSIS, the LDCs, OPEC, and indeed AILAC, are side-lined. 
Hallding et al (2013) consider the origins of the BASIC coalition to be the result of its 4 
member states being singled out by Annex I parties for inclusion in binding mitigation 
commitments because of their status as rising economic powers; thus binding together made 
strategic sense for protection. Chasek (2005) also investigated the formation and maintenance 
of AOSIS, concluding that it arose from its members’ common vulnerability to the effects of 
climate change for small island states. 
  Secondly, a similar amount of research was devoted towards coalitions’ 
internal dynamics and potential for fragmentation. Rayner and Jordan (2013) ascribe the 
EU’s development of ambitious climate policies in the negotiations to its polycentricity, in 
that because “no one EU institution has offered a consistent lead” (2013:80), the component 
parts of EU governance have been allowed to pursue different approaches and innovate, 
meaning that the EU has emerged as a global leader in climate change. Brenton (2013:543) 
identifies a “battle” between AOSIS and BASIC within the overarching G77 & China 
coalition as a result of strong disagreements as to relative prioritisation of immediate, 
ambitious action on climate versus economic growth and action tied to financial assistance 
from developed country parties respectively. Najam (2011:219) note a similar tension 
between AOSIS and OPEC within the G77 & China along the same action versus economic 
growth lines, meaning that the G77’s unity is “forever tentative”. Betzold et al (2012) find 
increasing evidence of differences between AOSIS members themselves regarding the 
coalition’s proposed positions on land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) and 
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reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) schemes, but that the 
coalition has remained a “tightly co-ordinated negotiation coalition” (2012:607) through 
unity of position on other areas, such as adaptation and financial and technology transfer. 
Goulding (2015) spots divisions within AOSIS as well, as a result of PSIDS’ decision to 
break AOSIS ranks by participating in REDD+ and stating their positions independently of 
the coalition, and she attributes this to the influence of Australia and New Zealand 
moderating PSIDS’ stance on ambitious climate action. 
 Thirdly, research has focused on the impact, or success, of coalitions in the UNFCCC. 
Oberthür (2011) assesses the EU’s performance in multilateral climate change negotiations in 
terms of its goal achievement and its relevance, finding that whilst it improved markedly in 
the 1990s and 2000s, it failed to effect high levels of influence on proceedings at the 2009 
COP15 in Copenhagen. Studies also consider the extent to which the EU’s behaviour can be 
characterised as leadership, such as Zielonka (2008), Kelemen (2010), Postolache (2012), 
Fernandez Martin (2012), Groen et al (2012), and Rayner and Jordan (2013). Groen et al 
(2012) set the criteria for leadership of being able to drive other actors towards particular 
goals and the achievement of these goals deriving from this driving force. Attributing 
performance as determined by a mixture of domestic factors and external contexts such as 
intra-EU cohesion and changing global geopolitics, they conclude that the EU improved in 
the 2010 Cancún COP16 compared to Copenhagen as a result of greater participation in 
UNFCCC decision-making and greater influence on outcomes than at COP15. Zielonka 
(2008) and Kelemen (2010) view the EU as the global leader in international environmental 
governance as a result of its model of regulatory politics, allowing it to spread environmental 
protection norms from its domestic politics across the world, although it is seen as either a 
story of quasi-imperial imposition (Zielonka. 2008) or “virtuous environmental leadership” 
(Kelemen, 2010:346) respectively. Fernandez Martin (2012:194) disagrees, however, arguing 
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that the EU is losing influence in the UNFCCC as its share of global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions decreases, and that it has only been viewed in a leadership rôle because “nobody 
else wanted to take it”.   
 Brenton (2013:542-543) identifies the EU, G77 & China, and a “loose 
association” of the United States (US), Canada, and Japan3 as the 3 “great powers” of the 
UNFCCC’s early years which have “disproportionately moulded the negotiation outcomes” 
as a result of their “economic weight, global political influence, and level of GHG emissions” 
which accounts for approximately 70% of the global total. However, he goes on to note that 
BASIC usurped the EU in terms of influence at COP15, in which “the final deal was done 
between the US and BASIC, with the EU not even in the room” (2013:546). Nhamo 
(2010:353-354) argues that BASIC adopted a leadership rôle in the wake of COP15, again 
attributing the coalition’s subsequent influence to its “significant global muscle in terms of 
geopolitics, land space, population, economics, and military power.” Finally, Goulding 
(2015) also studies the influence of AOSIS, noting that it has reduced as its PSIDS members 
found greater success in influencing the UNFCCC negotiations outside the coalition at COPs 
in Cancún, Durban, and Doha. 
 
1.2.2 Strategies in the UNFCCC4 
 
As a result of the foci of formation and maintenance, internal workings and potential 
fragmentation, and judgements of coalition success in studies on coalitions’ participation in the 
UNFCCC, a crucial component of the Convention’s negotiation dynamics have been 
 
3 The United States, Canada, and Japan form part of the Umbrella Group, along with Australia, Belarus, Iceland, 
Israel, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, and Ukraine (UNFCCC, 2014) 
4 See Chapter 2 for an in-depth analysis of the literature on strategies and strategic reasoning. 
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overlooked in the literature, namely the strategies employed by coalitions to further their goals 
and embed their positions within eventual UNFCCC outcomes. According to Odell (2010), 
literature on multilateral negotiations has understudied strategies, despite it being a well-
researched area in other disciplines such as psychology, law, and business. This is particularly 
evident in the case of the climate change negotiations. While strategies in the UNFCCC are 
considered in some studies for which strategies are not the focus of research, within a 20-year 
period, only 10 studies focusing on states’ strategies, comprising 7 about particular states and 
3 examining broader patterns of states’ strategy use could be identified, while only 6 studies 
explicitly investigated the strategies used by coalitions within the UNFCCC. When considering 
research into the reasoning behind parties’ strategic choices, these numbers drop even lower, 
with 9 studies of states and only 3 studies of individual coalitions attributing the strategic 
decision-making to specific selection pressures. Furthermore, these 3 studies make the 
argument for single specific factors, such as power dynamics (Betzold, 2010; Deitelhoff and 
Wallbott, 2012) or coalition members’ domestic vulnerability to climate change (Oculi and 
Stephenson, 2018) determining strategy choice, rather than considering a multiplicity of 
influences at work. In order to gain an appreciation of the range of possible factors in strategy 
selection in multilateral negotiations, it is necessary to consider other negotiation areas, such 
as trade negotiations (e.g. Odell (2005) and Frenhoff Larsen (2007)) or intra-EU negotiations 
(e.g. Da Conceiçao-Heldt (2006) and Elgström and Jönsson (2000)), which have larger bodies 
of research on the topic. As such, there is an opportunity for a study of the strategies used by 
an individual coalition and its reasons for selecting them to make a novel contribution to 





1.3 Research Aims in Context of Empirical Reality and Climate Change Policy-Making 
 
The mitigation of the threats posed by anthropogenic climate change, and the governance of 
the solutions to do so, have rightly attracted considerable scholarly attention. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014:8) states that “continued emission 
of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting changes in all components of 
the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive, and irreversible impacts for 
people and ecosystems” and that  “climate change will amplify existing risks and create new 
risks for natural and human systems” (2014:13). This is particularly true for Latin America. 
Whilst the region does not face the sorts of existential threats from climate change as do the 
members of AOSIS, the member states of AILAC, which comprise almost the entire western 
coast of Central and South America, are nevertheless extremely vulnerable to its effects. 
According to two different indices of states’ vulnerability to the effects of climate change, 
member states of AILAC rank among the top ten globally: Peru and Honduras in Brooks and 
Adger’s (2003) rankings of states affected by natural disasters related to climatic activity, and 
Guatemala and Honduras in Kreft et al’s (2015) Global Climate Risk Index, based on 
considerations of fatalities and economic damage from extreme weather events. Indeed, in both 
studies, Honduras is even ranked first among all states around the world. 
The IPCC (2019) projects that over the coming century, Central and South America are 
likely to be affected by increased warming, with the result of yield reductions for cereal crops 
and threats to food security, increases in wildfires, and increases in the frequency and intensity 
of droughts. AILAC’s Central American members are likely to be subject to more intense 
hurricanes (Vergara et al, 2007; CAF, 2014) and the destruction of their Caribbean coral 
ecosystems which protect them from storm surges and host fish nurseries (Vergara et al, 2007; 
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de la Torre et al, 2009), while all AILAC member states are likely to suffer coastal flooding 
and extreme precipitation events, increased exposure to tropical diseases, and the salinization 
of coastal aquifers (Vergara et al, 2007; de la Torre et al, 2009; CAF, 2014; Rojas Hernández, 
2016). Andean AILAC states are also likely to experience severe glacial retreat (Vergara et al, 
2007; de la Torre et al, 2009; CAF, 2014). This is especially important, as it is likely to result 
in floods, avalanches, dam ruptures, and landslides (Rojas Hernández, 2016), as well as “a 
dramatic decline, in the long-term, in water availability in the dry season in areas fed by 
glaciers”, which will result in “growing conflict over the distribution of water resources” 
(Painter, 2008:1). Peru in particular is vulnerable in this way, as South America’s most water 
stressed country, with 98% of its population living west of the Andes, where less than 2% of 
its water supplies are situated; as such, the population is reliant on glacial meltwater runoff 
(Painter, 2008). Furthermore, with each of these impacts comes the associated damage to 
socioeconomic systems within AILAC member countries. It is estimated that across Latin 
America, total economic losses could reach approximately US$91 billion by 2050, although 
this estimate does not take into account damage to non-economic sectors or the “possibility of 
increased frequency or potency of natural disasters” (de la Torre et al, 2009:10-11), which seem 
likely to occur. 
  Given AILAC members’ vulnerability to climate change, there is a justice-
based imperative to acknowledge the bloc’s participation in, and contribution to, global policy-
making for solutions in the UNFCCC so as to avoid what Fraser (1997:14) describes as 
recognitional injustice through “being rendered invisible”. According to Schlosberg 
(2012:450), “lack of recognition is an injustice in itself; insulting, ignoring, degrading, and 
devaluing individuals or their communities is a type of harm.” In the case of the UNFCCC 
negotiations, this is particularly important, as a lack of recognition entails a lack of political 
status (Schlosberg, 2012); without recognition as valid and equal actors, parties cannot achieve 
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parity of participation in the negotiations, as “communities require processes that give them 
some locus of control over their destinies as part of a recognition of identity and place” (Adger 
et al, 2011:21). This is surely even more the case for those who stand to lose significantly from 
the effects of climate change, yet to which they have contributed little, with AILAC member 
states’ contributions to global GHG emissions accounting for only 0.75% of the total (Carbon 
Atlas, 2019).  
 Nevertheless, Edwards et al (2017) note that AILAC is scarcely mentioned in literature 
on global climate governance. Indeed, their article is one of only 2 pieces of scholarship 
identified to date which make AILAC their focus (Edwards et al, 2017; Watts and Depledge, 
2018), while only 2 others acknowledge AILAC’s participation in the UNFCCC. Costantini et 
al (2016) make a passing reference to AILAC as one of a series of new UNFCCC coalitions 
since 2012, while Blaxekjear and Nielsen (2014) map AILAC’s negotiating positions as a 
bridge-builder in relation to various UNFCCC features such as the Annex I/non-Annex I 
firewall and CBDR, as one of 7 new coalitions as the focus of their study.  
 Both Edwards et al (2017) and Watts and Depledge (2018) note AILAC’s 
bridge-building identity and examine the bloc’s positions in the UNFCCC and their 
contributions to the outcomes of UNFCCC decision-making. Edwards et al (2017) chart 
AILAC’s formation, citing a shared identity and a wish to make their voice heard as key drivers 
of unity, and Watts and Depledge (2018) concur that this stemmed from a desire to present a 
Latin American voice other than that of ALBA in the UNFCCC. Edwards et al (2017) conclude 
their article with considerations of whether AILAC can continue to wield influence in the 
UNFCCC, noting that the group’s organisational structure, with a dedicated support unit of 
experts in climate policy and negotiation and a governance committee for administrative and 
political decision-making, has given it a solid foundation to maintain its levels of visibility and 
impact. Watts and Depledge (2018) ask the same question, writing that AILAC’s continuation 
33 
 
as an active UNFCCC participant is tied to its ability to act domestically in keeping with its 
ambitious positions on climate action in the negotiations, and that whilst so far AILAC 
members are meeting this challenge, it is not guaranteed to remain the case in future. 
 However, neither of these studies specifically examines the strategies used by AILAC 
in the UNFCCC. Given the “protracted lack of effective policy response to global climate 
change” (Nasiritousi and Bäckstrand, 2019:24), it is surprising that there has not been an 
investigation of how a bridge-building actor like AILAC, wishing to forge ahead with 
ambitious action and to find common ground between parties, has operationalised these 
intentions in choosing specific strategies in the negotiations. This thesis aims to make such a 
contribution. 
 
1.4 Research Questions, Theory, and Methodology 
 
This thesis seeks to answer two main questions. These are: 
 
1. Which strategies did AILAC use in the UNFCCC negotiations between 2013 and 
2018 inclusive? 
2. What were the reasons for AILAC choosing the strategies that it did? 
 
As shown above, these are questions which have not been addressed before in the literature. 
The 2013 – 2018 timeframe has been chosen as 2013 was the first full year of AILAC’s 
participation in the UNFCCC, and 2018 was the most recent year of data availability during 
the project’s data collection phase. The timeframe could have been shortened to solely an 
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analysis of AILAC’s strategies in the periods either before or after the finalisation of the Paris 
Agreement (PA) in December 2015, but there was judged to have been a manageable 
quantity of data available to conduct an analysis on AILAC’s strategy choices over the whole 
period. 
 
1.4.1 Theoretical and Methodological Approaches 
 
In keeping with Betzold’s (2010) assumption that at least one of several potential drivers 
behind actors’ choices of strategy is the power dynamics within which they are situated, this 
thesis adopts a power-based theoretical perspective on negotiations. However, such a 
perspective must be able to account for alternative drivers of strategy choice as well, such as 
domestic politics, institutional influences, and intra-coalition dynamics. Governmentality is 
one such theoretical perspective. This thesis aims to contribute to another small but growing 
body of existing research which applies a Foucauldian governmentality understanding of 
social relations to settings of multilateral climate negotiations. This research has embraced 
perspectives from global governance literature which have investigated the “network-like 
modes of governing on the global stage” and have led to a “recognition of new forms of 
agency in the international arena” (Stripple and Bulkelely, 2014:5-6). Climate 
governmentality applies Foucault’s dialectical conception of power as both the constitution of 
relations between actors and the processes which determine their nature (Foucault, 1978) to 
the politics of climate change and to the recognition of these new forms of agency. If power 
consists of these mutually-constituting relations and processes, then this implies that “new 
spaces of governance may generate new forms of power…Critically, power, and the 
processes of governing through which it is manifest, are not simply held by agents, but 
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realised through practices” (Stripple and Bulkeley, 2014:14). As Lövbrand and Stripple 
(2014:34) therefore note, climate governmentality studies are “an effort to redirect the 
analysis and understanding of power and government in the contemporary study of climate 
politics. Whereas global governance studies have helped us to ask questions about the who 
and locus of climate governance, students of climate governmentality typically draw attention 
to the how of climate governance: how the climate is conceptualised and construed as a 
domain of government, [and] how climate governance is accomplished in practical and 
technical terms”.  
As negotiation strategies are by definition questions of how particular actors interact 
with each other within social relations, the application of governmentality to the aims of this 
thesis is a natural fit. Despite this, the majority of climate governmentality literature has 
examined the “day-to-day, micro-practices of environmental governance” (Death, 2011:4), 
non-state actors’ rôles in shaping climate governance within state governance, or “the growth 
of standards and codes of conduct in distinct social spheres such as the carbon marketplace and 
urban life” (Lövbrand and Stripple (2014:35). Furthermore, the small amount of literature 
which has applied climate governmentality to the UNFCCC negotiations themselves, such as 
Death’s (2011) study of the theatricality of climate summits and Bäckstrand and Lövbrand’s 
(2006, 2016) analysis of discourses permeating the negotiations, have tended to focus on the 
processes of social interactions and largely overlook the agency of actors. This is in keeping 
with Foucault’s original understanding of power, which argues that actors should not be seen 
as “autonomous agents wielding the power of discourse on behalf of transparent interests” 
(Litfin, 1994:23). This thesis aims to strike more of a balance between the how and the who of 
climate governance by analysing the strategies of AILAC in particular whilst still 
understanding them as discursive processes in the Foucauldian sense by adopting the insights 
of Hajer (1995:53, emphasis added), who calls for an “argumentative turn” in governmentality 
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studies, such that “the object of research is the practices through which actors seek to persuade 
others to see reality in the light of the orator or rhetorician”. Chapter 3 provides a more in-
depth consideration of the theoretical basis of this thesis and how it can be applied to the study 
of AILAC’s strategies. 
 Furthermore, this thesis aims to break new ground in using a Critical Discourse 
Analysis methodology to uncover the AILAC strategies and explain the reasoning behind them. 
CDA is grounded in Linguistics, and to date there has been little crossover in its use between 
Linguistics and social science (Van Dijk, 2008). In relation to climate change, discourse 
analysis has been used in studies of media coverage (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005; Boykoff, 
2008; Billet, 2010) and to a lesser extent in the examination of discourses prevalent within the 
negotiations themselves, as in the case of Weisser’s (2014) study of the practices of documents 
in the UNFCCC, or the aforementioned studies by Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006, 2016). 
This latter sub-group, however, in keeping with the trend of climate governmentality studies, 
has not sought to analyse the discursive strategies employed by individual actors, instead 
focusing on the discourses themselves which permeate the UNFCCC negotiations. This thesis, 
by focusing specifically on AILAC, aims to add such a contribution to the literature.  
It employs CDA’s 3 analytical levels of textual analysis, processing analysis, and social 
analysis (Fairclough, 2010). Textual analysis describes in detail the multimodal features of 
AILAC’s technical submission documents to the UNFCCC such as the discourses contained 
within them and particular linguistic features which contribute to the deployment of strategies, 
e.g. framing concepts in particular ways, as well as the responses from interviews with AILAC 
delegates. Processing analysis draws on both of these data sources in order to interpret the 
findings of textual analysis and to identify particular strategies used by AILAC in the 
negotiations. Finally, social analysis provides an explanation through consideration of the 
responses from interviewees as to the reasons for choosing particular strategies as well as of 
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the wider social context in which AILAC is situated, such as the UNFCCC institutional 
framework, and the distribution of power resources among parties. Corpus-Linguistic Analysis 
is used to triangulate the CDA methodology, allowing the thesis to make another contribution 
to a small body of literature (Baker et al, 2008) in blending the methods of CDA and CLA 
together. Chapter 4 discusses the CDA methodology used in the analysis in greater detail. 
 
1.5 Thesis Layout and Findings 
 
After this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature specific to strategy 
choice and use in the UNFCCC, as well as reasons for the use of particular strategies, which 
draws on literature from both within and outside of the UNFCCC negotiations. Chapter 3 
presents the governmentality theoretical perspective in greater depth, describing its rationale 
and applicability to the aims of this thesis whilst providing responses to criticisms made of its 
internal logic. Chapter 4, as mentioned, provides an overview of the analytical structure of the 
CDA methodology. It specifies the sources of data and methods of data collection, and how 
CDA’s tripartite framework was applied to these. It also introduces a triangulating method of 
CLA into the CDA framework to add to the methodological robustness of the thesis. 
 Chapters 5 to 9 cover the analysis of the thesis. Each chapter assesses the evidence for 
AILAC’s use (or lack thereof) of different strategies. Chapter 5 looks at AILAC’s use of 
technical submissions to the UNFCCC; Chapter 6 its use of constructive proposals and rhetoric, 
and compromise offers; Chapter 7 its use of persuasion and rational argument; Chapter 8 its 
use of coalition-building, bilateral meetings, informal negotiating spaces, and concessions 
trading; and Chapter 9 AILAC’s use of moral pressure, blocking, demands, and threats. Chapter 
10 comprises the discussion of the interpretation and explanation of AILAC’s strategic choices 
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in relation to knowledge from existing literature, while Chapter 11 presents some conclusions 
and evaluative reflections of the thesis as a whole before offering some suggestions as to future 
avenues of research. 
  The main finding of this research is that AILAC overwhelmingly chose less 
aggressive strategies such as constructive proposals, persuasion, and coalition-building over 
more aggressive strategies such as demands and threats. While multiple factors influenced 
AILAC’s individual strategy choices in various ways, this trend was primarily down to two 
factors: AILAC’s position in the power dynamics of the UNFCCC negotiations and its relative 
levels of different power resources, as well as the group’s self-identification as a progressive, 
bridge-building bloc. AILAC lacks the material power resources required to be able to use 
more aggressive strategies credibly and therefore did so sparingly, even though blocking 
strategies would have been guaranteed under the UNFCCC’s consensus-based decision-
making rules. According to rational choice perspectives, this should mean that less aggressive 
strategies were used by AILAC simply because they have no other options. 
 However, AILAC confirmed the reasonable assumption that the bloc only uses a 
strategy if it believes there is a reasonable chance of it delivering a satisfactory outcome. 
AILAC’s continued use of less aggressive strategies therefore shows that the bloc did believe 
these could prove successful. By expanding the definition of power resources, the 
governmentality theoretical perspective reveals that AILAC is rich in power/knowledge 
resources, meaning that, through attempts to ground the negotiations in technical and scientific 
knowledge of climate change, strategies based on knowledge resources such as constructive 
proposals and persuasion can be used with a reasonable belief of success, while strategies 
reliant on tactical knowledge such as coalition-building and the use of bilateral meetings can 
also be used with expectations of effectiveness. These strategies were also dependent on 
AILAC’s delegation dynamics as sources of power/knowledge, such as the experience, skill, 
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and personalities of the individuals involved and the rôle of the support unit, especially given 
AILAC’s policy of individual negotiators’ decision-making on strategy in face-to-face 
negotiations as long as they remain within pre-agreed positional red lines. Furthermore, 
AILAC’s pro-multilateralism, bridge-building identity only served to reinforce the 
attractiveness of these less aggressive options in the eyes of the bloc, as strategies such as 
coalition-building, persuasion, and constructive proposals naturally fit with AILAC’s stated 
aims of building spaces for consensus whilst advancing ambitious, progressive positions. 
  In identifying AILAC’s preference for less aggressive strategies over more 
aggressive strategies and specifying which strategies were used to what degree, the analysis 
successfully answers the first question of the thesis. It also successfully provides explanations 
as to its pattern of strategy use, thereby answering the second question as well. However, in 
seeking to be an exploratory study on AILAC, the thesis is subject to the criticism that its 
scope was too broad, meaning that had specific factors on strategy choice been selected as the 
research object, a more detailed analysis of their influence on AILAC could have been made. 
Furthermore, the methodology was beset by some technical issues, such as an inability to find 
on the UNFCCC Submissions Portal some AILAC submissions referenced in those which 
were collected, and difficulties with the conversion of documents into files to be used in 
CLA. Nevertheless, the thesis demonstrates the applicability of both a governmentality 
theoretical perspective and a CDA methodology to studies of multilateral negotiations, and 
contributes to the growing literature on climate governmentality. It finishes by suggesting 
future avenues of research, such as similar studies on other UNFCCC coalitions in order to 
determine the extent to which influences on AILAC’s strategy choices hold true for other 
actors; studies of other influences such as the gender balance of delegations; and a 








Odell (2010) argues that while strategies have been relatively well explored within fields like 
psychology, law, and business, the concept has been under-studied within international 
relations. This is particularly true of the UNFCCC negotiations. Research into strategies used 
by any party – whether a bloc of states or an individual state – is scarce. While there has been 
some scholarship on the participation of blocs within the UNFCCC negotiations, research 
into their strategies is especially limited. Over a 20-year span, only 6 studies (Larson, 2003; 
Betzold, 2010; Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012; Audet, 2013; Bhandary, 2017; Oculi and 
Stephenson, 2018) explicitly focusing on blocs’ strategies within the UNFCCC were 
identified at the time of writing, although more consider strategic behaviour in the context of 
other foci, as will be seen below. Even less research (Betzold, 2010; Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 
2012; Oculi and Stephenson, 2018) examines both the strategy use of a specific bloc and the 
reasoning behind its strategic choices. 
 This chapter divides into 3 sections. The first section examines evidence of the 
use of different strategies within the UNFCCC negotiations from the literature; first by blocs, 
and secondly by states. These are organised by actor rather than strategy, to convey the range 
of strategies potentially available to an actor. The second considers how to categorise 
strategies, drawing on existing typologies from literature outside of the climate change 
negotiations, arguing that seeing strategies on a spectrum rather than within categories is 
preferable. The third section addresses the reasons behind strategy choices; given the limited 
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amount of such scholarship situated within the UNFCCC negotiations, it branches out to 
other areas of negotiation literature, such as WTO and intra-EU negotiations. 
 




Interestingly, 4 of 6 studies focusing on blocs’ strategies within the UNFCCC centre on 
AOSIS, while other blocs, even longstanding parties to the UNFCCC, are noticeably 
underrepresented. Ostensibly, another AOSIS-focused study could have been included, 
though Ashe et al’s (1999) study on the rôle of AOSIS in the negotiations leading to the 
formation of the UNFCCC does purport to examine the group’s strategy. However, using the  
definition of strategies in Chapter 1, their analysis centres more on the group’s positions on 
particular issue areas, and assesses the effectiveness of  AOSIS in incorporating their 
positions into the final UNFCCC text, than considering the strategies the group used to make 
this happen. 
 Larson (2003), however, does make the strategies of AOSIS the centrepiece of her 
study, asking how a party low in traditional resources of power (military and economic 
might) like AOSIS can reach its objectives in multilateral negotiations, using a conflict 
resolution systems framework to answer it. From examining AOSIS position papers from 
1994, she finds AOSIS uses 3 categories of strategies – collaboration, co-operation, and 
competition – in response to 3 challenges that the group has as a result of its low-power 
status. These are the symbolic challenge of climate change as an abstract threat to small 
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island states, the social challenge of AOSIS being on the margins of international 
policymaking, and the economic challenge of coping with poverty while attempting to take 
on powerful interest groups in the climate negotiations. She finds the group’s contributions 
revolve mostly (87.8%) around collaborative and co-operative approaches, such as 
constructive proposals pressing the UNFCCC for “collaborative research and information-
sharing systems”, and parties to the UNFCCC to “develop valid and predictable UN 
communication and knowledge-building systems” (2003:140). In fact, the majority of her 
research shows AOSIS’ use of constructive proposals, although given that the focus of her 
work was 1994, in the relative infancy of the UNFCCC and before any legal instruments such 
as the Kyoto Protocol (KP), the proliferation of constructive proposals is not surprising, as 
there was a need for ideas and suggestions before other strategies, like persuasion or 
coercion, could be used to support them. Larson hints at the use of persuasion by AOSIS to 
support preventative measures on climate change, when she describes AOSIS as “a 
committed advocate” (2003:143), although it is unclear whether this entails persuasion, or 
simply the proposal of preventative measures in the first place, given this description is 
immediately followed by the statement that “AOSIS was the first party to propose a protocol 
response to the global security risks associated with greenhouse gas emissions” (2003:143). 
Larson does note, however, that AOSIS engaged in coalition-building with the EU and 
members of the G77 & China to build support for its protocol proposal, implying the use of 
persuasion in order to achieve this (2003:144). 
 Larson also cites another example from outside of climate change negotiations 
to demonstrate how a low-power state can achieve success when negotiating with another 
state possessing greater military and economic power than itself, namely the case of Iceland 
in the “cod wars” with the UK between 1949-1976. Here, she notes Iceland’s use of 
persuasion within international forums, concessions trading using positive inducements 
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towards the UK, coercion in the form of the harassment of UK fishing vessels, and bilateral 
meetings between Icelandic and UK communities. 
  Betzold (2010) also focuses on AOSIS strategies within the UNFCCC. She uses the 
categories devised by Zartman and Rubin (2000b) for strategies which “borrow power” 
(Zartman and Rubin, 2000a) – that is, which use sources of power external to the party under 
examination. These are: “context-based” strategies, such as appeals to principles, morality, 
and norms; “target-based” strategies appealing to other parties’ self-interest, such as 
proposing solutions to common problems and persuasion “that A’s preference is ultimately in 
B’s interest”; “third parties-based” strategies, which harness support of NGOs, lobby groups, 
and epistemic communities to influence negotiations outside of the formal negotiation 
environment or provide expertise and knowledge for use within formal negotiations; and 
“process-based” strategies which “level the playing field” by skilfully ‘playing the game’”, 
e.g.  by building coalitions with other actors, or being first to propose ideas (Betzold, 
2010:136). She finds that between 1990 and 1997 in the UNFCCC negotiations, AOSIS used 
all 4 of these strategy types. Using a context-based strategy, the group utilised a discourse of 
vulnerability to climate change as moral leverage over other parties to pressure them to take 
more ambitious climate action. Using target-based strategies, AOSIS employed persuasion 
and rational argument to attempt to convince less ambitious parties to step up their pledges of 
action by “refut[ing] laggards’ objections” over short-term and long-term costs of action and 
inaction. This enabled them to use a process-based strategy and build coalitions with other 
parties like the EU (2010:139-140). As to third party-based strategies, AOSIS sought to base 
its participation strongly on scientific evidence acquired from NGOs, and bolstered its 
attempts at persuasion with justificatory references to the IPCC and other scientific reports. 
This borrowed power in the form of knowledge allowed the group also to deploy a process-
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based strategy, namely putting forward technical submissions and proposals, especially in the 
early stages of negotiations to ensure consideration of their views. 
  Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012) also take a cross-section of AOSIS negotiation 
strategies at a particular point in time, at COP15 in Copenhagen, 2009. They identify 5 
AOSIS strategies. Firstly, the group attempted to frame climate change as a moral issue 
through its slogan of “1.5 to stay alive”, and by explicitly linking it to questions of justice 
along a discourse of vulnerability and equity with future generations, to strengthen any moral 
pressure it brought to bear on other parties  by “delegitimis[ing] bargaining strategies that 
relied on power resources that AOSIS members themselves overwhelmingly lacked” 
(2012:358). For the same reason, the group also attempted to frame climate change as an 
objective problem, to be addressed only in accordance with advice provided by scientific and 
technical expertise, and it did so by making “demands” (2012:358) based on scientific 
predictions, especially with reference to the IPCC. Thirdly, AOSIS built coalitions with other 
blocs, such as the LDCs and the EU, as well as civil society to build public pressure in 
support of their demands. Deitelhoff and Wallbott also imply AOSIS used persuasion 
alongside these demands, commenting that the group “built on integrative negotiation 
strategies, emphasising win-win scenarios” (2012:359). Finally, they observe the proactivity 
of AOSIS in drafting and putting forward proposals for the UNFCCC’s consideration.  
Betzold et al (2012) also consider AOSIS strategies, and agree with the previous two 
studies that AOSIS attempted to exert moral leverage and build coalitions especially with 
more progressive parties such as the EU. They hint at AOSIS’ use of constructive rhetoric 
when they note the “co-operative nature and consensus orientation of small island state 
diplomacy” (2012:594).  Although their main focus is whether AOSIS as a bloc is 
fragmenting, part of their analysis examines the group’s use of technical submissions, noting 
that they continued to use this strategy between 1995 and 2011. The article also flags another 
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possible strategy, although does not provide any evidence that AOSIS used it, namely side 
payments and concessions trading between parties across multiple negotiation topics, i.e. quid 
pro quo agreements of support in one or more negotiation topics or even negotiations outside 
of climate change. 
  Oculi and Stephenson (2018) specifically focus on AOSIS’ use of a 
vulnerability discourse to attempt to exert moral pressure on others. They find that before the 
Cancun COP, AOSIS referenced the Bali Action Plan’s identification of SIDS, LDCs, and 
flood- and drought-affected countries in Africa as particularly vulnerable (2018:75), thus also 
attempting to persuade other parties of the legitimacy of this view with an appeal to authority 
in the form of the Bali Action Plan. However, they also find this was not well received 
among LDCs and Latin American states (although the authors do not mention AILAC 
specifically, they cite Colombia in particular, an AILAC member state) because in practice 
their claims excluded Latin America from qualifying as particularly vulnerable, although 
SIDS did consider them vulnerable. To maintain the existing coalition between SIDS, LDCs, 
and Latin American states, SIDS at COP16 “had to make a major compromise to appease the 
Latin American constituency, which included a promise from SIDS not pushing that they are 
only ones most vulnerable” (2018:76). Thus, as Oculi and Stephenson’s Table 1 states, the 
small island states that comprise AOSIS engaged in coalition-building, attempting to gain the 








2.2.2 Multiple Blocs 
 
Audet (2013) adds a different dimension to the scholarship on bloc strategies in the UNFCCC 
by approaching it from an explicitly discourse-based perspective, then tying this to an 
analysis of blocs’ positions on climate justice issues. He analyses ways in which blocs utilise 
discourses of climate justice, in particular through use of “enouncements” at COP meetings, 
which he defines as “a strategic way of speaking of an object in the context of a discursive 
space constituted with references to other (past or competing) statements and specific 
discursive rule”, where a discursive space constitutes “an arena for power struggle” 
(2013:375). Obviously, then, such enouncements could take the form of official submissions 
and statements by a bloc, but they could theoretically form part of other strategies, such as 
constructive proposals, attempts at persuasion, or even making demands or blocking, and he 
showcases a number of these with references to a wide selection of blocs including the EU, 
AGN, ALBA, BASIC, EIG, and LDCs. 
 Indeed, Audet identifies the ALBA bloc at the Cancun COP as proposing an 
enouncement on a responsibility-based climate justice discourse as part of a wider “strongly 
oppositional stance” targeting the US in particular (2013:376-377), and that ALBA members 
Venezuela and Bolivia have also historically used blocking strategies, especially at the 
Copenhagen COP in 2009. Interestingly, however, ALBA also used such an “oppositional” 
discourse within a strategy of making proposals. At Cancun, the group proposed “measures 
that would promote climate justice”, such as “acknowledging a climate debt owed by 
developed countries, respecting human rights and indigenous people’s rights, adopting a 
‘Universal Declaration of Rights of Mother Earth’ [and] establishing an ‘International Court 
of Climate Justice’ (2013:377). The EU also proposed new ideas through its enouncements 
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on climate justice, putting forward “a series of considerations regarding how 
intergenerational responsibility could be assumed” (2013:377), while, in keeping with other 
studies in AOSIS, AOSIS chose to pursue less a discourse of out and out climate justice, 
thereby avoiding confrontation, and instead focused efforts on building and exerting moral 
pressure by making enouncements on the urgency of climate action as necessary for its 
members’ survival. Both BASIC and the EIG are implied to have used enouncements for 
persuasion purposes, as Audet writes that “compared to the EIG’s discourse, the BASIC 
group discourse places emphasis on ‘development’ instead of ‘transition’ and on balanced 




Barnett (2008) examines some of the strategies used by the OPEC coalition in his 
investigation of the relationship between OPEC and the G77 & China as a whole, writing that 
OPEC “work very hard to block and delay progress in the climate regime.” He identifies 
Saudi Arabia as the leader of OPEC within the UNFCCC, instrumental in “obstruct[ing] 
progress in the climate negotiations through tactics such as outright refusal to agree, insisting 
on linking progress on the compensation issue with progress on other issues (including on 
assistance for adaptation – a key concern of G77), blocking discussion of ideas and issues, 
stressing scientific uncertainty and contesting the validity of IPCC reports, wasting time, 
fomenting mistrust among parties, misrepresenting the G77 position, and introducing 
meaningless text or text that is clearly going to be unacceptable to other parties” (2008:4). 
Furthermore, he writes that there has been speculation that OPEC engaged in informal 
coalition-building with the United States in the 2000s, noting that “OPEC (and the Saudi 
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regime in particular) shares a common interest with the United States government and its 
corporate allies in maintaining high oil prices” (2008:4).  
 
2.2.4 The European Union 
 
Oberthür’s (2011) study of the EU’s performance within the UNFCCC negotiations touches 
on the strategies the bloc has used, albeit within the greater context of analysing its success in 
achieving its policy goals on the international stage. The article uses generic language to 
describe the bloc’s strategic behaviour, writing of the EU’s “support” for a position calling 
for reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions from 2020 onwards (2011:670), without 
specifying whether this was a proposal that the EU put forward or one by another party which 
the EU could support as part of a coalition-building strategy. It describes the EU’s 
unsuccessful “pressure” for developed states to be given binding greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction commitments, and “pushing for” binding emission targets ahead of the Kyoto 
Protocol negotiations in 1997 (2011:669), though it does not describe the strategies which the 
EU attempted to achieve these policy goals. It does, however, mention the EU’s brokering of 
a compromise, by accepting “a weakening of the environmental integrity of the Kyoto 
Protocol” to achieve developed states’ agreement to Kyoto’s implementation rules in the 
early 2000s (2011:669), and the group’s use of bilateral negotiations with other parties within 
the UNFCCC sessions. Further, Oberthür identifies two strategies the EU should have utilised 
after its failed leadership bid in the 2009 Copenhagen COP: concessions trading with 
“linkages to other issue areas where the EU enjoys more influence (e.g. economy)”, and 
coalition-building with similarly-minded progressive parties, especially small island states 
and certain Latin American and African states (2011:678-679).  
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The EU’s strategy choices also form part of Bang et al’s (2005) study, although they 
focus on domestic changes of position and portray them as strategy, which does not meet 
Bailer’s aforementioned definition. Nevertheless, they do identify the EU as having 
increasingly relied on granting concessions to other parties between 1997 and 2005 to foster 
progress towards their ambitions and assume leadership in the negotiations. Belis and Schunz 
(2013) also examine the EU within the UNFCCC, although they focus specifically on its 
relationship with China, and specifically on this relationship outside of the UNFCCC. 
Regardless, in terms of the bloc’s negotiation strategies within the UNFCCC, they note the 
use of bilateral meetings with China to develop joint commitments on climate action – even 
describing the relationship between them as a “fully fledged strategic partnership” (2013:194) 
- and temporary efforts at coalition-building to secure the entry into force of the Kyoto 
Protocol after the withdrawal of the US in the early 2000s. Besides these fleeting mentions, 
however, the language around the EU’s strategy uses is also somewhat vague – for example, 
Belis and Schunz write that at COP17 in Durban, “the EU arguably re-emerged as a 
successful negotiator in a last-minute showdown around the launch of the Durban Platform, 
setting the stage for a novel negotiation process on a global agreement” and “the EU had thus 
again stepped up its diplomatic activism in 2011” without specifying exactly how the bloc did 
so (2013:195).  
 
2.2.5 The MLDCs 
 
Bhandary (2017) examines the case of a small bloc within the UNFCCC, namely the 
Mountainous Landlocked Developing Countries (MLDCs), composed of Afghanistan, 
Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. He writes that the MLDCs recognise their inability to 
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operate fully as a bloc within the UNFCCC because of their capacity and resource 
constraints, but that – perhaps in an attempt to rectify this problem – the bloc has adopted a 
similar strategy to AOSIS by “heavily emphasis[ing] the vulnerability of its members to 
glacial retreat, the lack of extensive research on the risks and impacts of climate change on 
mountainous systems and the vertical zoning of the countries, that is topography that does not 
allow habitat migration” (2017:184).  Bhandary says the bloc has identified the preamble of 
the Convention as a basis to push for recognition of the MLDCs as particularly vulnerable, 
and thus has attempted to exert its moral pressure to bring this about, although he notes that 
progress has stalled, with the bloc suffering from internal disagreements about how it should 
operate within the UNFCCC. Additionally, in a section on lessons which the MLDCs could 
learn, Bhandary observes the CfRN used technical submissions and proposals to try to raise 
the profile of the REDD scheme at the 2005 Montreal COP, and attempted persuasion of 
developed country parties by framing REDD as a cost-effective emissions reduction scheme 




Finally, very little has been written about AILAC strategies. In their paper on the content and 
contribution of the bloc’s positions, Edwards et al (2017) do illustrate some of the strategies it 
uses. For example, they state AILAC made use of informal spaces such as the Cartagena 
Dialogue outside of the UNFCCC and the High Ambition informals at COP21. However, 
unsurprisingly, given it was not the goal of the paper, they do not go into specifics regarding 
strategy use and the language used to describe AILAC’s strategic behaviour is relatively 
vague; Edwards et al (2017:76) write that “AILAC stated that the principles of the 
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Convention should be applied in a contemporary context and evolve with changing national 
circumstances”, but they do not explain whether this was put forward in a technical 
submission or in negotiation sessions, or whether it constituted an example of persuasion, a 
specific constructive proposal, or even a demand. Similarly, statements that AILAC “called 
for a legal anchor that would link national contributions to the legal agreement” (2017:77) 
and “argued” the importance of a global adaptation goal (2017:80) also cannot be definitively 
tied to specific strategies, or even strategy use at all – it may be the authors’ explanation of 
the AILAC positions on different issue areas. Watts and Depledge (2018) compare the 
contributions of ALBA and AILAC in the UNFCCC, but like Edwards et al, do not explicitly 
analyse AILAC strategies. Instead, they also consider the AILAC’s positions but mostly 
mention AILAC strategic behaviour non-specifically, writing of AILAC’s “co-operation with 
developed states”, its “consensual pursuit of pragmatic solutions”, its participation in the 
Cartagena Dialogue, and that AILAC “pushes” for ambitious climate action, although they do 
note AILAC’s joint submissions with the EIG and EU (2018:8). 
 
2.3 Strategies of States Within the UNFCCC 
 
While there is limited literature specifically examining the strategies used by blocs within the 
UNFCCC, there has been more scholarship on the strategies of individual states in the 
climate change negotiations, although still not a great deal in absolute terms. This is 
especially surprising given the length of time the UNFCCC has been operating and the sheer 
number of parties involved. The literature review could only identify 10 studies focusing on 
states’ strategies, comprising 7 about particular states and 3 examining broader patterns of 
states’ strategy use. Those which consider particular states unsurprisingly look exclusively at 
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the bigger emitters, so smaller emitters - mainly developing country parties which make up 




The earliest identified study of a state’s strategies in the UNFCCC was Hattori’s (1999) 
analysis of Japan’s rôle in the lead-up to the 1997 Kyoto COP. He examines the “dual role” 
of Japan in the negotiations as both mediator and negotiator, which had implications for their 
choices of strategy (1999:168), and as such, the delegation was instructed to “leave some 
room for flexibility” (1999:174). As a negotiating party, Japan’s delegation had been told not 
to accept emissions reductions for the country of more than 2.5% vs 1990 for carbon dioxide, 
methane, and nitrous oxide, and therefore, to block proposals which designated the country as 
committed to greater reductions, should the situation arise.  
As the incoming host, however, Japan in its mediating rôle – the function of which 
Hattori states is to “pave the way to agreement” (1999:169) - attempted to build broad 
support among parties for a spirit of co-operation at COP3. Essentially, Japan attempted to 
build an alliance of parties who would do their utmost to ensure a successful COP outcome 
with a new binding protocol. It proposed a numerical target in October 1997 for global 
emissions reductions (5% vs 1990 levels, distributed among participating countries) and a 
timeframe to achieve this (2008 to 2012), and attempted compromise on the number of 
greenhouse gases to be included in this reduction, amending its proposal to include 3, rather 
than one (carbon dioxide). These compromise efforts were again part of a wider strategy of 
bridging the gap between developed parties, namely the EU and US, as they had disagreed 
over the issue of reductions being weighted according to different parties’ emissions 
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contributions. Both before and during the COP itself, Japan made use of a variety of spaces, 
such as bilateral meetings and other informals, to “reduce tension reigning between and 
among the North and the South by providing opportunities to exchange information and 
interests” (1999:181) and “to mediate the issues in these informal meetings by proposing 
specific compromise wording for the draft protocol” (1999:182), but also “to break the 
stalemate and bring about agreement” (1999:180-181). This implies that Japan attempted to 
persuade other parties within these meetings to pledge support for their compromise 
proposals. Indeed, Hattori mentions that Japanese ministers in bilateral meetings “tried to 
encourage flexibility” from their counterparts (1999:183). Furthermore, during the COP 
process, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto called US President Clinton, UK Prime Minister 
Blair, and German Chancellor Kohl “to instruct their negotiators in Kyoto to show more 
flexibility in settling the negotiation” (1999:184).  
 
2.3.2 United States 
 
As well as examining the strategies of the EU, Bang et al (2005) consider how the United 
States’ strategies changed between the 1997 negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol and 2005. 
While they still focus largely on domestic position changes, they describe the US as having 
“opposed” the EU and China’s positions on issues such as exemptions from emissions 
reductions for developing parties, and  having “insist[ed] against them” (2005:7). This 
description subtly implies both that the US made demands, and also blocked proposals, and 
Bang et al also describe the US as having “pushed for maximum flexibility” (2005:7), which 
could also be interpreted as having applied pressure to other parties to support them – the 
degree of rhetorical force could determine whether this counted as persuasion or coercion, 
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although Bang et al do not provide any further clues on the matter. Bang et al, however, do 
note the US built coalitions with other parties more sceptical of the KP provisions, such as 
Australia, India, China, Italy, and South Korea, and used bilateral meetings with them to 
switch the focus of negotiations away from binding emissions reduction commitments to 




Bang et al (2005) also study Russia’s changing strategies between 1997 and 2005. They note 
that Russia went from forming an alliance with the US in opposing EU ambition for the 
Kyoto Protocol, to making demands of the EU to engage in concessions trading in exchange 
for Russian ratification of the Protocol, aware Russia would be the tipping point to bring the 
KP into force in the mid-2000s after the US withdrawal. For example, Bang et al state the 
EU’s endorsement of Russian membership of the WTO had a major impact on accelerating 
Russian KP ratification. 
Andonova and Alexieva (2012) examine both the positions and strategies of Russia in 
the UNFCCC. Like Bang et al, they note the initial volatility of the latter, beginning with its 
“obstructionist statements and prolonged ratification of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol” (2012:614), 
before changing to “a more positive rhetoric of engagement in climate co-operation” at 
COP15, and then to further obstructionism by blocking a second emissions reductions 
commitment period under the KP alongside the US, Japan, and Canada two years later at 
COP17 in Durban (2012:615). Thus, Russia used submissions and statements, a more 
constructive strategy of compromise, blocking, and coalition-building within the Umbrella 
Group at different negotiation stages, although its support for the UG has remained stable 
55 
 
since the KP negotiations. For example, their research shows Russia made several joint 
submissions with Australia and Canada, fellow UG members, between 2007 and 2009. 
Furthermore, they note Russia also used concessions trading, made proposals to the 
UNFCCC, such as its proposal to the Copenhagen Accord in 2009 on an overall emissions 
reduction largely dependent on US and Chinese action, and made demands, such as its 
insistence on the absorption capacity of Russian forests being taken into account in its 
emissions reductions targets. However, Andonova and Alexieva report that, overall, Russia’s 
primary strategy in the UNFCCC up to 2012 was passivity and caution, manifested by 
supporting no greater than 2.81% of any one of its’ allies statements, or not following up on a 
coalition of BRIC countries alongside China, India, and Brazil because of disagreements 
about historical responsibility for climate change . They write that “Russia’s approach is 
perhaps best described as ‘waiting for the best deal’”, and “in the absence of any clear 
commitments from other key actors, the Russian government prefers to avoid making 
premature vows” (2012:624). Therefore, although it used a mixture of strategies, its overall 
engagement with the UNFCCC negotiations was relatively low, and the country “has opted to 




Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2012) conduct a similar analysis of India’s participation. They 
note that traditionally within the UNFCCC, India has attempted to build a grand coalition to 
support its positions across the G77 & China and has made strong opening demands. This has 
been coupled with a refusal to accept compromise or any trading of concessions, and attempts 
to exert moral pressure on its negotiating. Despite this, they refer to one example, early in the 
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UNFCCC’s lifespan, of India deviating from these patterns and making a constructive 
proposal for compromise on CBDR. However, they argue that from the late 2000s, India’s 
strategies have changed, gravitating more towards the country being “a transparent 
negotiator, with firm convictions, one that is ready and flexible enough to search for 
compromise and suggest new solutions” (2012:582). Their research indicates India stands out 
amongst non-Annex I parties as having made significantly more constructive proposals, as 
well as being willing to exchange concessions with others late in negotiation sessions, while  
building the new BASIC coalition along with China, Brazil, and South Africa and refocusing 
this as its priority rather than the wider G77. They also argue India has moved away from its 
previously preferred confrontational approaches. That said, their findings indicate India did 
not abandon them altogether, as, while it made no threats nor refused to compromise, it did 
make demands, while rejecting or ignoring those of others. Additionally, their findings are 
based on only one interview with an Indian delegate, and thus they note that the answers 
acquired may not be representative of all of India’s delegation; furthermore bias may have 
arisen because less confrontational strategies are generally seen as normatively superior, and 




Part of Bang et al’s (2005) study also examines China’s strategies between 1997 and 2005. 
China is described as having blocked any movement in the negotiations that would see 
developing country parties take on any emissions reduction commitments, but Bang et al do 
state that the country ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Somewhat frustratingly, they also state that 
China “generally has a great influence on the G77” without specifying how this is exerted 
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(2005:14). More recently, 3 other articles have examined China’s strategies in the climate 
change negotiations. While Belis and Schunz (2013) report that China has previously adopted 
more confrontational strategies such as refusing to accept any binding emissions reduction 
commitments at the Copenhagen COP while demanding the same, and technological 
assistance, from developed parties, Dong (2017) reports that since COP21 in Paris, China has 
changed its strategic approach to climate negotiations. He writes that it exercised flexibility 
on issues such as adaptation, loss & damage, and finance, to foster co-operation and 
compromise among parties, thereby attempting to assume a leadership rôle within the 
negotiations, and now embraces a strategy of concessions trading, exchanging financial and 
technical assistance in return for co-operation on climate action. Indeed, this is combined 
with a coalition-building strategy on various negotiation issues with parties from the 
developing world, with Dong reporting Chinese commitments between 2011 and 2015 of 
410m yuan to foster greater climate co-operation with the LDCs, SIDS, and African parties in 
particular. Godbole (2016) reports a similar Chinese offer of US$3.1bn for a climate change 
co-operation fund, and even that the US and Chinese presidents issued joint statements to the 
UNFCCC in 2014, 2015, and 2016 in support of their proposed domestic action, which could 
be interpreted as coalition-building to boost the legitimacy of their respective domestic 
climate measures. 
 
2.3.6 Multi-State Studies 
 
Several studies identify patterns in strategy choices without focusing on particular states, 
across the UNFCCC as a whole or in groupings larger than any single bloc. Castro et al 
(2011) examine the impact of the Annex I status for the dynamics of the UNFCCC 
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negotiations. Through multivariate statistical regressions, they find it has effectively “split 
UNFCCC members into two distinct groups…It thereby generated two separate fora for 
discussion in addition to the already existing ones” (2011:8). Thus, parties almost 
inadvertently engaged in a form of alliance-building in supporting parties on their side of the 
Annex I divide by default, as their results “impl[y] that the split between Annex I and non-
Annex I membership has indeed been responsible for some of the negotiation dynamics 
observed during the UNFCCC negotiations” (2011:22). Castro et al also recognise parties’ 
use of statements and submissions, as these form the basis of their dataset for analysis, as 
well as Saudi Arabia’s often-used strategy of blocking progress in the negotiations. This 
accounts for the authors’ result that while Saudi Arabia has supported more non-Annex I 
parties’ statements, it does not strongly align with either side of the divide, having blocked 
both. 
 Costantini et al (2016) also widen their focus beyond one individual state, although 
they limit their consideration to coalition-building. They conduct a cluster analysis of 
developing countries to predict coalitions that developing country parties might build with 
others based on common factors, such as vulnerability to climate change, geography, 
demographics. As such, they predict rather than analyse existing strategy use, although they 
do note that coalition-building has clearly been widely used for bloc-building. 
 
2.4 Strategy Typologies 
 
Bailer’s (2012) study is perhaps the most thorough assessment of states’ strategies within the 
UNFCCC, and provides a good overview of the types of available strategies identified in the 
literature thus far. Table 1 in her article (reproduced below) lists 5 typologies of strategy 
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classification with a focus outside of the climate change negotiations. Dür and Mateo 
(2009)’s hard/soft and McKibben’s (2011) non-co-operative/co-operative distinctions come 
from work on analysis of strategies used within internal EU negotiations and distinguish the 
two categories by the level of conflict they introduce to proceedings while Hopmann’s (1996) 
bargaining/problem-solving comes from international conflict resolution, and Walton and 
McKersie’s (1965) distributive/integrative and Odell’s (2000) value-claiming/value-creating 
focus on labour and international trade negotiations respectively.  
 
 
Figure 1: Bailer’s (2012:536) Table 1 on Strategy Typologies  
 
Bailer (2012:536) rejects use of distributive/integrative, value-claiming/value-creating, and 
bargaining/problem-solving typologies for strategies on the basis that describing strategy in 
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these ways conflates the ways an actor negotiates with other parties with the actor’s true 
motivations and preferences, which are “generally extremely challenging to identify”. Her 
article uses Dür and Mateo’s (2009) hard/soft distinction, arguing it focuses not on the 
interests of the actor, but the observable level of conflict added to negotiations by the use of a 
strategy. She also argues this is fundamentally similar to McKibben’s (2011) distinction, in 
dividing strategies into categories depending on whether they are non-co-operative or co-
operative, thus also concerning itself with the resultant effect of the strategy’s use on the 
wider negotiations rather than the logic behind its use in the first place. Within Bailer’s 
preferred hard/soft distinction, she gives a few examples of where certain strategies would 
fall: making threats, shaming or criticising other parties, and deliberately blocking progress5 
would be considered as hard strategies; while offering concessions, showing flexibility and 
willingness to compromise, and making constructive proposals, would qualify as soft 
strategies. Weiler (2012), whose study uses the same dataset as Bailer, also adds making 
demands to the list of hard strategies. 
 There are two fundamental problems with setting up dichotomies of strategies. Firstly, 
depending on the context, a strategy could be located on either side of the typology’s divide. 
Coalition-building, for example, by party A towards party B may please party B as a show of 
support, but anger party C who was hoping to be able to outmanoeuvre party B within the 
wider multilateral negotiations. Concessions trading with certain parties but not others may 
have similar effects, as may particular forms of compromise or use of submissions and 
statements, depending on their content.  
Secondly, how particular strategies are deployed can create difficulties in categorising 
a strategy on one side of the hard/soft divide or the other. This is particularly evidenced by 
 




potential uses of persuasion, which Bailer’s work does not even categorise as a hard or soft 
strategy, and is not included in her analysis, despite it being a strategy noted in other studies 
on strategic behaviour in the UNFCCC, such as Betzold’s (2010) and Bhandary’s (2017). 
Persuasion neatly shows that tactics within an overall strategy can affect the level of conflict 
it may or may not create. For example, persuasion is reasonably considered a non-conflictive 
strategy on principle, given its reliance on strength of argument and logic of its ideas; as 
Odell (2010:624) notes, “Persuasive arguments are made during efforts to reduce conflict and 
reach mutual-benefit agreements.” However, it is easy to imagine that persuasion could also 
produce different levels of conflict with target parties depending on tone of voice or framing 
used, e.g. framing the climate negotiations not at all as a question of justice in persuasion 
attempts at ALBA, or even making rational arguments in person in an aggressive or hostile 
tone of voice towards any party. The same principle can be applied to other strategies, too – 
coalition-building, or another apparently constructive proposal, for example, if framed so that 
it does not at all appeal to the target party, may end up antagonising them, despite contrary 
intentions and expectations. This highlights the problem with Dür & Mateo’s categorisation 
system, which is based on the expected outcome of a strategy. Whilst preferable to typologies 
which conflate strategy with a party’s intention, their typology overlooks potential variations 
in the actual process of executing a strategy which in one context may lead to its 
classification as hard/conflict-increasing, and in another as soft/conflict-reducing. 
 
2.4.1 Specifying Strategies on a Spectrum 
 
Litfin (1994) offers a possible solution to this problem. She examines the negotiations over 
the establishment of the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol for the Protection of the 
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Ozone Layer, focusing especially on the rôle of scientific discourse. However, albeit framed 
as power relations, Litfin proposes a spectrum of interactions. Some of these qualify as 
strategies, although the spectrum does not encompass every identified strategy in 
international negotiations. She writes: 
“One can imagine a spectrum of power relations, ranging from those most rooted in 
domination and control to those characterised by mutuality and intersubjective 
understandings. At one end we would find force, where a powerful actor removes the effective 
choice to act otherwise. Following force might be coercion, where one actor threatens 
another; then manipulation, where some level of deceit is involved; then authority, where an 
actor is recognised as having either a legal or a moral right to impose decisions. Finally, the 
knowledge-based power of persuasion relies upon evidence and argumentation.” (1994:18) 
As well as the obvious benefit of including persuasion alongside strategies like coercion and 
manipulation, Litfin’s arrangement of strategies on a spectrum avoids the problem of 
potentially unjustified artificial distinctions between strategies. Viewing strategies as existing 
on a spectrum recognises there is the potential for overlap between them – for example, a 
party may use submissions and statements as a strategy for putting forward its views, but the 
discursive content of those submissions and statements may involve the use of persuasion, 
demands, threats, proposals, or compromises, among others. This spectrum-based perspective 
on strategies can be combined with a focus on the actual process of strategy use, rather than 
underlying motivations or expected strategy outcomes. A variable which could be used for 
such a spectrum is the tone most expected for a given strategy’s use in negotiations, ranging 
from more to less aggressive, with the caveat that in theory, most strategies can be deployed 
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with a variety of framings and tones6. Figure 2 below demonstrates this, and places the 















Having gathered evidence of strategy use within multilateral environmental negotiations from 
the literature, the thesis will investigate use of 12 of the strategies depicted on the above 
spectrum; any of the above strategies is theoretically available to any party with the exception 
 
6 It is difficult to imagine, however, coercion or threats being deployed with a constructive framing, while it is 




Coercion & Threats 
More Aggressive Tone Less Aggressive Tone 
Technical Submissions & Statements 
Persuasion & Rational Argument 
Concessions Trading 
Bilateral Meetings 
Use of Informal Spaces 
Use of Force 
Exerting Moral Pressure 
Compromise 





of the use of force, as participation in UN institutions prohibits parties from using it as a 
negotiation strategy, as per Article 2.4 of the UN Charter (United Nations, 1945). The thesis 
will henceforth use the definitions listed below in Table 2 for each strategy. Where possible, 
these are based on definitions from existing literature, although in some cases where no 
specific definition existed, either dictionary definitions or original definitions had to be used.  
Table 2: Definitions of Strategies to be Investigated 
Strategy Definition 
Use of Technical Submissions The provision of official documents to 
the UNFCCC Submissions Portal7 in 
order to present the positions and views 
of a party or group of parties to other 
negotiating parties; as opposed to doing 
so in face-to-face negotiating sessions 
Constructive Proposals & Rhetoric The proposition of ideas and use of 
language by a party with the aim of 
making progress within a particular issue 
area towards universal agreement 
Compromise Offers The proposition of ideas and use of 
language designed to overcome 
disagreements between parties by “partial 
surrender of one’s position for the sake of 
coming to terms” (OED, 2020a) within a 
 
7 http://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx  
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particular issue area in order to make 
progress towards universal agreement 
Persuasion The use of rational argument, logic, and 
evidence in order to change the opinion 
of another party on a particular issue area 
(Litfin, 1994) 
Coalition-Building The offer to another party to work 
together “in order to support their 
position in the bargaining process with 
greater emphasis” (Costantini et al, 
2016:129) on a particular issue area 
Bilateral Meetings The arrangement of private meetings 
between two parties away from formal 
UNFCCC negotiating sessions (Tenzing, 
2016) 
Use of Informal Spaces The engagement in negotiations away 
from formal UNFCCC negotiating 
sessions, such as external fora, social 
occasions, corridor conversations, or 
“informal informals” for problematic 
issue areas in which “parties concerned 
meet, without anyone necessarily 
facilitating the discussion (parties will 
typically do away with country flags  and 
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will refer to one another  by name)” 
(Tenzing, 2016:31) 
Concessions Trading Also known as issue linkage; the 
concession of a position by one party in 
one issue area in order to secure 
concessions from another party in a 
different issue area (Da Conçeicão-Heldt, 
2006) 
Exerting Moral Pressure The use of appeals to principles, morality, 
and norms in order to effect behavioural 
change in another party (Betzold, 2010) 
Blocking The withholding of consent to, or use of 
veto on, a proposal, by a party within a 
particular issue area in order to prevent it 
from forming part of an official 
UNFCCC agreement; alternatively, a 
party’s refusal to change a position 
causing an impediment to progress 
(Bailer, 2012) 
Making Demands The submission of peremptory requests 
to another party by virtue of authority 
(OED, 2020b) 
Coercion & Threats A “declaration of hostile 
determination…or damage to be inflicted 
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in retribution for or conditionally upon 
some course” (OED, 2020c)  
 
2.5 Reasons for Selecting a Strategy 
 
A variety of factors may result in selection of a particular strategy in a particular context. 
Firstly, all parties have the option of blocking negotiation outcomes, as the UNFCCC 
operates a system of decision-making by consensus, in which all that is required to impede 
progress is for one party to veto an agreement (Weiler, 2012). The nature of climate change 
as a global environmental problem which requires every party to act to solve the problem for 
everyone’s benefit also means that such blocking options are theoretically feasible, which 
leads to what Litfin (1994:203) labels “the peculiar phenomenon of the ‘power of the weak’.” 
However, when parties attempt to engineer more “positive outcomes”, i.e. something 
which may at least provide a route to eventual adoption of a decision or some form of 
consensus agreement, a major consideration must be the extent to which the party expects the 
strategy selected to deliver what it would deem a successful outcome. For example, Wagner 
(1999:108) writes that most negotiations analysts believe that “problem-solving” – i.e. less 
aggressive - strategic behaviour by parties leads to “superior results”. Based on this 
expectation, parties may choose to adopt such strategies, e.g. identifying potential 
concessions trades, making constructive proposals, or coalition-building, if they consider 
substantive progress in addressing climate change a successful outcome. This is a reasonable 
assumption given their participation in the UNFCCC in the first place and the demonstrably 




2.5.1 Power Dynamics 
 
Key to this, however, is the concept of power in the negotiations, which in turn depends on a 
party’s resources. Within traditional conceptualisations, a party’s economic strength (Weiler, 
2012) is viewed alongside its military strength as a proxy for its negotiating power, as 
theoretically a strong party should be able to ensure that parties with relatively fewer material 
resources adapt their behaviour in line with its preferences, given the potential threat a strong 
party may hold for them (Weiler, 2012).8 Such threats may take the form of consequences 
outside of the climate change negotiations, such as economic sanctions (Weiler, 2012), the 
withdrawal of international agreements, or even loss of prestige from public criticism of a 
party by another with greater power resources. However, within the UNFCCC negotiations, 
given the nature of action required to meet the UNFCCC’s stated goals of temperature 
stabilisation, a party’s greenhouse gas emissions can be considered a significant power 
resource in negotiations. As these emissions need to be reduced as much as possible to keep 
global average temperature increases within the limits cemented in the Paris Agreement, a 
party with significant emissions is afforded leverage, as other parties need them to take action 
in order for progress towards the Agreement’s goal to be made (Happaerts, 2015). In practice, 
a party’s high level of greenhouse gas emissions usually results from significant industrial 
activity, and therefore power as a result of significant emissions can generally be equated to 
power because of economic strength. Powerful parties, therefore, because of other parties’ 
reliance on their action, can feasibly use the full range of strategies available and have the 
credibility to use more aggressive strategies such as threats, demands, and blocking outcomes 
(Dür and Mateo, 2008; Weiler, 2012). Bailer (2012) hypothesises that because of this 
 
8 For further discussion of the theoretical aspects of power, see Chapter 3. 
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credibility, powerful parties in the climate change negotiations are more likely to use more 
aggressive strategies, which was confirmed by her findings (2012). In their analysis of 
internal EU negotiations, Dür and Mateo (2008) find a similar result: under circumstances 
where context, stage, issue, and level of negotiations remain constant, more powerful parties 
are more likely to use more aggressive strategies because they are less reliant on the outcome 
of negotiations than their negotiating partners, and their greater economic resources make the 
use of aggressive strategies more credible. Bang et al (2005) cite China as a good example of 
a party with all types of power resources; as a high emitter of greenhouse gases, other parties 
rely on Chinese action to resolve climate change. Its population size and military strength 
also give it political power on the international stage in various fora, affording it the 
credibility to use more aggressive strategies such as blocking outcomes and making demands. 
 Conversely, parties with less economic or military strength, or lower current 
emissions totals, may struggle to use more aggressive strategies with any credibility, given 
their inability to follow through on the threat (implied or otherwise) of consequences should 
other parties not adjust their behaviour to their liking (Dür and Mateo, 2008)9. Furthermore, 
per what Axelrod (1984:13) dubs the ”shadow of the future”, i.e. the chance of parties 
interacting more than once – which in climate change negotiations, is naturally very high – 
weak parties are also incentivised to maintain the best possible relationship with stronger 
parties because they rely on them to follow through with climate action, or because they fear 
retaliation from more powerful parties if they attempt any more aggressive strategies against 
them (Dür and Mateo, 2008). Even though, as mentioned above, blocking strategies are in 
theory an option given the nature of climate change as a collective action problem and the 
institutional set-up of the UNFCCC, there is, therefore, a disincentive for weaker parties to 
 
9 However, as mentioned before, every party to the UNFCCC can in theory veto any negotiating outcome as a 
result of the UNFCCC’s system of decision-making by consensus. 
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use strategies which may be considered more aggressive. Bailer’s (2012) findings echo this 
logic, with weaker parties making less use of more aggressive strategies in the UNFCCC 
negotiations. As such, it may be that less powerful parties instead use less aggressive 
strategies, such as proposing constructive solutions or offering compromises (Weiler, 2012), 
or coalition-building, evidenced by AOSIS’ attempts to build broad coalitions with other 
groups such as the LDCs and the EU (Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012). 
  Litfin (1994), however, conceives of another form of power resource within 
international environmental negotiations, namely knowledge. Since climate change 
negotiations are deeply technical and based in scientific knowledge, as are most international 
environmental problems (Litfin, 1994), having a good level of understanding of the scientific 
and technical issues can give a party an advantage. For example, grounding persuasion 
attempts in technical knowledge adds credibility to the party’s arguments, suggesting they are 
the product of rigorous analysis, and in turn potentially boosting the likelihood of acceptance 
by the target parties. Furthermore, a good level of tactical knowledge – for example, 
understanding the positions and preferences of negotiating partners - is also advantageous for 
a party, as it may then be able to predict the moves of others, or frame its advances to 
maximise the strategy’s chance of success with another particular party.  
Litfin (1994:15) describes this knowledge-based power as “discursive”, defining a 
discourse as “a set of linguistic practices and rhetorical strategies embedded in a network of 
social relations” (1994:3). Use of knowledge-based power, therefore, relies upon deployment 
of such linguistic practices and rhetorical strategies. In other words, the process of the 
communication of ideas, concepts, and values to a particular strategic end depends on the 
language used for it, as well as other features. These can include selection of information to 
be communicated in the first place (Litfin, 1994) or the framing of concepts so as to provoke 
interpretation in a particular manner by the recipient, which makes the communicant’s 
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preferred outcome in theory more likely. Indeed, Litfin argues that viewing knowledge-based 
power as discursive in this way is particularly helpful when examining international 
environmental regimes, such as the UNFCCC, as “the framing of information is decisive” 
(1994:191). It is easy to imagine how awareness of the discursive nature of knowledge-based 
power is beneficial for strategies across the spectrum; knowledge of the positions of other 
parties may allow for tailoring threats or persuasion attempts specifically to them, and 
framing offers for co-operation within a coalition so as to make acceptance more appealing to 
the target party. Indeed, Lewis (1998:499), writing in the context of negotiations within the 
European Council, argues his research shows “Communicative rationality matters; small 
states with good arguments can still win”, thereby demonstrating the importance of the 
process of discursive communication to persuasion strategies. Another especially obvious 
benefit of such knowledge could be seen within concessions trading, as offering concessions 
specifically desired by the target party would likely raise the chance of the offer’s acceptance, 
or perhaps allow the party to request higher priority concessions.  
 This broader conception of the basis of power, and its focus on the discursive 
processes of its utilisation in strategies, allows for the possibility that parties traditionally 
regarded as weak because they lack conventional power resources may in fact be able to 
wield significant power within negotiations by resorting to other sources, and can help to 
make sense of such parties’ strategic choices which would not otherwise fit conventional 
conceptions of power structures in the UNFCCC (Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012). Betzold 
(2010:135) and Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012:359) argue exactly this point by referring to 
AOSIS’ ability to “borrow” power from external sources to make its influence felt within the 
UNFCCC. Drawing on work by Zartman and Rubin (2000b), Betzold argues the group 
derived moral power by utilising a discourse of vulnerability of its member states, which 
promoted the idea that AOSIS members would be hardest hit by climate change impacts they 
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had done the least to cause, thereby appealing to principles of equity and fairness. 
Furthermore, she writes that AOSIS appealed to the self-interest of other negotiating parties, 
thereby drawing on other parties’ conventional negotiating power to use it for itself, by using 
persuasion strategies that climate action benefitted all parties to build a broad coalition of 
support for its proposals.  
AOSIS also used the knowledge-based power provided by NGOs and lobby groups 
through their expertise in the technicalities of climate change policy and science, as well as 
tactical knowledge and legal advice for the negotiations themselves, both improving their 
ability to participate and use strategies of persuasion and constructive proposals (Betzold, 
2010). Betzold argues that AOSIS accessed a fourth source of external power – knowledge 
and use of the intricacies of the UNFCCC process itself - to be better able to “play the game”, 
e.g. by organising its member states into a “tight negotiating coalition which actively 
participated in the negotiations” and putting forward submissions so that AOSIS positions 
were considered in the wider negotiations (2010:141). Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012) also 
attribute use of these alternative power resources to AOSIS. They refer to AOSIS’ discursive 
power, noting that through skilful use of language, tone, and communication media, AOSIS 
made questions of morality and legitimacy central while deploying its technical expert 
knowledge effectively in persuasion attempts. 
 
2.5.2 Domestic Politics - Vulnerability 
 
The domestic politics of a coalition’s member parties can also influence the strategies it 
chooses. How far member parties are vulnerable to climate change may affect the salience of 
climate change as an issue domestically (Weiler, 2012; Costantini et al, 2016), as it is 
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plausible that parties highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change will take the 
phenomenon more seriously as a threat. Therefore, climate change is likely to occupy a more 
prominent rôle in the parties’ domestic political discourses. This may then cause the coalition 
to favour certain strategies, or use particular tactics within strategic behaviour. Odell 
(2010:622) argues “the perceived alternatives to agreement” – here the effects of climate 
change on a party should no international agreement be reached – “are more accurate guides 
to behaviour and outcomes than state power and size.” For example, a high degree of 
vulnerability to climate change effects among coalition members may mean they perceive 
climate change as an urgent political issue requiring international action. The coalition may, 
therefore, frame climate action as such within negotiations, potentially resulting in the 
coalition lobbying for greater levels of international action, e.g. by exerting moral pressure on 
other parties to accelerate negotiation progress (Weiler, 2012), or perhaps reaching out to 
other parties who are similarly vulnerable to form larger coalitions through which to 
negotiate in the UNFCCC. By contrast, Costantini et al (2016) reason that more vulnerable 
parties, given their “impatience” for a swift conclusion of agreements towards climate action, 
could be expected to use less aggressive strategies to secure a quicker negotiating conclusion 
by not risking confrontation. Less vulnerable parties, then, less concerned with concrete 
outcomes, could credibly adopt more aggressive strategies, such as demanding lower levels 
of ambition requiring less action on their own part, as the prospect of such gains is worth 
risking delays to a timescale on which they are not so dependent. 
Bailer (2012) tests the hypothesis that, the greater the salience of climate change as a 
domestic political issue to a party, the greater the chance it will use more aggressive 
strategies, such as exerting moral pressure or making threats. She finds this is confirmed 
when salience is equated to vulnerability to climate change, as parties felt that the potential to 
accelerate progress towards international agreement was worth risking a breakdown in 
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negotiations. However, Weiler (2012) points out that literature on intra-EU negotiations, 
albeit not on climate change, shows parties for whom an issue is especially important are 
actually more likely to favour less aggressive strategies such as concessions trading, as the 
urgency of the relevant issue requires some form of action, however insufficient, over none at 
all. Weiler (2012:556) also notes the degree to which a party’s interests are vulnerable to 
global climate action may affect its strategic choices, writing that “Politically vulnerable 
countries might try to slow the negotiations down, or they might demand compensation for 
their expected losses”. Good examples include fossil fuel-producing countries dependent on 
export revenues, such as Saudi Arabia using obstructionist strategies of blocking and delays 
(Barnett, 2008; Weiler, 2012). Costantini et al (2016) add that such countries tend to have 
higher GDPs per capita than other developing country parties, and therefore can be seen as 
less vulnerable to the effects of climate given their potential to adapt. 
 
2.5.3 Domestic Politics - Identity 
 
Another element of the domestic politics of parties potentially influencing their strategy 
choice within the UNFCCC negotiations may be their particular identities and values within 
their domestic political cultures. A party which places great emphasis on the importance of 
national sovereignty within international negotiations might be reluctant to agree to any form 
of compromise which it feels may impinge on this, or could resort to making demands or 
blocking measures to prevent any decisions which, from its perspective, threaten national 
sovereignty of UNFCCC parties. Developing country parties who view the UNFCCC as an 
arena in which equity is a central but as yet unfulfilled tenet may also resort to such strategies 
to ensure that developed country parties take the lead on action (Costantini et al, 2016) as per 
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Article 3.1 of the Convention (UNFCCC, 1992).Likewise, developed countries may 
stonewall requests to take on greater proportions of climate action because they deem them 
unfair burdens on their economies (Costantini et al, 2016). By contrast, a party self-
identifying as a leader may be more inclined to use strategies which allow it to act as such 
(Weiler, 2012). For example, it may seek to broker compromises among disagreeing parties, 
or be proactive by putting forward a number of constructive proposals for other parties’ 
consideration as a way of advancing negotiations towards a concrete outcome. Hattori (1999) 
cites Japan, as host of the 1997 Kyoto COP, making constructive proposals and attempting to 
persuade parties to follow its lead, as it wanted to conclude a successful conference in order 
to save face and preserve national prestige while in the global spotlight as COP host. 
China represents a good example of a strategic shift from a focus on sovereignty to 
leadership. Dong (2017:35) attributes China’s shift towards a more constructive rôle and its 
use of less aggressive strategies, such as making constructive proposals and coalition-
building, to a desire for what he terms “international prestige”, with China wanting to be 
portrayed as the global leader on climate action. However, he does also note China’s 
vulnerability to climate change effects as another factor driving this alteration. Godbole 
(2016:361) agrees, adding “The Chinese government is highly sensitive to criticism and 
negative publicity”, that the country is “highly conscious of its global image”, and is making 
a “serious effort to cultivate an image as a benign, normal power. Which is claiming its 
rightful position in the international order without trying to disrupt the present order” 
(2016:363). Godbole notes a particular feature of China’s domestic political situation as 
especially relevant, namely its environmental challenges and failings, which “have come as a 
huge embarrassment to the regime”, leading to China shifting its strategies to try to regain a 




2.5.4 Domestic Politics – Democracy & Lobby Groups 
 
Furthermore, Bailer (2012) produces some interesting findings about the degree to which a 
party exhibits the traits associated with democratic politics, particularly in terms of the effects 
of domestic NGO and industry lobby groups. She finds that in parties with lower democratic 
ratings, the effect of domestic lobby groups is to shift a party’s strategy choices away from 
more aggressive options, whereas “this negative effect on the use of hard strategy becomes 
weaker the more democratic the countries are” (2012:545) . Rietig (2016:271) argues that 
ability of NGOs to interact with governmental decision-makers, and by extension to influence 
a party’s strategic choices in climate international negotiations, depends on “how 
approachable and open the respective home government is”, which in turn depends on 
funding structures and the institutional culture of domestic politics. However, her research 
based on COP15 at Copenhagen does indicate that at least in the UNFCCC negotiations, 
“environmental lobbyists have limited influence on the negotiations according to government 
representatives” as, unlike lobbyists from industry and business, they have little leverage to 
influence governmental choices (2016:282). Rietig does distinguish between their influence 
on parties in the negotiations – i.e. the strategies they use while there - and on the domestic 
politics which may in turn form parties’ positions going into negotiations, and it is on the 
latter which her research focuses. She states activists “used information politics to frame 
climate change as a danger requiring urgent action and pushed the climate change issue by 
the domestic agenda by organising demonstrations drawing media attention” (2016:281). 
However at the negotiation sessions themselves, where there could be more opportunity to 
influence strategy, she notes that lobbyists can have influence by joining government 
delegations and negotiating on their behalf.  
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Bailer (2012), however, finds that overall, democratic parties are less likely to use 
more aggressive strategies than autocratic parties, because of the sets of rules, norms, and 
values within them which tend away from more aggressive strategies and favour more co-
operative approaches on the international stage. Conversely, more autocratic parties do not 
need to factor in the values of their domestic populations as much, and this argument is 
supported by Barnett (2008) in the case of Saudi Arabia and OPEC’s frequent blocking 
strategies, given the former’s lack of democratic elections. This would explain the 
aforementioned effects of domestic lobbying in both democracies and autocracies, with 
lobbying moderating autocracies away from their initial choices of more aggressive strategies 
towards less aggressive choices, with the inverse true for democratic parties. This, according 
to Bang et al (2005:8), also explains the US’ decisions to make demands and block proposals 
in the period of negotiations towards the Kyoto Protocol, with influential industry lobby 
groups and business representatives successfully adopting “strong political pressure and 
outreach campaigns” to modify American UNFCCC strategies towards these more aggressive 
strategies in order to avoid greater responsibility for American domestic actors. They also 
attribute the US’ coalition-building and bilateral meetings with other parties sceptical of the 
Kyoto Protocol’s requirements to this domestic political situation. 
   India’s domestic political situation is also the variable to which Michaelowa 
and Michaelowa (2012) attribute a change in its choices of negotiation strategy in the 
UNFCCC. They write that traditionally, India has made strong demands of its negotiating 
partners and used blocking strategies and attempts to exert moral pressure on others; indeed, 
they go so far as writing that “India has become increasingly known as a redoubtable ‘nay-
sayer’ that insists on its positions and accepts neither compromise nor side payments” 
(2012:576). However, 4 factors have led to a rise in the prominence of certain domestic 
actors’ voices and levels of influence – termed by Dubash (2012b) as “progressive realists” 
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and “progressive internationalists” (2012:577) – which in turn has shifted Indian strategic 
choices towards less aggressive approaches, with the delegation adopting concessions 
trading, compromises, and constructive proposals alongside its traditional choices of demands 
and criticisms. These factors are a growing awareness among the population of India’s 
vulnerability to climate change; greater awareness of the financial benefits available to India 
from climate action, like those from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM); a growing 
domestic energy demand leading to greater energy security concerns as the level of imported 
energy has increased; and finally public criticism from other states such as the Maldives at 
India’s perceived inaction on climate change. All 4 have generated greater media coverage of 
climate change in India and have influenced the government towards a more constructive and 
less aggressive approach when negotiating. Andonova and Alexieva (2012) take a similar 
view as to the reasons behind Russian changes in UNFCCC negotiating strategies. They 
argue that greater awareness of climate change impacts on Russia, awareness of the financial 
opportunities for Russia from joint implementation projects and carbon trading and an 
increasing focus on energy efficiency and modernisation domestically have led the country to 
depart from its largely obstructionist behaviour since the Kyoto Protocol negotiations towards 
a greater mix of more and less aggressive strategies, e.g. concessions trading and constructive 
proposals alongside making demands and blocking tactics. Andonova and Alexieva argue this 
mixture of strategies is largely designed to make Russia unpredictable, maximising room for 







2.5.5 Delegation Dynamics 
 
The dynamics of a party’s delegation can also influence its strategy choices in international 
negotiations. Weiler (2012:556) notes this is an understudied element of negotiations, and 
may “be a crucial factor in understanding bargaining processes”, as the influence of 
delegation characteristics  “can lead to negotiation dynamics that cannot be explained by 
appeal to [material] power resources alone.” Frenhoff Larsen (2007:876) supports this 
argument, and links it neatly to the discursive nature of negotiations as mentioned previously 
by Litfin, writing that “…the negotiator is the channel through which information flows 
between the domestic constituencies and the negotiating opponent in the international 
negotiations. This position gives the negotiator considerable control over communications.”  
 Thus, dynamics such as the size of a delegation, the experience levels of 
negotiators, the personalities and backgrounds of the individuals involved, and their personal 
preferences, styles, and relative skill levels can reasonably be expected to be relevant 
considerations for strategy choice. A bigger delegation makes a party better equipped to react 
to developments in the negotiations, in theory improving chances of selecting a strategy more 
likely to provide the party with its desired outcomes (Bailer, 2012) – Andonova and Alexieva 
(2012) argue that Russia’s ability to be unpredictable by choosing a mixture of strategies 
stems from its large delegation - although as Weiler (2012) notes, parties may field bigger 
delegations as a result of having comparatively greater power resources, e.g. better ability to 
finance a greater number of delegates attending negotiations. Barnett (2008) argues that this 
is the case for OPEC, with its fossil-fuel financial backing allowing it to field a bigger 
delegation than almost all other developing country parties, in turn giving it greater 
negotiating capacity and protecting it from challenges to its blocking strategies from 
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dissenting voices within the G77. Nevertheless, Bailer finds the size of a delegation has no 
significant impact on a party’s use of more or less aggressive strategies (2012). 
A more skilled and/or experienced negotiator may be better able to select an 
appropriate strategy for a particular context, e.g. knowing when best to apply moral pressure 
to produce desired results and when to opt for persuasion strategies, where attempting to use 
moral leverage would not be received well by a target party.10 This could be because, as 
Weiler (2012:555) argues, skilled negotiators are “generally better prepared, ask more 
questions, explore more options, set clearer limits, and are more likely to consider long-term 
goals than their less skilled counterparts”. Bailer (2012) hypothesises and finds that 
experienced delegations are more likely to use more aggressive strategies to secure their 
governments’ desired outcomes, although she does not explain exactly why she arrives at this 
hypothesis. Dür and Mateo (2008), by contrast, find little evidence that within internal EU 
negotiations, the length of EU membership of a country – acting as a proxy for a delegation’s 
experience– has any significant impact on its strategy choices in negotiations; as stated, they 
favour an explanation revolving around a party’s power resources. 
  Likewise, the background, personality, styles and preferences, and even 
psychology of a negotiator may influence strategy selection; of the penultimate of these, Da 
Conceição-Heldt (2006:148) writes that, at least in the EU negotiation process, “the 
preferences of national-government representatives are crucial variables”. Likewise, a timid 
or quiet negotiator may be less likely to use more aggressive strategies such as threats or 
coercion if they feel uncomfortable doing so, and perhaps is more likely to attempt to build 
coalitions or use persuasion. By contrast, naturally confident negotiators may be more likely 
 
10 There is also an obvious link to knowledge as a power resource here; a party with good technical and tactical 
knowledge is able to provide its negotiators with more information, which may help their decision-making as to 
particular strategies in particular contexts. 
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to attempt to make demands or threats, or perhaps use persuasion because they are sure of 
their arguments (whether justified or not!). Odell (2010:623) also notes the influence of 
partisan bias on negotiators’ strategy choices, writing: “We know that the negotiator framed 
to take the perspective of one side in a dispute overestimates the value of her outside option, 
underestimates the degree to which the other side’s objectives are compatible with hers, and 
uses a self-serving definition of fairness” compared with non-partisan individuals presented 
with the same situation and information. This may mean that negotiators with a keen sense of 
attachment to the party they represent may be less inclined to compromise or offer 
concessions for trading, and  more inclined to pursue more aggressive strategies to prioritise 
achieving their party’s negotiating goals unaltered. He later notes that greater negotiation 
experience “often reinforces rather than offsetting biases” (2010:624), which could lead to 
more aggressive strategic choices, although this does not preclude the effects of partisan bias 
in comparatively inexperienced negotiators. 
Chasek’s (2011) work, however, has implications for partisan bias as its effects can be 
mitigated by the possibility of good working relationships between negotiators from different 
parties. The long periods of time that delegates spend together can build trust or even 
friendships between them, resulting in a more relaxed atmosphere in negotiation sessions, 
which may be conducive to less aggressive strategies such as offering compromises, 
coalition-building, or constructive proposals. Indeed, negotiations can even be punctuated by 
“private and confidential problem-solving workshops” dedicated to exactly such interactions 
between parties (2011:93). Consequently, she argues, the climate change negotiations are 
characterised by what Montville (1990:162) terms as “two-track diplomacy”: “an unofficial, 
informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations aiming to develop 
strategies, influence public opinion, and organise human and material resources in ways that 
might help resolve their conflict.” Her article goes on to argue for the existence of such 
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diplomacy by reference to meetings of the AWG-KP in 2007, as well as to Martinez and 
Susskind’s (2000) work on two-track diplomacy during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in 
1997. Elgström and Jönsson’s (2000:697-698) work is also relevant for considerations of 
partisan bias, as they write that when negotiators are technical experts in their field, selection 
of less aggressive strategies is more likely, citing evidence from intra-EU negotiations that 
with expert negotiators, “much more consideration is given to substantially successful 
agreements…than to national political concerns” and that “integrative solutions are seen as 
‘technically optimal’”.  
 
2.5.6 Intra-Bloc Dynamics 
 
Another variable potentially influencing a coalition’s particular strategy selection in a 
particular context is the dynamics within the bloc. For example, a coalition’s nature may 
predispose it towards certain strategies over others, perhaps because of the way and spaces in 
which it makes decisions on its climate diplomacy, or the way the coalition is organised. 
Oberthür (2011:671) states that the EU’s climate strategies are agreed at Council of Ministers 
level, and that during the 1990s, the rotating Council Presidency became the EU’s “exclusive 
voice and main external representation” in international climate negotiations. However, he 
adds that during the Irish presidency of 2004, EU external policy reform was enacted, leading 
to negotiating responsibility being delegated from the Council and Presidency to expert 
negotiators and members of the European Commission, which then resulted in “enhanced 
continuity and expertise of EU negotiators”, “more time for outreach” to other UNFCCC 
parties, and “the emergence of a European identity among negotiators” (2011:672). Clearly, 
then, this formal centralisation but also multi-level delegation of climate diplomacy 
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responsibility has repercussions for the delegation dynamics of the EU. Oberthür does not 
explicitly tie these changes to any particular strategic direction. However, given the 
aforementioned work of Odell (2010) and Elgström and Jönsson (2000), this reorganisation 
of the bloc’s climate diplomacy responsibilities may have played its part in the shift from the 
EU “pushing” in the 1990s for binding emissions reduction commitments to its “second 
major diplomatic victory in the campaign to save the Kyoto Protocol in 2004, when, in 
exchange for concessions concerning Russia’s bid for WTO membership, it convinced Russia 
to ratify and thus bring the Protocol into force” (Oberthür, 2011:669). As AILAC also has a 
supranational Support Unit, this Unit may also have an equally pivotal rôle in the bloc’s 
selection of strategies for use in the UNFCCC negotiations. 
  The coalition’s cohesion - i.e. the degree to which its members share opinions 
over negotiating issues (Wagner, 1999) may affect its choice of strategies. For example, it 
may mean that one member has more say in determining the coalition’s overall strategy than 
its counterparts, which in turn may be based on the parties’ respective power resources. Odell 
(2010) discusses the impact of a coalition’s dynamics in relation to the use of blocking 
strategies under consensus-based institutional decision-making, such as that of the UNFCCC. 
He argues 3 factors affect the credibility of a coalition using blocking strategies, and that a 
coalition’s credibility in using them is a determinant of whether it will choose to block in the 
first place. These factors are: the relative power of the coalition’s members, which has a 
material impact on its credibility in using blocking strategies; how far coalition members 
share the same positions and preferences, i.e. its likelihood to fragment over disagreement in 
strategy choice; and the coalition’s size, which may boost its ability to withstand 




Wagner (1999), albeit in the setting of negotiations within the UN Commission on 
Sustainable Development (CSD), focuses on the second of these factors, namely the level of 
coalition cohesion as a determinant of strategy selection. She hypothesises that highly 
cohesive coalitions will tend to use more “convergent bargaining” behaviour – i.e. more 
aggressive strategies such as blocking, a refusal to change positions and compromise, and 
attempts to coerce others to change their positions (1999:110) – because their differences 
compared with other coalitions are more sharply defined, which leads to them having more of 
a “we-they” attitude (1999:112). Coalitions with low degrees of cohesion, by contrast, will 
adopt problem-solving behaviour, such as those less aggressive strategies mentioned above, 
being less likely to possess a pan-coalition identity and therefore also less likely to perceive 
the negotiations in terms of their coalition versus other parties. This gives rise to the belief 
that concessions trading and compromises with others may be viable. According to Wagner 
(1999:117), the data and analysis confirmed these hypotheses, with the high-cohesion G77 & 
China and EU coalitions favouring more “convergent bargaining” and fewer “problem-
solving” strategies than the low-cohesion JUSCANNZ coalition, thereby demonstrating the 
relevance of coalition cohesion in strategy choice. 
 
2.5.7 Timings   
 
Additionally, the concept of timings within the negotiations can also affect a party’s strategy 
choice. A party may favour different strategies at different stages of negotiations. Although 
their study on negotiations between teachers and school boards in the US is situated in a 
completely different issue area, Putnam et al (1990) identify 3 distinct phases in a negotiation 
session and associated commonly used strategies. Firstly, in the early stages of negotiations, 
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parties attempt to determine the relevant issue and required action. In the second phase, 
persuasion is commonly used as parties attempt to convince others of their views, whereas 
the third phase sees greater problem-solving behaviour and collaboration, which could take 
the form of compromises, constructive proposals, and concessions trading. Odell (2005) also 
notes parties’ strategies vary according to the stage in WTO negotiations. More aggressive 
strategies like demands and blocking at the start give way to concessions trading, followed by 
compromises and constructive proposals in the run-up to the deadline, often in bilateral and 
small group meetings. Coalitions in the UN Commission on Sustainable Development 
negotiations, however, did the opposite. The proportion of problem-solving-esque strategies 
dropped over time, being replaced by “convergent” strategies, as parties began with 
submissions and proposals, before negotiating more robustly and only being prepared to trade 
concessions towards the end (Wagner, 1999:119). 
Timings longer than individual negotiation sessions may also have an impact on 
strategy selection. In their study on negotiations within the EU, Elgström and Jönsson (2000) 
connect timescales and delegation dynamics as linked factors in strategy selection. They 
write that “The time aspect is essential. ‘Permanent’ negotiations seem to be a pre-condition 
for a co-operative mode of behaviour to be established, and for joint codes of conduct to 
develop” as “members get to know each other and interpersonal relationships are 
formed…Attitudes of ‘belonging together create pressure for members to reach consensus 
solutions, and this necessitates joint problem-solving” (2000:688). They do note, however, 
that at least for EU negotiations, such “permanent” negotiations do not entirely remove the 
preponderance of more aggressive strategies, as their evidence suggests that “conflictual 
behaviour and bargaining are not totally absent” (2000:689). To sum this up, they quote 
Iklé’s (1964:2) pithy summation that “without common interests there is nothing to negotiate 
for; without conflict there is nothing to negotiate about”. 
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  Wagner (1999) identifies a difference in strategies used between intersessional 
meetings and official conferences of the UN CSD. Her findings indicate that because of a 
more relaxed atmosphere, a greater proportion of delegates being experts rather than political 
figures, and the absence of any need for delegates to forge a consensus there and then (unlike 
the official conferences), intersessional meetings are marked by greater levels of problem-
solving-esque strategies than the official CSD conferences. Given the UNFCCC also uses a 
COP and intersessional meeting structure similar to the CSD, it might be logical to assume 
that similar patterns are seen within the climate change negotiations. 
 In terms of examples from within the UNFCCC itself on the impact of longer-scale 
timings, Bang et al (2005) argue that the EU changed its strategic approach to one based 
more around concessions trading in the early 2000s after the Kyoto Protocol had been agreed 
but had not yet garnered enough ratifications to enter into force. This was to incentivise other 
parties to ratify rather than abandon the Protocol as the US had done, therefore increasing the 
pace of progress. This is consistent with Spector and Zartman’s (2003) argument that within 
international organisations, once overarching principles and goals have been established and 
attention turns towards the organisation’s governance, parties’ strategies typically switch 
from more adversarial forms of interaction where they attempt to outmanoeuvre and compete 
for advantage – i.e. typically more aggressive strategies such as blocking outcomes, making 
threats, and making demands – to strategies more focused on problem-solving, such as 
making constructive proposals, compromising, and coalition-building. However, Odell 
(2010) says this is not a settled argument, as there remains evidence from arenas like the 
WTO, the UN Security Council, and the EU which shows that the aforementioned patterns of 
behaviour continue despite these organisations having been established some time ago. 
Indeed, there is ample evidence of a variety of strategies continuing to be present within the 
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UNFCCC negotiations long after its initial establishment, or after the agreement of its 
protocols, as seen in the previous section.  
  
2.5.8 UNFCCC Institutional Dynamics 
 
Finally, the nature of the institutional arena and its dynamics – i.e. the UNFCCC – should be 
considered a potential influence on parties’ choices of strategy. Linking its relevance to 
negotiators’ preferences as an equally important factor, Da Conceição-Heldt (2006) sees the 
institutional setting as key to determining strategy choices in the context of intra-EU 
negotiations, and particularly highlights decision-making rules as a crucial variable. As 
mentioned above, that the UNFCCC requires consensus for decisions to be officially adopted 
(UNFCCC, 19992)11 means in theory every party has a viable strategy of blocking outcomes, 
although each will have to weigh up the impact both within and outside the UNFCCC 
negotiations of blocking an outcome, such as attracting public criticism. For example, Barnett 
(2008) writes that because of Saudi Arabia’s lack of democratic elections, it has little to fear 
in terms of a domestic political backlash from engaging in blocking and obstructionism, and 
was also able to rely on the US for support within the UNFCCC. The credibility of this 
blocking strategy for a party is therefore a material consideration in its use. Odell (2010) 
argues that the formation of minority coalitions can be more likely in such institutions 
requiring consensus or unanimity for decision-making, as use by coalitions rather than 
individual parties, may boost the credibility of blocking as a strategy. However, Elgström and 
Jönsson (2000) caution against inferring too strong a connection between decision-making 
rules and strategic choices, noting that, at least in the context of intra-EU negotiations, any 
 
11 See Articles 7.2(k) and 15.3 
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form of decision-making can involve parties’ use of a wide variety of strategies. They 
specifically state that “None of the decision rules per se can be logically linked to creative 
problem-solving” (2000:691) given the complex relationship between decision-making rules 
and strategy and the multiple intervening factors between them. 
 Nevertheless, other features of the UNFCCC could also affect parties’ choice of 
strategy. Da Conceição-Heldt (2006) argues that within intra-EU fishing negotiations, 
different patterns of negotiation strategies are seen under consensus-based decision-making 
depending on the number of topics for negotiation. More aggressive strategies are more likely 
when only a single topic is at issue because of parties’ ability to veto; less aggressive 
strategies, such as coalition-building and concessions trading, are more prevalent when the 
negotiating topic comprises multiple policy areas, as this allows parties to simplify 
negotiations by consolidating their power resources behind fewer positions and to negotiate 
side deals to make progress across topics. Thus, the UNFCCC’s highly complex nature, with 
multiple sub-topics being negotiated concurrently at subsidiary body meetings and COPs, 
may mean parties are more likely to use these less aggressive strategies. 
 Castro et al (2011:7) suggest the “constructed peer group hypothesis” as a 
part-determinant of parties’ strategy choices. Within the UNFCCC context, this hypothesis 
contends that the division of parties into Annex I and non-Annex I categories has meant 
parties are more likely to exhibit more co-operative behaviour towards parties on the same 
side of the “firewall”, and more likely to use more aggressive strategies towards those on the 
other side. Their reasoning for this is that parties on the same side of the Annex I/non-Annex 
I divide, given they have been grouped together by the UNFCCC regime, are likely to meet 
and converse more often – e.g. the G77 & China meeting as the de facto non-Annex I 
grouping - leading to a “more trustful atmosphere conducive to more fruitful deliberations” as 
members feel more closely related (2011:8). Furthermore, the fact that the Annex I/non-
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Annex I division centres on differentiating binding responsibilities and privileges among 
parties gives members on either side of the divide an incentive to make a distinction in their 
choice of strategies towards members of the same side of the divide and those across the 
firewall. Co-operation with those on the same side can help to further a common aim, i.e. a 
reinforced united front from non-Annex I parties against acceptance of binding emissions 
reductions on them, and an insistence on exactly that from Annex I parties. Castro et al 
conduct statistical analysis of data consisting of parties’ statements in negotiating sessions 
between 2007 and 2009. When controlling for other variables - such as country size and 
education levels, government ideology and political freedom levels, and indices of 
vulnerability to climate change - the regressions they undertake “clearly indicate a role of 
Annex I versus non-Annex I membership that holds over and above the influence of relevant 
country characteristics” (2011:19) in favour of their hypothesis, i.e. that the “mere existence 
of the split between Annex I and non-Annex I seems to have amplified the divide between 
developing and industrialised countries” (2011:22) However, this finding may be less 
relevant to this thesis, given the well-publicised High Ambition Coalition (HAC), of which 
AILAC formed part, which bridged across the firewall at COP21 (European Commission, 
2015), thus providing evidence of the bloc’s more positive interactions with Annex I parties 
such as the EU. 
 Additionally, although to date no comparable study exists for the UNFCCC context, 
Odell (2005) examines the influence of the chair of WTO negotiations on parties’ strategic 
choices, in particular different forms of mediation designed to promote compromise and 
consensus among parties. He states that, at least in WTO negotiations, given the complexity 
of the relevant technical and legal issues, most delegates are not fully informed of exactly 
what they are negotiating, which creates a space for the chair as an (often experienced) expert 
authority figure to wield some influence in their decision-making processes. Odell identifies 
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3 main forms of chair mediation in the WTO as a result: the more passive set of “observation, 
diagnosis, and communication tactics”, such as meeting with delegations to identify 
impediments to consensus and feed information to delegations to reduce the effect of partisan 
bias (2005:431); the more interventionist set of “formulation tactics”, such as the organisation 
and establishment of specific negotiating groups involving particular parties, interventions 
such as jokes to diffuse hostility and tension at appropriate times, and the proposal of ideas 
and concepts by the chair, often through informal meetings such as dinners or groups with 
small numbers of targeted individuals; and “manipulation tactics”, which he notes in the 
WTO have mostly consisted of “pushes” to accept an outcome just before its deadline, after 
most of its constituent parts have already been agreed by consensus (2005:441-442). Odell 
cites an example of a WTO chair refusing to let delegates leave a meeting room until they 
had agreed to choose a text for development; another of a chair pressuring specific delegates 
by threatening to contact their capitals to complain about their inability to reach a consensus 
should one not be secured; and a chair shaming delegates into action by threatening to 
withdraw from the mediation rôle. It is possible, then, that UNFCCC secretariat members, or 
chairs of the various working groups through which negotiations are conducted, may use 
these means to attempt to influence parties’ strategy choices. 
   Hattori’s (1999) study of Japanese participation in the 1997 Kyoto COP also 
hints at a similar factor in parties’ strategy selection, namely the rôle of the conference’s host. 
Japan used its legitimacy as host of COP3 to persuade parties to reach a consensus on the level 
of emissions reductions to which developed country parties would be committed, and achieved 
this through the use of informal meetings with key stakeholders and propositions which 
specifically addressed what the international community would accept. Thus, it may be that 
parties are influenced by both the architecture of the Convention and the host party in their 
selection of particular strategies in particular contexts. 
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Chapter 3 presents the theoretical basis of the study, namely a Foucauldian governmentality 
perspective on interactions between negotiating parties. As governmentality places great 
emphasis on power relations as an explanation for the nature of governance and the behaviour 
of social actors (Okereke and Bulkeley, 2009), the study shares the assumption that power is 
at the very least one among several drivers of the choices parties make with regard to the 
strategies they use (Betzold, 2010). This chapter builds on the shorter discussion of power as a 
driver of strategy choice found in Chapter 2, with its first section addressing theoretical 
problems with rational choice perspectives identified by studies such as Litfin (1994), Betzold 
(2010), and Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012). It argues that rational choice approaches to power 
within international relations make unfounded assumptions regarding the nature of parties’ 
self-interest and the nature of power resources which parties possess, meaning that a different 
theoretical perspective is required. The second section presents governmentality as such a 
theory, and examines its understanding of power as discursive, productive, and a set of 
relational processes. The final section of the chapter responds to 4 major criticisms of 
governmentality: an ignorance of actors’ agency in favour of the power of discourses, its 
discursive view of power relations, its explanatory power, and its ability to transition to 
supranational scales of investigation. In each case, it is shown why governmentality remains 
an applicable and suitable theoretical underpinning in order to answer the questions of this 




3.2 Problems with Rational Choice Theories 
 
Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012) argue that orthodox rational choice theories of power are ill-
equipped to explain negotiation dynamics. These theories, such as neorealism and 
neoliberalism (Sterling-Folker, 2010), tend to see negotiations as pre-determined according to 
the distribution of material power resources among parties, and the choices and constraints 
actors have (Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012). From their perspective, parties make cost-benefit 
analyses of negotiating choices and outcomes based on their levels of material power 
resources (Litfin, 1994) and “a set of self-interested priorities” (Sterling-Folker, 2010:117), 
and the decisions they actually make are in turn based on these analyses. Under neorealism, 
parties are assumed to be alike in terms of their interests (sometimes referred to as “black 
boxes”) and to differ only in their relative power capabilities (Mearsheimer, 2010), while 
under neoliberalism, parties’ interests are seen as being determined by their domestic political 
situations (Wendt, 1999). 
Waltz (1979:153), a neorealist, writes that “the political clout of nations correlates 
closely with their economic power and their military might”, while Mearsheimer (2010:78-
79), another neorealist, argues that “power is based on the material capabilities that a state 
controls. The balance of power is mainly a function of the tangible military assets that states 
possess” and “Latent power [which] is based on a state’s wealth and the size of its overall 
population…and a state’s latent power refers to the raw potential it can draw on when 
competing with rival states.” Neoliberals take the same interpretation on the source of power; 
Keohane and Victor (2011:8) write that “power is a function of both the impact of one’s own 
decisions on others (which depends mainly on size and economic output) and on favourable 
asymmetries in interdependence leading to better default (no-agreement) positions for the 
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state”, and Russett (2010:101) agrees, equating power with “material capabilities – economic, 
demographic, and military.” Following this conceptualisation of power, this should mean, as 
Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012) state, that parties with greater material power resources 
control negotiations given their ability to make credible threats or provide incentives because 
of their power resources, and the lack of constraints on them doing so. In terms of strategy 
choice, then, this would resemble Bailer’s (2012) hypothesis and findings that such parties 
more often use more aggressive strategies while parties without such resources have no 
choice but to resort to less aggressive strategies. 
  However, Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012:347) point out that parties’ interests 
and subsequent negotiating positions “are not often determined at the outset because states 
are uncertain about the viable options or the positions of other states.” Litfin (1994:2) points 
out that this is even more the case in environmental multilateral negotiations, as “a nation’s 
interests are often unclear under conditions of scientific uncertainty.” In the case of climate 
change, whilst there is overwhelming consensus on the science of its anthropogenic causes 
(IPCC, 2014), the solutions proposed as necessary to deal with its effects are contested. As a 
result, parties’ interests should not be assumed to be entirely alike, nor solely determined by 
domestic politics. Viewing them as such understates the level of uncertainty in parties’ 
strategic decision-making as a result of not having perfect knowledge of both the negotiating 
context (e.g. the issues to be negotiated) and their negotiating partners. 
 Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012) identify two consequences of this criticism. Firstly, 
the fact that parties’ interests are not a given prior to negotiations suggests that they are open 
to change as the negotiations themselves progress, which could have implications for the 
analyses parties make with regard to the strategies they use. This in turn suggests that rational 
choice theories overlook influences contained within the process of negotiations as potential 
variables in strategy choice, in favour of viewing strategic choices as the results of static pre-
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determined factors: either the distribution of material power resources or parties’ domestic 
political situations. Secondly, they argue that as a result of the complexity of multilateral 
negotiations in terms of the number of issues being negotiated by a multitude of parties - 
especially apt in the case of the UNFCCC – material power resources cannot explain some of 
the proceedings in these negotiating arenas. This is borne out by the literature, which 
provides examples that these theories’ expectations do not hold, particularly in the case of 
AOSIS in the UNFCCC. Betzold (2010) and Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012) demonstrate that 
AOSIS chose to use discourses of vulnerability to exert moral pressure on its negotiating 
partners and to justify its demands for more ambition within UNFCCC outcomes. Given 
AOSIS member states’ lack of material power resources, these should not have been viable 
options according to rational choice power theories. Instead, AOSIS relied on other power 
resources to legitimise its strategy choice, such as moral power derived from its members’ 
vulnerability in the face of climate change (Betzold, 2010; Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012). 
Furthermore, parties with greater levels of material power resources have been observed to 
use less aggressive strategies, such as the EU offering compromise solutions to negotiating 
impasses (Oberthür, 2011) and engaging in coalition-building (Belis and Schunz, 2013). 
The above criticisms of rational choice theories are not to suggest that parties in 
negotiations do not weigh up the potential benefits and drawbacks of choosing to use 
particular strategies before making their decisions. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 2, it is an 
intuitive assumption that parties analyse the potential for strategies to provide them with 
satisfactory outcomes before committing to any one course of action. Rather, the criticisms 
posit that such analyses are not solely based on the pre-existing combination of domestic 
political influences and actors’ relative levels of material power resources versus other parties 
to the negotiation. Other factors may also be at play, in particular during the process of 
negotiation itself; for example, Chapter 2 identified a plethora of other influences on strategy 
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choice from other areas of multilateral negotiation, such as delegation dynamics, institutional 
dynamics, and timings that could impact on strategy choice while negotiations are taking 
place. Nevertheless, while orthodox conceptualisations of power resources are unsatisfactory, 
it is still assumed that power dynamics between parties are a driving force of the process and 
outcomes of multilateral negotiations (Betzold, 2010), and therefore the strategic choices 
parties make within them. The majority of research on global environmental politics has 
investigated power asymmetries between states (Carter, 2015), while studies considered in 
Chapter 2 such as Betzold (2010), Bailer (2012), Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012), and Weiler 
(2012) demonstrate that power is an influential driver within the UNFCCC and on its parties’ 
strategy choices in particular.  
 Clearly, an alternative theoretical perspective to rational choice approaches is 
required for a fuller understanding of how and why parties use particular negotiation 
strategies. This perspective needs to retain a centrality of focus on power dynamics whilst 
being open to the possibility of influences besides material power resources and domestic 
politics on an actor’s choice of strategy within negotiations. Indeed, a multiplicity of 
influences on strategy choice is arguably likely rather than possible, given the complexity of 
the UNFCCC negotiations and the multiplicity of negotiating issues and parties involved 
(Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012; Carter, 2015). As a result of this complexity, it seems likely 
that factors at play in other negotiation arenas may well also be so within the climate change 
negotiations. Furthermore, such a theoretical perspective must be able to investigate the 
negotiation process as well as conceptualise power dynamics as being based on more than 







A Foucauldian perspective – often referred to as governmentality - is one able to meet these 
demands. Very little work has applied governmentality to the UNFCCC setting, let alone 
deployed its insights to make sense of parties’ strategy choices and the reasoning behind them 
within these negotiations. Lövbrand and Stripple (2014:35) point out that the majority of 
governmentality work on climate change negotiations has focused on the “role of non-state 
actors in shaping and carrying out climate governance functions (Okereke et al, 2009; 
Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2012), [and] the growth of standards and codes of conduct in 
distinct social spheres such as the carbon marketplace and urban life (Lovel and Liverman, 
2010; Paterson and Stripple, 2010; Rice, 2010)”. Death (2011) does apply governmentality 
perspectives to the UNFCCC, but his article examines the processes through which the 
“theatrical dimension” of international diplomatic summits such as the annual UNFCCC COP 
meetings “plays a key part in inspiring, directing, and governing the conduct of global 
politics” (2011:3), rather than focusing on particular actors or the process of negotiation 
itself. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2016) apply governmentality’s insights to the UNFCCC 
negotiation process but rather than examining the strategies used by particular parties, they 
consider the extent to which, and how, 3 prominent discourses - green governmentality, 
ecological modernisation, and civic environmentalism - permeate the negotiations as a whole 







3.3.1 Governmentality, Process, and Power 
 
To date, no studies have explicitly used governmentality to analyse and explain parties’ 
choice of strategies and their reasoning for them within the UNFCCC despite the fact that 
governmentality possesses the appropriate features to do so. Firstly, governmentality focuses 
specifically on “the actual dynamics of governance – the hows of governing” (Okereke et al, 
2009:71). If the UNFCCC regime is taken to encapsulate the global governance of climate 
change, as it is responsible for deciding on and co-ordinating international responses to the 
effects of the phenomenon, then one “how of governing” is how its parties come to determine 
what those responses should be and how they are operationalised; in other words, the 
strategies parties use in negotiating the UNFCCC’s outcomes. As such, governmentality’s 
focus on the processes of governance can be applied to the processes of negotiating, meaning 
that it should be capable of identifying influences on strategy choice which are not pre-
determined by either material power resource distribution or domestic politics of parties, and 
which affect parties’ strategic decision-making during the negotiations themselves. 
 Governmentality views power expressions as falling into two broad categories. 
Firstly, power can be expressed as “sovereignty”, instances of domination in which “power 
[is] exerted by autonomous agents imposing their sovereign wills” (Litfin, 1994:21) 
reminiscent of “a historical form [of power] that is characteristic of our societies: the juridical 
monarch” (Foucault, 1978:89). Sovereign power is not an appropriate lens through which to 
see the UNFCCC negotiations, as participation in UN institutions prohibits the use of force as 
a negotiation strategy, as per Article 2.4 of the UN Charter (United Nations, 1945). Indeed, 
Foucault sees sovereign expressions of power as increasingly rare, writing that they “are 
utterly incongruous with the new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right 
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but by technique, not by law but by normalisation, not by punishment but by control” 
(1978:89).  
   The second category of power expressions is what Foucault terms “discipline” 
(1977:27).  Disciplinary power is to be understood as a relational process – it is, as Foucault 
(1978:92) writes, “the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they 
operate and which constitute their own organisation”, “the process which, through ceaseless 
struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them”, and “the strategies 
in which they take effect”. These mutually-constituting relations and processes are covert, 
subtle, and not often immediately obvious to analysis. Key to a governmentality 
understanding of disciplinary power is a departure from rational choice perspectives by 
viewing knowledge and ideas as central to the processes of power dynamics between actors. 
Foucault considers knowledge and power to be bound together, and in fact uses the term 
“power/knowledge” (Foucault, 1978:98-99), in that the basis of power is accepted forms of 
knowledge and understanding. He writes that “relations of power are not in a position of 
exteriority with respect to other types of relationships (economic processes, knowledge 
relationships)…but are immanent in the latter; they are the immediate effects of the divisions, 
inequalities, and disequilibriums which occur in the latter, and conversely they are the 
internal conditions of these differentiations” (1978:94). In other words, power relations both 
are driven by and drive the relationships which actors have with knowledge, as both the result 
of the processes through which actors communicate and interpret knowledge, and the impetus 
behind different ways of them doing so. 
   If power dynamics between actors are inherently bound together with 
knowledge, then the nature of knowledge becomes all-important. Governmentality further 
differs from rational choice approaches by rejecting a positivist epistemology – i.e. that 
information or empirical data can be directly observed and measured, and subsequently 
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understood and communicated as knowledge and ideas objectively and with no 
presuppositions. Instead, the processes and language used in analysing and relaying 
information should not be viewed as value-free or “transparent” (Campbell, 2010:218). 
Rather, the information which is communicated between actors is a representation of the 
original information or objective empirical data (Lövbrand and Stripple, 2014), as a result of 
choices made by communicant actors regarding how to do so. These could include decisions 
regarding the language used in the transmission of information, the setting in which to 
express knowledge or ideas, or the format of expression itself. These choices are in turn 
determined by the social context in which actors finds themselves, as are the ways in which 
recipient actors interpret the received information (Litfin, 1994). As such, the reproduction of 
knowledge as a representation of the original knowledge can be said to be constructed from 
the social context12. On an individual level, this social context could be composed of the 
people with whom individuals have interacted, whom they have influenced and been 
influenced by, the experiences through which they have lived, the ideas to which they have 
been exposed, and the subsequent values, identities, beliefs, and ideas to which they 
subscribe or reject. 
In the context of the UNFCCC negotiations, the actors are parties or groups and the 
strategies they utilise are the processes of communication of ideas and knowledge. These are 
primarily language-based interactions with other parties, but also involve decisions as to the 
format of strategic interactions – e.g. within a technical submission or face-to-face 
negotiations – or the setting in which to negotiate, such as formal vs informal spaces. The 
social context parties find themselves in and which affects strategic decision-making 
certainly includes factors identified by rational choice approaches as influential on strategy 
 
12 This epistemological perspective is sometimes known as social constructivism – not to be confused with 
constructivism as a theory of international relations. 
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choice, i.e. the distribution of material power resources between parties alongside their 
domestic political situations. It could also include, however, any of the other factors 
identified in Chapter 2 as being relevant to strategy choice, such as the institutional dynamics 
of the UNFCCC as a negotiating arena, the particular dynamics of the delegation of the party, 
the dynamics between members of the negotiating bloc, and so on.  
  A governmentality approach to power relations holds that there is a 
multiplicity of actors embedded within a web of power relational processes. Foucault 
(1978:94) writes that “power comes from below; that is, there is no binary and all-
encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations, and serving 
as a general matrix - no such duality extending from the top down and reacting on more and 
more limited groups to the very depths of the social body”. Therefore, the entities which exist 
within the field of social relations, such as states, have only arisen, and are sustained, as a 
result of the different power relations between different actors in society, according to the 
prevailing discourses. This has a considerable implication when applying governmentality to 
the study of international negotiations. It necessarily entails a rejection of the neorealist 
conception of state parties as “black boxes”, i.e. that they are assumed to be alike in terms of 
interest and differ only in their relative power capabilities (Mearsheimer, 2010:78), as the 
variety of social variables in the social contexts of actors which make up a state means that 
no two states are likely to be identical. This in turn dictates that their choices within 
negotiations are unlikely to be identical either, thus addressing a key concern of Deitelhoff 
and Wallbott (2012). 
  Governmentality understands power dynamics as discursive (Litfin, 1994), in that 
they are dependent on, and expressions of, the various processes of communication and 
interpretation of information and ideas by actors, and the values which they ascribe to them 
(Campbell, 2010). This naturally leads to investigations of the ways in which parties in 
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negotiations interact with each other in terms of the information they exchange – in other 
words, the strategies they choose, and the ways in which they deploy them, as a result of 
power dynamics or other potentially relevant factors. But this understanding of power 
dynamics also has implications regarding power resources themselves in negotiations. If 
power is a function of the knowledge relationships between actors, then material power 
resources – military and economic capacity, as well as contributions to global GHG 
emissions in the context of climate negotiations - are “powerful” because of their ideational 
content as well as their material reality; it is the status and value of being able to effect 
change in the behaviour of others ascribed to them which means that actors come to view 
them as being worth having, fearing, or envying, and able to legitimise the use of more 
aggressive strategies such as threats or demands. To coin a phrase, the power of a resource is 
in the eye of the beholder.  
 Therefore, if this is the basis of power stemming from material resources, then 
the same can be said of ideas and knowledge themselves; their “powerfulness” is a product of 
their representations and interpretations by communicant and recipient actors, according to 
their respective social contexts. If such immaterial power resources are perceived as 
legitimate by negotiating parties, then they can underpin the viable use of strategies reliant 
upon them; alternatively, parties may attempt to legitimise immaterial power resources with 
which they are well endowed. This allows governmentality to broaden its conception of 
power resources available to parties in negotiations, and which may form part of the social 
context in which parties analyse which strategies to use. This can include moral sources of 
power such as ideas regarding equity and vulnerability as identified by Deitelhoff and 
Wallbott (2012) and Betzold (2010) in the case of AOSIS, scientific knowledge, as identified 
by Litfin (1994) in multilateral negotiations in the ozone regime, or tactical knowledge on 
other parties or ways to negotiate skilfully  (Betzold, 2010). Doing so allows for an 
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understanding of why, for example, AOSIS chose to use the strategies it did even on the 
assumption that it made its strategy decisions off the back of the type of cost-benefit analysis 
envisioned within rational choice approaches; these strategies were weighed up as viable and 
worthy of pursuit in light of considerations of self-interest and the distribution of power 
resources given that these are not limited to material sources alone.  
As stated in Chapter 2, investigations regarding knowledge as a power resource in the 
UNFCCC may be particularly fruitful, as “the framing of information is decisive” in 
international environmental negotiations (Litfin, 1994:191). Given the complexity of the 
UNFCCC negotiations (Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012; Carter, 2015), a good understanding 
of the myriad technical issues at stake, as well as tactical knowledge of other parties’ 
positions and strategic tendencies, may allow parties to use particular strategies that they may 
otherwise not have been credibly able to use, such as persuasion and rational argument, or 
may allow parties to tailor the use of strategies through particular tactics within them, such as 
employing framings of information such that the recipient party is more likely to agree to the 
behavioural change desired.  
 
3.3.2 Power Relations as Productive Processes 
 
Furthermore, the orthodox conception of power as repressive, in that it simply imposes 
constraints on the possible range of actions and knowledges of an actor (Campbell, 2010), is 
challenged by governmentality. Instead, power is to be considered as productive, because 
knowledge which is communicated involves its repackaging according to the social context 
of its communicator. Therefore, a new representation of this knowledge is produced as 
discourse (Litfin, 1994). Similarly, when an actor receives knowledge, it is unpackaged and 
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interpreted according to the audience’s social context, thereby producing in the recipient 
actor a new cognitive form of representation of the knowledge. However, the goal of power 
expressions such as negotiation strategies, is to effect behavioural change in other actors. If 
actors’ discursive choices are influenced by their social context, it follows that the 
interpretation and subsequent repackaging of novel knowledge can alter the social context of 
the recipient actor, which in turn can further produce new representations of knowledge, and 
arguably even new forms of actors. This is why Foucault refers to disciplinary power as the 
“conduct of conduct” (2000:341; in Okereke et al, 2009:67), in that its expression regulates in 
some way the behaviour of others by producing novel social variables which relate to actors. 
This could result in shifts in the self-interest of negotiating parties, and in turn, changes in 
subsequent strategic choices which could not have been foreseen at the outset of negotiations, 
thus reinforcing Deitelhoff and Wallbott’s (2012) suggestion that such interests, and the 
strategies they lead to as actors assess their options, may be susceptible to change during 
negotiations. 
 
3.4 Criticisms of Governmentality 
 
3.4.1 Governmentality’s Focus on Discourses Rather than Actors 
 
Foucault (1980) considers power relations to be similar to a web, made of up many connected 
networks of actors, practices, ideas, and knowledges. He writes of the “omnipresence of 
power”, which “must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique 
source of sovereignty from which secondary and descendent forms would emanate; it is the 
moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender 
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states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable” (1978:93). According to 
Foucault (1980), it is not possible to be exterior to this web of power because of its 
productive nature through its discursive processes. As Litfin writes (1994:21), “Because 
individuals are themselves the effects of power, becoming so entwined in networks of power 
that they are both agents and victims of social control, there is no autonomous subjectivity for 
Foucault.” Litfin (1994:23) goes on to argue that because of the centrality of discourse to the 
expression of power relations, actors should not be seen as “autonomous agents wielding the 
power of discourse on behalf of transparent interests”; their links to the broader discourses to 
which they subscribe, and the ways in which they fit into these networks of power, must be 
taken into consideration when examining their patterns of behaviour, as “discourse itself is a 
source of power, facilitating the production of identities and interests” (Litfin, 1994:29). 
Given this dual status of actors within the power web, it is argued that actors should 
not be seen as the bases of power in networks of social relations; rather, it is in discourses 
that power resides (Litfin, 1994). As Litfin (1994:37) writes, “the emphasis on discourse calls 
into question the traditional focus on agents…what is entailed is the decentring of the subject, 
engendered by a refocusing of one’s methodological lenses on the study of discursive 
practices rather than agents. Just as power necessarily entails some degree of subjectivity, 
even if only in contingent form, so too do discursive practices”. Following directly from this 
line of thought poses a problem for scholars of governmentality and for this thesis in 
particular, as it makes the selection of AILAC as the focus of the study – an actor in the 
UNFCCC negotiations – problematic. Bieler and Morton (2008) make the valid criticism that 
under a purely Foucauldian interpretation, attributing to discourses the status of the source of 
all power expression neglects the “who” questions of power expression in favour of the 
“how” questions. Rather than considering the actors involved and their particular power 
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dynamics in the variety of relationships they hold, it becomes all too easy simply to skip over 
these and point to the underlying discourse as the driver of power expression.  
 2 points can be made to address this agency-related gap left by Foucault 
(Hajer, 1995) within governmentality theory. Firstly, as Death (2014) points out, 
governmentality scholars are right to be wary of discussions of interests, motivations, and 
descriptions of agency that treat these concepts as given for any one actor, and do not explore 
their socially constructed nature in relation to the wider discourses in which they are situated. 
Secondly, Hajer (1995) nevertheless provides a way of marrying governmentality principles 
together with considerations of the agency of actors within discourses. He refers to the 
“social-interactive perspective”, which sees actors as “active, selecting and adapting 
thoughts, mutating and creating them, in the continued struggle for argumentative victory 
against rival thinkers” (Billig, 1989:82; in Hajer, 1995:54). He argues for an “argumentative 
turn” within governmentality studies, writing that the meaning embedded within a discourse 
can only be fully understood if one also considers the discursive practices and representations 
of counter-positions and discourses (1995:53). As such, “the object of research is the 
practices through which actors seek to persuade others to see reality in the light of the orator 
or rhetorician”, and therefore “environmental politics becomes an argumentative struggle in 
which actors not only try to make others see the problems according to their views but also 
seek to position other actors in a specific way” (1995:53).  
This “argumentative turn”, then, provides a justification for a honing in of research to 
focus on the variety of discursive processes employed by particular actors in their power 
relationships with others within a given discursive field – in the case of this thesis, the 
strategies used by parties and blocs within the UNFCCC negotiations. As Hajer (1995:55) 
himself writes, “this exposition of the social-interactive discourse theory [presents] ways in 
which the subject can be studied as actively involved in the production and transformation of 
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discourse” and it “allocates a central role to the discoursing subjects, although in the context 
of the idea of duality of structure: social action originates in human agency of clever, creative 
human beings but in a context of social structures of various sorts that both enable and 
constrain their agency. The transformational model of social reality then maintains that 
society is reproduced in this process of interaction between agents and structures that 
constantly adjusts, transforms, resists, or reinvents social arrangements” (1995:58). As a 
result, politics is conceived of as a struggle for hegemony of discourse, carried out by actors 
which form part of the discursive power networks over which contestations have emerged 
(Hajer, 1995). This, then, allows for the governmentality researcher to ask questions of 
“who” in the study of power relations. 
 
3.4.2 The Discursive Nature of Power Relations 
 
Bieler and Morton (2008) make a theoretical criticism of epistemologically social 
constructivist accounts of power relations when they assume that all such accounts are 
derived from the umbrella term of poststructuralism. For them, this appears to entail a 
relativist epistemology – i.e. the idea that there is no objective truth or reality, and therefore 
that the very essence of an object or feature within the world is not absolute, and only exists 
in relation to context, be it historical, cultural, or material. It is from this assumption that they 
source the title for their article, referring to Jessop’s (1990:295; in Bieler and Morton, 
2008:114) claim that “if the only properties which entities have are the product of discourse 
then one could discursively turn base metal into gold”. However, to claim this is 
fundamentally to misunderstand the ideas of Foucault and governmentality. Whilst some 
postructuralist scholars may subscribe to a relativist epistemology, it does not appear in 
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governmentality scholarship, which instead opts for a social constructivist epistemology. 
Therefore, poststructuralism and governmentality are not synonymous. 
 A social constructivism epistemology, unlike a relativist epistemology, does 
not argue for the non-existence of objective truth, reality, and a universe. On this point, it 
shares common ground with positivism. As such, a governmentality-based perspective on any 
entity recognises its objective existence and certain material properties of that existence. 
Unlike positivism, however, it makes central the contested and varying practices of 
knowledge production, representation, communication, and interpretation, and argues that 
social variables direct any one observer’s interpretation of an objectively existing entity. The 
subsequent representation of the entity in communication is akin to a viewing through a 
filtered lens. Its social properties, therefore, such as the meaning that is attached to it relative 
to other social actors, are constructed and are malleable, but the same is not true for its 
objective, material dimensions. For example, a material power source such as a state’s 
military strength may be represented as ineffectual within a negotiating arena in which the 
use of force is prohibited by international law, yet this does not make the state’s military 
strength impotent in absolute terms; it is purely specific to the social context in which the 
representations of military strength are produced and interpreted by different actors. As 
Miller and Rose (2008) set out, a governmentality-based study is one of the ways in which an 
entity is understood and subsequently represented, and the ways in which it can be acted upon 
and socially altered. As social constructivist it can, therefore, be seen as the mid-point on the 
epistemological continuum between positivism and relativism; knowledge, from this 
perspective, neither mirrors reality, but nor is it arbitrary – instead it is to be seen as 




3.4.3 The Explanatory Power of Governmentality 
 
The above example on military strength as a power resource illustrates another criticism that 
has been made of a governmentality perspective on power relations and interactions between 
actors, i.e. that they are specific to the social contexts which constitute the processes of power 
and the decisions actors make. As such, the explanatory power of the theory is seen to be 
limited to the set of circumstances within the case study under investigation, which are 
unlikely to be replicated exactly in other contexts. For example, the choices regarding 
strategy use and the particular driving forces behind them for AILAC are likely to differ from 
those of, say, the AGN, or the LDCs. As Litfin (1994:7) remarks, governmentality studies 
resist “unidirectional causal explanations”, and as a result offer “little in the way of 
methodological tidiness”.  
However, to criticise that aspect of governmentality studies is to overlook the 
important point that reality “is always particular, it is always dependent on subject-specific 
framing or time-and-place specific discourses that guide our perceptions of what is the case” 
(Hajer, 1995:17). This has two important implications. Firstly, the fact that revelations of 
power dynamics are context-specific does not make them any less representative of reality 
purely because they are context-specific. If the provision of an understanding of power 
relations that is as representative of reality as possible is the overriding concern of the 
researcher, then the fact that the underlying principles of said representation do not 
necessarily abstract neatly into an established explanatory and predictive theory does not 
make it any less valid for the use of a governmentality approach. In other words, one should 
not be desperate to make reality fit into preconceived theoretical boxes for the sake of 
neatness or regularity of a pattern if it does not do so of its own accord.  
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Secondly, some scholars such as Bieler and Morton (2008) have criticised discourse-
based accounts of power relations such as governmentality on the grounds that whilst they 
may be able to provide an assessment of the processes at play in shaping power dynamics and 
interactions between actors as a whole, they are unable to make any headway towards an 
explanation of why the situation in question is as it is,. In other words, as Death (2014:83) 
writes, such scholars criticise governmentality by arguing that considerations of “how” 
questions neglect the “causal why”. Death (2014:83) himself provides a retort to this point 
when he writes that “Causal conversations are not one of the limits of a governmentality 
analysis. Analyses of how forms of governance work in practice are an important 
contribution to showing why world politics looks the way it does.” This answer leads back to 
the first point: governmentality-provided answers are not worthless when it comes to 
explanatory power purely because they are context-specific; instead, “trying to map and grasp 
the case-specific constellation of power configurations and governmental technologies 
provides the researcher with a detailed understanding of the specific dynamics of each regime 
of practice” (Stephan et al, 2014:61), which in turn allows the researcher to consider why 
these dynamics have arisen in the first place. In the case of this thesis, an elucidation of how 
AILAC interacts with other parties within the UNFCCC – the strategies it chooses to use – is 
a prerequisite for understanding why it behaves in the ways it does. 
 
3.4.4 Applicability of Governmentality to International Scales 
 
A governmentality analysis of these power relations is unique in that it makes central to its 
analysis the processes through which they operate. These are what Foucault terms the 
“microphysics of power” (1983; in Litfin, 1994:20). Critics of governmentality argue that its 
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focus on said “microphysics” necessarily dictates that its ideas do not translate to any spatial 
scales other than the local; indeed, as Okereke and Bulkeley (2009:35) note, most 
applications of governmentality “have remained within the bounds of the nation-state”, given 
the attention to detail of particular processes, both linguistic and practice-based. For example, 
Death (2011:4) acknowledges that to date, “the eco-governmentality literature has tended to 
focus on the day-to-day, micro-practices of environmental governance”. As with the 
aforementioned criticism of governmentality regarding its perspective on actors and 
discourses as the wielders of power, this scalar criticism of the perspective poses a problem 
for this thesis which seeks to understand how and why AILAC, a supranational bloc, interacts 
with its negotiating partners in the ways it chooses. 
This inability for governmentality to apply to different spatial scales, however, is not 
the case. As Okereke and Bulkeley (2009) point out, there is no a priori reason why the 
process-based analysis provided by governmentality should be limited to any one spatial 
scale; it is equally valid to examine the processes of governance – in this case, negotiations 
towards internationally co-ordinated effects to address the effects of climate change -  at a 
local scale as it is at a national, international, or supranational scale. This is especially valid 
given the fact that governmentality does not feature an a priori assumption about the 
distribution of power among and across different spaces and spatial scales (Lövbrand and 
Stripple, 2014). International climate politics, then, are just as valid an analytical target as any 











Chapter 4 outlines the methodology used in the analysis to identify the strategies of AILAC in 
the UNFCCC, which is Critical Discourse Analysis. CDA is a methodology which comprises 
3 forms of analysis: textual analysis, processing analysis, and social analysis (Fairclough, 
2010). It naturally complements a Foucauldian governmentality theoretical perspective given 
its focus on social relations between actors, its recognition that these are discursive in nature, 
and its understanding of relationship dynamics as processes (Fairclough, 2010). Rydin (2005) 
and Fairclough (2010) note the utility of CDA for the analysis of strategies in particular, as 
CDA aims to demonstrate the ways in which the linguistic meanings and forms of texts realise 
particular discourses, narratives, and arguments, through the use or omission of particular 
means of rhetoric and features of language or other communicative modes such as symbols or 
images. As Fairclough (2010:19) writes, an analysis of the linguistic manifestations of 
strategies can “bring such a specifically semiotic focus to analysis of the proliferation of 
strategies, strategic struggle, the dominance of certain strategies, and their implementation in 
social transformations”.  
However, CDA has not been used a great deal to study political discursive 
interactions outside of Linguistics (Van Dijk, 2008), and there remains a general ignorance of 
each other’s theories and concepts on the parts of Linguistics and other disciplines of social 
science (Van Dijk, 2008). Climate change negotiations as a topic follows this pattern; to date, 
only Audet (2013) and Backstrand and Lövbrand (2006, 2016) have employed discourse 
analysis to identify prevalent discourses within the negotiations, while Weisser (2014) has 
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studied the performativity and practices of documents within the UNFCCC, and Paterson and 
Stripple (2007) have examined discourses of territoriality within climate change 
policymaking more broadly. This thesis therefore breaks new ground in applying CDA to 
identify the strategies used by a single actor, AILAC, within the UNFCCC, and its reasons 
for selecting them. It makes a further novel contribution to scholarship by drawing on 
research techniques from Linguistics and integrating Corpus-Linguistic Analysis as a form of 
triangulation within the CDA methodological framework. Following this short introduction, 
the first section of Chapter 4 demonstrates the applicability of the CDA framework to a 
governmentality perspective of social interactions by providing an overview of its rationale. 
The following 3 sections present the framework’s tripartite analytical techniques and the data 
sources used to answer the research questions. The penultimate section responds to criticisms 
of CDA regarding questions of its explanatory power, the rôle of interpretation, and 
positionality, before the last section introduces CLA as a triangulation component within the 
overarching CDA methodology, outlining its benefits and limitations alongside how it was 
utilised in this thesis. 
 
4.2 Critical Discourse Analysis as an Overarching Framework 
 
According to Fairclough (2010), arguably the leading figure in the development of Critical 
Discourse Analysis, 3 main properties pertain to CDA. Firstly, it is relational, i.e. it is 
concerned with social relations between different actors: a discursive approach elucidates 
different actors’ perspectives, shows how their discursive power is contingent on a broader 
context and social resources, and how actors can use language to further their own interests 
(Rydin, 2005). Secondly, it is transdisciplinary, in that CDA may draw on a variety of 
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theoretical underpinnings and may utilise a broad array of techniques for the collection and 
analysis of data (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). Thirdly, it is dialectical: it examines “relations 
between objects which are different from one another but not what I shall call ‘discrete’, not 
fully separate in the sense that one excludes the other” (Fairclough, 2010:4). He gives the 
pertinent example of power and discourse as being different but not discrete, overlapping 
with each other, and references Harvey (1996) when he says that “discourse can be 
‘internalised’ in power and vice versa; the complex realities of power relations are 
‘condensed’ and simplified in discourses” (2010:4). The dialectical relationship between 
power and discourse is a central concept of CDA, and it focuses in particular on the 
“discursive aspects of power relations and inequalities” (Fairclough, 2010:8), and the ways in 
which discourse can (re)produce social domination of one group over others (Van Dijk, 2008) 
as well as whether and how power relations have or have not changed over time (Van Dijk, 
2008). A key goal of CDA is the “demystification” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009:3) of the 
discursive aspects and effects of power relationships, which may appear at face value to be 
opaque and not immediately obvious either to participants or to outside observers (Carvalho, 
2008; Wodak and Meyer, 2009; Fairclough, 2010). 
The use of a CDA methodology is a natural fit for studies grounded in 
governmentality theory, as CDA often takes a Foucauldian explanation of the nature of power 
relations (Wodak and Meyer, 2009), and sees the use of language as inherently linked to 
Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power, given that language “has the capacity to make 
politics, to create signs and symbols that shift power balances” (Hajer and Versteeg, 
2005:179) and that the discursive enactment of power is inherently language-based (Van 
Dijk, 2008). Specifically relevant to the purposes of this thesis, a discursive perspective 
“problematises what conventional policy analysts take for granted: the linguistic, identity and 
knowledge base of policy making” and “allows one to ask if environmental policy is about 
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nature and the environment at all, or rather about a redistribution and reconfiguration of 
power in the name of the ‘environment’” (Feindt and Oels, 2005:163). As such, it therefore 
necessitates a social constructivist epistemology, although Fairclough (2010:4) terms this 
“critical realism”, stating that it is “a recognition that the natural and social worlds differ in 
that the latter but not the former depends upon human action for its existence and is ‘socially 
constructed’.”  
 CDA entails the investigation of semiotic - i.e. that which contains meaning – 
data (Wodak and Meyer, 2009), in which discourses are embedded, such as written, spoken, 
or visual forms of communication (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005; Van Dijk, 2008). In practice, 
this can include written texts, visual images, symbols, body language, music, and sound 
effects, to name but a few forms of media (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005; Van Dijk, 2008; Van 
Leeuwen, 2008; Fairclough, 2010), and analysis of such media is generally known as textual 
analysis (Fairclough, 2010). However, CDA views the relationship between discourse and 
such texts as dialectical, viewing such use of language as both representation of social 
variables and practices as well as social practice itself (Wodak and Meyer, 2009), in that the 
semiosis of texts is performative in and of itself because it impacts on social relations and 
social practices (Fairclough, 2010). 
Therefore, critical discourse analysis is more than just analysis of textual data, as 
discourse itself entails more than just the rôle of language in influencing social relations; it 
also includes practices (Carvalho, 2008). For example, a CDA approach would also consider 
relevant the format of the communication of semiotic data, such as the spaces in and the 
processes by which they are communicated. CDA attempts both to “understand the links 
between texts and social relations, distribution of power, and dominant values and ideas” 
(Carvalho and Burgess, 2005:1460-1461), and to explain “why and under what circumstances 
and consequences the producers of the text have made specific linguistic choices among 
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several other options that a given language may provide” (Baker et al, 2008:281). As a result, 
CDA encompasses a tri-partite framework as seen below in Figure 3, also requiring analysis 
both of what Fairclough (2010:132) terms “discoursal practice”, i.e. processes of text 
production and text interpretation, as well as “sociocultural practice” in the wider context of 
social relations surrounding the text. Therefore, according to Fairclough (2010:132), “the 
method of discourse analysis includes linguistic description of the language text, 
interpretation of the relationship between the (productive and interpretative) discursive 
processes and the text, and explanation of the relationship between the discursive processes 














Figure 3: Fairclough’s (2010:133) Tripartite Framework for CDA 
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4.3 Textual Analysis 
 
4.3.1 Interdiscursive Analysis 
 
Textual analysis, the primary dimension of CDA as demonstrated in Figure 3 above, allows the 
researcher to reconstruct discourses from the “texts” - semiotic data such as written texts, visual 
images, symbols, body language, music, and sound effects and so on -  in which they are 
embedded (Van Leeuwen, 2008). Fairclough (2010) argues that textual analysis has two 
primary functions: interdiscursive analysis, and linguistic (or multimodal, depending on the 
nature of the text) analysis. He writes that interdiscursive analysis considers the discourses, 
genres, and styles featured within the text, under the assumption that most texts are usually 
composed of multiple discourses, genres, and styles. Fairclough (2010:7) calls interdiscursive 
analysis “a mediating ‘interlevel’”, as analysis of such discourses, genres, and styles is 
“analysis of orders of discourse, which are the discoursal element or moment of social 
practices, social organisations, and social institutions.” In other words, these discourses, 
genres, and styles are the crux of the dialectical relationship between text and social practice: 
they are the embodiment of social practice in textual form (Wodak and Meyer, 2009).  
Fairclough (2010:232) describes genres as “semiotic ways of acting and interacting”, 
such as news articles or policy documents, which have particular impacts on social relations. 
Discourses are taken to be “semiotic ways of construing aspects of the world (physical, social, 
or mental) which can generally be identified with different positions or perspectives of different 
groups of social actors”, while styles are “identities, or ‘ways of being’, in their semiotic 
aspect” (2010:232). Discourses, then, are essentially the ideational and knowledge content of 
texts, which may frame topics in particular ways, including or omitting information according 
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to particular social relations such as power inequalities in order to evaluate, ascribe purpose to, 
or justify particular representations (Van Leeuwen, 2008). Styles relate to a particular identity-
based way of communicating: Fairclough (2010) gives the example of the identity of a 
“manager” within a business entailing a particular way of communicating with others which is 
reflected in the language used or not used. Within the UNFCCC, we might think of the 
examples of parties constructing texts in such a way as to assume leadership responsibilities 
e.g. the EU (Bang et al, 2005; Oberthür, 2011), or perhaps AILAC adopting a style conducive 
to its bridge-building rôle (Blexekjaer and Nielsen, 2014; Edwards et al, 2017) between Annex 
I and non-Annex I parties. 
 
4.3.2 Linguistic/Multimodal Analysis 
 
The second form of textual analysis is linguistic or multimodal analysis. This analysis of 
specific linguistic features of texts reveals “actional, representational and identifying 
meanings” and “their realisation in the linguistic forms of the text” (Fairclough, 2010:75). 
Furthermore, linguistic analysis reveals “how these meanings and forms realise the 
interdiscursive ‘mix’ of genres, discourses, and styles” (Fairclough, 2010:75), as “it is the 
grammar that does the work: this is where knowledge is constructed” (Halliday, 2004:212). To 
this end, there is a wide variety of linguistic features which can be considered, yet CDA 
researchers vary in their focus and extent of linguistic analysis (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). 
Some of the more common features to be studied, although this is by no means an exhaustive 
list, include choice of vocabulary (Wodak and Meyer, 2009) or images13 (Blair, 1996); 
 
13 Van Leeuwen (2008) also notes the potential significance of the positioning of images within texts. 
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implicatures, i.e. communication in such a way that the meaning conveyed is more than or 
different to what is actually “said” (Alba-Juez, 2009); and the ascription of (non-)agency to 
actors (Van Dijk, 2006) to obscure responsibility of actors or to reify abstract ideas as 
“objective things” (Billig, 2008:786) via nominalisations – “choosing noun phrases over verbs” 
e.g. the headline “Attack on protestors” rather than “Police attack protestors” (Billig, 2008:785) 
- or passivisations – “the passive voice over the active voice” (Billig, 2008:785). Van Dijk 
(2008) further suggests analysis of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation 
e.g. through the use of hyperboles and euphemisms; consensus-building - attempts to show that 
suggestions or policies are in the interests of everyone; and “the numbers game” - the use of 
figures, statistics, and references to external knowledge authorities in order to boost credibility 
and give a sense of objectivity of information. 
 
4.3.3 Data Sources for Textual Analysis – AILAC Submissions 
 
The texts for textual analysis in this thesis originated from two sources. Firstly, 62 English- 
and Spanish-language AILAC official submissions to the UNFCCC from between January 
2013 – immediately after AILAC’s formation in December 2012 during COP18 (Edwards et 
al, 2017) - and December 2018 (inclusive) were identified and collected from both the 
AILAC website14 and the official UNFCCC Submissions Portal15. The submissions were then 
ordered chronologically and assigned a number16 within a coding scheme in which features of 
textual analysis were identified and categorised – the researcher has a near-fluent level of 
Spanish, allowing for textual analysis of both English- and Spanish-language texts. However, 
 
14 http://www.ailac.org/en/remisiones-documentales 
15 http://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx  
16 See Appendix I 
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this may not be an exhaustive list of AILAC submissions: AILAC’s opening plenary 
statement to COP24 in December 2018 (AILAC, 2018j) refers to a submission from the 
special session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice, (SBSTA), the 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), and the Ad Hoc Work Group on the Paris 
Agreement (APA) in Bangkok in September 2018, on the relationship between COP24 and 
the Talanoa Dialogue. Despite repeated searches of the Submissions Portal, this was not 
located. Additionally, Table 2 in Watts & Depledge’s (2018) article states AILAC made a 
total of 46 oral statements during COP plenaries between 2013 and 2015, based on evidence 
in daily summaries from a series of Environmental News Bulletins (ENBs), which mention 
AILAC contributions in the negotiations in passing without actually documenting what was 
said. Therefore, it can be assumed these were reactive statements during the flow of 
negotiations, rather than pre-prepared official statements such as those collected for this 
research. There is therefore no obvious reason to believe there are any other available 
submissions missing from those considered by this thesis; indeed, inclusion of every 
available submission text is important in order to avoid the problem faced by some CDA 
research of particular texts being chosen for analysis to “prove a point” (Baker et al, 
2008:283) with the result of skewing findings in an unrepresentative manner. There is 
considerable precedent for using UNFCCC submissions in studies of international climate 
change negotiations (e.g. Betzold, 2010; Betzold et al, 2012; Audet, 2013; Blaxekjaer and 
Nielsen, 2014; Weisser, 2014; and Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2016). Weisser (2014:51) 
argues that the UNFCCC documents play a performative rôle by “constitut[ing] the 
organisation’s [the UNFCCC’s] conditions of possibility” in that they dictate and govern the 
actions taken against climate change around the world, as well as representing particular 
views of climate change and its politics, and the discursive struggles that took place in order 
for their creation. 
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4.3.4 Data Sources for Textual Analysis - Interviews 
 
Secondly, textual analysis was conducted on the responses of 35 AILAC national delegates 
and support unit advisors in interviews. Interview data formed an important supplement to 
data from AILAC submission documents, as much of the UNFCCC negotiations takes place 
verbally and its content is not recorded in documentary form. As such, responses from 
delegates participating in behind-closed-doors meetings are the only source of information on 
potential AILAC strategy use in these settings, and can be subjected to the same processes of 
textual analysis – identifying interdiscursive and linguistic features - as submission 
documents when transcribed to form texts. 
In order to arrange interviews, the researcher attended COP23 at Bonn in November 
2017 and made contacts with AILAC delegates, although time pressure meant that no 
interviews could be conducted there and then. Business cards were exchanged to secure e-
mail addresses for arranging future interviews, and delegates were asked to assist with 
approaching other delegates for participation where possible. Additionally, the researcher 
consulted UNFCCC documentation regarding participant lists from national delegations17 in 
order to determine which delegates had been present at negotiations and which might be able 
to offer some insight into the research questions based on their rôles within government 
ministries. The researcher was then able to search for e-mail addresses on government 
departmental websites and to get in contact through these. Each invitation for an interview 
contained a summary of the background of the researcher in order to foster open and honest 
communication between interviewer and interviewee, and the invitation explained that any 
data collected would be used for research purposes only, in order also to put the interviewee 
 
17 E.g. For COP23: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/cop23/eng/PLOP.pdf  
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at ease and to allow them to speak candidly should they accept. For the same reason, 
delegates were informed that their responses would be subject to anonymity, as well as to 
avoid any negative ramifications in their future work which might be created were they to be 
identifiable. 
 49 invitations for interviews were sent to AILAC delegates and support unit 
members, of which 35 were accepted; those which were not accepted either did not reply to 
the interview request, initially accepted but later were too busy, or suggested that they did not 
feel they would be able to provide useful data for the thesis. Every delegate who responded 
positively to an invitation was interviewed in order to provide as representative data as 
possible regarding AILAC’s strategic choices in the negotiations. Interviews were conducted 
either at a location of the individual delegate’s choosing (whilst adhering to ethical safety 
concerns regarding location e.g. by meeting in public places), or over Skype where face-to-
face meeting was not possible, in order to put the interviewee at ease as much as possible and 
encourage open dialogue. Interviews took place between July and November 2018, and were 
semi-structured in nature so as to keep to the topic at hand but not to lead the interviewees 
down any particular path in their answers, thereby prejudicing the results of the analysis by 
imparting the researcher’s presuppositions on the research.  
The interviews focused on the ways in which AILAC engaged with its negotiating 
partners within the face-to-face negotiations at the UNFCCC’s annual COPs and subsidiary 
body meetings.18 Interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes depending on the time 
constraints on the interviewee. Interviewees spoke in either English or Spanish depending on 
their preference in order to allow them to answer as fully as possible; as the researcher has a 
near-fluent level of Spanish, they were able to look up and translate any particular words or 
 
18 See Appendix II for interview questionnaire 
122 
 
expressions which were sources of confusion on the day. All interviewees were again 
reminded on the day of the provision of anonymity for their responses for the same reason, 
and to avoid any negative ramifications directly linked to them as a result of this thesis. One 
interview with 2 EIG delegates was also conducted, with the original aim of gaining the 
perspective of AILAC’s negotiating partners on its strategy choice. However, it proved 
difficult to obtain enough interviews from a wide enough array of other additional coalitions 
to gather a representative sample size as a result of a lack of replies to interview invitations, 
and so the views of these interviewees on AILAC were not included in the analysis. 
 Following Alba-Juez’s (2009) recommendations, interview recordings were 
transcribed and included variables such as the time and location of each interview, as well as 
interruptions, pauses, hesitations, and any laughter which occurred in order to provide as full 
a descriptive account as possible for textual analysis. These could be potentially significant; 
for example, a hesitation in a response may qualify the answer given, or a pause after a 
question could hint at an interviewee choosing to think through and be very selective with 
their subsequent response. The transcriptions were subsequently coded as well to allow for 
identification of features of textual analysis in the same manner as had been carried out on 
AILAC submission documents. All interview data were stored on a secure external hard drive 
kept with the researcher at all times. 
 
4.4 Processing Analysis 
 
Fairclough (2010) sees processing analysis as the intermediate level of CDA. The function of 
this level of analysis is to interpret the findings from textual analysis, as “the production 
process shapes (and leaves ‘traces’ in) the text, and the interpretative process operates upon 
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‘cues’ in the text” (2010:94). The aim, then, is to build a picture of the discursive strategies 
embedded within the texts which can be identified from these traces and cues. In the context 
of this thesis, the question therefore becomes: which, if any, of these strategies are evidenced 
by the genres, discourses, styles, or linguistic features identified in AILAC’s submissions to 
the UNFCCC or the responses of the AILAC interviewees? 
 Behind the texts are the actors responsible for the processes of text production. 
Producers of texts have control over discourse (Van Dijk, 2008) and aim to use semiotic 
forms of communication in order to position themselves in a particular way relative to other 
actors (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005). Furthermore, “producers endeavour through the rhetoric of 
their verbal and visual communications to position readers and viewers so that they interpret 
texts in the way intended” (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005:1459). This can be achieved by the 
management of the release and withholding of information: producers of texts are able to 
dispense information favourable to their positions and interests, and constrain the 
dissemination of information which is not (Van Dijk, 2008). As such, the members of the 
AILAC delegation acted as “discursive strategists”, as they made decisions regarding the 
discursive and strategic content of both the submission documents and the bloc’s face-to-face 
interactions with other UNFCCC parties at COPs and subsidiary body meetings. Interview 
data therefore again played an important rôle in this processing analysis level. Alongside 
questions regarding the specificities of AILAC’s interactions with other parties, interviewing 
these delegates allowed for questions regarding the strategic goals behind their interactions 
both through the AILAC submission texts and within the face-to-face negotiations. 
Furthermore, one interviewee provided the researcher with an internal AILAC document 
constituting the group’s rulebook (AILAC, date unknown) and a PowerPoint presentation 
delivered to delegates (AILAC, 2018o), which provided an insight into the group’s identity, 
objectives within the UNFCCC, and the processes of text production within the bloc.  
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4.5 Social Analysis 
 
Fairclough (2010:59) writes that “the constitutive work of discourse necessarily takes place 
within the constraints of the complex of economic, political, and discoursal/ideological 
structures” and that “processes of text production and interpretation are shaped by (and help 
shape) the nature of the social practice” (2010:94). Therefore, the relationship between 
discourse and the wider context in which social relations are expressed - or, as Fairclough 
(2010:77) puts it, “the relationship between semiotic and non-semiotic elements of social 
events” - is dialectical: they are separate yet also mutually constitutive, and shape each other 
(Van Dijk, 2006).  
CDA’s third level of social analysis seeks to explain why social interactions take the forms 
they do. This means that CDA needs to look beyond the contents of texts and their linguistic 
features in order to construct a fuller picture of discursive interactions, to marry the 
understanding of discursive strategies from textual analysis and processing analysis with an 
equivalent contextual “understanding of actors’ interests and resources and the social 
networks within which they are positioned” (Rydin, 2005:77). Fairclough (2010:95) identifies 
this social context in which actors are positioned as constituted by 3 levels of social 
organisation: “the context of situation, the institutional context, and the wider societal 
context”. In the case of this thesis, social analysis seeks to explain why AILAC chose 
particular strategies and the particular ways in which they used them. As discussed in Chapter 
2, it may be as a result of factors relating to the delegation itself which utilised them, such as 
characteristics of the delegates responsible for the processes of text production or intra-bloc 
dynamics, or there may have been influences from the wider social context. For example, the 
distribution of material and immaterial power resources among parties, the nature of the 
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UNFCCC as a negotiating arena and its rules on decision-making, or the vulnerability of 
AILAC member states to the effects of climate change may have helped to shape AILAC’s 
strategic choices and the deployment of their strategic interactions. Interviews with AILAC 
delegates, as the authors of the group’s texts and those responsible for the bloc’s strategic 
decision-making, allowed questions to be asked specifically on the reasoning behind 
AILAC’s strategy choices in order to determine which factors influenced it and how they did 
so. This was supplemented by research into the situational context of AILAC member states 
with regards to the effects of climate change, as discussed in Chapter 1, and the nature of the 
UNFCCC as an institution. Whilst at COP23, the researcher was able to attend a wide variety 
of side events and plenary sessions hosted by a variety of parties, civil society stakeholders, 
and the Fijian COP presidency, which revealed the sheer scale of the complexity of the 
negotiations, in terms of both the number of participants and the number of issues to be 
negotiated. They were also able to see first-hand the prevalence of use of informal spaces by 
negotiators, e.g. corridor conversations and discussions taking place over lunch in the canteen 
each day, and to gain an appreciation of the UNFCCC institutional architecture and its wide 
array of rôles in the negotiations.   
 
4.6 Criticisms of CDA: Explanatory Power, Interpretation, and Positionality 
 
4.6.1 Explanatory Power 
 
The brunt of the criticism towards CDA centres on the issue of bias and subjectivity. 
Fairclough (2010) reminds us that the CDA researcher produces his/her own discourse purely 
by carrying out his/her research; therefore, what is the researcher’s justification for claiming 
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that the results and insights gained from the research project are more representative and 
logical than another interpretation which places different levels of emphasis on different 
factors accounting for the social relations under investigation? Fairclough (2010) argues that 
the explanatory power of the results gleaned from the research is the chief criterion for an 
assessment of its validity. He argues that “The explanatory power of a discourse (or a theory, 
which is a special sort of discourse) is its ability to provide justified explanations of as many 
features of the area of social life as possible. So we can say that it is a matter of both quantity 
(the number or range of features) and quality (justification)” (2010:8-9). Jäger and Maier 
(2009:51) support Fairclough’s view of research validity; they argue that CDA should 
continue until the arguments seen therein start to repeat themselves, at which point 
“completeness (in the sense of theoretical saturation) has been achieved”, as a result of the 
research having captured the range of discursive features in the texts and contexts of the 
study. Therefore, CDA’s main “validity tests” are logic and credibility of argumentation 
(Carvalho and Burgess, 2005:1461); in the case of this thesis, following Fairclough’s (2010) 
reasoning, its explanatory power will be determined by how many strategies the research can 
identify and explain the use thereof, and how well it can do so. 
A focus on explanation as the intended endpoint of CDA research allows it to 
demonstrate the dialectical relationship between the “micro” level of individual discursive 
linguistic formations (akin to Foucault’s “microphysics” of power) and the “macro” level of 
social relations (such as a broader web of power under a Foucauldian interpretation) and to 
“see the latter as both the conditions for and the products of the former, and which therefore 
reject[s] rigid barriers between the study of the ‘micro’ (of which the study of discourse is a 
part) and the study of the ‘macro’” (Fairclough, 2010:31). This emphasis within CDA on the 
dialectical nature of discourse at different scales, and its insistence on seeing the interlinkages 
between text, discourse practice, and context, allows CDA to rebuff one of Widdowson’s 
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(2004) strongest criticisms, in which he accuses CDA of opening the door wide to the 
consequences of selectivity bias in its interpretation and explanation phases by analysing 
fragments of texts in isolation from the rest. Van Dijk (2006:129) recognises this issue but 
again returns to the dialectics of CDA to address this problem, therefore writing that “data 
should never be described in isolation, but in relation to the text (co-text) as a whole and in 




Nevertheless, CDA has come in for criticism because of the centrality of interpretation to its 
analysis as the intermediary level of the framework. Widdowson (2004:103) criticises CDA 
because of the “explicit socio-political pretext” which “motivates the selection of features for 
special attention”, and therefore, in his view, leads to nothing more than the demystification 
of “workings and effects of texts on readers who are pretextually positioned to derive 
discourses from them which suit their purpose. In short, what we find in CDA are critical 
discourse interpretations.” Van Dijk (2011:612) responds to this criticism by arguing that 
CDA “is more descriptive and explanatory than normative. It does not tell readers how they 
should understand a text, but rather studies how different types of readers actually do so in 
different contexts”. Thus a distinction is drawn between critical study and prescriptive study: 
CDA aims to expose and critique the “reality” (in as much as is ever possible) of discursive 
social relations embedded within texts, rather than to insist that its interpretation is how 
readers must understand them. 
Even with this useful explanation, however, Mackay (2017) argues that to 
acknowledge one’s interpretative bias should not be seen inherently as a drawback to CDA 
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research; indeed, these principles are held specifically because they are considered to be 
“right”, and worthy of intellectual defence. She writes that interpretation, as a feature of CDA 
based on these principles, should be acknowledged rather than avoided:  
“My argument is that [CDA] would be strengthened if the attention paid to identifying the 
influences which have shaped the texts we study was – to a greater extent than is presently 
the case – paid to ourselves and the influences which shape our interpretation of the texts – 
or our ‘reading’ of our results (which amounts to the same thing)…One can present one’s 
socio-political agenda…and then rigorously, systematically, and explicitly apply the method 
that you have made democratically available for all to employ…we, as politically committed 





Acknowledging the significance of interpretation within CDA entails a recognition that “we 
[researchers] are one of the ‘filters’ through which the questions pass and the ‘results’ come, 
and each of us is uniquely situated – indeed, embodied – in culture, in time, in place, in 
history, as well as in our ever-evolving personal narratives” (Mackay, 2017:9-10). As such, 
CDA researchers must remain mindful of how their positionalities have an impact on the 
work produced (Wodak and Meyer, 2009), as this could lead the research towards the 
researcher’s preconceptions even if they are not valid. Given the impossibility of completely 
“objective” research in discourse analysis (Wodak and Meyer, 2009), CDA should therefore 
adhere to an ethical code in order to be considered as a valid methodology, namely being as 
open and transparent about the values and position of the researcher as possible, as well as 
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the objective of the work, as Mackay (2017) suggests. She writes that “to equip the student in 
the most democratic way possible, it would surely be better to declare one’s interest as an 
analyst and, to the extent both possible and deemed necessary, furnish our students, our 
readers, our audience, with some information about us” (2017:11). 
What is then revealed, however, should be a question of what is deemed relevant to 
the reader, though bearing in mind that what a researcher and a reader deem relevant may not 
be the same things; but also the researcher must consider that it can be advantageous to 
withhold certain information, on, for example, grounds of safety (Mackay, 2017). It is also 
important, though, to “draw the attention of our readers to this omission, and to the 
implications of our decision to leave certain aspects opaque, as opposed to transparent” 
(Mackay, 2017:11). This should not be taken, however, as an admission that a critical take on 
discourse analysis weakens the legitimacy and validity of the research outputs or implies that 
CDA involves less scientifically rigorous methodology (Van Dijk, 2008). 
   As such, it is important the positionality of this research is established before 
any discussion of its findings. This doctoral thesis is by a British-Irish researcher based 
within a UK university. They have an academic background in Geography (both Human and 
Physical), and are therefore well-versed in the science and policy-making of climate change. 
They have previously conducted CDA research on the media coverage of climate change in 
the Peruvian print media, and as such, have a strong interest in, and fondness for, South 
America. It is therefore possible that this research may contain biases in favour of the conduct 
of AILAC as a negotiating bloc given its reputation as a bridge-building group with a genuine 
desire to advance ambitious solutions to climate change (Blaxekjaer and Nielsen, 2014; 
Edwards et al, 2017; Watts and Depledge, 2018), which may have an impact on the 
interpretation of AILAC’s strategic choices. 
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4.7 Triangulating Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
While the interpretative nature of CDA research is worthy of defence according to Mackay’s 
(2017) arguments above, its centrality of interpretation is still vulnerable to human error. For 
example, it may be the case that findings are skewed as a result of the researcher misreading 
or misunderstanding the meaning of texts through fatigue or even boredom (Baker and 
Egbert, 2016). Alternatively, unconscious or inadvertent selectivity of samples may lead to 
overstating discursive significance and intentionality when there is none (Van Dijk, 2006). 
CDA has been accused of “reduc[ing] to a rather random enterprise” (Widdowson (2004:97) 
without coherent descriptive techniques grounded in linguistic theory. From Widdowson’s 
(2004:110) perspective, if textual analysis is to be conducted credibly, it cannot be conducted 
selectively and instead must be “as systematic and comprehensive as possible.” 
 One way of addressing this criticism is to employ triangulation. This is defined as 
“cross-referencing between independent entities…within a single data set or comparatively, 
performed by one analyst or by a number, using one method or a number of methods” 
(Mackay, 2017:5-6), in order to hold in check the researcher’s “propensity to allow their 
subjective view to skew their analysis” (Mackay, 2017:5). Triangulation is often employed 
with CDA research (Mackay, 2017), as CDA is a methodology as opposed to a method – it 
neither limits itself to any one specific method nor has methods associated exclusively with it 
(Baker et al, 2008; Wodak and Meyer, 2009). As such, CDA is open to the use of other 
methods of analysis providing they can contribute to its overall aim (Fairclough, 2010). 
Triangulation within qualitative research enables scholars to address limitations relating to 
their own biases, or those resulting from the use of only a single method (Baker and Levon, 
2015; Mautner, 2009) in order to validate their data (Baker and Egbert, 2016).  In the case of 
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this thesis, the use of interviews triangulates CDA’s textual analysis by allowing the 
researcher to question the actors responsible for the formation and enactment of AILAC’s 
negotiation strategies, thereby providing a check on any misrepresentations of discursive 
features of the bloc’s submission texts and the subsequent misinterpretations that would 
follow as a result.  
 
4.7.1 Corpus-Linguistic Analysis 
 
Triangulation can also take the form of the integration of quantitative methods with 
predominantly qualitative methodology such as CDA (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). In 
particular, the quantitative methods of Corpus-Linguistic Analysis can be used alongside 
qualitative methods in CDA in order to boost the validity of results by demonstrating similar 
or converging results from, in the case of CLA, a more deductive methodology (Wodak and 
Meyer, 2009; Mackay, 2017). Indeed, Widdowson (2004) himself suggests the use of CLA in 
order to mitigate his criticism of CDA as running the risk of employing unsystematic and 
seemingly random analysis with consequences of unrepresentative findings. However, Baker 
et al argue that, despite the fact that the “theoretical and methodological cross-pollination” of 
CDA and CLA benefits both methodologies (2008:297), the number of studies employing a 
combination of CDA and CLA methods in proportion to the number of studies using either 
CDA or CLA on their own is “extremely small”, and the majority of those which do use the 
two together have generally overlooked the use of quantitative analysis within their research 
outputs (2008:274-275). In utilising both CDA and CLA and employing some quantitative 
analysis in the process, this thesis adds to this small body of literature. 
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CLA inputs large corpora – bodies of naturally occurring, electronically stored and 
coded text, as well as metadata (information relating to the texts themselves, their authors, the 
contexts of their production etc) – into computer software in order to produce measures of 
statistical significance for particular linguistic features within a group of texts (Baker et al, 
2008; Mautner, 2009; Baker and Levon, 2015; Berglund and Wynne, 2015). Such features 
might include keyness – “the statistically significant higher frequency of particular words or 
clusters [or lemmas (word stems), word families, or functionally-related words] in the corpus 
under analysis in comparison with another corpus” in order to give a sense of the “aboutness” 
of texts and reveal salient uses of language (Baker et al, 2008:278; McEnery, 2016:20); 
collocations – “the above-chance frequent co-occurrence of two words within a pre-
determined span, usually five words on either side of the word under investigation (the 
node)” (Baker et al, 2008:278); and concordances – “instances of a word or cluster in its 
immediate co-text” (Baker et al, 2008:279). The strength of CLA, therefore, is its ability to 
identify “repetitive lexical combinations that indicated more subtle ideological 
representations and would perhaps otherwise have been missed, even if researchers had 
access to the full dataset”, and to provide measures of both relative and absolute frequency of 
articulation of these constructions (Baker and Levon, 2015:230; Mautner, 2009; Berglund 
and Wynne, 2015). As Wodak and Meyer (2009:30) conclude, CLA “adds a quantitative 
methodology to CDA. Therefore, CLA applies a rather deductive methodology in selecting 
specific words which are relevant for analysis” while also allowing further qualitative 
interpretation of these features. 
   CLA as a triangulating method for the CDA methodology also allows the 
latter to mitigate some of its other aforementioned criticisms. While Van Dijk (2006) defends 
CDA from accusations of selectivity bias in its textual analysis (Widdowson, 2004) by 
arguing that textual analysis never describes fragments of texts in isolation and instead does 
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so in relation to their co-text, there is still the possibility of human error. CLA, however, both 
explicitly examines co-textual relations through its analysis of concordances and analyses 
texts in their entirety, as well as providing a greater likelihood of reliability of results given 
the large size of its corpora datasets (Widdowson, 2004; Mautner, 2009; Baker and Levon, 
2015). CLA can therefore help to “act as a corrective” (Widdowson, 2004:124) to any 
instances, however unintentional, of misrepresentative selection and interpretation, or “cherry 
picking” on the part of the researcher (Baker and Levon, 2015:222) by removing “human 
cognitive, social, or political biases which may skew analysis in certain directions or even 
lead to faulty conclusions” (Baker and Egbert, 2016:3). This is not to say that there is no 
interpretation or subjectivity involved in CLA: the researcher must decide which texts to 
include in a corpus, which linguistic features will be analysed, and which “cut-off” points of 
statistical significance to use, even before they then interpret and explain the results provided 
by the software (Baker et al, 2008). Therefore, CLA should not be seen as entirely 
subjectivity-free, but instead a way of triangulating some of the more criticised features of 
CDA. If anything, this subjectivity is to be embraced: CLA can “find examples of a 
phenomenon one has already noted”, “reinforce, refute, or revise a researcher’s intuition and 
show them why and how much their suspicions were grounded”, or even “reveal patterns of 
use previously unthought of” (Partington, 2003:12). 
However, CLA also has its limitations without the overarching CDA methodology to 
complement it. CLA analyses the linguistic features which actually do explicitly make up 
texts, rather than “what could have been written but was not, or what is implied, inferred, 
insinuated or latently hinted at” (Baker et al, 2008:296). As such, qualitative analysis from 
CDA is needed to recognise what has been omitted that CLA techniques have missed (Baker 
and Levon, 2015), such as features relating to format, layout, and visuals, given the need for 
“plain text” files with many software packages (Mautner, 2009). Furthermore, a key 
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determining factor of the usefulness of CLA in relation to broader CDA analysis is the 
capability of the software used, as particular features of language use and “semantic 
subtleties” cannot be identified “if you cannot program your computer to identify them, and 
so you end up with those which are manifest in forms that can be counted” (Widdowson, 
2004:118). This provides only a descriptive analysis if CLA techniques are utilised in 
isolation (Baker and Levon, 2015). In summary, as Berglund and Wynne (2015) note, “the 
computer can help, but it doesn’t do the research”, and as Mautner (2009:124) amusingly puts 
it, “at an Oscar night of methods, my vote would be on corpus linguistics as Best Supporting 
Actor”. 
 The combination of CDA and CLA, therefore, provides this thesis with 
another opportunity to make a novel contribution to the academic literature, by providing a 
“best-of-both-worlds” scenario incorporating the use of large volumes of data whilst still 
providing analysis of linguistic details (Mautner, 2009). All of the 62 official AILAC 
submissions to the UNFCCC were converted from PDF files to “plain text” Notepad files and 
input into the #LancsBox corpus software package developed by the University of Lancaster 
(Brezina et al, 2017) in the same chronological order as used for textual analysis. The 
software recognised each word and produced a token for each one as a different part of 
speech, recognising words as nouns, adjective, verbs, pronouns and so on. The AILAC 
submissions produced a corpus of 119,987 tokens. As this is a relatively small corpus 
compared to most used in CLA research (most exceed 5 million words (O’Keeffe and Farr, 
2003)), the corpus was used in its entirety rather than subjected to a process of sampling; the 
fact that it was a manageable size helped to avoid the problem of sampling selectivity bias. 
The software was then used to identify instances of keyness, collocations, and concordances 
within the AILAC submissions. The Brown Corpus, a corpus of modern American English of 
approximately 1.01 million tokens which was downloaded along with the #LancsBox 
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software, was used as a reference corpus against which to compare for measures of keyness 
in order to determine the statistical significance of keywords within the AILAC submissions. 
This was selected over the alternative of the Lancaster-Oslo-Bergen (LOB) Corpus of modern 
British English, as American English provides a better comparison with AILAC texts given 
the likelihood of AILAC delegates to have learned American rather than British English as a 
result of AILAC countries’ greater proximity to the United States than the UK. Corpus-
linguistic analysis of the AILAC texts was conducted after the researcher had undertaken 
textual analysis of the AILAC submissions to avoid skewing the textual analysis towards 
features already identified by #LancsBox. Instead, this allowed the corpus-linguistic analysis 



















The analysis is divided into 5 chapters (5-9), with each chapter covering different strategies. 
Chapter 5 covers AILAC’s primary strategy in the UNFCCC negotiations as identified by 
critical discourse analysis: putting forward technically rigorous submissions. This strategy was 
also most commonly cited by interviewees, in 33 of 35 responses. Use of detailed submissions 
has served two purposes: presentation of AILAC’s substantive ideas in the negotiation process 
on wide-ranging interconnected topics19, and as evidence of the group’s technical capacity and 
rigour20 enhancing its credibility in the eyes of others. One AILAC support unit advisor stated, 
“the most consistent approach has been to rely very heavily on, on the technical coherence and 
providing very specific technical inputs to the process.”21 This chapter considers the types, 
timings, and topics of submissions, before analysing notable features: their visual presentation, 
structure, and key discourses of the primacy of technical knowledge and universality. 
 
5.2 Submission Types 
 
The research identified 62 AILAC submissions between January 2013 and December 2018 
(inclusive). 56 were made by AILAC alone, while 6 of the 62 submissions were made jointly 
with other parties: Submission 3 with Mexico and the Dominican Republic, Submissions 8 and 
 
19 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018 
20 Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018 
21 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
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51 with the EIG, Submission 54 with the AGN, Submission 59 with Australia, Canada, the 
European Union, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and Switzerland, and Submission 60 with 
AOSIS, the European Union, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, and Switzerland. Of the overall 62, 
49 were technical submissions (including all made with other parties) outside of formal 
negotiation sessions. 13 were statements made during meetings of the annual COP in 
November/December or intersessional meetings of the Subsidiary Bodies to the UNFCCC in 
Bonn in May (and the special session in Bangkok in September 2018). 
An AILAC delegate said the group submits documents to the UNFCCC in response to 
open calls for participation, but that “we are not the type of group that is sending all the time 
different positions” because of reluctance to show AILAC’s hand to other negotiating parties.22 
This would account for most (33 of 49) AILAC submissions (excluding statements) beginning 
either with a standardised paragraph explicitly expressing that AILAC “welcomes the 
opportunity to submit” its views (see, for example, inter alia, Submissions 16 (AILAC, 2016g), 
29 (AILAC, 2017g), and 44 (AILAC, 2017v)), or even one where an invitation to submit is 
specifically mentioned (see, for example, inter alia, Submissions 2 (AILAC, 2013b), 4 
(AILAC, 2014b), 10 (AILAC, 2016a), 28 (AILAC, 2017f), and 30 (AILAC, 2017h)). It also 
accounts for the fact that the majority of statements (11 of the 13) being delivered at the opening 
or closing plenaries of negotiating sessions, i.e. when parties are invited to speak. That there 
are considerably fewer statements than technical submissions probably reflects the fact there 
are usually only 2 formal negotiating sessions annually - SB meetings in May, and the annual 
COP at the year-end – whereas the UNFCCC Submissions Portal is open between these 
sessions to allow parties to respond to calls from UNFCCC bodies, like the Secretariat, the 
SBs, and various subject-specific committees (UNFCCC, 2019a). 
 
22 Interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018 
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5.3 Submission Timings 
 
The group’s submission activity differed considerably either side of the signing of the Paris 
Agreement in December 2015: 9 submissions were put forward between January 2013 and 
December 2015 inclusive (2 in 2013, 5 in 2014, and 2 in 2015), whereas 53 were presented 
between January 2016 and December 2018 inclusive (13 in 2016, 26 in 2017, and 14 in 2018). 
The mismatch between numbers of submissions pre- and post-Paris is probably explained at 
least partly by the fact that the support unit was not established until April 201423. The support 
unit, according to the AILAC rule book, (AILAC, date unknown:4) comprises “international 
specialists” in climate change policy, whose rôle includes to “prepare the technical 
documentation for the negotiations in the core of the UNFCCC”. These full-time, professional 
expert advisors draft the group’s submissions, whereas each AILAC member state’s national 
delegates, organised by technical co-ordinations according to individual negotiating topics, 
negotiate for the group in the negotiating sessions (AILAC, date unknown). National delegates 
request the support unit to draft a submission on a particular topic given their greater technical 
expertise24. Delegates then provide feedback on the text and amend it before it passes to the 
overarching governance committee for sign off before submission to the UNFCCC25. As one 
AILAC support unit advisor stated: 
"The first draft comes from, from the support unit, from the advisors, err, it goes through a first 
reading with the co-ordinators and then it is presented to the group, discussed, and we request, 
err, comments and, err, any additions or inputs that they would like to provide to that. Err, this 
 
23 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018 
24 Interview with AILAC delegate, 10th July 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 6th September 2018; 
interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit 
advisor, 14th September 2018 
25 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit 
advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018 
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usually takes two to three rounds, so it’s, it’s about three to four drafts that we produce until 
we have a, a final version, and then that goes to the, to the governance committee for, for the 
final approval. Err, this is something very concrete, very specific for submissions." 
Before the support unit’s formation, the group’s delegates would have written the submissions 
whilst simultaneously carrying out their rôle as negotiators with portfolios of domestic climate 
policy work simultaneously26,  because AILAC countries had limited domestic capacity. This 
would have put pressure on delegates to produce submissions for every UNFCCC call.  
Of the 6 joint submissions with other parties, 2 were pre-Paris (in 2014 and in 2015), 
and 4 post-Paris (all in 2018). Of the 13 AILAC statements, all were put forward between 2016 
and 2018 – 2 in 2016, 4 in 2017, and 7 in 2018. It is surprising that no statements were found 
from before 2016, and unlikely that the group did not take opportunities to make statements at 
COPs 19, 20, and 21, nor the SB meetings between 2013 and 2015, especially for 2014 and 
2015 because the support unit had been established by then, and Peru, an AILAC member 
country, was hosting COP20 in 2014. Therefore, it seems most likely that statements were 







26 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th 
November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC 
support unit advisor, 16th October, 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 30th July, 2018; interview with former 
AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October, 2018 
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5.4 Submission Topics 
 
The submissions cover a wide range of topics, and Table 3 below reveals the breakdown of 
submissions by theme from 2013 to 2018, referencing the corresponding article of the Paris 
Agreement to each theme where applicable.  
 
Table 3: AILAC Submissions by Topic, 2013 - 2018 
Topic 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total 
Paris Agreement Legal 
Status & Goals (Article 2) 
1 4     5 
Mitigation & NDCs 
(Including Ambition and 
Common Timeframes) 
(Articles 3 & 4) 
   1 4 1 6 
Markets (Article 6)    1 2 2 5 
Adaptation (Article 7)  1  2 5 1 9 
Loss & Damage (Article 8)     1  1 
Finance (Article 9)    1 1  2 
Technology & Capacity 
Building (Articles 10 & 11) 
   1 2 1 4 
Transparency (Article 13)    1 2  3 
Global Stocktake (Article 
14) 






    2  2 
Agriculture 1      1 
Gender   1 1   2 
Human Rights   1    1 
Paris Agreement Work 
Programme 
   3 5 9 17 
Total 2 5 2 13 26 14 62 
 
The subject matter of the AILAC submissions is reflected in Table 1. However, for clarity, the 
category referenced as Paris Agreement Work Programme refers to submissions relating to 
agendas of future negotiation topics, e.g. agenda items for the APA or subsidiary bodies to the 
Convention. They cover a variety of issues; for example, Submission 11 (AILAC, 2016b) 
addresses the functionality of the APA (chair, agenda, and outputs), whereas Submission 49 
(AILAC, 2018a) deals with the Nairobi Work Programme (NWP) for improving parties’ 
understanding and knowledge of vulnerability to, and impacts of, climate change. Several 
submissions identified in the Work Programme group cover multiple topics; for example, 
Submission 36 (AILAC, 2017n) is a statement from the closing plenary of an SBSTA meeting, 
commenting on the progress of negotiations on finance, technology transfer, and transparency; 
whereas Submission 46 (AILAC, 2017x) is a statement from the opening plenary of the 
following SBSTA and SBI meeting, referring to upcoming discussions on finance, technology, 
capacity building, NDCs, adaptation, and loss & damage. 
 The AILAC submissions address most of the Paris Agreement’s main themes. Of 
substantive negotiating topics with dedicated Articles (excluding procedural matters such as 
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the Secretariat – Article 17 - or ratification and entry into force – Articles 20 and 21), only 
forestry (Article 5) and public awareness, education, and participation (Article 12) are not the 
focus of specific submissions. However, whilst covering many broad topics, the data from the 
table show the group’s attention has focused on certain themes. Their biggest contribution has 
been proposals and reflections on the Work Programme (17 out of 62 submissions in this 
category (27.4%)), followed by adaptation in 9 submissions (14.5% of the total). The group’s 
work then spans 6 topics with corresponding Articles in the Paris Agreement, generally evenly 
spread. Legal status & goals of the Paris Agreement, mitigation and NDCs, markets, 
technology & capacity building, transparency, and the global stocktake all featured in between 
3 and 6 submissions. Topics without a dedicated section in the Agreement e.g. agriculture, 
gender, and human rights appeared in 2 or fewer submissions. 3 themes with corresponding 
Paris Agreement Articles that did not feature in many AILAC submissions are loss & damage, 
finance, and compliance and implementation, with 1, 2, and 2 respectively. 
    The timing of submissions follows a clear pattern for some topics. 
Unsurprisingly, submissions on the legal status of the Paris Agreement are all from 2013 to 
2015, before the Agreement was written, when questions about its status were pertinent in the 
formative process. Likewise, the Paris Agreement Work Programme submissions all date from 
2016 to 2018, as planning of the programme could only take place once the Agreement had 
been drafted. These submissions have gradually become more frequent, from 3 in 2016 to 9 in 
2018. Surprisingly only one submission in the pre-Paris Agreement period (Submission 3, on 
adaptation) addressed a substantive issue which would progress to be the focus of an Article of 
the Paris Agreement, whereas AILAC only made submissions on other substantive issues 




 However, the initial picture of attention in AILAC’s submissions is not entirely 
representative. Corpus-linguistic analysis of these texts (see Table 4, below) reveals use of 
specific terms across all submissions does not quite mirror the number of submissions by topic. 
For example, of substantive topics, adaptation is used most frequently, (1254 times across 50 
submissions), consistent with its higher number of submissions, but mitigation, ambition, and 
NDCs together produced a total of 1095 tokens across 50 texts -  greater than expected from 
the 2:1 ratio of submissions on adaptation and mitigation respectively. Implementation and 
compliance produced 671 tokens in the text across 56 submissions, despite being the subject 
of only 2 submissions, whereas transparency produced 298 tokens across 43 submissions while 
the stated subject of 3submissions – a lower token total than the 1:3 ratio of tokens versus 
adaptation that would be expected from submission theme numbers alone. Gender is also 
interesting, producing 168 tokens across 18 texts, despite being the focus of 2 submissions: a 
lower-than-expected ratio (circa 1:7.5) of use of the word across submissions versus adaptation 












Table 4: Corpus-Linguistic Word Tokens in AILAC Submissions by Substantive Topic 
Topic Tokens Number of 
Tokens 




Paris Agreement Legal 




134 6 5 








1095 50 6 
Markets (Article 6) Markets, non-
markets article 6 
172 28 5 
Adaptation (Article 7) Adaptation, adapt, 
adaptive 
1254 50 9 
Loss & Damage 
(Article 8) 
Loss & damage 46 11 1 
Finance (Article 9) Finance, financial 338 46 2 
Technology & 
Capacity Building 























671 56 2 
Agriculture Agriculture, farm, 
farmer 
32 9 1 
Gender Gender 168 18 2 
Human Rights Human rights 65 9 1 
Forestry Forest, REDD+ 69 14 0 
 
The corpus-linguistic analysis of the numbers of tokens of different negotiating topics broadly 
correlates with  interviewees’ responses, when asked which topics were high priority areas for 
AILAC (see Table 5, below), although interviewees were not asked whether the legal status of 
the Paris Agreement was a priority area, given the  Agreement was signed in 2015 and has 
since been legally-binding. Of the 35 AILAC delegates and support unit advisors interviewed, 
32 cited adaptation as a priority, the most for any issue area, consistent with the highest number 
of tokens in the submissions.  This explains the prevalence of the topic in AILAC documents, 
given the support unit advisors draft the submissions, and the delegates amend and revise the 
support unit’s drafts. Similarly, 28 interviewees (80%) cited mitigation and NDCs, also in 
keeping with the high number of tokens found by the corpus-linguistic analysis. Compliance 
and implementation accumulated 671 tokens, broadly in line with the ratio of token totals to 
priority status as determined by interviewees - with 17 interviewees deeming it a high priority 
issue. The 5 topics least deemed a priority by interviewees (i.e. at most 5 of the 35 interviewees) 
– loss & damage, gender, human rights, agriculture, and forestry – also accumulated the fewest 
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tokens in the corpus-linguistic textual analysis, as would be expected given who drafts AILAC 
submissions. Markets produced 172 tokens, only 4 more than gender, but was cited as a priority 
by just under half of interviewees; this number is likely higher because Article 6, being a 
substantive issue under the Paris Agreement, has its own technical co-ordination under the 
AILAC group, whereas gender, human rights, agriculture, and forestry do not, and loss & 
damage is yet to have a co-ordination set up as of 2018 (AILAC, 2018o). The global stocktake 
was designated a priority by 9 interviewees, and accrued 313 tokens, broadly in proportion 
with the interviewees-to-tokens ratios of the aforementioned subjects. 
 
Table 5: Interviewees’ Priorities by Topic 
Topic Number of Interviewees Designating Topic as High 
Priority Area (out of 35) 
Mitigation & NDCs (Including Ambition and 
Common Timeframes) (Articles 3 & 4) 
28 
Markets (Article 6) 17 
Adaptation (Article 7) 32 
Loss & Damage (Article 8) 3 
Finance (Article 9) 28 
Technology & Capacity Building (Articles 10 & 11) 8 
Transparency (Article 13) 30 
Global Stocktake (Article 14) 9 





Human Rights 3 
Forestry 3 
 
However, some results are surprising: as for mitigation, 28 interviewees also cited finance as a 
high priority, though finance only accumulated 338 tokens in the AILAC submissions 
compared with mitigation’s 1095 tokens. This could be because, as stated by nearly one third 
of interviewees, finance is the most difficult topic on which to make progress in the 
negotiations, being “deadlocked” by disputes between developed and developing countries27.  
If, therefore, the chance of progress is small, a better use of limited group resources would be 
to devote them to areas where progress is seen as more achievable. Such is the level of 
frustration on finance that one support unit member even remarked “I’m not emotionally 
qualified to answer your questions on finance, thank you!28” Furthermore, a former AILAC 
delegate, previously part of the group’s finance technical co-ordination, stated the group prefers 
to leave finance negotiations to the wider G77 & China bloc, of which AILAC is part, because 
of its tough stance on the topic29. That progress is hard to come by on finance, coupled with 
the fact that AILAC lets its finance negotiations work through the G77 & China, would explain 
the lower number of tokens in the group’s submissions than one might expect given 
interviewees’ prioritisation of the topic. 
 Transparency was a priority theme for 30 of the 35 interviewees, 4 interviewees 
flagging it as the biggest priority of all, yet only 298 tokens were recorded in the texts. This 
could be because, as one AILAC support unit advisor explained, the Paris Agreement’s 
 
27 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018 
28 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018 
29 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018 
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Enhanced Transparency Framework is an overarching component of the rule book30, and 
therefore affects virtually every other topic in the Agreement. For example, it is inherently 
linked to the NDC portion of mitigation, as this is based upon the provision of information 
about national emissions reduction targets, as well as the adaptation communication part of 
adaptation, which provides similar information; and the global stocktake is based entirely on 
provision of information at regular intervals. That its tokens occur in more than two-thirds of 
all AILAC submissions is consistent with its priority status as a topic with many issue linkages, 
and that many uses of these tokens in non-transparency-focused submissions appear in the 
explanation of other features’ connections to transparency. For example, inter alia Submission 
16, paragraph 3 (AILAC, 2016g) on markets states: 
 “At the outset, AILAC would like to emphasize that transparency and overall ambition are key 
for the implementation of Article 6. Hence, robust guidance for Article 6.2 as well as robust 
rules, modalities and procedures for Article 6.4 need to be delineated in order to ensure that 
mitigation outcomes are real, measurable and verifiable. Likewise, results achieved through 
the implementation of activities under Article 6.8 should also be transparently shared including 
on these results support the implementation of NDCs.” 
Submission 55, paragraph 11 (AILAC, 2018g) also states: 
“AILAC welcomes the exchanges held on developing the guidance for the adaptation 
communication and that a basis for negotiations at the next APA session has been agreed. For 
AILAC, the guidance for the adaptation communication must help achieve the global 
adaptation goal. Fortunately, a limited amount of work on this guide is pending, including its 
linkages with the Enhanced Transparency Framework, since adaptation efforts may be 
reported within it.” 
 
30 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
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5.4.1 Cross-Cutting Submissions 
 
Furthermore, every topic was referred to in a much wider spread of submissions than just those 
which focused on each subject, demonstrating another characteristic of AILAC’s submissions: 
they are cross-cutting and wide-ranging, often incorporating many themes in each text. As well 
as the fact that the submissions from the Work Programme category often cover more than one 
theme, shown by the aforementioned examples of these statements, submissions in other topic 
categories perform a similar function. For example, Submissions 41 (AILAC, 2017s) and 42 
(AILAC, 2017t) were categorised into the adaptation and mitigation groupings, as they address 
a public registry for countries’ national communications to the UNFCCC under Article 7 and 
Article 4 respectively, yet the subject of a public registry is inherently related to transparency, 
given it would provide access to information about each party to the UNFCCC and their 
proposed actions on adaptation and mitigation. Even topics which were not the main subject of 
an AILAC submission are discussed, such as forestry and REDD+ (a total of 69 tokens across 
14 submissions). 
The cross-cutting nature of the AILAC submissions reflects a recognition of the 
technical intricacies linking issues in the UNFCCC regime, and can be interpreted as AILAC 
aspiring to make its submissions technically rigorous. This claim was found to be supported 
through discourse analysis of the texts. For example, Submission 27 (AILAC, 2017e) discusses 
AILAC’s views on modalities, procedures, and guidelines (MPGs) for the Transparency 
Framework on Action. It begins by referencing the specific relevant established text from the 
Paris Agreement as a basis for the discussion in paragraph 3: 
“For AILAC, each of the main sections of the MPGs should respond to mandates received from 
Article 13 paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the Paris Agreement.” 
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The submission is organised around 4 key questions about the nature of the future Transparency 
Framework: the components of its MPGs, how it should build on existing transparency 
arrangements under the UNFCCC, how it should provide flexibility for developing countries, 
and whether other elements should be considered in the development of its MPGs. All these 
questions require technically detailed answers, given these negotiation areas will 
fundamentally determine the functioning of as key a mechanism of the Paris Agreement as the 
Transparency Framework for Parties, affecting their legal obligations under the Agreement. 
Under each question heading, it provides several paragraphs of more general thoughts, e.g. 
paragraph 8: 
“…the current reporting guidelines for developed and developing countries and the ICA and 
IAR processes were designed to meet different purposes. Under the Paris Agreement, all 
Parties have NDCs and common objectives. If all Parties wish to respond to these objectives, 
it is essential to generate common MPGs that consider the flexibility for developing countries 
that need it in light of their capacities in order to, over time, have robust reports and reviews 
that contribute to the evaluation of the implementation of action.” 
It then refers the reader to the submission’s two annexes (see Figures 4-6 below). These provide 
an itemised breakdown of every component AILAC considers should form part of the MPGs 
for the Transparency Framework, and the group’s suggestions about building on existing 
arrangements for each element in the Transparency Framework. This, by definition, also covers 
areas related to NDCs and adaptation. The annex provides thorough, detailed suggestions 
relating to each issue which the group identified as unresolved in the negotiations. This level 
of detailed analysis and consideration of topical issues is a constant theme throughout AILAC 
submissions (see, for example, Submission 14 on the modalities for the accounting of publicly 
mobilised finance (AILAC, 2016e) Submission 33 on NDCs under the APA mitigation agenda 
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item (AILAC, 2017k), and Submission 50 on a proposal and justification for use of common 
reporting timeframes for NDCs (AILAC, 2018b)). 
 



















27’s Annex II 








5.5 Visual Presentation 
 
The way AILAC submissions are presented also helps reinforce the idea that they are written 
by a group with expertise and technical rigour. That the majority of AILAC-only submissions 
(47 of 56) were presented with the AILAC logo in the top right-hand corner of every page, as 
well as a recreation of the AILAC logo as the background to the page (present in 30 of 56 
submissions) presents AILAC as a professional group, focused only on climate change 
negotiations, as indeed it is. Furthermore, this appears to set AILAC apart from some of the 
other negotiating groups, especially those in the developing world. Initial examination of 
submissions, shows neither the AGN31, the LMDCs32 (LMDCs, 2017), nor the G77 & China33 
as a whole include any logo or non-textual representation of their grouping in submissions, and 
while AOSIS34 and the LDCs35 do employ logos, these are only displayed at the top of the first 
page of a submission, unlike AILAC submissions where the AILAC logo appears on every 
page. This creates the impression of a professional group which has technical credibility and 
official status. That AILAC has its own professionally-run (albeit, rarely updated) website, 
from which several of the submissions for this research were sourced, and a Twitter account 
used to boost its outreach activities (Watts and Depledge, 2018), enhances this. 
 Use of the AILAC logo in group submissions – seen above in Figures 4-6 - began in 
2014 with Submission 4 on the Durban Platform’s work stream for enhancing pre-2020 
mitigation action. This is traceable to 2014, coinciding with the start of another feature of 
AILAC negotiating - the establishment of the support unit as AILAC’s permanent secretariat.  
 
31 https://africangroupofnegotiators.org/document-library/agn-submissions-to-the-unfccc/  
32 https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Iran_On%20behalf%20of%20_LMDC_18Sept.pdf  
33 https://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/application/pdf/dsubmission_g77_11_june_2014.pdf  
34 https://www.un.org/depts/los/biodiversity/prepcom_files/streamlined/AOSIS.pdf  
35 https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/LDC%20submission_March6.pdf  
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As mentioned, this group of full-time, professional expert advisors draft the group’s 
submissions and are therefore responsible for the appearance of the documents, including the 




The support unit’s rôle in drafting the group’s texts also can account for the almost template-
like formats evident in the structuring of most AILAC submissions. The texts begin with 
references to legal or decision texts from previous negotiating sessions, followed by an 
introductory section on background context, before addressing substantive issues at hand in the 
submission. The opening paragraphs, which either “welcome the opportunity to submit” 
AILAC’s views to the UNFCCC, or present AILAC’s thoughts “following an invitation”, 
reflect the standard format used, as the wording is reproduced in each submission.  
The introductory sections demonstrate the group has considered relevant earlier 
developments, both legal/decision-based and substantive progress in the negotiations, adding 
further to the impression of technical rigour. However, a different template is followed in 
statements to UNFCCC negotiating sessions, adopting a more obviously diplomatic style. This 
template format addresses the chairs and co-chairs of the relevant negotiation session at various 
points throughout each statement. It always ends by thanking chairs and presiding officers, 
reiterating AILAC’s willingness to continue participating in negotiations. For example, 
paragraph 11 of Submission 12 (AILAC, 2016c) states that AILAC “…is ready to continue 
moving forward together with our partners in a constructive spirit…”, and paragraph 15 of 
Submission 52 (AILAC, 2018d) states “…AILAC is willing to continue supporting these 
efforts, along with our fellow negotiators, in a constructive spirit…” This phrasing is used 
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almost verbatim in each AILAC statement to the negotiating sessions. Recognition of the 
protocols of diplomatic engagement within the UNFCCC forum also adds to the credibility of 
AILAC as a serious negotiating group whose contributions to climate change discussions are 
worthy of consideration. 
 
5.7 Key Discourses: Primacy of Technical Knowledge 
 
AILAC use their technical submissions and statements, boosted by credibility derived from 
their technical rigour, to promote certain discourses embedded within their texts, though they 
are not the designated topics of the submissions themselves. First amongst these is the primacy 
of technical and scientific knowledge within the climate change negotiations. AILAC seeks to 
establish climate scientific and technical knowledge as both the lingua franca of the 
negotiations – that is, the prism through which all negotiations take place between parties – 
and as the acid test of whether the commitments of parties under the Paris Agreement have 
been met. This has been a consistent discursive push from AILAC before and after signing of 
the Paris Agreement, and takes various forms: from calling for scientific knowledge to 
underpin the entire negotiations, to boosting the agency of technical expert bodies like the 
IPCC. Among many examples, section 2 of Submission 6 (AILAC, 2014d) lists among 
AILAC’s requirements for the preamble of the Paris Agreement the need for “the fundamental 
basis of the agreement on science”, and calls for the establishment of “a mechanism to 
periodically review nationally defined contributions (on all issues) based on science and 
respective capacities.” Submission 10 (AILAC, 2014a), immediately after the signing of the 
Paris Agreement, states “targeted support should be provided to developing countries to 
increase the participation of technical experts and policy practitioners from developing 
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countries…”, effectively calling for an increase in the level of technical discussions in the 
negotiations. Submission 15 (AILAC, 2016f) begins by quoting the Paris Agreement’s Article 
14.1, which states collective progress towards the Paris Agreement’s goals must be assessed 
“in a comprehensive and facilitative manner…and in the light of equity and the best available 
science”, and later discusses the “specific areas and modalities by which the Group considers 
the IPCC could provide information to support the collective assessment of progress.” It further 
states that “For AILAC, the IPCC bears strong scientific legitimacy in the context of the work 
of the Convention”, and therefore that “the best available science in the form of the latest 
Assessment Reports of the IPCC should clearly form part of the inputs to the GST.” Submission 
33 (AILAC, 2017k) asserts the importance and fundamental status of verifiable, rigorous 
methodologies and quantifiable technical data, stating that guidance on the accounting of 
parties’ NDCs “should drive the use of the more appropriate and scientifically accurate 
methodological approaches and metrics for estimating and accounting for anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions and removals provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) in order to reduce uncertainty”, while Submission 59 (AILAC, 2018k), with 
several other parties, reinforces this point, stating that “In order to quantify carbon dioxide 
equivalents Parties must use methodologies and common metrics asserted by the IPCC and 
adopted by the CMA.” 
 By seeking to establish scientific and technical knowledge as a dominant discourse 
within the UNFCCC negotiations, AILAC attempts to give itself greater negotiating power 
versus other parties. AILAC understands that if the negotiations are reduced simply to 
expressions of traditional sources of power in international negotiations – namely, economic 
(and its proxy in climate change negotiations, namely CO2 emissions) and military power, and 
latent power in the form of population sizes – it cannot hope to have meaningful influence on 
the outcome of the climate change negotiations. According to the World Bank (2018a, 2018b), 
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of the AILAC countries, only Colombia sits ranks within the top 40 wealthiest states by GDP 
(ranked fortieth), and none ranks within the top 40 of gross CO2 emissions. Indeed, total 
AILAC countries’ CO2 emissions amounted in 2018 to 293.4 Mt, of a global total of 36573 Mt 
(Carbon Atlas, 2019); this is equivalent to 0.80% of the global total. The total population of 
the AILAC countries in 2018 according to the World Bank (2018c) was 143,331,000, which 
amounts to only 1.89% of the global total of 7,594,270,360, while the total of the AILAC 
countries’ military spending accounted for merely 1.12% of the 2018 global total (World Bank, 
2018d).  
  However, if negotiations are conducted so that technical knowledge and 
expertise is a source of power able to affect the outcome, AILAC becomes a much more 
relevant participant, given the plentiful expertise of its support unit advisors. A support group 
member stated it is in the character of AILAC, and in particular that of the support unit, to be 
grounded in science: 
“The support unit is like-minded professionals who have worked on climate change in previous 
jobs, who have a passion for the topic, and who believe that the process could be made more 
effective if a certain line were followed…what I’ve seen is that the internal dynamic of the 
support unit, in a handful of individuals with quite a lot of knowledge, with a high level of 
professionalism and pretty informed views, converge on how it might work. And then what you 
see is different documents along different topics that radiate from an overall view that the 
support unit has put together.”36 
AILAC countries’ national delegates have a strong grounding in technical and scientific expert 
knowledge as well as the support unit advisors. 22 of the 35 interviewees specifically noted the 
majority of delegates are drawn from national environment or foreign affairs ministries, and 
 
36 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018 
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several also stated that most are technical negotiators from environmental science backgrounds 
rather than being diplomatically trained37, although foreign affairs personnel with negotiations 
training are still integral to AILAC’s activity. 
 This push to establish scientific and technical knowledge as the bedrock of the 
UNFCCC negotiations through the use of submissions – as one support unit advisor put it, “to 
rely very heavily on, on the technical coherence and providing very specific technical inputs to 
the process”38 – separates AILAC’s behaviour, both in relation to the concept of 
power/knowledge and its selection of a primary strategy to use, from AOSIS. Where AOSIS 
deployed moral power by appealing to vulnerability discourses (Betzold, 2010; Deitelhoff and 
Wallbott, 2012) as its primary strategy, AILAC focused on establishing the primacy of 
technical knowledge through its technical submissions to boost its negotiating power by 
steering the setting up of the “rules of the game” towards a rulebook which would play to its 
strengths. Where AOSIS “borrowed” power in the form of specialist scientific and technical 
knowledge from outside NGOs (Betzold, 2010; Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012), AILAC 
utilised the in-house expertise of its technically-capable delegates and expert support unit 
advisors to achieve its primary aim.  
 AILAC’s drive to cement scientific and technical knowledge as the lingua 
franca of the UNFCCC negotiations enabled the bloc to utilise other strategies which rely on 
knowledge and expertise for legitimacy, like constructive proposals and persuasion. Both are 
used within submissions and the discussions of the negotiating sessions at the COP or SB 
meetings39. 
 
37 Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; 
interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th 
November 2018 
38 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
39 See Chapters 6 and 7 respectively. 
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5.8 Key Discourses: Universality 
 
Another discourse which emerged from the critical discourse analysis was AILAC’s drive for 
universal participation in both signature and ratification of the Paris Agreement, and the 
subsequent implementation of its rulebook to achieve its long-term goals. Tokens for either 
“all parties”, “all countries”, or “universal” were recorded 105 times across 34 of the 62 
submissions by the corpus-linguistic analysis, showing a relatively consistent drive to call for 
universality of engagement from parties. This feature was also recognised as being repeatedly 
emphasised during the textual discourse analysis of the submissions in several different ways. 
Sometimes AILAC’s submissions actively called for universal participation in fighting climate 
change, as in Submission 7 (AILAC, 2014e), which states “the 2015 Agreement should include 
a global goal on MoI, to be achieved through efforts by all Parties in accordance with the 
principles of equity and CBDR-RC”, or Submission 58 (AILAC, 2018j), which states: 
“It is essential for AILAC that what is adopted under the Paris Agreement Work Program 
[PAWP] respects the integrity of the Agreement, including in particular the consideration of 
flexibilities for developing countries and the obligation of all Parties40 to undertake efforts in 
accordance with the provisions of the Agreement.” 
In other submissions, the universality of participation in the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement is taken as read, as if it would never be in doubt once the rule book has been agreed. 
For example, Submission 11 (AILAC, 2016b), on the logistics of the APA agenda, states 
“Ideally…there would be no more than 2 contact groups scheduled in parallel, in order to 
ensure the highest possible participation by all Parties, especially those with smaller 
 
40 The original text also highlights the underlined text by presenting it in italics, unlike the rest of the 
surrounding paragraph; the entire quotation here is italicised for differentiation from the main body of text. 
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delegations”. Similarly, Submission 41 (AILAC, 2017s), on a public registry for adaptation 
communications, states “…the guidance of the adaptation communication would provide for 
common elements that will serve as a level playing field for all Parties”. Phrasings such as 
these suggest that, by assuming that universality will necessarily follow agreement of the rule 
book, AILAC is trying to ensure that this is exactly what happens, by embedding the concept 
of universal participation into the normal discourse of climate negotiations. 
All the tokens for “universal” in particular were situated within submissions from 2014, 
before the signing of the Paris Agreement. This makes sense given more than half (5 of 9, and, 
indeed, 4 of the 5 submissions from 2014) of AILAC’s pre-Paris submissions centred on the 
legal status and goals of the Paris Agreement, and AILAC viewed the development of a 
“balanced and fair and universal and ambitious agreement” as a top priority41. That the research 
identified this repeated discourse of universality of participation matches the findings of Watts 
and Depledge (2018:8) when they write that AILAC pushes for an ambitious response to 
climate change “in a way that does not exclusively focus on historical wrongs, and instead 
looks to the benefits of ambitious actions by all Parties, with a strong international regime 
promoting ambitious domestic policy, and vice versa.” 
   Only one slight deviation from this discursive pattern was identified within the 
textual analysis of the submissions. In Submission 57 (AILAC, 2018i), paragraph 4 states: 
“We note the dissimilar progress achieved in this session under the different agenda items, 
with respect to which we express our deepest concern. We understand the importance of 
incorporating the interests and considerations of all the Parties in the rules of the Agreement, 
but we must take into account the common interest of having a set of clear and precise rules.” 
 
41 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
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For the first time, AILAC implies that reaching agreements that every party is happy with is 
secondary to agreements being based on robust rules and procedures. AILAC here appears to 
be advocating a “deep-but-narrow” agreement, where participation is less widespread among 
parties but the agreement itself does a better job of fighting climate change, contrasted against 
a “broad-but-shallow” agreement, adhered to by far more parties but whose contents provide 
less effective ways of fighting climate change, even factoring in wider participation among 
parties. However, the very next paragraph, paragraph 5, seems to contradict this, again 
reverting to the original discourse of universality and stating: 
“We must be pragmatic, recognizing that the pace of under discussions under the current 
modality will not allow us to complete the mandate of the PAWP. In that sense, and in the spirit 
of good faith and that Paris is and must be an Agreement of all, with all and for all, we believe 
that it would be convenient to allow you, Madame Co-Chairs Mr Chairs, to give us a  decisive 
and strong guidance towards our objective…” 
If anything, the language in the above quotation is even more unequivocally in favour of 
universal participation in the negotiations than paragraph 4 is in running counter to the usual 
AILAC discourse. Furthermore, the fact that support for the universality discourse is expressed 
in the paragraph immediately following one where it is questioned leaves the idea of AILAC’s 
support for universality lingering in the reader’s mind, and thus the submission as a whole still 
does not run counter to the established pro-universality discourse of AILAC documents as a 
whole. 
  The reasoning behind the universality discourse can be traced back to the 
AILAC rule book. In paragraph 1, the rule book states that one of AILAC’s 3 objectives is “to 
create bridges between the different negotiating groups, building trust and favouring the 
creation of propitious spaces for consensus” (AILAC, date unknown:1). Therefore, as a bridge-
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building group, it is in AILAC’s DNA, as it were, to encourage universal participation, as this 
is the only way to build the consensus AILAC desires. This is reflected in interviewees’ 
responses. 30 of the 35 delegates and support unit advisors questioned on the rôle of AILAC 
in the UNFCCC negotiations stated it aims to act as a bridge-builder, and more than half (22 
of 35) stated that this identity was a conscious factor in the way the group chooses strategies 
and how to deploy them. One former delegate stated that one of AILAC’s main features is that 
it has always been “multilateralism-orientated” and has “a respect for multilateralism in 
general” because the AILAC countries have “this traditional respect for international law”42, 
while a support unit member who previously worked as part of another party’s delegation stated 
they could see a clear bridge-building identity at the genesis of AILAC in 201243. Another 
delegate responded that the group has always “called ourselves like that…we want to be, like, 
a bridge group…So, I think, yeah, it’s part of our DNA”, and therefore its behaviour accords 
with this44. Yet another delegate confirmed that the group continues to embrace its bridge-
building persona by describing the approach of preparing rigorous submissions and pursuing a 
discourse of universal participation as the group’s “heritage”45. This heritage was described 
thus by a former AILAC support unit advisor: 
“We always created the group with the idea of being a group that bridges, that generates 
solutions for consensus, that wants to bring different sides of the table into a middle ground. I 
remember one of the delegates at the time wanting to use the slogan ‘The middle is beautiful’. 
Right, so AILAC always wanted to be, to be the broker between the different extremes…I think 
it is part of its character.”46 
 
42 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018 
43 Interview with support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
44 Interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018 
45 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 
46 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018 
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A support unit advisor stated the group’s aim is always to achieve the most ambitious common 
denominator possible within the negotiations, and commented on the reason behind this 
approach: 
“And there is this genuine effort because of the genuine interest of AILAC countries in 
multilateralism that – and all AILAC countries – and I’m very proud of this – are, I would say, 
very respectful and believe in the strength of multilateralism, no? And so that’s something that 
drives this bridge-building intent, and it’s very genuine.”47 
However, the self-described bridge-builder identity is not the only reason behind the group’s 
push for universality of participation in the climate change negotiations. Paragraph 1 of the 
AILAC rule book also states that another of AILAC’s 3 core objectives is “to drive innovative 
and viable proposals in order to accelerate the fulfilment of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol and the implementation of the 
Paris Agreement, as well as the construction of sustainable long-term agreements.” Given the 
AILAC countries willingly signed the UNFCCC, it is reasonable to assume that they did so 
motivated by self-interest. Considering the AILAC countries’ particular vulnerability to 
climate change, it is not hard to see why universality of participation is a discourse that the 
group pushes consistently. All interviewees noted that AILAC countries are likely to suffer 
disproportionately from climate change effects. As climate change is a collective action 
prisoners’ dilemma problem, this suffering can only be averted by an effective agreement. 
Given the global nature of the problem, an agreement realistically can only be effective if all 
parties act together. This is only reinforced by the fact that as per the UNFCCC’s (1992) 
decision-making rules, any outcome can only be formally adopted by consensus among all 
parties. 
 
47 Interview with support unit advisor, 27th September 2018 
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After use of technically rigorous submissions, AILAC’s next-most common strategies are use 
of constructive proposals and compromises. CDA identified evidence supporting this 
conclusion from the submission texts, and 31 of the 35 AILAC interviewees cited constructive 
proposals and compromises as frequently used strategies in face-to-face negotiations. These 
strategies’ use is inherently linked to the use of technically rigorous submissions, the latter 
legitimising the former, as mentioned in Chapter 5. On the basis that technical and scientific 
knowledge is the established foundation for contributions to the climate change negotiations, 
AILAC’s negotiating partners must take its proposals seriously, given they are grounded in 
sound understanding of the science, despite the group’s lack of material power resources. The 
first section of this chapter examines AILAC’s use of constructive proposals, examining its use 
of “should”, “shall”, and “would”/”could” terms, discourses of positivity and opportunity 
running through AILAC submissions, and the use of proposals in negotiation sessions. The 
second section considers AILAC’s use of compromise, highlighting 2 examples from 
submissions before turning to compromise offers in sessions. 
 
6.2 Proposals and Use of “Should” 
 
AILAC submissions are littered with examples of their proposals in the climate change 
negotiations, aligning with interviewees’ responses on use of constructive suggestions as a 
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strategy. One interviewee explained submissions are a vehicle for suggesting ideas, citing an 
example where NDCs were described as an “anchor” to the Paris Agreement48. This intention 
is most obvious in the group’s use of the word “should”, evidence of AILAC putting forward 
ideas it would like included in the UNFCCC rule book and governance structures, but which 
are not yet formal rules. One of many examples is in Submission 2 (AILAC, 2013b) which, 
referencing assessments of vulnerability, options for adaptation measures and costs, and 
therefore the most cost-effective solutions, states “…the Convention should provide guidance 
on common methodologies to undertake such assessments (and include scientific, technical 
and socio-economic data)…”. Submission 40 (AILAC, 2017r), referring to the design of the 
global stocktake, states that “the institutional framework that assists the CMA in the 
development of the GST should build on existing arrangements under both the Agreement and 
the Convention…” Submission 61 (AILAC, 2018m), on the provision of information by parties 
under the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF), states “…we would like to propose that 
Parties that would like to report additional information on adaptation that is not included in the 
ETF MPG [modalities, procedures, and guidelines] should follow the guidance developed by 
APA4.” 
Corpus-linguistic analysis of AILAC submissions produced 918 tokens for “should” in the 
context of proposals, with a relative frequency of 76.508288 per 10,000 tokens. This figure 
may actually be higher but for the ambiguity of the Spanish verb “deber”, which can be 
translated into English as “should”, “shall”, or “must”, and would have added a further 3 tokens 
to the total. Nevertheless, the relative frequency of “should” in the Brown Corpus of American 
English, is 8.754280, given a relative frequency ratio between the AILAC submissions corpus 
and the Brown corpus of 8.739529:1. The log likelihood of there being a statistically significant 
difference between the relative frequencies of “should” of the 2 corpora is 1819.85, which, 
 
48 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
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according to the University of Lancaster’s Centre for Computer Corpus Research on Language, 
exceeds the critical value needed (15.13) for evidence of such a statistically different difference 
at 99.99% confidence (UCREL, 2019). 
   Of the 918 “should” tokens, 443, or 48.26%, are collocations with the word “be” 
within a window size of 5, i.e. that “be” can be found within five words to the right of “should”. 
Brezina (2018:69) presents a calculation for an expected frequency of collocations, multiplying 
the total node frequency (918) by the collocation frequency (443) and the window size (5), 
divided by the total number of tokens in the corpus (119,987). Incorporating the window size 
into the calculation corrects for the possibility that the bigger the window size, the greater the 
chance of random co-occurrences of “should” and “be” (Brezina, 2018). The calculation here 
gives a result of 16.9466, clearly less than the number of recorded collocations at 443. 
Therefore, more have occurred than would be expected due to chance. At face value, this could 
imply a high degree of passive verb constructions with agency deletion, in turn implying that 
AILAC does not make specific suggestions about who might, or how to, put into effect the idea 
in question. For example, Submission 6 (AILAC, 2014d) states “Support should be given to 
countries who need it most and who are willing to go beyond their capacity”, again without 
specifying by whom, or how, this support should be provided. However, from textual analysis, 
it is evident that more often than not, agency can be inferred by the context of the relevant 
sentences. For example, Submission 50 (AILAC, 2018b) states “…the first round of NDCs 
should be updated by 2020”, and given the national nature of NDCs, it is clear that updating 
should be carried out by parties to the Convention. Similarly, Submission 41 (AILAC, 2017s) 
states “As the guidance of the adaptation communication would be revised iteratively the 
registry should also be updated accordingly”, which follows a passage of text where AILAC 
states “Furthermore, the Registry must allow for Parties to update their adaptation 
communication at any point in time”, thus clarifying agency beforehand.  
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Other examples of this collocation also do not imply agency deletion because agency 
is not a relevant consideration. For example, Submission 28 (AILAC, 2017f) states that “The 
Global Stocktake should be a process that tangibly reflects the functional linkages between 
mitigation and adaptation action.” That less than half the total number of “should” tokens forms 
a collocation with “be” within a window size of 5, and that even those which do more often 
than not do not contain agency deletion, shows AILAC usually makes its proposals in a specific 
manner, identifying how or by whom an idea should be performed, rather than leaving it open 
to interpretation. This aligns with the first strategy of making technically rigorous submissions, 
as specificity is a key part of this approach. 
 
6.2.1 Use of “Shall” vs Use of “Should” 
 
By contrast, AILAC’s use of the word “shall” - in the context of international negotiations  
more associated with demands than proposals as its use also signifies obligation in treaty texts 
(D’Acquisto and D’Avanzo, 2009; Krapivkina, 2017) - is considerably more limited, producing 
only 105 tokens in the group’s submissions, at a relative frequency of 8.750948. The use of 
“shall” is found in 2 sets of circumstances; firstly, when referencing established texts from 
previous agreements, such as the Paris Agreement, or decision texts from previous negotiating 
sessions. For example, Submission 33 (AILAC, 2017k), when discussing features to be 
included in parties’ NDCs, states “For AILAC, the features of NDCs are already reflected in 
the Paris Agreement and decision 1/CP.21, as described below”, before listing points such as 
“That parties shall account for their NDCs” and “That NDCs shall be communicated every 5 
years”. It is also used, however, in AILAC’s identified priority areas, to emphasise their 
importance. This can be seen in the fact that use of “shall” is concentrated in certain discourses 
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and in under half of the total submissions. All 105 tokens for “shall” are found in just 27 of the 
total 62 submissions, and 87 (82.86%) of these can be found within just 16 submissions which 
use the word relating either to transparency or the provision and reporting of information, or in 
relation to the Paris Agreement’s legal status. Both are clear priorities for AILAC, shown by 
the fact that more than half of the pre-Paris submissions focused on its legal status, and the that 
30 of 35 AILAC interviewees cited transparency as a high priority. Indeed, 34 of all “shall” 
tokens appear in Submission 43 (AILAC, 2017u), which focuses on the Enhanced 
Transparency Framework. For example, it states “Parties shall report their estimates of 
emissions and absorptions for all IPCC categories, gases and C pools considered in their 
National GHG Inventories throughout their inventory period”, and “In the case of developing 
country parties, Parties shall submit every two years, a National Inventory Report that should 
include the inventory for the calendar year no more than two years prior to the date of 
submission…”  
 Of the 105 “shall” tokens in AILAC submissions, only 8 (7.62%) form a collocation 
with “be” within a window size of 5. As the corrected expected frequency of collocation 
calculation produces a value of 0.035 ((105 x 8 x 5)/119987), the collocation is more frequent 
than would be expected due to chance, but, much like the use of “should”, in most cases AILAC 
does not use “shall” with agency deletion. Either it is used to specify the nature of an idea the 
group is proposing – for example, Submission 32 (AILAC, 2017j) states “…the use of ITMOs 
[internationally transferred mitigation outcomes] to achieve NDCs under this Agreement shall 
be voluntary” - or, “shall” is used in contexts where agency can be inferred elsewhere in the 
text. For example, Submission 43 (AILAC, 2017u) states “Recalculations shall be reported in 
the NIR, with explanatory information and justification for recalculations”, where an NIR is 
identified elsewhere as the National Inventory Report, and therefore the responsibility of each 
party to the Convention. That the majority of “shall” tokens occur in contexts relating to 
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AILAC’s priority topics and very few involve passive verbal constructions with agency 
deletion, along with its use of “should”, is consistent with the argument that its submissions 
are specific in nature as part of the strategy of being technically rigorous. 
  Nevertheless, the ratio of “should” versus “shall” relative frequencies in AILAC 
submissions is 8.742857:1. This ratio shows AILAC is not generally seeking to impose its 
views on negotiating partners by making demands or being too rigid, but rather embodying a 
constructive spirit by putting forward ideas for others to consider. This constructive approach 
is in keeping with AILAC’s identity as a bridge-builder, identified by interviewees, and 
AILAC’s stated aims, per its internal rule book (AILAC, date unknown:1). Indeed, it meets all 
3 requirements of the rule book, namely the following (the relevant sections which the ratio of 
“should” to “shall” in submissions fulfils have been italicised): 
1) To “generate co-ordinated, ambitious and progressive positions that positively support 
the balance in the multilateral negotiations on climate change, considering a coherent 
and responsible vision of sustainable development and the environment and future 
generations” 
2) To “drive innovative and viable proposals in order to accelerate the compliance of the 
UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and implementation of the Paris Agreement, as well as the 
construction of sustainable, long-term agreements” 
3) To “build bridges between the different negotiation groups, promoting trust, and 







6.2.2 Use of “Would” and “Could” 
 
This constructive approach to putting forward proposals is also bolstered by use of other terms. 
Frequently, AILAC seeks to build on its initial suggestion, which often uses a “should” verb, 
by following up with “would” or “could” in subsequent clauses or sentences to develop the 
idea, for example by more detailed explanation of meaning or ways of application. 243 tokens 
for “would” appear in AILAC submissions, and the textual analysis identified instances of this 
word being used to develop a constructive follow-up to an initial idea in 23 submissions. 
Similarly, “could” tokens numbered 249, and were used in this manner in 33 submissions.  
 A few examples demonstrate the use of these features in practice. Paragraph 7 of 
Submission 7 (AILAC, 2014e) suggests that to help countries tackle climate change 
domestically, the then-future Paris Agreement “should be accompanied by the contributions 
that each Party will commit to implement.” Paragraphs 8 to 10 discuss the nature of these 
contributions, with paragraph 10 providing adding that “…the contributions would be inscribed 
in individual contribution documents, to which the Agreement will make an explicit 
reference…” Paragraph 13 also states these contributions “should be subject to an ex-post 
review”, and the very next sentence provides additional detail, stating “Country contributions 
would be subject to the Convention’s and the 2015 Agreement’s MRV and transparency 
requirements.” Submissions 24 (AILAC, 2017b) and 26 (2017d) use a follow-up “would” to 
explain the implications for the ideas in their proposals. The second point in Section I.B of 
Submission 24 states “…the goal of assessing adaptation needs should ensure that all required 
adaptation efforts…are covered. This assessment would also contribute to having a clear 
picture of the adaptation needs and a better understanding of each country´s capacity to respond 
to its current and expected climate change impacts.” Paragraph 3 of Submission 26 states 
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“AILAC considers that the remaining sessions…should continue under the current APA 
agenda…” and follows up by further stating that “This would enable discussions to advance 
with a focus on substance, avoiding having to spend valuable negotiating time in aspects 
pertaining to process.” 
  There are similar examples of the use of “could”. In paragraph 19 of Submission 
4 (AILAC, 2014b), AILAC supports the creation of an online platform for countries’ policy 
plans and actions, stating this platform “should also include a searchable database with the 
contact information of all the experts who have participated in the TEMs [technical expert 
meetings]”, before proceeding to examine the implications of such a database, adding “their 
collective knowledge could be extremely useful for actors who are working to develop and 
implement policy.” Submission 32 (AILAC, 2017j) uses “could” similarly, with paragraph 6 
affirming the possibility of learning lessons from implementation of the Kyoto Protocol with 
regards to the accounting of internationally transferrable mitigation credits, which “could be 
used as inputs to avoid double counting and ensuring environmental integrity.” Paragraph 9 of 
Submission 15 (AILAC, 2016f) uses “could” to add detail to a proposal, stating “…the best 
available science in the form of the latest Assessment Reports of the IPCC should clearly form 
part of the inputs to the GST”, before going on to say that “a summary of information derived 
from the ARs could be provided in an ad-hoc manner as an input to the GST.” Likewise, 
Submission 61’s final section on APA5 uses “could” to develop an idea, stating that “Regarding 
adaptation…we would prefer to have a text in Chapter IV.D that reflects the importance of 
having all stakeholders’ perspectives. It could read as follows: ‘How best available science, 





6.2.3 Positivity and a Discourse of Opportunity 
 
Building upon the constructiveness of regularly presenting its ideas to the negotiations, AILAC 
frames such climate action as a series of opportunities, and a discourse of opportunity runs 
through the submission texts. This resonates with the argument by Watts and Depledge 
(2018:8) that “AILAC's approach is based on a framing of climate change less as a burden, and 
more as an opportunity… with opportunity justifying ambition and bridge-building.” The 
group even goes as far as to title Submission 10 (AILAC, 2016a) “Submission…on 
Opportunities for the Technical Examination Process on Adaptation.” The tokens 
“opportunity” or “opportunities” are shown by corpus-linguistic analysis to occur 107 times – 
more than some of the (albeit minor) substantive topics, across nearly three quarters of the 
submissions, 45 of 62. These tokens have a relative frequency in the Submissions corpus of 
8.917633 per 10,000 tokens, versus 172 tokens at a relative frequency of 1.695649 per 10,000 
tokens in the Brown reference corpus, which gives a log likelihood of 147.70; therefore, there 
is a 99.99% confidence level of statistically significant difference between the frequency of use 
of these terms between the AILAC submissions and the reference corpus. 
3 instances of climate action as opportunity particularly stand out. Firstly, climate 
action is portrayed as an opportunity to tackle a global problem effectively. For example, 
Submission 3 (AILAC, 2014a), jointly made with Mexico and the Dominican Republic, states 
that “We see the post-2020 climate regime as a unique opportunity to promote robust and 
determined action by all Parties”, while Submission 58 (AILAC, 2018j) states “The COP which 
begins today in Katowice is a unique opportunity so that Parties can implement the Agreement 
in an effective and progressive manner over time.” Secondly, climate action is framed as an 
opportunity to foster understanding, agreement, and co-operation between countries. For 
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example, Submission 8 (AILAC, 2015a), jointly made with the EIG, states “For AILAC and 
EIG, it is important that the in-session workshop on gender-responsive climate…is viewed as 
an opportunity to increase a common understanding among Parties”, while Submission 62 
(AILAC, 2018n) states “On the issue of the long-term goal on finance, and under the same 
spirit of trust…we have an opportunity here at COP24 to make progress by agreeing it all 
parties together, in order to reflect needs and priorities of developing countries.” Thirdly, 
climate action is presented as an opportunity for development and improvement of human 
wellbeing. For example, Submission 9 (AILAC, 2015b) states “…the Paris Agreement presents 
a crucial opportunity to ensure that climate policies and actions are informed by and grounded 
in existing human rights obligations and maximise the effectiveness of the actions and the 
benefits to people and the planet”. Similarly, Submission 23 (AILAC, 2017a) states 
“Adaptation is a crucial yet costly task that can also be considered an opportunity to enhance 
the development potential of countries…” 
  AILAC’s attitude towards the climate change negotiations as a series of 
opportunities is further reinforced by the aforementioned fact that most AILAC submissions 
(excluding statements) begin with a standardised paragraph explicitly expressing that AILAC 
“welcomes the opportunity to submit its views” (e.g. inter alia, Submissions 16 (AILAC, 
2016g), 29 (AILAC, 2017g), and 44 (AILAC, 2017v)). Thus, even the chance to participate is 
seen as a positive occurrence. AILAC builds on this positivity by regularly framing individual 
points in its submissions as opportunities to improve the substance of negotiating topics in 
terms of their effectiveness. For example, among many instances, on adaptation, Submission 
21 (AILAC, 2016l) presents the idea of a regular adaptation communication as part of parties’ 
NDCs thusly, stating “AILAC considers that this periodic momentum will enable an 
opportunity to assess overall adaptation efforts”. Additionally, in finance Submission 29 
(AILAC, 2017g) positively frames the coinciding of the work of the Standing Committee on 
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Finance (SCF) on the Paris Agreement’s financial mechanism, both in terms of its 
implementation and its governance structure, stating “AILAC considers that this conjunction 
presents an opportunity for the SCF to assess the current financial architecture under the 
Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, in light of the implementation of the 
latter.” Furthermore, Submission 35 (AILAC, 2017m) on technology and capacity-building 
states “AILAC believes the formulation of long-term low greenhouse gas emission 
development strategies…presents a valuable opportunity in which include such technology 
pathways within national planning.” 
 
6.2.4 Vocabulary Choice 
 
The discourse of positivity is evident in AILAC’s submissions, both in its choice of vocabulary 
and its labelling of ideas as opportunities. In its in-session statements, which are the most 
visible of its submission texts as they are read out to all parties in the plenaries (there being  no 
guarantee that AILAC’s technical submissions will be read by other parties), on 12 out of 13 
occasions, AILAC concludes with a paragraph emphasising its upbeat attitude towards the 
negotiations and full commitment to constructive participation. In 6 of the statements, AILAC 
ends by stating “AILAC is willing to continue supporting these efforts”, either “together with 
our negotiating colleagues” or “along with our fellow negotiators”. In the remaining 7, AILAC 
is either “ready to continue moving forward together with our partners” (AILAC, 2016c), 
“would like to express its willingness to continue advancing together with our partners” 
(AILAC, 2016d), “looks forward to continuing these efforts” (AILAC, 2017n), “willing to 
continue promoting these efforts, together with our negotiation colleagues” (AILAC, 2017x), 
“prepared to continue advancing these efforts” (AILAC, 2017y), “reiterates its commitment to 
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continue participating in this process” (AILAC, 2017z), or “ready to continue to support all 
efforts” (AILAC, 2018j). 8 of these statements say that AILAC intends to do so “in a 
constructive spirit”, and the 4 which do not, nevertheless echo the same sentiment stating: 
“…our group looks forward to continuing these efforts and to honour the collective 
commitment to fully comply with the Paris Agreement” (Submission 36: AILAC, 2017n) 
“Our group is prepared to continue advancing these efforts and to honour the collective 
commitment to fully comply with the Paris Agreement” (Submission 47: AILAC, 2017y) 
AILAC “…reiterates its commitment to continue participating in this process” (Submission 48: 
AILAC, 2017z)  
“AILAC stands ready to continue supporting these efforts, together with our negotiating 
colleagues towards this goal. You can count on our full support in this effort.” (Submission 62: 
AILAC, 2018n). 
Other uses of positive vocabulary occur throughout the AILAC submissions. AILAC uses the 
verb “welcome” 44 times across 31 submissions, giving a relative frequency across the 
Submissions corpus as a whole of 3.667064 per 10,000 tokens, versus a relative frequency in 
the Brown reference corpus of its use as a verb of 0.394337, which gives a log likelihood of 
90.37. There is therefore a 99.99% confidence level of statistically significant difference 
between the frequency of use of these terms between the AILAC submissions and the reference 
corpus. 23 of these tokens are concordances with the token for “opportunity” or 
“opportunities”, and thus form part of the aforementioned discourse of opportunity. The 
remaining 23, however, across 10 submissions, 5 of which are the high-profile in-session 
statements, further contribute to AILAC’s strategy of constructive input. For example, 
Submission 12 (AILAC, 2016c) states AILAC “welcome[s] the progress made regarding the 
consideration of the manner in which the IPCC reports relate to the global stocktake under the 
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Paris Agreement…”, and Submission 55 (AILAC, 2018g) states AILAC “welcomes the 
progress made across the different agenda items of the Paris Agreement Work Plan”, and 
additionally that it “welcomes the exchanges held on developing the guidance for the 
adaptation communication, and that a basis for negotiations at the next APA session has been 
agreed.” This is clearly AILAC expressing support for the negotiations process and 
participation of all involved. Indeed, on 15 occasions and in 3 in-session statements, AILAC 
says it “looks forward” to such things as “engaging with other Parties in fruitful discussions” 
(AILAC, 2017l; 2017s), continuing exchanges (AILAC, 2016i), progress (AILAC, 2017y), 
discussions (AILAC, 2017o), or efforts (AILAC, 2017n). Its use of this verbal concordance in 
submissions has a relative frequency of 1.250135 versus its equivalent in the reference corpus 
of 0.157735, producing a log likelihood of 28.03 and a statistically significant difference at a 
confidence level of 99.99%. 
 
6.2.5 Recognition of Progress 
 
Another positive feature of AILAC’s submissions is that they frequently acknowledge and 
highlight progress already achieved in the negotiations. In 11 of its 13 in-session statements, 
all highly visible to the rest of its negotiating partners, AILAC uses various phrases to achieve 
this, implying that the group views developments favourably, thus contributing to their air of 
support for the negotiations and constructive attitude towards them. For example, in 
Submission 13 (AILAC, 2016d), the group states “…for AILAC it is of the highest relevance 
that during the last two weeks substantive discussions were begun aimed at implementing the 
Paris Agreement”, and that “AILAC celebrates the progress made in the core of ICAO to 
regulate CO2 emissions in international air transport…”; while Submission 36 (AILAC, 2017n) 
177 
 
states “We underline the progress made in relation to the mandate to develop the modalities for 
the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions…” 
and “We also highlight the progress made in relation to the Nairobi Work Program”. However, 
this emphasis of negotiating progress appears redoubled from the end of 2017 onwards, as 3 
consecutive statements (Submissions 46 – 48) from the subsidiary body and COP meetings in 
Bonn in December 2017 are laden with examples of this linguistic practice. For example, 
Submission 46 (AILAC, 2017x) recognises the chairs’ efforts to “ensure that the Local 
communities and indigenous peoples platform is successfully established”, while Submission 
47 (AILAC, 2017y), among a plethora of examples of positivity towards progress, states “We 
express our particular satisfaction at the progress made in gender issues, agriculture, indigenous 
peoples, and loss and damage”. Likewise Submission 48 (AILAC, 2017z), the closing 
statement of AILAC from COP23, states “We see the outcomes of this conference as a sign 
that with compromise and political will, it is possible for us to finalise the guidelines of 
implementation of the Paris Agreement Work Program in Katowice in a timely manner”.  
  This emphasis continues in statements from 2018, with Submissions 52, 53, 55, 56, 
and 62 all publicly recognising and praising negotiating progress. For example, Submission 52 
(AILAC, 2018d) states AILAC “receive[s] with satisfaction the adoption of the initial strategy 
of the International Maritime Organisation that will contribute to the global mitigation effort”; 
Submission 53 (AILAC, 2018e) “praise[s] the co-ordination efforts that the four of you 
[subsidiary body co-chairs] are developing to ensure coherence, balance and consistency”; 
Submission 55 (AILAC, 2018g), inter alia, states AILAC “considers that important progress 
was achieved on the development of specific elements of the Global Stocktake…”; Submission 
56 (AILAC, 2018h) states AILAC “is grateful for your [subsidiary body co-chairs’] efforts to 
prepare the ‘tools’ to structure and advance in our negotiations under the diverse themes of the 
agenda…”; while Submission 62 (AILAC, 2018n) states AILAC “would like to start by 
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thanking all of you [chairs of the subsidiary bodies, the APA, and delegates present], and the 
co-facilitators, for your hard work in guiding us over the last three years in the continued 
progress of our work up to this moment…” 
  However, praise for progress appears in AILAC’s technical submissions as well 
as in its statements, albeit to a much lesser degree. Submission 18 (AILAC, 2016i) asserts 
“AILAC is encouraged by the discussions held at the 44th Session of the SBI”, while 
Submission 35 (AILAC, 2017m) frames the Paris Agreement positively, describing it as a 
“watershed in the efforts of the international community to tackle climate change…” 2 of 5 
submissions including this feature also fall within the timeframe when it is most frequently 
seen in the group’s statements, namely late 2017 to 2018, with Submission 49 (AILAC, 2018a) 
confirming that “AILAC believes the NWP has made important contributions and progress in 
its thematic work…” and has “created a wealth of knowledge that is relevant to the needs of 
developing Parties”, while Submission 51 (AILAC, 2018c), made jointly with the EIG, states 
“AILAC and the EIG support the recommendation put forward by the Paris Committee on 
Capacity Building that the 7th meeting of the Durban Forum should be centered on the 2017-
2018 focus area…” and that “the 6th Meeting of the Durban Forum demonstrated the usefulness 
of addressing capacity building…” 
 That AILAC’s recognition of and appreciation for progress in the negotiations increases 
in frequency from the end of 2017 onwards is likely because by this time, there has been more 
progress towards the successful implementation of the Paris Agreement and its rule book; 
indeed, before 2015, the Paris Agreement itself had not been developed. However, 3 
interviewees from the AILAC support unit and one further AILAC delegate interviewee 
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highlighted frustration with the negotiations from mid-to-late 201849; indeed, one of the support 
unit interviewees attributed these frustrations across several negotiating topics to game-playing 
and broken promises of other negotiating partners50. Therefore, drawing attention to 
negotiating progress by trying to maintain whatever momentum had been generated by work 
completed despite frustrations and obstacles to progress from parties’ game-playing is 
consistent with AILAC’s progressive nature as set out in its internal rule book (see above). 
 
6.2.6 Proposals in Negotiation Sessions 
 
According to interviewees’ responses, AILAC also pursues this strategy of constructive 
proposals in the face-to-face negotiation sessions, which correlates with Watts and Depledge’s 
(2018:8) point that, “in terms of negotiation style, AILAC prides itself on the consensual 
pursuit of pragmatic solutions.” One delegate reported that a strength of the group is its ability 
to contribute new ideas to the process, and that AILAC continues to act as bridge between 
groups through constructive proposals in a variety of settings: 
“…in the middle of negotiations we will say, ‘OK, I have this new idea – why don’t we try 
this?’ And, err, this is something that we have done during the negotiations, like an in-session 
paper or an idea or a conversation in the hall or whatever, just to try to bridge these 
positions.”51 
 
49 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit 
advisor, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support 
unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
50 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018 
51 Interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018 
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A former AILAC support unit advisor added that part of the reason for pursuing this strategy 
of constructive proposals was to help parties understand the necessity of climate action – thus 
bridging the gap between different viewpoints about how much and what kinds of action are 
needed – and then catalysing that action in the negotiations: 
“So, what we wanted to do was take away the myths around how hard things were done, and 
just put things on the table on the most technical basis to really understand what was at 
stake.”52 
This statement further shows the close relation between AILAC’s first strategy of making 
technically rigorous submissions in order to be seen as a group with deep technical expertise, 
and to provide its delegates with legitimacy in discussing such technical matters when it comes 
to the face-to-face negotiating sessions in the COPs and SB meetings. Given the vulnerability 
of AILAC countries, the group needs action to be taken, and one way of catalysing that is to 
participate actively, supplying the negotiations with ideas and suggestions for consideration, 
and possibly even adoption within the UNFCCC regime. The strategy can also be considered 
in the context of power relations. If AILAC can establish technical knowledge as the bedrock 
of the climate change negotiations, the use of substantive proposals based on this expertise will 
add weight to the group’s words, as their ideas will be put to other parties for consideration and 
possibly even adoption within the UNFCC regime. Therefore, the more proposals AILAC puts 
forward, the more attention the group garners, and, given the sound technical footing on which 
they are made, the more AILAC can affect the direction of the climate change negotiations. 









Part of AILAC’s constructive rhetoric is the pursuit of compromise between parties and ideas, 
as reflected in the group’s third stated aim of building bridges and promoting trust between 
groups. The data gathered indicate this strategy is adopted more in face-to-face negotiating 
sessions than in submissions, which is logical given compromise requires that different ideas 
are put forward first, a task which is addressed in the submissions. Nevertheless, some 
constructive compromises can be seen in AILAC texts. Firstly, there is symbolic compromise 
in the group’s logo which appears on the majority of their submission texts; a former support 
unit advisor present at the group’s formation explained “what we originally had envisioned was 
that it would be a bridge…between developing and developing…and so it was kind of this 
middle of the ground group that could find issues and unlock things”53. AILAC’s logo is indeed 








Figure 7: AILAC logo (AILAC, 2019) 
 
53 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
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A total of 5 tokens for “compromise” were identified across 4 submissions: one technical 
submission, and 3 statements. That nearly a quarter of AILAC statements, therefore, mention 
compromise indicates the group is openly pursuing this strategy, as these are the most visible 
textual contributions, coming during negotiating sessions. “Compromise” is found in contexts 
which encourage the concept among parties. For example, Submission 13 (AILAC, 2016d) 
states “AILAC would like to express its willingness to continue advancing with our partners 
with a constructive spirit…”, while Submission 48 (AILAC, 2017z) says the group 
“highlight[s]…the openness and compromise of all the parties that allowed us to adopt the 
Gender Action Plan” and other features of the negotiation outcomes, as well as asserting that  
AILAC “see[s] the outcome of this conference as a sign that with compromise and political 
will, it is possible for us to finalise the guidelines of implementation of the Paris Agreement 
Work Program in Katowice…” Submission 62 (AILAC, 2018n) also sees AILAC 
“encourag[ing] Parties to continue working in the spirit of constructive compromise to adopt a 
Technology Framework that can be made operational in an effective manner…” 
 
6.3.1 Common Timeframes 
 
However, contextual knowledge of 2 contentious subjects within the negotiations is needed to 
demonstrate better examples of AILAC pursuing compromise in submission texts. Firstly, 
“common timeframes”  - in the UNFCCC this is the notion that reporting and implementation 
of countries’ contributions in their NDCs should be along timelines common to all parties, 
which then involves considerations of transparency, the global stocktake, and mitigation 
ambition to name but a few. As such, common timeframes are divisive, given both related 
complexities and the questions they raise regarding timings of action and the agency behind 
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deciding timings, with potential implications for national sovereignty over NDCs. One former 
AILAC support unit advisor indicated the difficulties in reaching agreement among parties on 
common timeframes, revealing that the omission of a concrete commitment to common 
timeframes in the text of the Paris Agreement “was one of my biggest, saddest – I mean, saddest 
let-goes of, of Paris.”54 Indeed, the only commitment in the Agreement was in Article 4.10, for 
the next COP to “consider common time frames for nationally determined contributions at its 
first session” (UNFCCC, 2015). Another AILAC delegate also cited negotiations around 
common timeframes in sessions on NDCs and the global stocktake as the most difficult area in 
the entire negotiations, describing it as “a nightmare”55 in which there is no agreed basis to 
begin negotiating towards a formal text. 
  Recognising the difficulties around common timeframes, one of AILAC’s submissions 
on this topic (Submission 50 – AILAC, 2018b) proposes 4 scenarios for NDCs: no common 
timeframes, common timeframes of 5 years with synchronisation beginning in 2020, common 
timeframes of 5 years with synchronisation beginning in 2030, and common timeframes of 10 
years with synchronisation beginning in 2020. AILAC’s submission examines how each 
scenario could be implemented, the resulting implications for NDCs, and advantages and 
drawbacks. The group therefore purposely does not write off any outcome, although it does 
express a preference for avoiding a no-common timeframes scenario. However, that it 
considers each possibility shows AILAC is willing to compromise and consider different views 




54 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
55 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 
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6.3.2 Non-Market Approaches 
 
The second good example of AILAC pursuing compromise as strategy is evident from its 
submission references to “non-market approaches” within Article Six negotiations. The 
UNFCCC describes non-market approaches as forms of co-operation between countries which 
“can be anything and everything, provided it’s not market- based. It’s a broad basket, but based 
on what Parties have expressed since Paris, the non-market approaches mechanism will focus 
on co-operation on climate policy, it could include fiscal measures, such as putting a price on 
carbon or applying taxes to discourage emissions” (UNFCCC, 2019b). Given the vagueness of 
this description, it is unsurprising that AILAC interviewees stated there is a lot of confusion 
amongst all parties’ negotiators as to what this approach actually entails. One former AILAC 
support unit advisor said “nobody knew what the fuck non-markets were”56 at its inception, 
while another AILAC delegate confessed at present, “we don’t know what is this non-markets 
thing”57; another former support unit advisor added that the non-markets approach is “in this 
moment, a black hole – nobody knows what it is.”58 Another support unit advisor believed that 
non-markets is “not even a sound, technical thing, it’s just a principle”59. Numerous AILAC 
delegates attributed the origin of the non-markets approach to the ALBA group60, and ALBA 
is certainly its proponent, given its preference for state-led economies and aversion towards 
market mechanisms in climate policy (Watts and Depledge, 2018). The IETA (2015) reports 
that ALBA opposed use of the phrase “market mechanisms” in the Paris Agreement, and 
 
56 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
57 Interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018 
58 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018 
59 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018 
60 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th 
September 2018; Interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; Interview with AILAC support unit 
advisor, 14th September 2018; Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; Interview with former AILAC 
support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
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indeed, this term is not used in the final text, as only “co-operative approaches”, “a mechanism 
to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions” and “non-market approaches” are 
discussed in Article Six (UNFCCC, 2015). 
  It is safe to assume, then, given that the focus on non-markets stems from a 
political philosophy not shared by the AILAC countries, and that the group’s negotiators do 
not seem to know what exactly the topic signifies nor its current status, that non-market 
approaches are not a high priority for AILAC. However, AILAC does recognise the topic is 
important to ALBA and it is willing to engage with them on this to secure overall progress on 
Article Six. One former support unit advisor stated “the key to get something on markets – it 
may be having something on non-markets – and the key for that may be Ecuador”61, while 
another stated explained AILAC engaged with ALBA on non-markets “because it gave them 
a space, and they needed, politically they needed the space to discuss their, to feel like they 
were being heard.”62 Another delegate explained the kind of dialogue AILAC aims for with 
ALBA negotiators in face-to-face meetings on non-markets is akin to saying “OK guys, it’s 
your invention, that’s what you want to see in the Article, but please try to explain to us what 
is your approach and why you’re doing that”63, while another said “We might agree or disagree 
or whatever, but as long as we can engage on [non-markets], then we can start making 
progress”.64  
This compromise approach of giving time and effort to something AILAC does not see 
as particularly important except to placate its negotiating partners is evident within AILAC 
submissions. Passing references to markets are matched by the same brief attention to non-
market approaches. For example, Submission 6 (AILAC, 2014d) proposes the then-future Paris 
 
61 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018 
62 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
63 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 
64 Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018 
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Agreement’s mitigation section should address “provisions related to market and non-market 
mechanisms and their rôle in the national and global mitigation efforts…”, while Submission 
20 (AILAC, 2016k) suggests that “for the market and non-market components of Article 6, it 
is especially important to achieve coherence with the enhanced transparency framework when 
these are used to make progress towards achieving the NDCs…”. Similarly, Submission 46 
(AILAC, 2017x), as a visible statement in the negotiating plenary, states “AILAC also 
considers that Article 6, paragraphs 2, 4 and 8 is important for achieving nationally determined 
contributions and increasing ambition thereof…In this regard, it is essential to design 
guidelines and robust rules that ensure that the results of mitigation market approaches are 
real, measurable and verifiable. A similar approach should be applied to non-market activities 
with regards to the transparent presentation of results.” 
  In 3 of AILAC’s 5 submissions focused on Article Six, non-markets are 
covered, although the amount of text dedicated to this in Article Six is considerably less than 
that dedicated to markets, and where non-markets are discussed, much more text focuses on 
defining the topic than occurs in text on market approaches. Submission 16 (AILAC, 2016g) 
dedicates 3 paragraphs to non-markets, versus 5 paragraphs each for Article 6.2’s ITMOs and 
6.4’s market mechanism, and the first paragraph simply clarifies AILAC’s understanding of 
non-markets: 
“With a view to pursue the design of the work programme for non-market approaches to 
sustainable development as per Article 6, paragraph 8 of the Paris Agreement, AILAC would 
like to state its understanding that non-market approaches are those cooperative approaches, 




The following 2 paragraphs then suggest that work on Article 6.8 be undertaken in 
collaborative spaces outside of the UNFCCC – “For AILAC this work programme should be 
circumscribed to international collaborative initiatives that are not developed anywhere else 
under the UNFCCC process” - also suggesting that all results should still adhere to the 
transparency framework’s rules. By contrast, the rest of the submission suggests such details 
as metrics for quantification of ITMO outcomes, reporting protocols thereof (e.g. to avoid 
double counting), and lessons learned from implementation of previous market mechanisms 
under the Kyoto Protocol. Submission 44 (AILAC, 2017v) is similarly structured, but to an 
even more extreme degree – just 3 paragraphs out of 40 are dedicated to non-market 
approaches, which state that the non-markets section of the Paris Agreement work programme 
“should be focused on providing a general description on how main guiding principles of the 
Article 6 of the PA will be operationalized”, and that “a decision on this issue should include 
a list of criteria that non-market approaches implemented by Parties should fulfil”. Each gives 
3 brief suggestions, but no more detail, while the last of these paragraphs simply says that “a 
decision on this issue should include modalities through which Parties exchange experiences 
or joint implementation of non-market approaches should be facilitated”. Submission 32 
(AILAC, 2017j) follows a similar pattern, with only 4 of 20 paragraphs on non-markets, 
whereas market approaches also feature illustrative diagrams and tables to support the 
suggestions in these sections (see Figures 8 and 9, below). In the group’s remaining 2 markets-
focused submissions, non-markets are ignored completely, as these submissions focus on 6.265 
(AILAC, 2018k) and 6.466 (AILAC, 2018l) respectively, although these were made jointly with 
several other parties. 
 
65 Submission made jointly with Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and 
Switzerland 


















6.3.3 Compromise in Negotiating Sessions 
 
Besides examples of compromise in AILAC submissions, interviewees reported that pursuit of 
compromise is a strategy used often by AILAC delegates in negotiating sessions67, as it aligns 
with AILAC’s stated aims of bridge-building and seeking to build spaces for consensus. One 
delegate stated the group is “very flexible with the language”68 in negotiating sessions to allow 
for phrasings and terms that are acceptable to the broadest range of parties possible – as one 
support unit advisor put it, to find “the most ambitious common denominator” “because we are 
very interested in protecting multilateralism and building bridges”69. The group does try to 
infuse its compromise positions with as much ambition as possible, in line with AILAC’s other 
aims of generating ambitious and progressive positions and driving viable proposals forward. 
One delegate explained “normally we try to bring the, like, the positive elements from other 
positions and put [them] inside of our submission as part of the consensus.”70 2 interviewees 
cited use of compromise in relation to other strategies71; two delegates reported that AILAC 
uses compromise as a strategy in spaces outside the large plenary negotiating sessions, and 
cited examples of compromise in bilateral meetings with other groups72, and in informal spaces. 
In particular, corridor conversations are used to steer the mode of negotiation away from 
concessions trading in the plenaries: 
 
67 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; 
Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; Interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; 
Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 
16th October 2018; Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; Interview with former AILAC 
support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018; Interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; Interview with 
AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
68 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 
69 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018 
70 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 
71 These will be analysed in more detail below. 
72 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018 
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“Or, err, but I don’t think it’s really the way we do things, actually [concessions trading]. So 
we just try to move things directly from the microphone, or directly with the negotiators in the 
halls, err, just to try to get to an agreement – ‘Hey, this position from you is really difficult for 
me, so let’s try to find a way out’.” 73 
However, there are disadvantages to pursuing compromises in negotiating sessions. One 
interviewee stated that because AILAC tends to seek the middle ground from the beginning, 
when the presidency of a COP or SB chair convenes selected parties to find agreement on a 
text, AILAC can be isolated. In their words: 
 “…that leaves us in a space of vulnerability. Why? Because then sometimes we are left out of 
the room, in the last, last nights of the COP, because what the presidency is trying to do is 
bring together those two extremes. So, who’s called into that room? It’s the LMDCs, or the 
Umbrella Group and the LMDCs”74  
AILAC is therefore discounted on the assumption that it will support a compromise. Ironically, 
then, the presidency’s attempts at bridge-building can inadvertently exclude the group actively 
seeking the same objective. Furthermore, because AILAC’s identity is tied to seeking 
compromise and consensus, the group has much less room for manoeuvre with other strategies, 
as other parties will expect AILAC to revert to type in crunch moments. As one former delegate 
put it: 
 “…and that [bridge-building identity] makes us not great negotiators, because presidencies 
tend to know that we will probably concede unless it’s really major. Other countries are much 
more willing to just be a pain for minor things, and we, we don’t play that way, but that’s costly 
in terms of your political liberty for the negotiations.”75 
 
73 Interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018 
74 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018 
75 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018 
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Therefore, it allows other parties to try other strategies with AILAC, or perhaps to make 
stronger requests or demands on the group, safe in the knowledge that AILAC will concede at 


















76 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018 
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A third strategy which AILAC uses in the climate change negotiations is persuasion and 
rational argument. As with constructive proposals, persuasion is inherently linked to AILAC’s 
use of technical submissions to legitimise its technical power/knowledge underpinnings, while 
also relying on tactical knowledge for deployment in negotiation sessions. This chapter 
analyses AILAC’s persuasion strategies in 3 parts. It considers first, how AILAC uses 
persuasion and rational argument within its submission texts, citing direct evidence from the 
texts themselves to demonstrate 5 methods; secondly, the group’s attempts to persuade within 
in-session negotiations, providing examples targeting different coalitions and states and of how 
persuasion links to other strategies; and third, different influences on AILAC’s rationale for 
using persuasion and rational argument, both in terms of when using the strategy and the 
reasons for doing so in the first place. 
 
7.2 Uses of Persuasion and Rational Argument in Submission Texts 
 
There is evidence throughout AILAC submissions of attempts at persuasion although not 
addressed to any specific party. Instead persuasion appears in the form of justifications for 
suggestions and rational arguments for AILAC’s case. These were identified through textual 
analysis in 50 of the 62 AILAC submissions, including 8 of the 13 in-session statements. 
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Justifications for AILAC proposals were made in 5 ways: through forceful language, using 
references, examples, further explanation, and visual presentation. 
 
7.2.1 Forceful Language 
 
A common set-up in the submission texts is to make a substantive proposal using forceful 
language (i.e. beyond use of the word “should”), for example presenting an idea in a proposal 
as “necessary”, “fundamental”, “urgent”, “crucial”, “pivotal”, with AILAC “urging” or 
stressing the “urgency” that a proposal is accepted, or that a proposal “must”, “needs”, or “has 
to” be enacted, preceded or followed by a justification. Linking words and phrases such as 
“therefore”, “in order to”, “for this purpose”, and the use of infinitives connect the clauses and 
sentences containing proposals with supporting justifications. This clearly demonstrates 
AILAC recognises the need to present readers with a well-reasoned proposition for the 
proposals it supports most strongly, reflected in initial use of more forceful language in place 
of or alongside use of “should” phrases associated with constructive proposals. Textual analysis 
identified this syntactic construction in 38 of 62 submissions, while corpus-linguistic analysis 
pinpointed frequencies of the above terms in this justificatory context, as well as their 
comparative frequencies in the Brown reference corpus, as shown in Table 6 below. This also 
allows for the calculation of their log-likelihoods and therefore the confidence levels where a 
statistically significant difference between the 2 corpora can be reasonably assumed. Only 2 
terms do not reach the critical value for 99.99% confidence of a statistically significant 
difference – the verb construction “has/have to”, and the adjective “pivotal”, although the latter 




Table 6: Frequencies of Corpus-Linguistic “Forceful” Language Tokens 







Threshold = 15.13) 
“Need/s/ed” 488 751 699.07 
“Must” 197 1013 36.39 
“Necessary” 107 222 115.34 
“Fundamental/ly” 58 69 100.91 
“Critical” 34 58 44.52 
“Urge/s/nt/cy” 33 62 37.07 
“Crucial” 30 30 58.32 
“Has/have to” 22 337 8.71 
“Pivotal” 2 1 5.39 
  
A few examples help illustrate how AILAC uses these terms to persuade the reader of its 
viewpoint. Submission 10 (AILAC, 2016a), on the technical examination process on adaptation 
(TEP-A), argues that parties have not committed to enough action in the pre-2020 period, and 
that this should be rectified. It begins its section A by stating that: 
“AILAC remains concerned with the existing emissions gap of 10 to 17 GtCO2e per year 
between Parties’ resulting from mitigation commitments and actions, versus the level of 
mitigation ambition needed to achieve the aforementioned average global temperature goal. 
Particularly vulnerable countries, including those of AILAC, will be disproportionately 
affected by the increased costs and risks associated with delayed and insufficient action on 
mitigation and adaptation.” 
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Using the above reasoning as a pre-emptive justification, the same paragraph goes on to state: 
“Therefore, the Enhanced Action Prior to 2020 must address the gaps in climate action that 
we are currently facing.” 
AILAC therefore feels enabled to use stronger language than the advisory “should”, arguing 
instead, that action gaps “must” be addressed because it has made the case for doing so, here 
by invoking a moral aspect in its reasoning alongside technical detail on emissions gaps and 
temperature goals. A further proposal and justification builds on this in the following 
paragraph: 
“AILAC believes that the TEP-A must provide a political and technical setting under the 
Convention for Parties to identify opportunities to dramatically increase implementation of 
adaptation actions in all countries.” 
AILAC can again use the word “must” because it is providing a justification. To give extra 
credibility to these ideas and demonstrate how they might work in practice, the rest of the 
submission then sets out a more detailed clarification of what the proposed TEP-A should entail 
in terms of process and topics. 
 Submission 29 (AILAC, 2017g), on the Standing Committee on Finance, contains 
various suggestions from AILAC about the scope of the work the SCF should undertake. The 
fourth of these proposes the SCF “should play a more active role in the work related to the 
mobilization of finance.” The same paragraph develops this proposal further, stating “it is 
crucial that work is done in this regarding building upon lessons learned and previous 
experiences from different actors and sources of information”. However, the first word of this 
sentence clause is “therefore”, and it follows 2 sentences of rational argument as justification 
for both the original proposal vis-à-vis the SCF’s purview and the latter idea on lessons learned: 
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“From the establishment of the SCF, several questions were raised in terms of the scope of this 
function. Throughout time, it has become evident that the reporting, monitoring and 
verification of private climate finance poses significant methodological challenges for the 
existing system; therefore it is crucial…” 
Nevertheless, AILAC is seemingly wary of appearing dictatorial, as frequently use of stronger 
language than a simple “should” proposal is attenuated by use of qualifying phrases at the 
beginning of a sentence. To take one example among many, Submission 11 (AILAC, 2016b), 
on the work programme for the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, contains a 
paragraph on the APA agenda which reads as follows: 
“As particularly vulnerable countries, AILAC underscores that adaptation to climate change 
continues to be of the utmost importance for our Parties and that adaptation must further be 
given parity in the preparation of the entry into force of the Paris Agreement. Currently, the 
Paris Agreement and decision 1/CP.21 have decided that many tasks related to adaptation will 
be carried out by the Adaptation Committee in some cases in conjunction with the Least 
Developed Countries Group of Experts (LEG) and in other provisions with other bodies 
including the Standing Committee of Finance… For AILAC, it is essential that the APA Agenda 
provides a space to coordinate with these other bodies on the preparation of entry into force 
of Article 7, and that this work be coherent with that of the APA….” 
Through this careful use of strong language (“must further be given parity”, it is essential”), 
AILAC argues robustly for priority status for adaptation within the work programme of the 
APA through a justification invoking the importance of adaptation measures for countries 
especially vulnerable to climate change effects. However, the use of “it is essential” is preceded 
by “For AILAC”, implying this is only AILAC’s perspective, thereby allowing room for 
interpretation as to AILAC’s intentions. In other words, it allows the reader to interpret this 
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sentence not as AILAC demanding that the APA agenda give a dedicated space for adaptation, 
but rather as a signal of the topic’s importance for AILAC evidenced through its reasoning, 
and therefore as a justified proposal which still fits within the group’s identity as a constructive 
actor in the negotiations rather than a difficult partner making demands and trying to control 




AILAC submissions seek to persuade that their proposals are justified through the use of 
references. These primarily reference either existing legal and/or treaty texts within the 
UNFCCC, such as the Paris Agreement and COP decisions, or scientific reports, e.g. from the 
IPCC or UNEP. In referencing these texts, and therefore the bodies which have authored them, 
AILAC seek to situate their proposals within the context of authoritative perspectives, namely 
text already approved in UNFCCC negotiations, or scientific and technical experts on climate 
change.  AILAC can therefore “borrow” persuasive power for their ideas, albeit not as directly 
as AOSIS (Betzold, 2010), given AILAC has its own in-house technical experts in the support 
unit and national delegations able to interpret and utilise scientific data to support their 
arguments, rather than relying on external NGOs. 
  Textual analysis of AILAC submissions identified instances of references to 
external text in 29 AILAC submissions, showing this was a commonly used strategy. For 
example, Submission 9 (AILAC, 2015b) outlines the “rationale that support[s] keeping and 
strengthening…human rights language in the Paris Agreement.” Part of the case for this 
proposal, continuing the rational argument at the beginning of the text where AILAC explains 
links between climate change and human rights, is made by referencing existing UNFCCC 
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decisions which have made similar connections. It specifies 4 COP decisions where human 
rights have been promoted, as well as REDD+ safeguards, and 3 published decisions of the 
Green Climate Fund, to demonstrate a precedent for human rights-focused language within the 
Convention and therefore that it is legitimate to preserve the inclusion of such topics. Several 
of these decisions are quoted directly, such as Decision 1/CP.16. Submission 9 states that: 
“Decision 1/CP.16 states that ‘Parties should, in all climate change related actions, fully 
respect human rights’. The same decision notes the Resolution of the United Nations Human 
Rights Council on human rights and climate change, ‘which recognizes that the adverse effects 
of climate change have a range of direct and indirect implications for the effective enjoyment 
of human rights and that the effects of climate change will be felt most acutely by those 
segments of the population that are already vulnerable owing to geography, gender, age, 
indigenous or minority status, or disability.’” 
Submission 4 (AILAC, 2014b) details AILAC’s proposals for accelerating the implementation 
of climate action pre-2020. The rationale for these proposals is that acceleration of action is 
necessary given the available scientific information on the “emissions gaps” between parties’ 
emissions reduction commitments at the time, and the commitments required to hold warming 
to below increases of either 2°C or 1.5°C, which would go on to be the stated aim of the Paris 
Agreement. The submission references a UNEP report in its footnotes, from where it can cite 
the relevant data, namely the “existing emissions gap of 10 to 17 GtCO2e per year between 
Parties’ existing mitigation commitments and actions, versus the level of mitigation ambition 
needed to hold the global average temperature increase to below 2°C or 1.5°C.” It references 
again to support AILAC’s argument, citing the Summary for Policymakers of the IPCC’s Fifth 
Assessment Report, stating that “Recent scientific information presented in the Fifth IPCC 
Assessment report has confirmed that global greenhouse gas emissions are still accelerating 





AILAC also uses persuasion in its submission texts is by providing specific examples to justify 
their arguments. Examples help to illustrate AILAC’s points in greater detail and clarify the 
context in which they are situated in several instances. In Submission 6 (AILAC, 2014d), 
AILAC argues “Adaptation is a matter of collective responsibility on addressing climate 
change, ensuring sustainable development and eradication [of] poverty, and should be treated 
as such under the Convention and in the new Agreement.” The following sentence elaborates 
on how adaptation can assist with sustainable development and poverty eradication: “Climate 
change impacts, and thus adaptation opportunities are central to development efforts in 
developing countries in several sectors such as health, culture, water, food security, 
biodiversity and ecosystem services, affecting the most vulnerable and causing migrations and 
climate refugees.” By providing more detail with these examples – namely, the numerous ways 
in which these countries will be affected without adaptation - AILAC shows fellow developing 
countries why they should take adaptation seriously and contribute towards the collective 
responsibility they advocate. AILAC does the same for developed countries, identifying issues 
more likely to resonate with them, such as biodiversity and ecosystem service loss, and 
proliferation of climate refugees. Examples are used similarly in Submission 33 (AILAC, 
2017k), where AILAC considers the links between NDCs and transparency. It states that 
“…AILAC is of the view that having clear and well described mitigation goals, through the 
presentation of clear and complete upfront information, will facilitate tracking their progress 
in an easier and more transparent manner.” The following sentence uses an example to clarify 
why such clear goals are beneficial and worthy of inclusion in NDCs: “For example, if a Party 
provides complete information that helps to understand how the LULUCF sector is included in 
201 
 
its NDC, it would be easier to track the progress of mitigation actions in this sector and, 
therefore, progress of its NDC.” 
  AILAC further uses examples as persuasion to justify its arguments by 
illustrating how ideas can be put into practice in specific contexts. Submission 23 (AILAC, 
2017a) contains a section on steps “necessary to facilitate the mobilization of support for 
adaptation in developing countries” in the context of a 2°C warming limit. One of these steps, 
AILAC suggests, would be to “…enhance the use of public finance and policy interventions to 
create regulation and incentives to promote the mobilization of resources for adaptation 
action.” The submission then provides 5 specific examples of how this could be achieved, 
namely: 
“a. Identifying co-benefits in public and private investment opportunities that deliver both 
adaptation and mitigation outcomes in strategic areas such as energy, land use, land-use 
change and forestry, as well as cities and major infrastructure projects.  
b. Improve information disclosure in financial markets so risks can be priced and better 
managed. 
c. Strengthen the co-benefits between adaptation and mitigation actions.  
d. Develop incentives to investment of adaptation action i.e. financial incentives to develop 
certain crops that are more apt for specific territories (considering expected climate change 
impacts) than in others. 
e. Create and strengthen adequate norms and institutional arrangements.” 
By providing this list of suggested examples, AILAC bolsters its argument for resource 
mobilisation regulation and incentives by demonstrating concretely how this could be 
achieved. This transforms AILAC’s argument from a vague proposal to one with practical 
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solutions for implementation, making it a more credible proposal deserving serious 
consideration, rather than one to be dismissed for lack of detail. Similar uses of examples occur 
in numerous other AILAC submissions, such as Submission 8 (AILAC, 2015a), made jointly 
with the EIG, about the organisation of an in-session workshop on gender in climate policy. 
This provides examples of how 5 AILAC countries have already integrated gender into their 
national climate policies, thereby justifying an in-session workshop as there are already lessons 
to be shared. Submission 21 (AILAC, 2016l) also uses examples to bolster an argument by 
showing how AILAC’s proposals could be put into practice. Here, AILAC argues any 
adaptation communication by parties to the UNFCCC must be consistent with existing methods 
of providing information to the Convention. It justifies this, arguing that existing instruments 
“can serve as a basis for the adaptation communication and its consideration would help to 
avoid unnecessary additional efforts.” The next sentence then details 3 examples of existing 
informational instruments – the National Communication, the National Adaptation Plan, and 
the NDC, In a sub-section for each of these instruments, the submission elaborates on AILAC’s 
vision as to how they relate to the adaptation communication. For example, the group describes 
the National Communication as providing input and “a basis to identify needs to be submitted 
in the adaptation communication”, while the NDC should be the “main vehicle for the 
adaptation communication” because of its success thus far in building political support for 
adaptation in the Convention. 
 
7.2.4 Further Explanation 
 
AILAC submissions attempt to persuade the reader of the reasonableness of its perspectives by 
dedicating extra text to more extensive explanations. As several delegates identified, AILAC 
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values highly the tactic of explaining the group’s positions within an overall strategy of 
persuasion, as persuasion is less effective when the target audience has little or no 
understanding of the positions being communicated or the perspectives from which they 
originate77. Rather than an extra sentence or clause within a sentence to justify a proposal, the 
submission texts can explain the underlying thinking in more depth, or where the justification 
is multifaceted, in a paragraph or two to press home the point more forcefully and head off any 
potential criticisms of the proposal before delegates reach the negotiating room. An example 
of this is found in Submission 6 (AILAC, 2014d) on the nature of the then-future Paris 
Agreement. The second paragraph of the section entitled General Considerations makes the 
case for the Paris Agreement explicitly recognising a link between climate action and 
development, as shown below: 
“The link between climate change and development options should be clearly reflected on the 
legally binding agreement. Climate change is a direct threat to development. This threat is 
represented in the impacts that climate change has in all countries, and especially in those 
developing countries that are particularly vulnerable, which directly undermine the efforts to 
achieve sustainable development by inflicting incalculable losses in their economic, social and 
environmental structures and development trajectories, and undermining efforts to guarantee 
the well-being of their populations. Thus, climate change is a threat to the equitable right to 
development, not because the need to limit emissions, but because its impacts limit development 
opportunities and undermines development gains. Poverty eradication efforts are therefore 
challenged.” 
 
77 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 
23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018 
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Given the initial suggestion is vague at face value, it requires further elaboration in the 
paragraph that follows, which allows for greater explanation of the links between climate 
change and development, equity, and poverty to make the point more forcefully and 
convincingly. It also allows AILAC to link this paragraph to 2 further suggestions in the 
following paragraph, that the Paris Agreement’s focus should “be on options and actions that 
all countries can pursue in order to pursue sustainable development pathways compatible with 
climate protection” and that “The new legally binding agreement should set the conditions for 
a global economy of growth that is climate sensitive: a ‘Climate Global Economy’”.  
Submission 7 (AILAC, 2014e) attempts to persuade by using extra text in a similar 
way. In it, AILAC argues that the then-future Paris Agreement “should include an aspirational 
goal on adaptation” incorporating 4 features which it then sets out. The fourth of these is that 
the goal should include “the undeniable relationship” between mitigation ambition, climate 
impacts, adaptation needs and costs, and loss & damage. It then elaborates on this claim, which 
forms the basis of the justification, with 2 further sentences, spelling out the ramifications of 
more or less mitigation ambition on adaptation needs and costs, and losses & damages, which 
are inversely proportional. Other examples of AILAC taking time to develop justifications in 
more detail appear in Submissions 23 (relating to the incorporation of socio-economic data into 
climate models) (AILAC, 2017a), 34 (relating to AILAC’s proposal for adaptation 
communications to report on future plans rather than progress already made) (AILAC, 2017l), 
and 40 (relating to AILAC’s concern about the GST being “over-designed”) (AILAC, 2017r), 
among others, and in particular, the aforementioned example of AILAC’s constructive 
proposals on common timeframes (Submission 50 – AILAC, 2018b). These still amount to 
persuasion given AILAC’s view that common timeframes of some kind should apply to NDCs, 
and Submission 50 deliberately presents 3 scenarios of common timeframes of different lengths 
and harmonisation dates after outlining the scenario of NDCs with no common timeframes. 
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This means that these subsequent ideas linger for longer in the mind of the reader, especially 
given that the Submission is set up to present the difficulties of a no-CT scenario (“If common 
timeframes for NDCs are not agreed, several important challenges will be faced” and then 
considering them in 3 substantial paragraphs) versus the benefits – albeit with rational thought 
on potential disadvantages – of CTs, e.g. “…a common timeframe of implementation based on 
a periodicity of 5 years would be the most consistent choice for the timing feature of NDCs…” 
 
7.2.5 Visual Presentation 
 
AILAC submissions use persuasion to support their proposals also through visual presentation. 
Using a list format to set out reasons justifying proposals allows for clear and concise 
representation of ideas. The clearer the information, the greater chance of gaining other parties’ 
support given that delegates are required to read and interpret huge volumes of text, often in a 
language other than their mother tongue, potentially presenting linguistic challenges. 
Formatting text can offer similar benefits. Since 2014 (AILAC, 2014c), AILAC submissions 
have used bolding of text, italicisation, and underlining to emphasise key or specific points and 
improve the clarity of messages. A good example is found in Submission 5 (AILAC, 2014c), 
on the proposed nature of NDCs under the then-would-be Paris Agreement. The text says 
“AILAC has stated that the scope of INDCs should include contributions on mitigation, 
adaptation and means of implementation.” The adaptation component of this proposal is 
justified in a separate section below, beginning with a paragraph reading: “Having national 
contributions on adaptation serves multiple purposes and these purposes will shape the 
potential UFI [up-front information].” The following paragraph is then sub-divided 5 times, 
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with each sub-division focusing on an individual purpose, thereby clearly spelling out the 
AILAC rationale:  
“1. To communicate how parties will contribute to the global goal on adaptation  
2. To help the international community further understand the actions to be undertaken by 
parties, thereby facilitating collaborative efforts amongst countries.   
3. To foster national ambitious action on climate change  
4. To recognize parties’ efforts to combat climate change  
5. To facilitate potential adaptation action as Parties distinguish adaptation contributions 
made with their own resources from additional adaptation efforts they would carry out with 
support.” 
Submission 15 (AILAC, 2016f), on the relationship between the IPCC and the Global 
Stocktake provides further evidence of improved clarity in AILAC submissions due to text 
formatting. This submission uses all 3 formatting options noted above. Paragraph 2, in the 
background context section, uses both italics and underlining to clarify the precise aim of the 
submission: 
“Following the first session of the APA in May 2016, Parties were invited to submit their views 
on the identification of the sources of input for the global stocktake; and the development of 
the modalities of the global stocktake, noting the work under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific 
and Technological Advice on advice on how the assessments of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change can inform the global stocktake. 
Here the italicised font is also used to signify that the wording is not originally AILAC’s, but 
taken from the aforementioned APA session. Nevertheless, the formatting clearly signposts 
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that the focus of the rest of the submission is the IPCC-GST relationship. Paragraph 7 contains 
the submission’s key point, and uses a bold font for emphasis: 
 “Building on this extensive experience and bearing in mind the benchmarks established under 
Article 2 of the Paris Agreement as well as the long term goals under Article 4 paragraph 1 and 
Article 7 paragraph1 and the guidance included in Article 7 paragraph 14, AILAC foresees 
that the IPCC should be requested to include the periodical preparation of special reports 
to serve as input on the year that the GST is to take place. This should be done in a timely 
manner that is consistent with the timings of the GST.” 
The rest of the submission develops this initial idea and presents AILAC’s suggestions for the 
content and manner of delivery of the IPCC’s special reports, but remains based on the initial 
idea highlighted in bold. This makes the “take-home” message clear for the reader. Use of these 
formatting options is common across several other AILAC submissions, and is found in both 
technical documents and statements to negotiating sessions (see, for example, Submission 23 
(AILAC, 2017a), Submission 40 (AILAC, 2017r), and Submission 56 (AILAC, 2018h) 
amongst others). 
Diagrams and tables are used similarly to achieve clarity in AILAC’s submission texts. 
In addition to the benefits of clear and concise presentation, diagrams and visual representation 
may allow for the simplification of complex ideas and concepts which a reader may not 
otherwise find immediately easy to process. Submission 34 (2017l) uses a diagram to make 
AILAC’s proposal for the components of a party’s adaptation communication more easily 
intelligible. The submission has 2 dense paragraphs of text in small font outlining AILAC’s 
ideas on the National Communication, National Adaptation Plan, and NDC as a basis for an 
adaptation communication. However, bearing in mind time pressures on delegates to read other 
groups’ submissions, the submission includes a diagram (see Figure 10) succinctly 
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summarising the fundamental relationship between these components as they relate to an 
adaptation communication from AILAC’s perspective. This allows AILAC to put its proposals 
across more effectively, improving the chances of a reader understanding and accepting them.  
 
Figure 10: Submission 34’s “Potential Linkages Amongst Vehicles Mentioned in Art. 7.11 if 
Party chooses to use the range of instruments made available to them” (AILAC, 2017l) 
 
7.3 Uses of Persuasion and Rational Argument in Negotiation Sessions 
 
As well as within the “textual space” of the AILAC submissions, AILAC negotiators use 
persuasion within in-session negotiations at COPs, SB meetings, and bilaterals with other 
groups and parties. 8 of the 13 statements, delivered aloud by AILAC delegates in plenary 
negotiation sessions, contain evidence of persuasion and rational argument. According to most 
AILAC interviewees (24 of 35), this is built on using persuasion and rational argument in face-
to-face meetings with other parties’ and groups’ negotiators. However, an important point 
made by an AILAC delegate – and reflected by the fact that persuasion was not cited by every 
single AILAC interviewee - is that it should not be assumed that persuasion is used uniformly 
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by AILAC across every topic of negotiation, and that its use depends on the dynamics of each 
negotiating track78.  
Nevertheless, the strategy is clearly well-used by the group across a wide range of 
UNFCCC negotiations. Asked about the group’s use of persuasion in in-session meetings, a 
former support unit member, responded: 
“How would you do this otherwise? How would you negotiate differently than that? …I think 
we generally always try to change people’s minds because there’s no other way to argue in 
good faith in a negotiation. Otherwise, there are some points where it becomes to impossible 
or too difficult”79 
One AILAC delegate labelled negotiation by persuasion as “our main construction, always”80. 
Another even bemoaned that AILAC negotiators “don’t know how to negotiate – they only use 
persuasion” without understanding the reasons for other parties taking the positions that they 
do81, although this latter point is questionable, given the research conducted by the support unit 
on other groups and parties, which will be discussed in the following section. The latter 
perception is also challenged by information provided by another former AILAC delegate, who 
stated the group is “super careful with the framing of the words” in delivering its arguments 
“because we’re always trying to…we use certain words that we know will speak to certain 
groups”82, thus implying an understanding of other groups’ rationale.  
Interviews with AILAC delegates and support unit members yielded numerous 
examples of AILAC negotiators using such framing of persuasion attempts to suit particular 
negotiating partners. When AILAC knows that a particular group or party shares its position 
 
78 Interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018 
79 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018 
80 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018 
81 Interview with AILAC delegate, 10th July 2018 
82 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018 
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on an issue, the group attempts to persuade them to join forces in making the case for an AILAC 
proposal, even though their particular preferences on the issue may differ slightly from those 
of AILAC. AILAC does this by framing its approach to them in terms of the need for a united 
front 83, and to reinforce the idea that they essentially share ideas with AILAC, even if they are 





Several interviewees provided evidence of thorough and even somewhat cautious approaches 
when persuading the LMDCs group. Within the GST negotiating track, one AILAC delegate 
stated the group’s attempts at persuading the LMDCs depend on framing the group’s proposals 
as the product of rigorous analysis, backed up by technical evidence: “when I talk to the 
LMDCs…the conversation gets, or has to be, like, really structured in AILAC’s position, and 
it has to be presented that we have worked on it, that we have been doing our homework, and 
if we want something, it’s because we have thought about it.”85 A support unit advisor agreed, 
remarking that AILAC attempts to persuade the LMDCs have to be “constrained and 
scripted”86. In the transparency negotiations, one support unit advisor stated a key element of 
AILAC’s relationship with the LMDCs is to recognise their position  - that they will not agree 
to further obligations because they believe developed parties have not yet met their own 
commitments, in particular relating to finance. The advisor stated AILAC recognises the power 
 
83 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018  
84 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018 
85 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 
86 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018 
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of this position politically, but the group still attempts to persuade the LMDCs to support its 
proposals for greater universal transparency commitments because of AILAC’s ambition for 
effective climate action, and therefore when putting proposals to the LMDCs, “only when you 
show that what you might do could get the developed countries to also move are they more 
open.”87 Another support unit advisor agreed with this view of persuasion attempts towards the 
LMDCs: “you need to find a way of striking that nerve from a place that appeals to them, and 
what appeals to an LMDC position is, naturally, finance. So you want to emphasise that you’re 
willing to go all the way as the G77 and stick it to the developed world, but for that to have an 
echo, we need to have some movement in such and such.”88 However, wary of the political 
power of the LMDCs, and that they often oppose AILAC’s views, the support unit advisor also 
stated that sometimes AILAC needs to feed its ideas to other parties in order that they are 
seemingly the originators of these proposals as far as the LMDCs are concerned: “sometimes 
you get resistance from the LMDCs just because it came from us – so it can’t come from us. 
So, sometimes it’s about floating the ideas in the right way so that they fly, and that they come 




AILAC interviewees also spoke of similarly cautious approaches to persuasion of the AGN. 
Indeed, the delegate who remarked on the need for a structured AILAC position, framed as the 
product of rigorous analysis and technical expertise when approaching the LMDCs, said the 
same of negotiations with the AGN89. 2 support unit advisors explicitly described the AILAC 
 
87 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018 
88 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018 
89 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 
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approach to persuading the AGN as “cautious”90 – “given that, as I say, they can stab us very 
badly, and wound us, and we are very, I would say, defensive of that”91 The fears referenced 
here by the advisor relate to a dispute between AILAC and the AGN within the UNFCCC 
negotiations over whether African countries should be given the same special circumstances in 
the Paris Agreement as the LDCs and SIDS countries have, as under Article 9.4 this would 
enable African states’ access to prioritisation for support from developed states alongside the 
LDCs and SIDS. According to a former support unit advisor, since 2016, and particularly 
during 2018, the AGN has put forward proposals for an agenda item to discuss making this 
change92 after Latin American states vetoed it at COP21. This remains unacceptable for 
AILAC, “because basically if you have LDCs, SIDS, and Africa – the only region that is not 
there from the developing world is Latin America”93, thus signifying that Latin America would 
be at the bottom of the priority list for support from developed states.  As a support unit advisor 
remarked:  
“We respect the key vulnerability and recognise the key vulnerability of SIDS and LDCs, but 
we don’t want our vulnerability to be taken for granted. That’s, that’s a very big red line for 
AILAC. Err, as you know, Latin America is, is one of the, err, continents with greater 
inequalities, and, err, and we need that to not be invisibilised. And we cannot come back to 
capital with, err, the legal, the rule book of the legally-binding agreement we just adopted with 
us out of the mix, no? So having something like SIDS, LDCs, and Africa is a total no-go for 
us.”94 
 
90 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit 
advisor, 27th September 2018 
91 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018 
92 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; the item can be seen on UNFCCC 
meeting agendas, such as in item 16 in the provisional agenda for COP24 (UNFCCC, 2018a) 
93 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018 
94 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018 
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Indeed, the delicate situation is even addressed in AILAC submissions. Submission 48 
(AILAC, 2017z) states: 
“AILAC recognizes very respectfully the particular conditions of the Least Developed 
Countries and the Small Island Developing States, as is also recognized in the Agreement and 
in Decision 1/CP.21. In this sense, we note with concern the intention to continue the informal 
consultations focused on the circumstances and special needs of Africa, despite the fact that 
already for a long time it has been shown that this subject puts at risk the delicate balance 
achieved in Paris to attend to the circumstances of all developing countries.” 
Because of this profound disagreement with the AGN, therefore, AILAC’s attempts at 
persuading the group on other matters are understandably cautious, as it is wary of creating 
tensions with the AGN that may hamper the progress of the negotiations as a whole – something 





AILAC adopts a particular framing approach when attempting to persuade ALBA to back its 
proposals. As mentioned in Chapter 6, ALBA states are known to prefer state-led economies 
and for an aversion towards market mechanisms in climate policy (Watts and Depledge, 2018). 
AILAC is aware of this, and as a result attempts persuasion with sensitivity to ALBA’s 
principles, adjusting its wording accordingly when putting forward proposals or speaking to 
them. As one former support unit advisor stated, “…you balance the text, and you say these 
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words in different places, and that helps them see themselves in different places.”95 Another 
AILAC support unit advisor spoke of recognising the importance to ALBA of climate justice 
and equity96, epitomised by its adoption of the discourse of the “rights of Mother Earth” (Watts 
and Depledge, 2018:7). Although they noted that the current relationship between AILAC and 
ALBA is difficult because of the two blocs’ fundamental differences in political philosophy, 
an AILAC delegate did state that any AILAC outreach attempts towards ALBA would need to 
be transmitted through a prism of climate justice and equity to have any chance of being 
received positively97. 
 
7.3.4 Developed Parties 
 
AILAC’s approach to persuading developed states also follows a particular framing pattern 
which is, in a sense, not to use framing. According to several interviewees, AILAC engages 
straightforwardly with developed states, like the EU or Umbrella Group members, without any 
particular political angle. One delegate stated their conversations with developed states’ 
negotiators, at least in the GST work stream, are always “really frank and open – ‘OK, I want 
this, I don’t want this, we have common ground in this’ – really fluent”98, while a support unit 
advisor added that the group interacts with developed states “from a very realistic point of view 
on what’s possible for them politically or not, and we bear that in mind to achieve an outcome, 
because we are very mindful of the fact that if they’re not on board, then we might have, like, 
the shiniest thing altogether and it’s not going to produce and result in a solution to the 
 
95 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
96 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018 
97 Interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018 
98 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 
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problem.”99 Therefore, AILAC is mindful of the importance to climate action of developed 
states’ participation, given their sizable contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions, and 
is as straightforward as possible with these parties to encourage their active participation. The 
same advisor even characterised the engagement with developed parties as “honest”, perhaps 
differentiating this approach from the group’s persuasion attempts with other parties in that 
with developed parties, there is no particular angle with which to frame persuasion other than 
pragmatism: 
“So, with each player, you know what’s going to work for them. I think, when you speak to 
developed countries, you tend to do that less, because you speak to them from a pragmatic 
point of view. Like, ‘I know that you’re developed and everything, and that you want China to 
do their share, but that’s not what’s written down in the Convention. And we need to work with 
what we have.’ And so you speak to them in the context of Cartagena, or when you speak to 
the US, from a very honest place. ‘Help me help you’, you know? Like, ‘If you want me to help 
you from this side of the aisle’, so it’s very honest.” 
This pragmatic approach to developed parties is evident in examples from other interviewees. 
A former delegate explained how they attempted to persuade developed countries in the finance 
negotiation stream to improve their financial commitments to developing countries. AILAC 
framed the situation as one where, if developed countries did not pledge to contribute more 
finance, AILAC would have no choice but to support the wider G77 position on finance - which 
was generally perceived as more confrontational towards developed parties than AILAC’s – 
even though it did not want to “set loose the G77” because of  additional complications it brings 
in reaching an acceptable compromise for all parties.100. A former support unit advisor also 
provided an example from the negotiations over the content of the Paris Agreement in which 
 
99 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018 
100 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018 
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AILAC successfully persuaded the US to compromise on the structure of the Enhanced 
Transparency Framework. The advisor explained how AILAC negotiators managed to soften 
their US counterparts’ position towards “flexibility” for parties’ requirements under the ETF, 
persuading them that, while AILAC, like the US, did not want a bifurcated classification 
between Annex I and non-Annex I parties, a singular system which did not differentiate 
between the capacities of developed and developing countries was not achievable based on  
positions AILAC knew other parties held at the time101. As such, it was AILAC’s 
straightforwardness and decision to be pragmatic in this situation which yielded results from 
the US delegation. 
 
7.3.5 Persuasion’s Links to Other Strategies 
 
Other interviewees identified links between persuasion and constructive proposals and 
compromise, noting in particular the relationship with the latter in in-session negotiations. A 
former AILAC delegate stated that compromise and persuasion go hand in hand, explaining 
that AILAC attempts to persuade others of its positions “all the time, but with concrete 
proposals. Concrete and progressive and tactical proposals, because not everyone is going to 
agree with us, so we try to find the minimum ground – in other words, we know that we have 
to give in to some of our tactical lines, but we want to get something back.”102 A former AILAC 
support unit advisor commented on the timing element to the persuasion – constructive 
proposals relationship, noting that the group first attempts to persuade others of its positions, 
but then follows with new constructive proposals when initial ideas are not accepted in their 
 
101 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
102 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018 
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original form or when negotiation becomes difficult, thus sparking a cycle of persuasion and 
proposals, gradually driving towards compromise103. Interestingly, another AILAC delegate 
observed that the group’s grounding in technical and scientific knowledge inoculates its 
negotiators at least to some degree from against parties’ attempts to persuade them of their 
positions, as they can discern what is or isn’t a viable proposition from a technical standpoint, 
thus allowing them to defend AILAC views which are grounded in the science and thus have 
solid logical reasoning behind them104. 
  In addition, AILAC delegates noted the variation in the spaces where the group 
uses persuasion and rational argument strategies. As well as face-to-face formal negotiation 
sessions in UNFCCC events to which the previous interviewees’ comments refer, both bilateral 
meetings105 and informal spaces, such as corridors or social meetings over drinks or meals,106 
were identified as where AILAC has utilised persuasion107. One delegate cited how AILAC 
negotiators were able to persuade AOSIS negotiators to support AILAC proposals on the global 
stocktake to represent the G77 as a whole108, by reminding them during an informal corridor 
conversation of the two groups’ similar interests. AILAC negotiators raised the BASIC 
position, which involved provision of a carbon budget based on the principle of historical 
responsibilities that would allow BASIC countries to continue to emit at business-as-usual 
levels, something AOSIS opposed. Thus, framing AILAC proposals strategically as opposition 
to that which AOSIS also opposed was key to winning AOSIS support. However, such an 
example is not as commonplace as some AILAC delegates would like, because AILAC 
delegates have large portfolios of domestic work to accomplish in addition to their work on 
 
103 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018 
104 Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018 
105 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd August 2018 
106 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 
107 The use of informal and different spaces as an AILAC negotiating strategy is discussed in Chapter 8. 
108 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 
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international negotiations, thus limiting their time to focus on the latter.109 Nevertheless, the 
same delegate did mention that the support unit, because they are employed by the AILAC 
group rather than national governments, have considerably more time to invest in negotiations 
outside of the formal spaces of plenaries and work stream sessions, and thus are able to attempt 
to persuade other negotiators of AILAC positions and proposals here. 
 
7.4 The Rationale Behind Using Persuasion and Rational Argument 
 
7.4.1 Power Dynamics 
 
AILAC’s use of persuasion and rational argument is clearly influenced by power dynamics 
between parties. AILAC lacks the leverage required to attempt more aggressive strategies, such 
as making threats or demands. If the negotiations are reduced simply to expressions of material 
power resources (upon which such strategies are based) – namely, economic (and its proxy in 
climate change negotiations, CO2 emissions), military, and latent power in the form of 
population sizes – AILAC cannot hope to have a meaningful influence on the outcome of the 
climate change negotiations. Its member states are not big emitters, do not possess significant 
economic clout, nor have strong military power or large populations in a global context. 
Interviewees demonstrated the group knows its shortcomings in these power resources limit its 
range of credibly available strategies110. One former delegate remarked "If you are actively 
trying to engage, but also if you’re just a country that’s not really important – unless you’re 
very compelling on the mic, it’s, like, ‘OK, thanks, next’."111, while a support unit member 
 
109 Interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018 
110 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with AILAC support unit member, 16th 
October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd 
October 2018 
111 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018 
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simply stated “persuasion’s all we have”112. While perhaps an oversimplification, as AILAC 
does in fact have other strategy options (see Chapters 5, 6, and 8), the basic point rings true, in 
that AILAC can only credibly use “soft” strategies to pursue its goals within the UNFCCC.  
Using persuasion links neatly to strategies discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 – technically 
rigorous submissions, and constructive proposals and compromise –therefore playing to 
AILAC’s strengths. The credibility required for AILAC’s attempts to use persuasion derives 
from its deep technical and scientific knowledge, which the group aims to convert into political 
capital for persuasion purposes through its use of technically rigorous submissions, with the 
intention of making such technical and scientific knowledge the lingua franca of the UNFCCC 
negotiations. Several delegates explicitly stated AILAC’s attempts at persuasion are grounded 
in scientific and technical knowledge113. One support unit member went further still, 
summarising how AILAC’s attempts to persuade with rational argument are linked both to 
technical and scientific knowledge and to the group’s constructive proposals and rhetoric: 
 “…so yeah, of course, the aim of, of providing these technical inputs is to inform others, and 
then as a second, err, phase, or as, as a second step of, of the process, to try to persuade them 
that by undertaking these very in-depth technical processes within AILAC, we’ve considered 
and we’ve evaluated many different scenarios and many different possibilities and then come 
up with these as a suggestion or a recommendation to, to others – it’s based on, on that 
specificity of the process and in that very strong consideration of the issues…So I would say 
that has been very consistent in, in how the group has, has been working since its inception.”114 
Therefore, if AILAC is perceived as a serious and credible participant in negotiations which 
values highly the rôle of technical and scientific knowledge, this carries with it the (justified) 
 
112 Interview with AILAC support unit member, 16th October 2018 
113 Interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018 
114 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
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implication that its positions are the product of rigorous analysis of the state of play of 
requirements to address climate change, based on its aforementioned knowledge. This is further 
boosted by delegates making the conscious decision to maximise clarity in explaining the 
group’s ideas and proposals, a common feature in AILAC negotiating, as numerous delegates 
stated in interviews115. Consequently, AILAC is afforded power/knowledge to attempt to 
persuade other parties to support any constructive proposals which AILAC puts forward, as 
they originate from this perceived sense of scientific validity and negotiating credibility based 
in the group’s technical knowledge, which the group attempts to frame as the arbiter of validity 
across the negotiations as a whole through its technical submissions. 
 However, such technical power/knowledge can be a blunt tool without an 
understanding of the ways in which to wield it most effectively. Here AILAC is rich in another 
form of power/knowledge, namely tactical knowledge about the state of play in the 
negotiations. The AILAC support unit conducts research in advance of negotiations to 
determine other groups’ and parties’ positions, landing zones, and any other useful information 
which AILAC may use to better its chances of succeeding with persuasion, or indeed any other 
strategy116. This is especially important given 32 of 35 interviewees stated any strategy 
selection decision depends on the logic of the negotiations at hand, i.e. which option is most 
likely to yield a satisfactory outcome. 2 former support unit advisors revealed that one of the 
unit’s key tasks since its creation has been the development of a matrix of other parties’ 
 
115 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC 
delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with former 
AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018 
116 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 14th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC 
delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with 
AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 9th October 2018; 
interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th 
October 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with former AILAC 
support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with 




positions, preferences, and potential trade-offs which might allow AILAC delegates to gain 
traction with them in their negotiations117 - in simple terms, which buttons to push - or not -  
on their negotiating partners. This allows AILAC delegates, therefore, to “borrow” power from 
others’ self-interest (Betzold, 2010), by tailoring their attempts at persuasion to suit particular 
parties and framing their interactions according what the group’s knowledge of the target party,  
as in the aforementioned ways for the LMDCs, AGN, and developed parties, or in the example 
of persuading AOSIS delegates to support AILAC proposals within the area of the G77 GST 
negotiations. The support unit provides this information to AILAC delegates as talking points, 
presentations, and colour-coded documents containing key information on other parties118, 
which is often invaluable to AILAC delegates as most of the group’s negotiators have little 
time to dedicate to work on the UNFCCC negotiations because of their demanding domestic 
work portfolios119. Furthermore, as one former AILAC delegate stated, this affects AILAC 
persuasion attempts both within in-session meetings and submission texts: 
“And we are super careful with the framing of the words, which is, together with who gives the 
message, it’s important, because we’re always trying to…we use certain words that we know 
will speak to certain groups, right? …And so, the text itself, when it’s a fully-written 
intervention, the text itself is super carefully crafted.”120 
Tactical knowledge also extends to factors outside of the negotiations which may affect 
negotiations between parties within the UNFCCC – e.g. the geopolitical relationships between 
parties. This too is part of the support unit’s briefings to the group’s negotiators, and can help 
AILAC negotiators to understand the reasoning behind other groups’ positions and 
 
117 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC support 
unit advisor, 20th November 2018 
118 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018 
119 Interview with AILAC delegate, 30th July 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; 
interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 
2018 
120 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018 
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preferences; in other words, geopolitical tactical knowledge can inform UNFCCC-specific 
tactical knowledge. One AILAC delegate gave the example of the African Group: “…in the 
case of the African Group…you will understand their positions only if you have the, the vision 
of what is happening at the UN, and other processes, in finance for development, in SDGs 
implementation – so it’s always important to have an overall view.”121 Additionally, AILAC’s 
delegation is essentially composed of delegates from the member states’ environment and 
foreign affairs ministries, the latter being more attuned to international relations between 
AILAC and other parties outside of climate change, and therefore also able to share their 
insights with their environmentally-focused colleagues. 
However, interviewees gave a somewhat mixed response when asked about the degree 
to which geopolitical considerations affect persuasion attempts. Those from foreign affairs 
ministries were largely of the opinion (9 of 13) that while geopolitical relations were at the 
back of the minds of AILAC delegates, framing of persuasion relied mostly on information 
about other parties’ behaviour specifically within the UNFCCC negotiations, as well as 
technical knowledge from the AILAC support unit and delegates from AILAC member states’ 
environment ministries. As one AILAC delegate stated, “…the negotiation in climate change, 
err, at least from our countries, is more related with, with the logic of our environmental 
policies, and not necessary with the trade or the international relations policies.”122  
 9 of the 13 interviewees from environment ministries also agreed that 
geopolitical considerations were not at the forefront of the framing of persuasion attempts 
towards particular parties, although this seems to be more because delegates from ministries of 
environment have technical and scientific backgrounds, and therefore focus on the technical 
 
121 Interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018 
122 Interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018 
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details of the climate change negotiations123. As one AILAC delegate from a ministry of 
environment stated, “So, we try to stay in the technical considering that if we cross that, we 
can hurt those [geopolitical considerations], err, and that’s not our competence. I mean…but 
we know there is a context behind.”124 Support unit members answered similarly, noting that 
because AILAC has a support unit which is not employed by any one country in particular, the 
group can focus on issues specific to the UNFCCC negotiations without being drawn into 
geopolitical considerations, as it is “removed from the government position”125. 
Furthermore, another support unit member noted that because the AILAC delegation 
contains negotiators from member states’ foreign affairs ministries, this brings a level of 
experience which is useful to the group in its persuasion attempts: “I think they’re old hands, 
so the diplomats are old hands in diplomacy, so actually that’s fine, they’ll just avoid the 
pitfalls. It means that, err, that’s how you maintain credibility with the more developed 
nations.”126 AILAC foreign affairs-based delegates therefore have the experience to know the 
importance of not framing persuasion attempts according to geopolitical factors, as it presents 
AILAC as focused on the climate change issue rather than trying to score geopolitical points 
or obtain geopolitical advantages over its negotiating partners. This, therefore, boosts the 
credibility of AILAC as an honest participant in the UNFCCC negotiations, which in turn can 
help to persuade other parties of the reasonableness of the group’s proposals and ideas. This 
geopolitically-neutral approach was highlighted by several AILAC interviewees, who 
identified the importance of caution in framing persuasion attempts, especially with close 
neighbours such as ALBA, given its stark difference in political philosophy from that of 
AILAC member states, and ABU127. Ironically, then, this approach emphasising absence of 
 
123 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd August, 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; 
interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018 
124 Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018 
125 Interview with former AILAC support unit member, 23rd October 2018 
126 Interview with AILAC support unit member, 16th October 2018 
127 Interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018 
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geopolitical framing in persuasion attempts can arguably be for strongly geopolitical reasons 




Use of persuasion is also in keeping with AILAC’s identity, as described in Chapter 5. Given 
that AILAC self-identifies as a bridge-builder, and embraces multilateralism to solve global 
problems, the use of persuasion is perfectly acceptable to the group, alongside its technical 
submissions, constructive proposals, and compromise offers, as it does not impinge its ability 
to perform this rôle within the UNFCCC negotiations. If anything, it actively boosts its attempts 
to build bridges between different parties. Indeed, as well as being ineffective, the use of more 
aggressive strategies would run counter to AILAC’s proclaimed identity and rôle in the 
negotiations, and so AILAC has no need to deviate away from its three-part strategy of 
technical submissions, constructive proposals, and persuasion, as one support unit advisor 
pointed out: 
“AILAC, as a group of countries, is trying to show that they play by the rules. So, they will not 
be the spoilers. They will not do what China has been known to do, or what some of the African 
countries are willing to do, or what Saudi Arabia is willing to do, and say ‘No, because…’ So, 
as minor countries that don’t invest in other countries, who are unwilling to throw their toys 




128 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018 
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7.4.3 Delegation and Intra-Bloc Dynamics 
 
The responses of interviewees regarding the influence of geopolitical factors also flag the 
importance of recognising that the characteristics of the people involved in the negotiations can 
also make a big difference to how effective persuasion can be. Therefore, knowledge is also 
required about who exactly AILAC negotiators will be interacting with, as well as reflection 
on the characteristics of the AILAC delegates attempting persuasion. 34 of the 35 AILAC 
interviewees responded that the individuals involved, both within AILAC and other parties and 
groups, are a significant factor in their negotiations, and this extends to persuasion attempts. 
This is particularly important because the consensus view from interviewees was that, within 
the red lines set by the group’s overall position on negotiation issues, AILAC delegates are 
essentially free to negotiate however they see fit towards the group’s goals, although they are 
required to report what they have done back to the group and get consensus approval for any 
particular tactics they want to try later that day, e.g. a more aggressive tone, or to play up a 
particular technical aspect129. The group holds meetings before negotiation sessions and at the 
beginning of each day of a negotiation session, when the support group provides the 
aforementioned intelligence and recommendations. AILAC negotiation co-ordinators can also 
update the group on the previous day’s events130, but, as one former delegate explained, “…in 
most cases, I would say we don’t design a strategy as such as a group…There’s a discussion 
 
129 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 21st August, 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 
2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 
2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd 
October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 
2018; interview with AILAC delegates, 31st October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018 
130 Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; 
interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 
2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 
2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; 
interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 
20th November 2018 
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about the position but not the way to present it, or the strategy. And then that is, in fact, up to 
the co-ordinator…many times you have to adjust the strategy day by day, so it falls to the co-
ordinator of that issue."131 Indeed, the same former negotiator elaborated that because of the 
highly complex nature of the negotiations on climate change, the large number of parties, and 
potential for negotiating scenarios to change daily, if not more frequently, the group recognises 
it would be “almost impossible” for AILAC to micromanage all of the strategic decision-
making of its negotiators”132. 
As such, individuals’ decisions on how exactly to operationalise persuasion attempts 
can make all the difference. Interviewee responses identified 3 main variables of personal 
characteristics which have a material impact on these decisions within AILAC attempts at 
persuasion, although obviously the effects are not uniform due to the natural variability in 
people’s characteristics. 
 Firstly, 25 interviewees specifically mentioned that the personalities and 
cultural backgrounds of individuals involved in persuasion attempts were an important 
dynamic. How confident an AILAC negotiator is on the microphone can affect the way in 
which persuasion attempts are pursued within negotiation sessions, and this is a function of the 
personality of the negotiator in question – whether a person is naturally outgoing or shy. For 
example, as several AILAC delegates explained, a less confident negotiator on the microphone 
may prefer to pursue persuasion attempts in corridor conversations or in informal spaces rather 
than in the formal spaces of sessions themselves133. Similarly, a more confident speaker may 
be more likely to use the freedom to improvise, where someone less confident may stick to 
 
131 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018 
132 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018 
133 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; 
interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018 
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reading out the pre-arranged talking points or statements provided by the support unit134. 
Furthermore, the personality of the negotiator may affects the tone of voice used, and one 
delegate even mentioned a variation in the “levels of politeness” as causing variations in the 
way persuasion attempts play out135, e.g. whether an AILAC proposal is presented and justified 
in an aggressive way136. One delegate remarked that AILAC delegates tend to be passionate in 
their persuasion attempts, as “We are Latins”, while a former delegate stated that, on the whole, 
the AILAC delegation has been such that its members are “relatively vocal and ready to speak”, 
though obviously some more than others, as one would expect from natural variation among 
people137. A support unit advisor also offered the view that while the personalities of the bloc’s 
negotiators generally mean they are vocal, they prefer to be so more in informal meetings and 
situations rather than on the microphone in formal settings.138 
  Several interviewees drew particular attention to the high proportion of female 
AILAC negotiators over time139; indeed, of the interviewees for this thesis, 21 of 35 were 
female. These responses typically characterised AILAC’s female negotiators as “strong”, or 
“star negotiators” – one male AILAC delegate even described his female colleagues as “like 
rock stars”140, while another described them as “kick-ass, powerful women”. In their view, this 
allowed them to be blunt when necessary – such as with the aforementioned framing when 
persuading developed parties – but also able to improvise if they felt that a particular line of 
argument was not proving fruitful. The second of the 2 abovementioned male delegates also 
 
134 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th 
October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
135 Interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018 
136 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th 
September 2018 
137 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018 
138 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
139 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC 
delegate, 10th September 2018; Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC 
delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with 
AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018 
140 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 
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suggested the high proportion of women negotiating for AILAC may be at least in part 
responsible for the group’s generally constructive approach to persuasion as a strategy, and 
negotiations in general: 
“I have a hard time believing that does not play a rôle in the, in AILAC’s personality. Even our 
support unit is mostly women. And this is not on purpose, right, this is just the way the cookie 
crumbles…And so, I think – again, no data to back this up – but there is…it changes the 
leadership style. And that tends to change the dynamic [of negotiations]. And that’s not to say 
that every male is hard, and, I mean, I’m not trying to draw that – but in general terms it does 
tend to change, to shift the dynamic. And I have a hard time believing – even when it [AILAC] 
was conceived, it was conceived mostly by a group of women. Err, I have a hard time believing 
there is no link there. Because we have a personality, and AILAC as a group has a personality, 
and that personality, that’s, err, being friends with everybody even when we don’t necessarily 
agree. Being able to cross these divides, but then having this deep technical capacity, because 
these people who I have the privilege of working with in AILAC in the vast majority of cases 
are monsters at what they do. It makes for a very uncommon – I think, at least – it makes for a 
very uncommon combination.”141 
Secondly, 26 interviewees opined that personal relationships with negotiators from other 
parties were an important dynamic in AILAC’s use of persuasion. They cited how far the group 
can foster trust with other parties as particularly important for persuasion142. Of course, a large 
part of this dynamic is determined by the personalities of both AILAC delegates and other 
parties’ negotiators, but it can also be affected by the length of time a delegate has spent within 
 
141 Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018 
142 Interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview 
with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; 
interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit 
advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC 
delegate, 7th November 2018 
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the UNFCCC negotiations – a point addressed below. Nevertheless, a trust-based relationship 
can help AILAC negotiators to pinpoint tactics more likely to succeed with particular 
negotiators, as more time spent getting to know the other person cam boost AILAC’s ability to 
predict how they will react to certain arguments or framings, allowing the AILAC negotiator 
to adjust accordingly143. Additionally, having good relationships with other parties’ negotiators 
allows AILAC to change the dynamic of a negotiating room in their favour when attempting 
to persuade the wider UNFCCC to support an AILAC proposal; one delegate remarked on their 
good relationship with an EU negotiator enabling them to call for their support for a proposal 
on the legal architecture of the Paris Agreement, which in turn convinced other parties to follow 
suit.144 
Furthermore, it can broaden negotiating options available to delegates – e.g. tone of 
voice or framing arguments in particular ways - without risking offending or irritating their 
counterparts. One delegate stated a good relationship with other negotiators, built on trust, can 
open doors for persuasion attempts by allowing the possibility of using different spaces to 
pursue the strategy, as over a drink or a meal, because “you can take off the costume”145 of a 
negotiator and perhaps speak more plainly or in a more relatable manner146, unbound by 
diplomatic protocols of formal negotiation sessions, which may prove more fruitful. Another 
delegate even agreed with this point by reference to something they had heard during the 
negotiations: 
“You need relationships with these people so that you can actually have a conversation. And it 
goes back to this personal, err, personality and personal, err, issue, where – I’ve heard this, 
and it, it was said half in jest by a senior negotiator from another party, but – “I cannot 
 
143 Interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018 
144 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018 
145 Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018 
146 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018 
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negotiate with you if I haven’t gotten drunk with you!” I get that. I mean, it’s not a black and 
white thing, but I get that.”147 
Thirdly, 23 interviewees cited experience, knowledge, and negotiating skill of AILAC 
negotiators as affecting persuasion attempts, and these contribute to negotiators’ personalities 
as well. Several interviewees raised concerns that while the group has many negotiators with 
deep technical and scientific knowledge of their issue areas, many are relatively inexperienced 
in the UNFCCC negotiations, and the number of experienced negotiators is dwindling148, 
which they felt could hamper AILAC’s ability to persuade other parties of their proposals and 
ideas. They attributed this to 2 main causes. Interviewees reported that the ministries from 
which the AILAC delegation draws most of its negotiators tend to rotate their delegates 
relatively frequently (approximately every 2-3 years), meaning most delegates are at least 
somewhat new to the UNFCCC negotiations and have insufficient time to accrue experience 
before being rotated out again; those from foreign affairs ministries may have experience of 
international negotiations and diplomacy, but tend not to have experienced the climate change 
arena before149. This lack of topic-specific negotiation experience is important, given the 
necessity of developing trust and relationships with their peers. One delegate remarked that 
sessions are much harder for new negotiators simply because they do not yet know all the other 
established negotiators, making it harder to attempt to persuade others - although this can be 
 
147 Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018 
148 Interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd August 2018; interview 
with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; 
interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; 
interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th 
November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
149 Interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview 
with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with 
former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview 
with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018; interview with 




mitigated by certain personalities150 - as well as because of difficulties in understanding the 
complexity of the UNFCCC negotiations, which can be confusing to those not used to its 
dynamics. Indeed, a guide manual to the UNFCCC negotiations written for developing parties’ 
negotiators (Tenzing, 2016:5) specifically states: 
“Attending UN climate negotiations for the first time is daunting, especially if it’s a Conference 
of the Parties (COP) session. With so many meetings happening in parallel — some open, some 
closed — and jargon and acronyms that constantly roll off people’s tongues, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process is notoriously complex.” 
Added to this lack of negotiating experience, interviewees highlighted lack of holistic training 
as a factor impeding their ability to use persuasion to its full effect. A former delegate noted 
that delegates from environment ministries “are not trained negotiators, they’re just experts in 
their field”151 - often the science of climate change - which means that they are not as able to 
assess and anticipate developments as foreign affairs-based delegates, despite their deep 
technical knowledge152. One support unit member even credits this influx of new negotiators 
without specific negotiation training as responsible for AILAC drifting towards more reactivity 
than proactivity across all strategies in the years since the adoption of the Paris Agreement153. 
However, this is not to say that interviewees felt total reliance on trained foreign affairs-based 
delegates would improve their ability to negotiate – as one former support unit advisor noted, 
when discussions in UNFCCC negotiations become very technical, “the people in the 
ministries of foreign affairs don’t necessarily understand what that has to do with anything”154. 
Furthermore, one delegate argued that negotiators based in environment ministries understand 
 
150 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 
151 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018 
152 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 
2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018 
153 Interview with AILAC support unit member, 13th November 2018 
154 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018 
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the effects of the agreements they are negotiating because of their technical knowledge, and 
therefore are better placed than foreign affairs delegates to offer flexibility, a key tool in 
negotiations. Foreign affairs delegates, conversely, may not necessarily understand the 
substance of what is being negotiated and become too focused on terminology. They gave the 
following example: 
“’Yeah, you want to call this blue? Fine, you can call it blue – as long as it is number one, two, 
three, four, five, I don’t care what you call it.’ But that is something that you have to have 
enough technical background, and enough technical comfort to be able to say that. Otherwise, 
if you came in with a political mandate that it had to be called red, it is going to be called red 
regardless of what else happens. And I think that gives us some degree of, of flexibility that is 
often not found [with foreign affairs delegates].”155 
That AILAC’s delegation is composed of members of both environment and foreign affairs 
ministries helps circumvent these problems in theory, by sharing the technical and tactical 
knowledge of these 2 sets of delegates, but the lack of UNFCCC-specific training mentioned 
above, according to interviewees, hampers this somewhat. Several interviewees reported 
variation in the level of training amongst AILAC member states, as a result of the differences 
in the capacities of the AILAC national governments156; governments with greater funding and 
expertise resources are unsurprisingly better able to provide training to their delegates, whereas 
those less with fewer resources are not able even to provide a delegate for every negotiation 
topic. As such, while group decisions on AILAC’s positions are made by consensus (AILAC, 
date unknown), in practice that some member states do not have a voice in some of the technical 
 
155 Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018 
156 Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; 
interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 
2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 
2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 
7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
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co-ordinations where approval for particular tactics within strategies in sessions is decided 
(either by having no one present or no one with enough training to be able to participate 
effectively), nor have delegates in sessions to negotiate for the group157, means that AILAC 
strategy can be more of a reflection of the preferences of the better resourced AILAC member 
states. AILAC can crudely be divided in two along this axis, with Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
and Peru generally better able to train delegates than Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and 
Paraguay. As one delegate put it: “Yes, those four, four big countries - at least one of those four 
big countries is usually one of the big voices in most streams - but that has a lot to do with how 
big the delegations are, and how big, or how well developed their capacities in climate change 
in general tend to be in those countries."158 A former Guatemalan delegate even blamed the 
Guatemalan government for “silencing” the country’s participation in AILAC because of 
domestic corruption and instability, with cronyism meaning those appointed to rôles in the 
country’s environment and foreign affairs ministries are unqualified and unsuitable for their 
positions.159 
 However, one support unit member did identify the support unit’s important rôle in at 
least partially mitigating the problem of a lack of training, given its members are both experts 
in the climate change negotiations – often both technically and tactically – and able to dedicate 
their time and energy entirely to AILAC in the UNFCCC negotiations, unlike delegates whose 
domestic work often leaves little time to dedicate to preparation for negotiating sessions. They 
 
157 Interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th 
August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC 
delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with 
AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview 
with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 
2018; interview with AILAC delegates, 31st October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; 
interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit 
advisor, 20th November 2018 
158 Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018 
159 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018 
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pointed out support unit members (who are not affiliated to any one member state’s government 
and do not align themselves with any particular AILAC states), while prevented from 
negotiating for the group (AILAC, date unknown) in sessions, do accompany AILAC delegates 
to negotiations to assist and advise where needed or requested, which can be especially useful 
given the general lack of climate negotiations-specific experience among delegates: “So if a 
person, err, who’s new to the process is sent to a meeting room for the first time, and they have 
the support unit person next to them, they’re going to listen to that support unit person, because 














160 Interview with AILAC support unit member, 16th October 2018 
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Chapter 8 discusses AILAC’s use of the remaining strategies on the less aggressive half of the 
spectrum. The section on coalition-building is divided into sub-sections for the evidence of the 
strategy in submission texts and formal sessions, preceding a sub-section on the influences on 
use of the strategy. The section on bilateral meetings is divided in half between a discussion on 
evidence of the strategy and analysis of influences on it. The section on informal spaces divides 
into 6 sub-sections: 2 short discussions of textual and interview evidence of the strategy’s use, 
before analysis of the reasoning behind use of 4 types of spaces: informals and informal 
informals, social meetings, corridor conversations, and external forums. The final section 
addresses concessions trading as a strategy. This section is presented with analysis of evidence 
from submissions and interviews mixed with each other and explanation of the reasoning 
behind concession trading’s use, as only through a retrospective analysis of submissions, 











8.2.1 Coalition-Building in Submissions 
 
Textual and corpus-linguistic analysis of AILAC submissions shows some evidence of the use 
of coalition-building. This includes subtle attempts at broad coalition-building, i.e. references 
to developed or developing country parties (284 tokens across 43 submissions161) rather than 
Annex I or non-Annex I parties (3 tokens across 2 submissions162) possibly reflecting a desire 
to avoid further entrenchment of divisions (Watts and Depledge, 2018), references to other 
parties as AILAC’s “partners”163, and references to specific parties and coalitions. For example, 
all 13 of AILAC’s statements in negotiating sessions declare the bloc “associates itself with 
the G77 & China”164, while Submission 4 (AILAC, 2014b) states “AILAC supports the 
proposal by AOSIS in their September submission to convene annual ministerial/high-level 
sessions on enhanced pre-2020 climate action.” Submission 38 (AILAC, 2017p) expresses 
AILAC’s agreement with the AGN’s ideas for risk assessment inclusions in future national 
adaptation communications, and Submission 58’s (AILAC, 2018j) statement at the opening of 
COP24 specifically references a presentation by AILAC, the EIG, and CARICOM at the 
Bangkok intersessional meeting in 2018 on the importance of COP24 producing results which 
reflect the inputs of the Talanoa Dialogue. All these references to specific parties demonstrate 
AILAC attempting to forge positive relationships, whether by expressing support for, 
 
161 Submissions 1 – 7, 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, 19-35, 37-40, 43, 46, 47, 49, 51, 54, 55, 58, 61, and 62 – see Appendix 
I for references 
162 One reference in Submission 2 (AILAC, 2013b) and two in Submission 7 (AILAC, 2014e) 
163 See, for example, Submission 12 (AILAC. 2016c), Submission 28 (AILAC, 2017f), and Submission 50 
(AILAC, 2018b) 
164 See, for example, Submissions 12, 13, 36, 46, 47, 48, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, and 62 (AILAC, 2016c; 2016d; 
2017n; 2017x; 2017y; 2017z; 2018d; 2018e; 2018g; 2018h; 2018i; 2018j; 2018n) 
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association,  or agreement with these parties, as the group has made a conscious decision to 
highlight them, which can be seen as attempts to build alliances, at least on certain issue areas.  
Additionally, 6 of 62 AILAC submissions were made jointly with other parties: 
Submission 3 with Mexico and the Dominican Republic, Submissions 8 and 51 with the EIG, 
Submission 54 with the AGN, Submission 59 with Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, Mexico, 
New Zealand, and Switzerland, and Submission 60 with AOSIS, the EU, Japan, Mexico, South 
Africa, and Switzerland. Clearly, that AILAC has publicly and officially put forward 
submissions with other parties and groups demonstrates it is seeking to present a united front 
with its submission author partners where they hold common positions. This can only be the 
result of active negotiations between delegates of AILAC and other groups and parties, aimed 
at formally agreeing to draft and present such submissions, given this requires active co-
ordination and co-operation. Indeed, other groups’ and parties’ influence is noticeable in the 
choice of language in some of these joint submissions. Several – although the sample size of 6 
is small - are markedly different in tone from the standalone AILAC submissions, in which the 
group generally avoids pressing its points too forcefully for all but its highest priorities, 
exemplified by its preference for “should” over “shall” verbs, or its tendency to cushion more 
forceful language – e.g. describing something as “critical” or “necessary”, or stating that 
something “must” occur – with qualifying phrases or justifications for its approach.  
For example, Submission 54 (AILAC, 2018f) with the AGN, on the adaptation 
communication’s place on the APA agenda, adopts a confrontational tone from the beginning, 
declaring in the first section with a standalone line that “It is not acceptable to have no further 
work on adaptation under transparency (item 5).” While the submission does provide a 
rationale for this viewpoint, it appears in a separate paragraph, thus maximising the impact of 
two groups’ disapproval of the lack of further work on adaptation in the transparency section 
of the APA agenda. The opening line of the second section of the statement reads “The position 
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of the AGN and AILAC is firm and unambiguous.” The 2 coalitions do subsequently state that 
they are flexible as regards the specific details to be worked on, but the strength of feeling in 
the initial statement is obvious, in sharp contrast to the way most individual AILAC 
submissions communicate views. Another good example is in Submission 60 (AILAC, 2018l), 
made jointly with AOSIS, the EU, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, and Switzerland on baselines 
for emissions reductions within Article 6.4. The submission uses a bulleted list of 21 proposals 
under 5 headings; all bar 4 of these proposals use a “shall” verb construction rather than 
“should”, thereby indicating that these proposals are intended to be definite, and by implication, 
non-negotiable. For example, the submission states “A BAT [best available technology] 
approach shall be used for establishing methodologies” and “The approach shall comprise an 
ambitious benchmark representing a level of GHG emissions for activities within a defined 
scope and boundary, reflecting best available technology (BAT), and taking into account 
national circumstances where appropriate”. 
   However, this firmer tone is not present in all of AILAC’s joint submissions. 
Submission 8 (AILAC, 2015a) with the EIG, proposing an in-session workshop on gender and 
climate change, contains the same qualifying phrases and conditional language as in AILAC-
only submissions. For example, the submission’s second paragraph (which is the first 
expression of the proposal) states: 
“…it is important that the in-session workshop on gender-responsive climate policy with focus 
on mitigation action and technology development and transfer is viewed as an opportunity to 
increase a common understanding among Parties as to the linkages and implications of having 
a gender approach to mitigation and technology…” 
The apparently strong declaration  “it is important that…” is prefaced, however, with “For 
AILAC and EIG”, thus directly presenting the firmer position specifically as a reflection of the 
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two groups’ views, rather than as a general demand made of other parties. The rest of the 
submission continues in this more constructive tone, with ideas proposed through “should” 
verb constructions (e.g. “We believe the workshop should be organised in the early days of the 
second week in SBI42…”) and other equally constructive sentence constructions (e.g. “Some 
concrete topics for further exploration and discussion during the workshop may include…” and 
“we would like to suggest the Secretariat to reach out to recognised intergovernmental and civil 
society institutions..”). Submission 8 also includes numerous justifications, as is typical of 
AILAC-only submissions; indeed, the submission contains an entire section citing examples 
of actions  by AILAC countries to demonstrate what attendees could learn and share from the 
proposed workshop, thus justifying its existence. 
 That only some of AILAC’s jointly-made submissions adopt a different tone and 
language compared with AILAC-only submissions is potentially attributable to the identity of 
the partners with whom AILAC is making them. It could be that AILAC is conscious of the 
power dynamics within the UNFCCC, and knows that, for example, a submission made jointly 
with parties better endowed with material power resources – whether economic power, as in 
the case of the EU and other developed country parties e.g. Japan and Switzerland – or latent 
power such as the AGN, representing over 1bn people – is likely to have greater political clout 
within the negotiations than submissions made by AILAC alone, making the use of more 
forceful language more credible. Submissions made with the EIG, however, adopted similar 
linguistic practices to those of AILAC-only submissions. This could also be because of the 
EIG’s profile within the power dynamics of UNFCCC negotiations -  the EIG only represents 
6 countries with a total population of 138,514,920 (World Bank, 2018c) – equivalent to 1.82% 
of the global total - and is responsible for only 3.24% of global CO2 emissions
165 (Carbon Atlas, 
2019). Another factor for joint AILAC-EIG submissions in particular could be identity. The 
 
165 1184.20Mt/year of 36573Mt/year global total 
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EIG portrays itself similarly to AILAC as a bridge-builder between developed and developing 
country parties166, whereas other groups with whom AILAC has made joint submissions do not 
necessarily subscribe to this promoted identity – for example, the EU portrays itself as a leader 
(Oberthür, 2011), while AOSIS has historically played the rôle of the “innocent victims” 
pushing for strong climate action from those with moral and historical responsibility (Betzold, 
2010:138). Consequently, submissions made by 2 groups self-identifying as bridge-builders 
require the bridge-building discourses and discursive practices to be evident throughout to 
maintain the credibility of these identities, whereas submissions made by an assortment of 
groups and parties identifying with different rôles does not need to adhere to one set of 
discursive practices to be credible, relying instead on the political clout – or even potentially 
sheer numbers - of the members involved. 
 
8.2.2 Coalition-Building in Negotiation Sessions 
 
Interviews with AILAC delegates suggest they also regularly engage in coalition-building 
efforts within negotiating sessions and meetings, with 29 of 35 identifying this as a strategy 
used by the group in such spaces. One interviewee remarked that AILAC goes about coalition-
building and using its alliances “on a daily basis”167, while another said AILAC engages in this 
“all the time”168. One former support unit advisor went as far as describing coalition-building 
as AILAC’s modus operandi169. Another former delegate went further still, identifying this 
strategy as the most important part of AILAC activity in the negotiations170. According to 
 
166 Interview with EIG delegate, 13th August 2018 
167 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 
168 Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018 
169 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
170 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018 
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delegates interviewed, the ways in which coalition-building takes place within negotiation 
sessions varies. AILAC uses bilateral meetings with other groups and parties to create 
communication channels, which then enables the group to agree common positions and 
commitments to present joint submissions with other parties171. AILAC volunteers to lead and 
chair negotiation sessions with other groups172, and co-ordinates with others sharing their views 
in advance of negotiation sessions on topics of particular importance. This is to ensure that in 
these sessions, a variety of voices is heard at different times to build momentum towards those 
parties’ common goals, with parties echoing and openly supporting each other173. All these 
tactics within this overall strategy aim to promote as much consensus as possible for positions 
which AILAC proposes or with which the group agrees174 This is especially important bearing 
in mind the UNFCCC’s requirement for consensus among parties before outcomes can be 
formally adopted (UNFCCC, 1992). 
 
8.2.3 Influences on Coalition-Building Strategies 
 
Interviewees’ responses also suggest AILAC delegates are equally conscious of the UNFCCC 
power dynamics and their implications for the success of strategic efforts when going about 
coalition-building as might be inferred from analysis of linguistic trends in the group’s joint 
submissions. A former support unit advisor explained an understanding of such dynamics 
underpins AILAC’s fervent coalition-building activity: 
 
171 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th 
November 2018 
172 Interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018 
173 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd 
October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
174 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 21018 
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“…the, the value of the group was that we could do that type of work, that soft power work and 
that coalition-building across every single pillar of the agreement, of the Paris Agreement, 
which we hadn’t been able to do before, which actually had sacrificed some of our 
credibility.”175 
In other words, AILAC’s coalition-building strategy is designed to borrow power in the way 
described by Zartman and Rubin (2000b) as a process-based strategy – as Betzold (2010:136) 
puts it, “skilfully playing the game” of negotiations. AILAC is aware it does not have the 
resources – economic- or personnel-based – to field delegates for every single area of what are 
extremely complex negotiations, and therefore by building and operating coalitions with other 
groups and parties, it can take advantage of their power resources for its own ends. Besides the 
obvious power benefits of presenting joint submissions with others, echoing another group in 
a negotiating room may not require the AILAC delegate present to have read in detail the 
agenda for the meeting and to have prepared talking points and interventions. If an issue area 
has been agreed in advance as the responsibility of another party for a particular objective, the 
AILAC delegate need only attend and repeat or support what their delegate(s) say(s), saving 
their time and energy for work on another issue where they have responsibility. One former 
support unit advisor gave the example of working with EIG and AOSIS delegates, with whom 
they would co-ordinate. The interviewee stated they would share notes in different negotiating 
rooms with these delegates to minimise the amount of advance work required of each delegate 
to be ready for a session, and to make sure the points that each participating delegate made on 
the microphone would tally with those made by other parties’ delegates within this coalition176. 
 According to the majority (25 of 35) of interviewees, decisions about which parties to 
build and make use of coalitions with unsurprisingly depends on 2 factors: firstly the 
 
175 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
176 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
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negotiating issue in question, as AILAC agrees with some parties but not others on different 
issue areas; and secondly the support unit’s ability to gather information on the positions and 
delegations of other groups and parties, so as to know which may be open to some form of co-
operation with AILAC and thus which to target177. This speaks of AILAC’s consciousness of 
its identity as a progressive bridge-builder, willing to ally itself to parties backing proposals 
and ideas leading to the sorts of concrete actions AILAC desires and not to those who do not, 
instead attempting to persuade them to change their positions and accept either their proposals 
or compromise versions. As such, some interviewees felt AILAC has “natural allies” on certain 
issues, or at least these parties have been natural allies since the negotiations over the Paris 
Agreement in 2015, when party positions were clarified as the UNFCCC moved to formalise 
negotiations into legal text178. For example, interviewees said AILAC enjoys a good 
relationship with the EU on issue areas such as transparency and the general level of ambition 
it wishes to see within the negotiations outcome as this is generally high, and combined with a 
rigorous approach to transparency179, but AILAC does not support the EU’s positions 
universally, withholding support on issues like those relating to finance provision to developing 
country parties180. Likewise, AILAC and the Umbrella Group can find common ground and 
argue in tandem with each other in negotiations over the importance of market mechanisms 
under Article Six181, though they are at odds on questions of mitigation and how much action 
 
177 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th 
September 2018 
178 Interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th 
November 2018 
179 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview 
with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; 
interview with AILAC support unit member, 27th September 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit 
advisor, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018; interview with AILAC support 
unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
180 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC support unit 
advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC 
delegate, 27th October 2018 
181 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview 
with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; interview 
with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018 
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is required.182 Assessments of which parties with whom to ally and for which issue areas also 
reveal, however, a consideration of the domestic situations of AILAC member states, as clearly 
such ambitious proposals are supported by the bloc because they are in the interests of its 
member states, given their extreme vulnerability to climate change effects (Edwards et al, 
2017). 
 One example evidences further consideration still of the impact on AILAC 
member states’ domestic situations, which is the relationship between AILAC and the AGN. 
23 interviewees characterised the relationship as positive, with 12 specifically mentioning the 
positivity and efforts at co-operation on issues relating to adaptation measures in the 
negotiations183, as demonstrated by the joint submission mentioned above. 26 interviewees, 
however, including some in the abovementioned 23, also characterised the relationship 
between AILAC and the AGN as “difficult”. That AILAC has a “love/hate” relationship, as 
one delegate put it184, with the AGN results from the coalitions’ differing views on the issue of 
the “special needs and special circumstances of Africa”, which was initially put forward at 
COP21 in Paris, before gaining traction once again in negotiations in 2018 (AGN, 2018)185. 23 
of the 26 interviewees cited this issue as responsible for this negative relationship dynamic 
between the groups186. The perception of AILAC interviewees was that the AGN was 
 
182 Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 10th July 2018; interview 
with former AILAC delegate, 21st August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; 
interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018 
183 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd August 2018; interview 
with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with 
AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; interview with 
AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; 
interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 
2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 9th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th 
November 2018 
184 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 
185 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018 
186 Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview 
with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 
2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit 
advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC 
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proposing this measure to gain the same recognition of the vulnerability of African countries 
as for countries specifically mentioned in the UNFCCC legal texts, namely the small island 
developing states and least developed countries, referenced in the UNFCCC preamble 
(UNFCCC, 1992) and the Paris Agreement, as in Articles 9.4 and 9.9 (UNFCCC, 2015), among 
other instances. Articles 9.4 and 9.9 are particularly relevant in this context from AILAC 
interviewees’ perspective, as formal recognition of African vulnerability equivalent to that of 
SIDS and LDCs would therefore add African parties to a priority list for the provision of 
financial support. As a former AILAC support unit advisor explained, “This is a major thing – 
because basically if you have LDCs, SIDS, and Africa [with this funding priority status] – the 
only region that is not there from the developing world is Latin America”187. The perceived 
exclusion of AILAC members from priority access to funding, therefore, is a domestic 
consideration, as the potentially smaller share of UNFCCC funding, or at least delayed access 
to it, would have material consequences on AILAC member states’ ability to proceed with 
climate action. However, because the issue impacts particularly on funding, broader domestic 
politics of AILAC member states would be affected, as it could affect government budgeting. 
 Another factor which has an impact on AILAC’s strategy of coalition-building, which 
interviewees mentioned repeatedly, is the relationship between individual AILAC negotiators 
and their counterparts from other parties. As shown in Chapter 7, AILAC’s deployment of a 
strategy in in-session negotiations, while constrained to the boundaries of the group’s positional 
red lines, depends greatly on the character and personality of delegates, and according to 
interviewees, this also holds for coalition-building. How far AILAC can pursue a strategy of 
 
support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 9th October 
2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th 
October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 
27th October 2018; interview with three AILAC delegates, 31st October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 
7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018; interview with former 
AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018 
187 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018 
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coalition-building depends on how positive the relationship is between its delegates and those 
of the target parties, meaning the group has vary its approach to different parties given the 
variety in the strength of the relationships between different delegates188. One AILAC 
negotiator explained both the fact that a positive personal relationship is a prerequisite for 
attempts at coalition-building with another party’s delegate, and the rôle of individual 
personalities in the process: 
“You like people or you don’t, and you get along with people or you don’t…And so we’ll have 
these relationships where we can actually come up to people and – people tend to think about 
relationships with people who you agree with, which obviously is a thing, but you need 
relationships with people you don’t agree with. You need relationships with these people so 
that you can actually have a conversation. And it goes back to this personal, err, personality 
and personal, err, issue, where – I’ve heard this, and it, it was said half in jest by a senior 
negotiator from another party, but – “I cannot negotiate with you if I haven’t gotten drunk with 
you!” I get that. I mean, it’s not a black and white thing, but I get that. Err, and so, we build 
these relationships with both sides.”189 
A former support unit advisor agreed on the importance of personal relationships, and 
emphasised the importance of developing trust between individual delegates to facilitate 
coalition-building. They gave an example of a conversation with an EU negotiator, who told 
them that they agreed to present a united front with AILAC on a particular issue in a session 
because they knew the AILAC delegate well, and knew them to be a “sensible person usually 
with common sense in the negotiations”, despite the fact that the EU negotiator “didn’t know 
what on Earth [they] were talking about”190. The same former advisor also suggested  a shared 
 
188 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 21s August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; 
interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
189 Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018 
190 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018 
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Latin American culture could be an important factor in how positive an AILAC delegate’s 
personal relationship is with a counterpart, and gave the example of coalition-building with 
delegates from the EIG, and from Mexico in particular:  
“…people are fond of Mexicans – Latin Americans in general – and, and they will usually be 
good friends, err, and, and have close positions, and be more inclined to generate common 
positions or submissions, joint submissions, because they know each other.”191 
Another delegate added that the aforementioned tactic of co-ordinating in advance of 
negotiating sessions on priority issues with other parties’ negotiators to build discursive 
momentum in the group’s desired direction is a much more viable option when the relationship 
between the AILAC delegate and their counterpart is strong.  They gave an example of a 
particularly strong relationship with a lead EU negotiator, which was used to ensure there 
would always be a voice supporting AILAC’s position in negotiations sessions where they 
were involved192. 
 
8.3 Use of Bilateral Meetings 
 
The AILAC submission texts provide no obvious evidence that bilateral meetings are used as 
a conscious strategy by the AILAC group. Corpus-linguistic analysis of the submissions 
produces only 6 tokens for “bilateral” across 3 texts - none refers to bilateral meetings, instead 
mentioning proposals for bilateral funding sources for climate finance. It seems reasonable, 
however, to infer that bilateral meetings occurred with other parties before the publication of 
joint submissions, although not explicitly stated. By contrast, 30 of 35 AILAC interviewees 
 
191 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018 
192 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018 
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stated the group uses this strategy regularly. Indeed, several AILAC support unit advisors said 
the group is always seeking to meet and discuss with other parties193, while one former AILAC 
negotiator, when asked about the frequency with which AILAC uses this strategy, replied “Oh 
God, so many bilaterals!”194 Interviews with AILAC negotiators revealed the group 
consciously decided to make bilateral meetings with other parties and groups a common 
occurrence when it was formed at the end of 2012195, and that since then, AILAC has not 
limited itself to formal negotiating sessions in order to institute such meetings. One support 
unit member stated the bloc’s “preferred approach” has been to “try to keep up the 
communication throughout the intersessional period as well, err, with many of the partners”196, 
and therefore the group engages in bilaterals all year round197. Of course, a significant 
proportion of AILAC’s bilateral meetings do occur within formal negotiating sessions of the 
annual COP or intersessional subsidiary body meetings. These are often planned ahead of 
formal meetings and are based upon the support unit’s research as to whether target groups or 
parties would welcome discussions on certain issue areas, what AILAC would seek to gain or 
achieve in such meetings, and whether any particular strategies are likely to be successful 
therein, e.g. coalition-building, compromise offers, persuasion, etc198. Indeed, interviewees 
reported bilaterals are used for a wide variety of strategic purposes – one delegate mentioned 
that compromises are very often offered through this medium199, while a support unit advisor 
referenced the co-ordination planning ahead of key negotiation sessions as discussed in the 
section on coalition-building200. 
 
193 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit 
advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018 
194 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018 
195 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
196 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
197 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018 
198 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
199 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018 
200 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018 
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  As such, the group begins formal negotiation sessions with lists of parties or groups to 
approach for a bilateral, which are discussed in its internal meetings just before the session 
starts, or at the start of each session day201. Another AILAC delegate added that the group does 
not just attempt to instigate bilateral meetings with other parties and groups; it has also reached 
out to working group chairs or COP presidencies when it has felt that the execution of its 
strategy required closer conversation with these actors202. The strategies and tactics which 
could be used in such bilaterals are then discussed, although not formalised and put into writing 
as a brief203 - for example, one delegate outlined the occurrences of a typical pre-session 
internal meeting on planning for bilaterals with other parties: 
“Yeah, normally, err, we have these two parts. Err, so we, we discuss what is the position, we 
discuss why we have that position, and we discuss how we’re going to bring this position – 
meaning strategy. So, err, strategy is always there, you know? Like, ‘OK, we might be able to 
do this, or we might be able to do this” – but strategy is, most of the time, never written 
anywhere…But at least we discuss it, and we say, ‘OK, we’re going to do this, and then do 
that, and then we can approach this team, and then we can approach the other team, we’re 
going to keep quiet on this topic and we’re going to be really vocal on that one.’ And, err, we 
agree on something, but we don’t, we don’t write a lot of things about the strategy. It’s not 





201 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd 
October 2018 
202 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 
203 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018 
204 Interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018 
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8.3.1 Influences on Bilateral Meetings 
 
The same delegate reported bilateral meetings are most often instigated initially through 
informal meetings with other parties’ negotiators, when more formal bilaterals under the guise 
of AILAC and another party or group can be organised205. As such, as with the execution of 
other strategies like persuasion and coalition-building, the characteristics of the individual 
delegates involved in arranging these meetings can be crucial. A recurring theme from 
interviews was that a high degree of trust between AILAC delegates and counterparts from 
other parties or groups allows bilaterals to be arranged much more easily, or even at all206, 
which in turn, as with aforementioned strategies, can be attributed at least partly to how far 
delegates can create an atmosphere of bonhomie with each other. One former support unit 
advisor suggested that a contributing factor to this may be shared culture; as with the strategy 
of coalition-building, they gave the example of AILAC delegates finding it easier to arrange 
bilateral meetings with their Mexican counterparts from the EIG207.  
Despite this, interviewees reported the same could not be said of relations with the 
ALBA group. The groups’ strong differences in political ideology (Watts and Depledge, 2018), 
especially on the rôle of market mechanisms within the UNFCCC agreements208, and the 
difficult political situation involving AILAC and ALBA member states – for example, the 
establishment of the Group of Lima in 2017 by states involving AILAC members refusing to 
 
205 Interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018 
206 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC 
delegate, 7th November 2018 
207 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018 
208 Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 10th July 2018; interview 
with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 
2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit 
advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with former AILAC 
support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018 
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recognise the national assembly of Venezuela, and condemning “the rupture of democratic 
order” in Venezuela (Rathbone, 2017; Taj et al, 2017), an ALBA member209 - have overridden 
the shared Latin American culture and background. As a result, there is essentially no formal 
relationship between the groups, so bilaterals essentially do not occur210. According to 
interviewees, this is not for want of trying by some AILAC delegates, at least in the past. 8 
AILAC delegates reported their past attempts to secure bilateral meetings with ALBA but no 
longer attempt to do so211. Several AILAC delegates reported offers made by AILAC to ALBA 
for bilaterals were rejected212, while one former support unit advisor revealed that from 
personal experience, ALBA negotiators either declined or did not turn up at the appointed time 
and place213. 
   However, as another delegate pointed out, a delegate’s level of experience can 
have a material impact on this ability to foster trust and therefore make the arranging of bilateral 
meetings easier, with delegates newer to the UNFCCC negotiations, finding it harder to arrange 
meetings, as they do not yet know negotiators from other parties or groups. Experienced 
 
209 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 
12th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC 
delegates, 31st October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
210 Interview with AILAC delegate, 30th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview 
with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; 
interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th 
September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 
13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 
14th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit 
advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with 
AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018; interview 
with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with 
AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th 
November 2018 
211 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC 
delegate, 21st August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC 
delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC 
support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with 13th November 2018; interview with former AILAC 
support unit advisor, 20th November 2018 
212 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 21st August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
213 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018 
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negotiators already have the connections, and therefore at least in theory the trust-based 
positive relationships and even friendships with other parties’ negotiators necessary to instigate 
bilaterals214. This delegate however also stated that this can be overcome through force of 
personality – i.e. if a delegate is naturally outgoing and prepared to “jump in” to negotiations. 
Another AILAC delegate was strongly of the opinion that compatibility in terms of negotiators’ 
personalities is key to making fruitful use of the strategy of interacting with other groups and 
parties through bilateral meetings. They stated: 
“You know, I think building trust in all of this is, is really important. But this is something that 
you don’t learn at school, this is something that nobody tells you in a, in a position paper, err, 
this is something that is really personal. So that’s why it really, unfortunately, it really depends 
on the type of people that you’re talking with, the type of negotiators, and, err, the more trust 
you build, of course, you can come together…I think it depends on the trust that you have on 
the negotiator itself. I, I don’t think it’s a matter of the groups – I think it’s a matter of the 
negotiator itself."215 
However, the first of these 2 delegates disagreed, and suggested that  the aforementioned  lack 
of UNFCCC-specific experience can be overcome if a delegate has previous experience from 
other arenas of international negotiations, which, as discussed in Chapter 7, is often the case 
with delegates from foreign affairs ministries. They gave the following example: 
"We, in Bangkok, err, had a delegate from Costa Rica – she was new in the process, and she 
did it really, really well. Because she knew how negotiations work – not on climate change, but 
rather in other spaces – err, but she knew that she has to talk to people, she knew that it was 
 
214 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 
215 Interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018 
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OK to talk to people, to approach to, to other parties, and to discuss openly, to take the mic 
and talk. But, err, because she was experienced. Not in the process, but in other processes."216 
 
8.4 Use of Informal Spaces 
 
8.4.1 Evidence from Submissions 
 
Tenzing (2016) states that informal meetings take place within the UNFCCC to promote further 
discussion on an agenda item which was not concluded during formal working group or plenary 
sessions, although these are not listed in the daily programmes of negotiating sessions such as 
COPs and SB meetings. He also explains the existence of what are known as “informal 
informals” for particularly difficult agenda items, in which “the parties concerned meet, 
without anyone necessarily facilitating the discussion (parties will typically do away with 
country flags  and will refer to one another  by name) to try to reach a compromise” (2016:31). 
The AILAC submission texts make only one reference to such meetings. While the word 
“informal” produces 9 tokens through CLA, 8 refer to informal notes prepared by chairs of 
sessions on such topics as conclusions of sessions or summaries of parties’ opinions217. Only 
Submission 58 (AILAC, 2018j), a statement at the opening plenary of COP24, acknowledges 
the existence of informal negotiating spaces, when it states that “…AILAC is ready to work 
actively and constructively from the beginning of the session in formal and informal 
negotiation spaces that allow us to advance the common understanding.” This statement 
 
216 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 




implies the group is willing to go beyond formal negotiating spaces and actively use such 
spaces to pursue its negotiating goals. This aligns with the third goal in the AILAC rule book, 
listed as to “Build bridges between the different negotiation groups, promoting trust, and 
favouring the creation of propitious spaces for consensus” (AILAC, date unknown: 1; 
emphasis added). 
 
8.4.2 Evidence from Interviews 
 
Interviews with AILAC delegates, however, provide evidence that the group actively 
negotiates in more spaces than those listed by Tenzing, with 25 of 35 interviewees confirming 
their use of such spaces. Alongside informal meetings and informal informals, these can be 
grouped into 3 primary categories: social meetings both during and outside formal negotiation 
sessions negotiation, corridor conversations during formal negotiation sessions, and forums 
outside the UNFCCC process. One former AILAC delegate summed up this approach as 
follows: “I think our strategy is to get involved in as much as possible, in as many as possible 
of possible groups of negotiating”218, while another AILAC negotiator, alluding to the panoply 






218 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018 
219 Interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018 
255 
 
8.4.3 Informals and Informal Informals 
 
Informal meetings take many forms. They may be more “official” informal meetings and 
informal informals as described by Tenzing (2016), or they may involve meetings of particular  
parties in various configurations on specific negotiation issues, such as the Friends of the Chair 
(UNFCCC, 2018b), the High Ambition Coalition (European Commission, 2018), the Friends 
of the Oceans (SPREP, 2018), or even individual groups meeting with the Secretariat or the 
presidency of a formal negotiation session. According to interviewees, AILAC participates in 
a broad range of these meetings. 2 delegates mentioned the group participated in informal 
meetings of the High Ambition Coalition220, one specifying this was so that AILAC would be 
able to pursue compromises in HAC meetings in the run-up to COP21 towards more legally-
binding language for what would become the Paris Agreement221. Numerous interviewees 
stated that AILAC attends informals on specific negotiation topics, like the discussions on 
Article Six, to open direct channels with facilitators and chairs of meetings222. Furthermore, 
several interviewees said AILAC engages in informal meetings specifically with the Secretariat 
and the presidencies of particular negotiation sessions223. 
 Exactly which meetings AILAC attends, however, depends on several factors. For 
example, in the case of informals with the Secretariat and session presidencies, these are 
usually consultations run by the Secretariat and presidencies, and therefore AILAC attendance 
 
220 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC support 
unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
221 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
222 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd 
September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with former 
AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with 
AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
223 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; 
interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd 
October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
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is first by invitation224. However, AILAC’s reason for attending such informals is often based 
in information-gathering; one support unit advisor stated that AILAC engages with the 
Secretariat and session presidencies to ask questions about their views, or how they are 
planning to run particular sessions225. This information-gathering can prove useful in the later 
selection and use of other strategies, as it can help AILAC anticipate scenarios within formal 
negotiation rooms. Attendance in such meetings also allows AILAC to put forward 
constructive proposals - one delegate explained that AILAC support unit advisors have 
attended informals with session presidencies where they have offered draft AILAC texts, 
intended to be a basis for discussion within formal negotiation sessions as a potential way to 
break deadlock226. Of course, this opportunity to deploy other strategies is another obvious 
reason for AILAC’s participation in other informals, like official topic-specific meetings or 
informal informals, or small-group meetings of particular parties on certain issues. 
 
8.4.4 Social Meetings 
 
The relationship between individual AILAC delegates and their counterparts is another factor 
potentially impacting on whether AILAC delegates make use of particular informal spaces in 
negotiating with other groups and parties. This may be a prerequisite for an invitation to a 
particular meeting, such as an informal small-group configuration of particular parties. This 
personal relationship factor is most obviously relevant in social meetings, as a good personal 
relationship between negotiators is an obvious prerequisite for a social meeting, and can help 
 
224 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th 
September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018 
225 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
226 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018 
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make conversation easier, allowing attendees to speak openly without fear of overt diplomatic 
consequences227. As one delegate put it, social meetings such as dinners or going for a drink 
allows one to “take off the costume” of a negotiator while still being able to negotiate228. Of 
course, in this situation, a delegate with experience of the UNFCCC process also has an 
advantage, as they already have networks of contacts for such social meetings229. 
 According to interviewees, AILAC uses social meetings between delegates for a variety 
of purposes. One support unit advisor reported dinners with other parties’ delegates “have 
proven to be very effective in gaining insight on different positions, on where landing zones 
are, and where alliances can occur”230.  Other delegates stated that sitting down over a drink 
with a negotiator from another group or party can be an effective way of defusing tension 
generated by the stressful situations which negotiators experience, and can therefore lead to 
parties finding common ground and eventually proposing a form of a compromise231. One 
former delegate reported taking part in confidential social meetings, often in the house of one 
of the negotiators in question, in order to use a variety of strategies while eating dinner; in 
particular, they named coalition-building in the form of agreeing shared positions, information 
sharing, but also persuasion attempts through “very blunt” conversations, especially with 
negotiators from developed country parties on the issue of finance232. Another delegate 
mentioned going for drinks with other parties’ negotiators at the end of the day in formal 
negotiation sessions simply as a way of building trust, facilitating a wide range of strategies to 
be used in future233. This is even the case for relationships with ALBA; while the 
aforementioned problems in the groups’ formal relationship subsist, one former support unit 
 
227 Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 
228 Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018 
229 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018 
230 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018 
231 Interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th 
November 2018 
232 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018 
233 Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018 
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advisor stated that there are good personal relationships between individual AILAC and ALBA 
negotiators, and that social meetings between the coalitions allow for contact and interaction 
where formal negotiations would not234. These personal relationships at least, strengthened 
through social meetings, could provide a way towards more formal negotiations between the 
groups should the overriding political tensions be resolved in future. 
 
8.4.5 Corridor Conversations 
 
Another space offering potential use of negotiation strategies is that of the corridor within 
formal negotiation sessions. According to interviewees, this serves 3 primary functions for 
AILAC. Firstly, corridor conversations as negotiators move from one negotiation room to 
another, or en route to or from lunch during sessions, are a prime space in which the support 
unit is able to gather tactical information on other parties, such as landing zones and issues to 
avoid for particular strategies235. Secondly, and similarly to use of social meetings, corridor 
conversations, removed from the tense and sometimes difficult atmosphere of formal sessions, 
allow delegates to foster trust and develop personal relationships with negotiators from other 
groups and parties as a precursor to then deploying other strategies once bonhomie has been 
established236. This can result in greater flexibility for AILAC negotiators by widening the 
range of strategies available to them within formal negotiating rooms. One delegate gave the 
example of sharing a cigarette break with other parties’ negotiators as a way of relating to them 
and breaking through tension or formality: 
 
234 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
235 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th 
October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 
13th November 2018 
236 Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018 
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“I’m a smoker, for example, and that’s one of the things where you’ll see – smoking is very 
interesting…It is so interesting, how you connect with different people – because when we’re 
outside, we’re all smokers. There are no heads of delegation versus, versus, err, grunts. There 
are no groups. ‘Can I bum a cigarette?’ is the type of phrase that you will hear in any accent 
from any level to any level at any given time, and I think that’s huge. And so it gives you a 
different dynamic, right? Err, I think that, that, err, that speaks very much to how…I mean, 
we’ve, we’ve had a five minute break in the midst of a negotiating session for Article Six, and 
we will go outside and have a cigarette, and in those five minutes that we have within the 
session, I will still have a different conversation with the same guy I was talking to than I will 
have when I go back to my room. It is that big of a deal.”237  
Thirdly, one support unit advisor stated they have recommended that AILAC delegates 
specifically use corridor conversations to address the perceived problem mentioned in Chapter 
7, that the AILAC delegation as a whole no longer contains a high proportion of negotiators 
with UNFCCC-specific experience. As such, the advisor felt the delegates’ personalities are 
better suited to informal conversations for deployment of the group’s strategies rather than 
speaking on the microphone in formal negotiation sessions: 
“So, I would say now we are doing much more of a corridor approach as well, err, trying to 
use some of the soft skills of, of the negotiators and of the different members of, of the 
delegations, whereas before, in the run up to Paris, I would tell you that, err, it seemed…like 
AILAC had this array of negotiators that were very well experienced, very eloquent and very 
outspoken. So they would use every opportunity to take the microphone, and, and be very 
engaged in, in the negotiation around the table, while right now, it seems to me that it’s not the 
case in all, all of the topics that have been prioritised for AILAC. SO, we also try to do much 
 
237 Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018 
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more of the corridor diplomacy and trying to reach out, not only in, in the microphone, but 
also in, in doing that, err, corridor diplomacy”238 
This temporal difference outlined in the above quotation can be attributed to a factor previously 
discussed in Chapter 7 and identified by interviewees, which is that the ministries from which 
the AILAC delegation draws the majority of its negotiators tend to rotate their delegates 
relatively frequently. This means most delegates are at least somewhat new to the UNFCCC 
negotiations and have insufficient time to accrue experience before being rotated out again, 
while those incoming negotiators from foreign affairs ministries may have some experience of 
international negotiations and diplomacy, but tend not to have experienced the nuances and 
specificities of the climate change arena before239. This may mean they feel insufficiently 
confident to intervene on the microphone in formal negotiation sessions, although, as stated 
before, this could be overcome through force of personality. 
 
8.4.6 External Negotiation Forums 
 
The fourth space for negotiation outside formal UNFCCC sessions is external forums. AILAC 
interviewees reported that the group uses the Cartagena Dialogue240, defined by Roberts and 
 
238 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
239 Interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview 
with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with 
former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview 
with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018; interview with 
AILAC support unit member, 13th November 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 20th November 
2018 
240 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 14th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC 
delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with 
AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018; interview 
with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd 
October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 
13th November 2018 
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Edwards (2015:138) as “an informal space rather than an official UNFCCC group” which 
“welcomes any country that is willing to work towards an ambitious and legally-binding 
regime”, and whose participants “work together within and across UNFCCC negotiating blocs 
to discuss openly and constructively the rationale behind each other’s positions, exploring areas 
of convergence and potential areas of joint action.” However, the Cartagena Dialogue appears 
to be a sort of space-group hybrid, given that it does book meeting rooms for discussion at COP 
events241, but also organises events outside of UNFCCC parameters242. The Dialogue presents 
an opportunity for AILAC delegates to speak to their counterparts in more technical depth on 
particular areas of negotiation243, given that meetings external to the UNFCCC system do not 
suffer the same time pressure of COPs to conclude formal agreements at the end of discussions. 
This comparative lack of time pressure means AILAC negotiators can speak to particular 
delegates from other parties or groups for purposes such as coalition-building or persuasion; 
indeed, according to one former support unit advisor, the Dialogue was especially useful for 
such strategies directed towards the EU and Umbrella Group’s members such as Australia and 
New Zealand244, as members of these coalitions also actively participate in Cartagena 
(Bangladesh, 2013; Roberts and Edwards, 2015). In addition to pursuing specific strategies, 2 
support unit advisors reported that AILAC’s presence in the Dialogue can be useful for 2 other 
purposes already seen in other informal spaces: building trust and personal relationships with 
other groups’ and parties’ delegates given their importance as a precursor to many strategies245; 
and for intelligence- and information-gathering behind the scenes by support unit members246. 
In addition to the Cartagena Dialogue, interviewees also identified several other external spaces 
 
241 See, for example, this scheduled event for the Cartagena Dialogue at COP24 in Katowice, December 2018: 
https://unfccc.int/event/cartagena-dialogue  
242 See, for example, this scheduled event for the Cartagena Dialogue in the Marshall Islands in April 2014: 
http://sdg.iisd.org/events/13th-meeting-of-the-cartagena-dialogue-for-progressive-action/  
243 Interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th 
October 2018 
244 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
245 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018 
246 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018 
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AILAC uses for similar purposes: the group attends workshops around the world organised by 
other parties when invited247, and participates in events organised by think tanks and research 
centres. 2 particular examples given were the Japanese Institute for Global Environmental 
Strategies (IGES), used particularly for discussions on links between Article Six and 
transparency issues248, and the Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES), used 
especially for discussions between heads of delegations249. 
 
8.5 Concessions Trading 
 
There is no obvious evidence in AILAC submission texts of outright concessions trading 
between AILAC and other parties or groups – that is, at no point does the bloc overtly state 
that it is willing to adopt or drop resistance to a particular position, in exchange for co-operation 
from others. Corpus-linguistic analysis of submissions produces no tokens at all for 
“concession[s]”, “side payment[s]”, or any spelling variations of “trade-off[s], and no tokens 
relevant to this context for associated verbs like “trade”, “swap”, or “exchange”. The phrases 
“in return” and “in exchange” likewise produce no tokens. 
This is, according to interviewees, broadly consistent with the behaviour of AILAC 
delegates in both formal negotiation sessions at COPs and intersessionals. The overall picture 
presented by interviewees was that the group does not set out to engage in concessions trading 
as it does not consider it a beneficial strategy to use250. This seems to be for 2 main reasons. 
 
247 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 
248 Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018 
249 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018 
250 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; 
interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 
2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 
2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 
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Firstly, interviewees felt  engaging in such a strategy could harm AILAC’s attempts to present 
itself as a transparent negotiator focused entirely on an ambitious agreement, and therefore 
deserving of other parties’ and groups’ trust, because explicit concessions-swapping could give 
the impression that the group was more focused on its own specific gains than the overall 
goal251. Indeed, several negotiators tried to distance AILAC from other parties whom they feel 
use this strategy cynically – one responded that “we fall victim to it, but we try not to do 
that”252, while another stated “We are not at all, at all like other groups we know, that say ‘OK, 
if you put human rights in there, then I will ask for the occupied territories’.”253 Secondly, 
interviewees stated the group is wary of embedding too many issue linkages in negotiations 
through concessions trading, given the potential complications produced by making 
agreements on certain issues conditional upon agreements on others254. As one delegate 
commented on concessions trading as a conscious strategic approach: 
“We try to keep that as far away as possible, because, for us, these issues are technical issues 
that have their own logic and have to be resolved on their own merits. There is obviously a 
political element to it…but the more that we can get resolved from a strictly technical 
perspective, the better. We don’t like horse-trading.”255 
However, 20 of 35 interviewees noted that AILAC has engaged in concessions trading whilst 
in the UNFCCC negotiations, albeit in a non-explicit, or even reluctant, manner. Indeed, 
numerous interviewees responded that some form of concessions trading is essentially 
inevitable in the UNFCCC because formal sessions produce agreements in an all-or-nothing 
 
2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 
20th November 2018 
251 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; 
interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018 
252 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018 
253 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018 
254 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018 
255 Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018 
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fashion: either everything is agreed as a package deal at the end of a COP, and thus every issue 
can be considered some form of trade-off, or there is no agreement at all256. Thus, towards the 
end of a formal session, the likelihood of AILAC being drawn into concessions trading 
increases as official UNFCCC texts are formalised and the group negotiates to secure particular 
outcomes under increasing time pressure257. As one former negotiator noted, AILAC is aware 
of the degree to which negotiating issues on climate are interlinked, and therefore, based on 
the tactical knowledge gathered by the support unit, plans in advance of sessions for exactly 
these types of scenarios as to what could be surrendered in order to secure particular 
commitments from particular groups and parties when time is of the essence258. 
 In the knowledge that AILAC will reluctantly engage in concessions trading when 
necessary, as well as specific information from interviewees, a retrospective reading of the 
group’s submission texts reveals one clear instance of trading by the group. According to 
interviewees, AILAC does not consider the issue of loss & damage a priority, with only 3 of 
35 interviewees designating it as such259. This is mirrored by the fact loss & damage produced 
the smallest number of tokens (46) of all the topics with specific Paris Agreement articles in 
AILAC submissions, and that only one of the group’s 62 submissions focuses specifically on 
loss & damage (Submission 25), in only half a page of text consisting of recaps of progress 
made by that point in time, and tentative suggestions phrased with conditional language in text 
and a table. For example, the Submission states  “…AILAC reiterates its belief that the five 
year rolling working plan is a strong basis for upcoming efforts on Loss and Damage and 
welcomes the fact that it will continue efforts of the initial two year work plan the ExCom 
 
256 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit 
advisor, 20th November 2018 
257 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 
2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018 
258 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018 
259 Interview with AILAC delegate, 30th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; 
interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
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originally designed” (AILAC, 2017c). However, several interviewees reported that the group 
began to pronounce more vocally on loss & damage as a priority topic in order to secure support 
from AOSIS on matters deemed more important to AILAC, such as their backing on the 
delicate issue of the potential redefinition of Africa’s special status and vulnerability260, or 
AOSIS’ support for AILAC strongly calling for binding emissions reductions commitments 
from all developing world parties261. One former support unit advisor explained the situation 
thus: 
“So, the example I can think of mostly revolves around adaptation and loss & damage. Err, not 
that we didn’t want loss & damage, but we weren’t going to get as much from loss & damage 
because we’re not losing as much, in the sense of, like, we aren’t all islands, like, literally 
losing our territory. So we knew that, like, we’re obviously, we were very vulnerable, all of us, 
and so we were into adaptation and vulnerability, but we didn’t necessarily have as much to 
gain from the loss & damage agenda as a low-lying state. Err, and so…that was certainly one 
where I think we, in the end, were, like, ‘Yeah, we’ll play along with loss & damage, we will 
fight for this and we will say that it’s really important, and we will go for it, knowing that we 
won’t get as much as you, but don’t fuck us over on the definition of vulnerability.”262 
Textual analysis demonstrates the change in tone from AILAC submissions on loss & damage 
before and after the resurfacing of the issue of Africa’s special status and vulnerability at the 
end of 2017. The group goes from paying scant attention to, and tentative statements on, loss 
& damage - such as that of Submission 25, or the vagueness of Submission 7’s (AILAC, 2014e) 
statement that “The Warsaw Mechanism on Loss and Damage should continue working, and 
be strengthened” – to strong pronouncements in statements at the subsidiary bodies pre-COP 
 
260 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 
23rd October 2018 
261 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 
2018 
262 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
266 
 
meeting and COP23 itself at the end of 2017, as well as at COP24 in December 2018. In the 
pre-COP meeting, AILAC’s Submission 46 (AILAC, 2017x) stated “…we will actively 
participate in the review of the reports of Adaptation Committee and Executive Committee of 
the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, both issues of utmost relevance to 
our countries”, while Submission 47 (AILAC, 2017y) at COP23 itself stated that “In loss and 
damage, we specifically celebrate progress on support for the action that we need to address 
this issue…we must continue to strengthen the work of the Convention on action and support 
in this issue.” Submission 58 (AILAC, 2018j), a statement at the opening plenary of COP24, 
makes a point of highlighting loss & damage: 
“The Special Report by the IPCC a little less than a month ago is absolutely clear and 
conclusive: ALL Parties must strengthen climate action in mitigation, adaptation and 
mobilization of support…This must happen now in order to be able to not exceed 1.5 degrees 
centigrade…Similarly, we must enhance action in terms of the loss and damage associated 
with climate change, highlighting the strategic role of the Warsaw International Mechanism 
for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts…We recognize that the time 
remaining for the technical negotiations under COP24 is very short, and draw the attention of 
Parties to this, as there are many essential matters that will be negotiated in Katowice, 
including loss and damage where we expect real progress enhancing the Warsaw International 
Mechanism.” 
At individual negotiator level, exact strategies each negotiator chooses is down to them263, 
albeit after discussions with the rest of AILAC’s delegation and the sharing of tactical 
 
263 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 21st August, 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 
2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 
2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd 
October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 
2018; interview with AILAC delegates, 31st October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; 
interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018 
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knowledge and recommendations from the support unit at meetings both before negotiation 
sessions and at the beginning of each day of a formal session264. As such, some interviewees 
responded that while concessions trading is not a strategy encouraged in group meetings, 
individual AILAC negotiators may choose – and indeed have chosen – to use it should they 
deem it the most effective way to secure AILAC’s desired outcome in the session in 
question265. As one negotiator stated, “If, of course, a negotiator in the table sees that that’s 
[concessions trading] an option, they will – and it’s a skilful negotiator – they will do it. But 
not as a general principle.”266 This opinion suggests also that a negotiator’s skill level – which 
can be affected by their experience level or level of negotiation training - can determine 
whether individuals use concessions trading as a strategy. Another interviewee added that 
positive personal relationships with negotiators from other groups or parties can determine 
whether individual negotiators are able to broker deals for concessions trading267, which in turn 
may determine whether the strategy is used at all, as expectations of effectiveness are central 
to the deployment of any strategy. 
What is particularly interesting on this point is that of the 4 interviewees who stated 
that individual negotiators may choose to use concessions trading, 3 were members of the 
support unit, who are, according to the AILAC rule book (AILAC, date unknown: 4), 
“international specialists” in climate change negotiations. Indeed, one support unit advisor 
stated “I would say it’s inherent to the negotiation process under the UNFCCC to, to use this 
 
264 Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; 
interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 
2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 
2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; 
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265 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th 
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266 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018 
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resource [concessions trading]. So, it’s the inherent trade-offs that, that lie in the process.”268 
Furthermore, interviewees repeatedly stated that the support unit are well connected with 
members of other groups’ and parties’ delegations, as they work behind the scenes of formal 
negotiation sessions, often via informal spaces such as corridor conversations, to gather tactical 
knowledge and information to be fed back later to the wider AILAC delegation in group 
meetings269. 
 This suggests that the reluctance to use concessions trading emanates more from 
national delegates than from the support unit, because of greater concern over the level of trust 
with which the group is viewed by negotiating partners, as interviewees intimated. However, 
it could also be because of greater levels of partisan bias in national delegates than that of 
support unit advisors, as they are directly employed by national governments rather than the 
supranational AILAC group, and therefore may, as Odell (2010:623) writes, “overestimate the 
value of [their] outside opinion, underestimate the degree to which the other side’s objectives 
are compatible with [theirs], and use a self-serving definition of fairness”, leading to a lesser 
desire to trade concessions. This seems unlikely to be a driving force, however, given the 
AILAC group’s general bridge-building character and its offers of co-operation to any party in 
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Chapter 9 examines the levels of AILAC’s use of more aggressive strategies: exertion of moral 
pressure, blocking, making demands, and coercion & threats, with one section for each 
strategy. This chapter details evidence of these strategies in submissions and face-to-face 
negotiations and provides explanations as to the levels of their use. The first section on moral 
pressure begins by sub-dividing the strategy into two variations: appealing to equity and 
vulnerability discourses, and naming & shaming, each considering AILAC’s strategy use in its 
submissions and in formal negotiations. However, like Chapter 8’s section on concessions 
trading, these sections present explanations for exertions of moral pressure intertwined with 
description, as evidence from interviewees necessitates retrospective textual analysis. The 
section on blocking finds little evidence in AILAC submissions and a general reluctance among 
delegates in negotiating sessions, a pattern mirrored by the sections on demands and threats, 
with AILAC identity and lack of leverage cited as key determining factors, although leverage 








9.2 Exerting Moral Pressure 
 
9.2.1 Appealing to Equity & Vulnerability Discourses 
 
According to Betzold (2010), Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012), Bhandary (2017), Oculi and 
Stephenson (2018), parties to the UNFCCC have attempted to exert moral pressure on 
negotiating partners through discourses of equity and vulnerability. Evidence from AILAC 
submission texts shows its attempts to exert moral pressure on its negotiating partners are 
modest. AILAC submissions contain only 23 tokens for the words “equity” or “equitable”, and 
these are described in an abstract manner without elaboration of meaning, or mentioned when 
referencing established Convention decisions. For example, Submission 2 (AILAC, 2013b) 
states that according to AILAC’s preferences, the then-future Paris Agreement “will be based 
in the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities”, without explaining what this means for respective commitments and 
responsibilities other than stating that its provisions for financial and technology transfer “must 
be designed in such a way that they reflect each country’s specific circumstances, priorities, 
development needs, responsibilities (including historical, present and future), and vulnerability 
to the impacts of climate change.” Submission 30 (AILAC, 2017h) on the Committee to 
Facilitate Implementation and Compliance falls into the latter category, stating “…the Paris 
Agreement under paragraph 2 of Article 15 prescribes that it shall be expert based. Paragraph 
102 of Decision 1/CP.21 elaborates on this composition in terms of number of members, areas 
of expertise and/or competence and equitable geographical representation…” In addition, 
corpus-linguistic analysis shows that the submissions contain only 11 tokens for the words 
“fair” or “fairness”, which also are used without explanation. For example, Submission 5 
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(AILAC, 2014c) calls for the assessment of “the fair share of the contributions of developed 
countries of the short term collective quantified goal to be defined as part of the 2015 
Agreement”. As such, discourses of equity are not prevalent within AILAC submissions, and 
there is little to no evidence of use of the strategy of moral pressure exertion via these 
discourses. 
AILAC does include references to vulnerability in 31 of its 62 submissions. However, 
corpus-linguistic analysis generated only 122 tokens for “vulnerable”, “vulnerability”, or 
“vulnerabilities”, a figure considerably lower than the results for some other salient topics in 
the negotiations, such as mitigation or adaptation with 1095 and 1254 tokens respectively. 
Furthermore, the group largely refrains from using emotive language or framing in reference 
to vulnerability to climate change, with mentions classifiable into 3 primary categories. Firstly, 
38 tokens relate to AILAC’s proposals that vulnerability assessments form part of UNFCCC 
action, such as Submission 43 (AILAC, 2017u) proposing that parties “may provide 
information related to co-operation, good practices, experiences and lessons learned in many 
areas including scientific research in the field of vulnerability assessment and adaptation”. Such 
references to vulnerability cannot really be classified as attempts to exert moral pressure. For 
a start, the fact that these tokens occur in constructive proposals means their tone is less 
aggressive than would be expected if applying pressure. Furthermore, the proposals do not 
specify any particular parties in their calls for action, so it would be difficult to establish the 
target of the pressure were it to be a deliberate strategy. 
   Secondly, 42 tokens involve measures to reduce vulnerability across all parties, 
as in Submission 38 (AILAC, 2017p), which states “…these elements [linkages between 
adaptation communications and the transparency framework] would be defined in a way that 
would help understand how to increase support, co-operation and political backing for present, 
on-going and upcoming priorities, needs, plans and action so Parties are less vulnerable”. This 
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discussion of vulnerability is less an attempt to exert moral pressure on parties, given the lack 
of specific targets, than a component of the discourse of universality that runs through AILAC’s 
submissions as a whole270. Of course, this can be seen as self-interested action, as AILAC’s 
vulnerability can only be assuaged through effective outcomes, which, given that climate 
change is a collective action prisoners’ dilemma problem, can only be achieved if all parties 
act together. However, that the application of moral pressure generally is predicated on self-
interest, and that portrayal of the concept of vulnerability in this manner can also be attributed 
to self-interest, does not make these strategic behaviours the same. 
Thirdly, 42 tokens reference measures to assist particularly or highly vulnerable parties, 
such as Submission 14 (AILAC, 2016g) stating “The successful implementation of the Paris 
Agreement depends upon…the adequate provision and mobilization of the means of 
implementation, in particular from developed to developing countries and particularly 
vulnerable countries”.  That these references distinguish highly vulnerable parties from those 
which are not means there is more credibility in viewing them as part of an attempt to exert 
moral pressure, especially given that 18 references specify such highly vulnerable parties as 
being developing country parties. There is, therefore, an implied application of pressure on 
developed country parties, as these are less vulnerable, to assist developing country parties in 
these instances. However, the consequences of the high vulnerability to climate change of these 
developing country parties – and inaction from developed country parties in particular - are 
never fully spelt out. Furthermore, the 68 references to “developed Parties”, “developed 
countries”, or “developed country Parties” in AILAC submissions never specify exactly whom 
is meant by these terms. Indeed, as stated in Chapter 8, AILAC never overtly equates developed 
countries/Parties with Annex I parties in its submissions, bearing in mind the difference in 
frequency of tokens for developed and developing countries (284) versus Annex I/non-Annex 
 
270 See Chapter 5 for a greater focus on this discourse. 
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I (3). Therefore, if such references to vulnerability are considered exertion of moral pressure at 
all, they should be seen as relatively light-touch, given the indirect way in which consequences 
of inaction are suggested, and the lack of specificity about whom is being addressed by such a 
discourse of vulnerability. Furthermore, references to particularly vulnerable parties could be 
seen merely a part of the universality discourse promulgated by AILAC throughout its 
submissions; by prioritising the needs of the most vulnerable, AILAC attempts to drive up 
ambition levels across all parties, as only by effective collective action can these needs be met, 
whereas lower levels of ambition, albeit involving all parties’ participation, might be sufficient 
to protect more resilient parties from climate change effects. 
  An interesting subset of the third category of vulnerability references is evident 
where AILAC specifically refers to its member states’ vulnerability to climate change. The 
group does this on 13 occasions within 11 of its 62 submissions271 - twice in 2014 submissions, 
3 times in 2016, and 5 times between the subsidiary bodies’ pre-COP meeting at the end of 
2017 and COP24 in 2018. For example, Submission 4 (AILAC, 2014b) states “AILAC 
countries are particularly vulnerable and will be disproportionately affected by the increased 
costs and risks associated with delayed action on mitigation”, while Submission 11 (AILAC, 
2016b) states that “As particularly vulnerable countries, AILAC underscores that adaptation to 
climate change continues to be of the utmost importance for our parties”. AILAC-specific 
vulnerability references in the group’s submission texts mostly do not spell out the exact 
consequences of climate inaction to AILAC member states as a result of their particular 
vulnerability; at most, they state AILAC members will be “disproportionately affected”272 by 
the adverse effects of climate change. In addition to this low “intensity” of moral pressure,  the 
 
271 Submissions 4 (AILAC, 2014b), 6 (AILAC, 2014d), 10 (AILAC, 2016a), 11 (AILAC, 2016b), 18 (AILAC, 
2016i), 23 (AILAC, 2017a) 46 (AILAC, 2017x), 47 (AILAC, 2017y), 52 (AILAC, 2018d), 55 (AILAC, 2018g), 
58 (AILAC, 2018j), 62 (AILAC, 2018n) 
272 Submissions 4 (AILAC, 2014b), 10 (AILAC, 2016a) 
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low frequency of these references across this study’s 6-year period makes it reasonable to infer 
that they are evidence  that the strategy is deployed at a low-level at most. Rather than a 
constant application of moral pressure from AILAC on the negotiations, these references to 
AILAC vulnerability serve more as a reminder of the group’s desire for ambitious outcomes. 
Interviewees suggested 2 plausible reasons why AILAC does not tend to highlight its 
vulnerability to pressure others into ambitious action. Firstly, AILAC recognises, as stated in 
Submission 48 (AILAC, 2017z), the particular vulnerabilities and special circumstances of the 
LDCs and SIDS, and therefore if the group claimed especially heightened levels of 
vulnerability, the effect of the argument would be weakened by the fact that climate-related 
effects in other parties are arguably even more severe than those in AILAC member states273, 
as some Pacific islands are facing existential threats (Weir et al, 2017). Secondly, as one 
support unit advisor pointed out, credibility of an AILAC strategy attempting to harness moral 
pressure would be hindered by AILAC member states’ continued extraction of fossil fuel 
resources, and thus the charge of hypocrisy could be levelled at the group274. Indeed, according 
to Strambo et al (2018), Colombia, accounted in 2017 for 1.5% of global coal production while 
only basing 6.5% of its domestic energy generation on coal, resulting in coal accounting for 
12% of the country’s total exports and generating approximately a quarter of public revenue. 
Peru, according to APEC (2015), increased its extraction of oil from 89,000 barrels per day in 
2003 to 104,000 barrels per day in 2013, and in 2012, production was expected to exceed 
500,000 barrels per day by 2021. The advisor suggested the fact that little to no fossil fuel 
extraction takes place in AOSIS member states explains why this strategy is viable for that 
group, and thus it would not be as effective for AILAC.  
 
273 Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018 
274 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018 
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  Additionally AILAC’s lack of vulnerability-based moral pressure may be 
because AILAC’s rôle as bridge-builder (AILAC, date unknown) 275 could be jeopardised if it 
were seen as trying to “guilt-trip” other parties into taking more ambitious climate action. 
AILAC’s core objectives call for the creation of “co-ordinated, ambitious and progressive 
positions that positively support the balance in the multilateral negotiations on climate change”, 
but alongside these, to “build bridges between the different negotiation groups, promoting trust, 
and favouring the creation of propitious spaces for consensus” (AILAC, date unknown: 1). The 
latter may be hindered should certain parties feel that AILAC is attempting to use moral 
blackmail to secure behavioural changes. Interviewees attributed considerable importance to 
AILAC’s identity and rôle as bridge-builder, open to working constructively with any party, 
with 30 of 35 affirming that this is how AILAC chooses to behave, and that the group has 
developed a reputation for bridge-building among onlookers (Watts and Depledge, 2018). 
Given this, it is unsurprising that 25 of 35 interviewees stated that continual application of 
moral pressure through vulnerability discourses is not something the group pursues in 
negotiation sessions. As one former support unit advisor put it, “The style of negotiation of 
AILAC countries is simply not that.”276 
However, one statement submission from the end of the subsidiary bodies’ meeting in 
November 2018 shortly before COP24 deviates from this pattern of references to AILAC’s 
vulnerability. Submission 55 (AILAC, 2018g) states the following: 
“AILAC attaches great importance to the success of these deliberations because our region, 
Latin America, is highly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. Within our group 
we have countries (including Honduras and Guatemala) which have suffered some of the 
greatest effects of extreme climate events over the past decade. It is projected that our group 
 
275 See Chapter 5 for greater discussion of AILAC’s bridge-building identity. 
276 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018 
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of countries will suffer loss and damage of between 1 and 7% of GDP due to climate change, 
particularly with respect to agriculture and water. Guatemala could suffer losses of up to 23% 
of its GDP.” 
It is notable that Submission 55 was made whilst the AGN was attempting to insert a 
reconsideration of the special needs and circumstances of Africa into UNFCCC proceedings. 
The AILAC statement – Submission 55 (AILAC, 2018j) - from the opening plenary of COP24, 
one month later in December 2018, states the following: 
“AILAC notes that the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement will require 
consideration of the special circumstances of all developing countries. AILAC reiterates that 
the Latin American region is highly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change and 
that, therefore, its immediate needs and special circumstances must be addressed.” 
It seems plausible, therefore, that this change in approach from AILAC – to portraying the 
vulnerability of its members -  and the near-simultaneous connection AILAC makes between 
Latin American vulnerability and the region’s special needs and circumstances may have been 
a response to increased attempts by the AGN to secure changes to Africa’s status within the 
UNFCCC. As such, the strategy of exerting moral pressure through a vulnerability discourse 
may have been used defensively at this point; in other words, AILAC may have been 
highlighting the vulnerability of Latin America to counter the increased efforts of the AGN to 
secure a re-evaluation of African special needs and circumstances, based on the argument that 
Africa’s vulnerability has hitherto been understated and is in fact on a par with that of the LDCs 
and SIDS. Were Africa to be successful, as stated in Chapters 7 and 8  it would mean Latin 
America would be the only part of the developing world without access to prioritisation for 
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support under Articles 9.4 and 9.9 of the Paris Agreement, which interviewees say is a red line 
for AILAC277.  
The domestic situation of AILAC member states, therefore, is plausibly a material 
factor in its adoption of this defensive moral pressure strategy, as the potentially smaller share 
of UNFCCC funding, or at least delayed access to it, would have consequences for AILAC 
member states’ ability to proceed with climate action, and could impact on government 
budgeting, thus affecting broader domestic politics. Of course, under the UNFCCC decision-
making process, AILAC would still be able to block the adoption of an agenda item changing 
the status of African special needs and circumstances, as it did at COP21278. However, 
repeating this veto would risk both antagonising the AGN and jeopardising the credibility of 
its self-appointed rôle of bridge-builder and its discourse of universal participation, particularly 
as opponents would be able to point to self-interest as the driving force behind the blocking 
action. As such, a defensive pressure application strategy, i.e. highlighting AILAC 
vulnerability, may be the preferable alternative to outright blocking because of considerations 
relating to AILAC’s image and identity in the UNFCCC. 
  Despite AILAC’s apparent reluctance to use vulnerability discourses in its 
submissions or on a regular basis in negotiation rooms as a way of exerting moral pressure on 
its partners, more interviewees – 16 to 10 - responded that, should natural events attributable 
 
277 Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview 
with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 
2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit 
advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC 
support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 9th October 
2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th 
October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 
27th October 2018; interview with three AILAC delegates, 31st October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 
7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018; interview with former 
AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018 
278 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018 
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to climate change take place in an AILAC country, they would be prepared to use specific 
events to exert moral pressure on their negotiating partners in face-to-face sessions, as it may 
help the group convince other parties to agree to AILAC proposals. Interviewees cited several 
examples of events used as the basis to exert moral pressure, such as severe floods in Guatemala 
in 2016279, the impact of Hurricane Otto on Costa Rica in the same year280, and the regular 
impacts of the El Niño phenomenon in Colombia and across western South America as a 
whole281. Some interviewees responded that negotiators’ statements took on a tone of greater 
urgency as they were able to discuss particular examples of climate change effects on AILAC 
countries when negotiating, as it allowed them to demonstrate the vulnerability of the group’s 
members282. Others, conversely, stressed they would not change the tone or framing of their 
interactions with other delegates, as the gravity of the content – i.e. evidence of a serious 
climate change-related natural disaster in an AILAC country – would speak for itself, 
particularly when the authority of science could be brought to bear on the argument, in keeping 
with AILAC’s strategy of grounding all of its behaviour in rational argument and scientific 
evidence283.  
10 interviewees disagreed with this approach, however, some arguing that because 
other parties are recognised as being even more vulnerable than AILAC members – namely, 
the LDCs and SIDS – the effect on other parties’ negotiating behaviour of AILAC highlighting 
its vulnerability would be limited284. Others argued that such events impact the internal 
 
279 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018 
280 Interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018 
281 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
282 Interview with AILAC delegate, 30th July 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; 
interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 
2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 
2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018 
283 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th 
September; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; terview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 
2018 




negotiations within AILAC about the priorities the group should pursue rather than the 
strategies the group will use to achieve them285, while one delegate stated that were such an 
event to occur in an AILAC country, they would adopt a more urgent tone but without 
referencing the event directly286. 3 support unit advisors stated that whether or not they would 
use such events in a negotiation depends on several factors. One stated that they would not 
recommend using such a tactic in small group negotiations like informals, informal informals, 
or other informal spaces, but that events could be referenced in plenary remarks287, while 
another stated the group would be “silly not to use” a climate event as a way of exerting moral 
pressure but they didn’t “know if it would be decisive if something particularly terrible were 
to happen” given the “cynicism” with which other groups have utilised this tactic in the past288. 
They cited an example of a negotiator from the Philippines at COP19 in 2013 who had begun 
crying in the opening plenary session as they did not know the whereabouts or safety of their 
brother due to a typhoon taking place at the time, only to be particularly obstructionist 2 days 
later in a session on intellectual property rights for technology transfer. Another former support 
unit advisor stated that whether the group would “make use” of climate-related natural disasters 
to exert moral pressure depended on the AILAC delegate raising the topic in the session in 
question289, which is evidenced by the group being fairly evenly split as regards the number of 
interviewees who responded that they would or wouldn’t refer to natural events as a moral 
pressure strategy. The advisor stated that while a speech writer from the support unit may inject 
more urgency into the language to be used, the personality - and indeed, the domestic workload 
- of the delegate delivering the speech may determine whether they recite the speech verbatim: 
 
285 Interview with AILAC delegate, 10th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd August 2018; interview 
with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 
2018 
286 Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018 
287 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018 
288 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018 
289 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018 
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“Sometimes it’s interesting because, err, that would give you a, a bigger sense of urgency for 
some negotiators; for some that would make you a bit more conservative. And they’d say, ‘You 
know what? My priority is back home, I’m not going to be as ambitious in international 
negotiations, precisely because I have all this happening in Peru.”290 
 
9.2.2 Naming & Shaming 
 
AILAC submission texts show no direct evidence of it applying another form of moral pressure, 
namely that of naming & shaming other parties which have hindered progress or reneged on 
their commitments. As discussed in Chapter 8, every mention of another group or party within 
AILAC submissions demonstrates AILAC attempting to forge a positive relationship, whether 
by expressing support for, or association or agreement with these parties. Furthermore, only 2 
incidences of the group attempting to shame certain parties without specifically naming them 
were identified from textual analysis. The more clear-cut instance occurs in Submission 62 
(AILAC, 2018n), a statement at the joint closing plenary of the subsidiary body and APA 
meetings, midway through COP24 in December 2018. After the 2 initial paragraphs where the 
delegate explains that they speak on behalf of AILAC and thanks both the facilitators of these 
sessions for their hard work and the Polish government for their hospitality and leadership, the 
first 3 substantive paragraphs read as follows: 
“The implementation of the Paris Agreement on behalf of ALL Parties, enabled by the common 
set of rules that we are to adopt, and that have been subject of intense technical deliberations 
for the last three years, must decisively answer the call for urgent action that the best available 
 
290 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018 
281 
 
science has made through the clear and unquestionable findings of the IPCC Special Report 
on the impacts of climate change of over 1.5ºC. 
It is regrettable that the SBSTA to the UN Convention on Climate Change could not welcome 
or recognize the best available science on climate change by welcoming the IPCCC report on 
1.5. 
Failure to do so will be a failure to meet the Paris Agreement purpose, and backsliding from 
the multilateral regime, to provide an effective answer, to what is arguably the most significant 
global challenge of our times.” 
On the day of this statement, 8th December 2018, news coverage revealed that the IPCC report 
“took note” of the report rather than “welcoming” it – which would have been seen as endorsing 
its core message that global emissions reductions of 45% would be needed by 2030 to divert 
the planet’s warming trajectory from 3ºC to 1.5ºC versus pre-industrial levels in the 21st 
Century – because 4 parties had objected, namely the US, Russia, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia 
(McGrath, 2018). Therefore, given that the identities of the parties responsible for blocking the 
adoption of the IPCC Report were common knowledge at this point, that the AILAC statement 
specifically draws attention to the failure to adopt the report can be interpreted as a form of 
indirect shaming. The statement implies they are responsible for “a failure to meet the Paris 
Agreement purpose” and “backsliding from the multilateral regime” despite the IPCC’s 
findings being “clear and unquestionable”, which suggests that the relevant parties are 
employing a blocking strategy to protect their own political and/or economic interests, 
especially as all other parties in the UNFCCC had agreed to “welcome” the IPCC report. 
 Besides this example, which requires contextual knowledge for the shaming nature of 
AILAC’s submission to be identified, there is little evidence of the strategy. The only other 
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example of indirect shaming identified, although less clear-cut, is in Submission 6 (AILAC, 
2014d), before the creation of the Paris Agreement a year later. Here, AILAC states: 
“It is fundamental that in the first session of 2014 we agree to the timeline, and that we define 
the specific elements of the argument no later than the June session (SBs 40, ADP 2-5). We 
trust, however, that Parties will understand the historic responsibility that we have and ensure 
that we do not get caught in fruitless, tactical discussions over ‘process’.” 
This statement again names no specific party, nor does it openly condemn actions that the group 
claims have definitely taken place; rather it is a plea to other groups and parties not to engage 
in blocking tactics. While it is plausible that AILAC may have issued such a plea whether or 
not they were aware of any party using such measures previously, given the urgency of agreeing 
a universal climate treaty in 2015, it seems more likely this statement is an indirect reference 
to certain parties’ past behaviour. It is known at the very least from academic scholarship that 
parties such as Saudi Arabia (Barnett, 2008; Weiler, 2012) and ALBA (Audet, 2013) had 
engaged in blocking strategies before 2014, albeit for different purposes. It seems more than 
reasonable to assume, therefore, that if such knowledge is available in academia, then 
negotiators on the ground in the UNFCCC would have knowledge of certain parties’ past 
attempts to stifle progress towards an ambitious agreement. This is a less concrete example of 
indirect shaming than that of COP24, as the statement does not seem to refer to a specific 
incident of hampering progress, but AILAC delegates’ contextual knowledge of other parties’ 
historical blocking strategies was demonstrated by interviewees. Indeed, when asked about the 
group’s relationships with other groups, interviewees provided several examples of blocking. 
The Umbrella Group were perceived to use blocking regularly until the very end of negotiating 
sessions in the run-up to COP21, to quell AILAC’s attempts to have adaptation included as a 
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component of NDCs291. Furthermore, interviewees reported that ALBA had frequently blocked 
attempts to progress on market mechanism discussions under Article Six292, while 3 
interviewees identified China as having used blocking strategies on loss & damage proposals 
on equity grounds293. 
Interviewees painted a similar picture to evidence from the group’s submissions on how 
far AILAC attempts to name & shame other parties in UNFCCC negotiation sessions. 19 
definitively stated that it is not a strategy they choose versus 8 who stated that they have 
attempted to shame parties in face-to-face negotiations, although of these 8, 4 stated they would 
only use the strategy as a last resort294, while 2 others stated that they use it only indirectly, 
through implicatures rather than directly naming parties295. One other stated they would only 
name & shame individual negotiators rather than the groups and parties they represent296, while 
another stated that they would never use the strategy in public, such as in formal negotiations 
where statements are recorded, instead choosing to use it in informal spaces such as social 
meetings and corridor conversations in order to avoid attention297.  
 Clearly, then, individual AILAC negotiators have discretion about whether to name & 
shame others in face-to-face negotiation sessions. This tallies with interviewee responses 
mentioned in Chapter 7, which reveal that within AILAC’s positional red lines on negotiation 
 
291 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th 
September 2018 
292 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018; interview with 
former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 21st August 
2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 14th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th 
November 2018 
293 Interview with AILAC delegate, 10th July 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 21st August 2018; 
interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018 
294 Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 21st August 2018; 
interview with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018 
295 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd August 2018 
296 Interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018 
297 Interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018 
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issues (decided by the Governance Committee), AILAC delegates are essentially free to 
negotiate however they see fit towards the group’s goals298. Indeed, one interviewee even felt 
an individual’s decision on whether to shame another negotiator or their group/party depends 
on whether they are “polite”299. However, this is obviously affected by the fact that the AILAC 
delegation tends to change relatively regularly as member states’ ministries rotate negotiators, 
which has the effect previously discussed of reducing the average level of experience and 
therefore potentially the confidence of AILAC negotiators300. Although this may be overcome 
by force of personality301, it could also be a relevant factor in the relative lack of shaming by 
AILAC delegates, as (naming &) shaming another party or negotiator is not to be taken lightly 
in a multilateral negotiation. 
 Negotiators did however, demonstrate awareness of AILAC’s lack of leverage, 
as discussed in Chapter 5, which impacts any potential decision to shame other parties, directly 
or indirectly, resulting in the majority view against shaming as a viable strategy. Interviewees 
recognised any AILAC attempts to shame other parties into behavioural change would likely 
 
298 Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 21st August, 2018; 
interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; 
interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit 
advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC 
delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018; interview with 
AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegates, 31st October 2018; interview with 
AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018 
299 Interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018 
300 Interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview 
with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with 
former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview 
with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018; interview with 
AILAC support unit member, 13th November 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 20th November 
2018 
301 Interview with AILAC delegate, 30th July 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th 
August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with former AILAC 
delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with 
former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview 
with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; 
interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 
2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 
23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th 
November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
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fail for 2 main reasons. Firstly, as with appeals to vulnerability discourses, shaming involves a 
moral judgement on another party’s behaviour, as condemnation is seen to be deserved because 
of its refusal to address a global problem despite moral arguments to act; yet that AILAC’s 
vulnerability is not perceived to be as severe as other developing country parties’ may dilute 
the potency of such an attempt to shame should other vulnerable parties join in. Secondly,  the 
group’s lack of traditional power resources presents minimal problems for other parties should 
AILAC threaten inaction on its own part, or geopolitical repercussions outside of the UNFCCC, 
given their small membership and the corresponding (relative lack of) economic and military 
potency302. One delegate likened any potential attempts by AILAC to shame other parties as 
“like the runt of the litter trying to play the big boy”303. Another stated that while the group 
may wish to shame certain parties for lacking ambition or inaction, AILAC is not in a credible 
position to do so, and so is reliant on “somebody else – hopefully a developed country – [who] 
can name and shame them in the plenary and we don’t have to do that”304. 
 Another factor which weighs heavily on AILAC negotiators’ decisions whether to 
shame is AILAC’s identity as a bridge-builder. As discussed throughout the analysis, the 
importance of this constructive rôle to the group is both evidenced by interviewees (e.g. 
described as being in AILAC’s DNA305) and enshrined in the AILAC rule book as one of the 
group’s main objectives (AILAC, date unknown). This is also at least partly responsible for 
AILAC’s aversion to shaming other parties in submissions or face-to-face negotiations, due to 
concerns that the strategy might tarnish AILAC’s bridge-building reputation developed since 
 
302 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd 
October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 
17th October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
303 Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018 
304 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018 
305 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th 
November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018; interview with former 
AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018 
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2012. As such, one interviewee stressed that AILAC’s identity as non-confrontational would 
override most considerations from delegates to shame other parties overtly306, while a former 
support unit advisor felt that identity considerations constrained such strategic choices, stating 
that “then it’s hard, it becomes hard to bang on the table, right?”307. Caution over AILAC’s 
reputation was also cited by interviewees who stated they would shame in negotiations but only 
as a last resort, with one delegate explaining this would only be after exhausting attempts to 
give target parties space to change their behaviour in some way more acceptable to AILAC’s 
ambition308. Furthermore, similar concerns as for appeals to vulnerability discourses were 
raised regarding potential accusations of hypocrisy should the group attempt to shame other 
groups or parties for continued use or sales of fossil fuels309, as this could incur further 
reputational damage. 
  Interestingly, however, 2 AILAC support unit advisors suggested the group may 
need to re-evaluate its perspective on naming & shaming strategies due to the changing 
dynamics of UNFCCC negotiations from 2018 onwards, like the aforementioned tensions with 
the AGN, and the US’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. One former advisor stated that 
the support unit has sometimes advocated the strategy to negotiators, although the latter had 
generally chosen not to follow this path310, while another advisor stated that naming & shaming 
is now more frequently under consideration as a viable strategy: 
“It’s under consideration precisely because of, of the scenario that we are facing in terms of, 
of, err…all of these question marks regarding the, the involvement of the US, and, err, the 
presence of, of certainly very high-ranking officials in the, in the ministerial segment. Err, the 
whole situation with, with the African Group, and, err, many of, of the things that they have 
 
306 Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018 
307 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
308 Interview with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018 
309 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018 
310 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018  
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been pushing for really hard, err, could potentially require a very strong position also from, 
from the AILAC countries. Err,, so I, I would say it’s still on, on the table, but, err, the cost of 
doing that is also high in terms of, of the impact that it could create in certain alliances that 
AILAC has been building for, for the past four or five years now.”311 
Clearly, then, certain events may prove important enough to AILAC’s interests to merit the use 
of naming & shaming at the expense of any potential reputational damage, or regardless of 
expectations of effectiveness given AILAC’s relative lack of leverage. Given it was identified 
in the above response as an event of sufficient importance to merit shaming strategies, it is 
particularly interesting that the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement was cited by 
several interviewees as an event which, though tempting, was not sufficiently detrimental to 
AILAC’s immediate interests to merit shaming. According to interviewees, AILAC planned to 
release a formal statement condemning the US withdrawal, but Honduras vetoed its release in 
intra-AILAC negotiations312 due to concerns it might harm Honduran-American negotiations 
outside of the UNFCCC arena on immigration issues313. As such, because AILAC’s decision-
making process for high-level political engagements is by consensus in its Governance 
Committee (AILAC, date unknown), no such statement was ever issued. 
 While geopolitical considerations were clearly to the fore in AILAC’s decision not to 
shame the US over its reneging on commitments made by accepting the Paris Agreement in 
2016 (Somander, 2016), according to interviewees, as with persuasion attempts, the relevance 
of geopolitical relations in considering potential shaming scenarios in face-to-face negotiations 
is mixed, varying between delegates and spaces. Of course, that interviewees recognised that 
 
311 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
312 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd July 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th 
August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 
2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th 
November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
313 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC support unit 
advisor, 13th November 2018 
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AILAC holds little leverage demonstrates understanding of the difference in geopolitical 
influence between the group and others, as this is predicated on relative levels of traditional 
power resources. Furthermore, some interviewees said they believed geopolitical 
considerations are more relevant for heads of national delegations at the higher level of the 
Governance Committee, responsible for responding to events such as the US withdrawal and 
determining the overall pattern of strategy, given their ties to their respective national 
governments314. 
  In contrast, however, ordinary AILAC delegates attributed lesser importance to 
geopolitical considerations in making individual strategic decisions between negotiators in 
formal and informal spaces315, like whether to shame individual delegates or to shame only in 
social meetings, either because of implications for or political relations with other parties 
external to the UNFCCC. As with persuasion strategies, interviewees gave several reasons for 
this, responding that they envision the UNFCCC as a stand-alone arena in which to negotiate 
given environment ministry delegates’ technical backgrounds and foreign affairs ministry 
delegates’ skill and training in avoiding conflation of already complex climate negotiations 
with other areas of international relations316. Some also noted the influence of support unit 
advice, focusing negotiation on issues specific to the UNFCCC without being drawn into 
 
314 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018; interview with 
AILAC delegate, 10th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with AILAC 
delegate, 3rd August 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with 
former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with 
AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018; interview with AILAC 
delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
315 Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview 
with AILAC delegate, 3rd August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with 
AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with 
AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview 
with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview 
with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit member, 16th October 2018; 
interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 
23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegates, 31st October 2018; interview with former AILAC support 
unit advisor, 20th November 2018 
316 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018 
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geopolitical considerations, as it is not directly employed by any AILAC member state’s 
government317. 
 In any case, AILAC’s principal mode of negotiating does not rely on frequent 
applications of moral pressure. As discussed in previous chapters, given the group’s lack of 
leverage, it makes sense for AILAC not to attempt strategies such as moral pressure which rely 
on traditional power resources. Furthermore, such strategies tend not to reinforce AILAC’s 
self-appointed bridge-building identity in the UNFCCC. Instead, it makes more sense for 
AILAC to play to its strengths and focus on “soft power” strategies, through which the group 
can use the power resources of which it has more, such as power/knowledge. As stated above, 
should the group prove successful in “setting up the rules of the game” to play to its strengths 
by establishing the primacy of technical knowledge in negotiations, it would have considerably 




The AILAC submission texts show little evidence of its direct use of blocking strategies within 
UNFCCC negotiations, although the group has the right to veto outcomes under UNFCCC 
decision-making processes. Only 2 examples of AILAC blocking a text could be identified: in 
Submission 61 (AILAC, 2018m), a mid-session submission at COP24, and in Submission 54 
(AILAC, 2018f), made with the AGN. Submission 61 lists issues AILAC has identified with 
the then-status of the outputs of the APA3 (mitigation), APA4 (adaptation communications), 
and APA5 (transparency) workstreams, and for every issue bar one, AILAC presents proposed 
 
317 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
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solutions to address the perceived problems. However, in the section on APA5, the group 
writes: 
“Under an Enhanced Transparency Framework, and taking into consideration the TACCC 
principles, we cannot work with the language in Chapter III.C of quantitative or qualitative 
indicators to track progress in implementing and achieving the NDCs, as we do not see these 
indicators as being mutually exclusive.” 
The group thus offers no suggested replacement or compromise to amend the specified 
language – it simply states that it “cannot work” with it. This can be considered blocking, as 
the impression is given that the group simply wants this portion of the text removed rather than 
replaced, as it proposes replacements throughout the submission elsewhere. 
 The first section of Submission 54, on the adaptation communication’s place on the 
APA agenda, contains the stand-alone line “It is not acceptable to have no further work on 
adaptation under transparency (item 5).” The submission proceeds to provide a rationale for 
this viewpoint, but only in a separate paragraph, allowing the full impact of the two groups’ 
resistance to the lack of further work on adaptation in the transparency section to be felt. In the 
second section of the statement, the opening line reads “The position of the AGN and AILAC 
is firm and unambiguous.” While the 2 groups later state they are flexible on details, making it 
obvious that this lack of transparency work is unacceptable to AILAC and the AGN can be 
considered blocking, as it gives the impression that the groups will not permit work to continue 
without addressing adaptation. This can be considered an example of what Odell (2010) deems 
a minority coalition working together to block an unfavourable outcome.  
   Nevertheless, these 2 examples aside, no blocking strategies could be identified 
in the remaining submission texts. No tokens were produced in corpus-linguistic analysis for 
any variants of the word stem “block”. Furthermore, no tokens were produced for other terms 
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potentially considered signs of blocking strategies, like stating that a negotiation outcome is 
“unacceptable” or that a proposal breaches the group’s “red lines”. Indeed, only 2 tokens were 
produced for “red lines” in all 62 submissions, both in Submission 62 (AILAC, 2018n), in 
which the group states: 
“Indeed, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We’ve heard constantly about red lines 
and critical issues. But the most critical issue of all issues MUST and SHALL always be to 
provide for a global response to a global problem. That is the hardest of all red lines, since 
failure to adopt a robust Paris Agreement Work Programme would result in an unattended 
disappointment for which will ALL be accountable. To this end, we make a plea to our Partners 
to set up a system that we can all be part of, and that delivers on its objectives of a 
transformation towards a low emission and resilient development.” 
This is not an example of a blocking attempt by AILAC, as the reference to red lines is clearly 
inserted to try to galvanise attempts to produce an agreement with universal participation, and 
the paragraph makes this explicit by its “plea” to continue negotiating constructively. 
Furthermore, nowhere throughout its submission texts does AILAC state that it “cannot accept” 
a proposal – indeed, only 7 tokens for “cannot” were produced across all 62 submissions318. 
These either make an explanatory point to support an AILAC position, as on the importance of 
continuing to negotiate on transparency by stating in Submission 62 (AILAC, 2018n) that 
“Without [transparency], we cannot keep track of whether the system is delivering on its 
aim…”, or setting out AILAC’s position, such as in the adaptation section of Submission 2 
(AILAC, 2013b): 
“Particularly vulnerable countries will need greater access to international resources. Also, 
new and additional international non-refundable co-operation should be allocated to assess 
 
318 Found in submissions 2 (AILAC, 2013b), 7 (AILAC, 2014e), 14 (AILAC, 2016e), 21 (AILAC, 2016l), 61 
(AILAC, 2018m), and 62 (AILAC, 2018n) 
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vulnerability and enhance capacity of countries to adapt to climate change. Funding for 
adaptation cannot be solely based on sources that are subject to market speculation such as 
the monetisation of CERs in the carbon market.” 
Asked about blocking, more interviewees stated that they did not favour it, at 19 versus 15, 
with one declining to answer. All 15 who considered blocking a viable option moderated their 
answers, however, to clarify that only after the exhaustion of the group’s preferred strategies, 
such as constructive proposals and compromise, persuasion, and coalition-building, would they 
consider using blocking, i.e. as a last resort if the group’s red lines were in danger of being 
breached319. Indeed, 2 interviewees gave the specific example of AILAC having blocked 
further proposed amendments to the special needs and circumstances of Africa once all other 
avenues of negotiation had proven ineffective320. Several others gave examples of the group 
being very close to blocking but ultimately not following through due to last-minute success 
with compromise strategies, such as formal COP decisions321, and a dispute with ALBA over 
the presence of observers in Article Six negotiations in 2016322. Several interviewees also 
remarked they feel the likelihood of AILAC having to resort to blocking is increasing due to 
negotiating outcomes getting closer to breaching AILAC red lines and locking unsatisfactory 
elements into agreements, in particular in negotiations over Article Six on the rôle of 
markets323. As one delegate summarised: 
 
319 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview 
with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; 
interview with former AILAC delegate 21st August, 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; 
interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; 
interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 
2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 
2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 
7th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
320 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th 
September 2018 
321 Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018 
322 Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018 
323 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview 
with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018 
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“We’re getting closer to the point where a bad deal is worse than no deal. In Article Six, for 
example, it is extremely clear to me that there are circumstances where we will walk away from 
the table and we will say ‘There will be no consensus’ and we will block a decision actively if 
we have to. Is it from the perspective of being bullies? No, because, for us, it’s very clear – we 
have to be…you have to be willing to be hated. Or at least to be, to be, to have people pissed 
off at you for a long time…’You are the ones who killed the decision!’ ‘Yes, well, it was a shitty 
decision and we had to kill it. We didn’t want to kill it, we tried not to kill it, we were very clear 
from the very beginning that these were the things we needed to see to be able to survive, but 
if push comes to shove, a bad decision in accounting, in markets, in one of these core elements 
is worse than no decision.’ If you agree to it, you will not discuss it again; if you disagree, then 
you will, it just means we’re going to be doing it again six months later, and six months later 
until we hit it. Once you’ve given them the rubber stamp, there is no taking it away. So I think 
we have to be – and I think it’s something that AILAC has never had to do because of the 
dynamics of the negotiation up to this point.”324 
The principal reason given by interviewees for AILAC’s reluctance to block - whether they 
considered blocking as a last resort viable or not - centred on the group’s self-identification as 
a bridge-builder between different factions within the UNFCCC, e.g. developed and 
developing party countries, or those with differing ambition levels. As discussed in previous 
analysis chapters, such a bridge-building rôle requires the group to be constructive and 
transparent in its positions and red lines to secure the trust of its negotiation partners. Therefore, 
the group prioritises strategies in keeping with this approach, such as making proposals and 
compromises, persuasion, and coalition-building. Interviewees felt employing blocking 
strategies would deviate from AILAC’s intrinsic nature and hinder AILAC’s bridge-building 
attempts, becoming an obstacle to achieving the group’s goal of an ambitious outcome from 
 
324 Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018 
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the overall negotiations. One delegate remarked that blocking is “dangerous for us, it’s really 
dangerous”325, while another explained: 
“…for us inside AILAC, it’s not in our genetic code to block like that, like other groups have 
done. I believe the rules of good faith and transparent negotiation – they’re common in AILAC. 
We want the Paris Agreement to be successful. And for that we need to make progress in the 
negotiation. From this point of view, we don’t want to block negotiations.”326 
A practical result of AILAC acting as bridge-builder is its tendency to occupy the middle 
ground in disputes between parties. As one former support unit advisor stated, “We see 
generally where there’s a reasonable middle ground – we’re not like ALBA, and we’re not 
OPEC or the LMDCs, and we’re not the US, and we’re not the EU, and so we hopefully will 
have some middle ground contribution to offer, and if we can pull people in from both sides to 
see that we’re generally wanting to get an agreement over and above everything, then they’ll 
respect that and work with us.”327 Indeed, another former support unit advisor revealed that the 
group once considered formally adopting the slogan “The middle is beautiful”328. This led to 
some interviewees raising a practical reason why the group avoids blocking in all but the most 
necessary scenarios: because negotiations are extremely complex and full of different parties’ 
competing interests, it is likely at least one party will object and block an issue’s progress.   
Therefore, given AILAC occupies the centre ground, there is no incentive for them to block 
unless a red line is at risk of breach. As one support unit advisor explained, the group is better 
off focusing on its primary strategic approaches: 
“It’s [blocking] unnecessary. If one of the traditional, if one of the usual suspects is already 
making noise, why bother? …in eighty percent of the topics, there is a range, with the usual 
 
325 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 
326 Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd July 2018 
327 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018 
328 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018 
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suspects at each extreme of the range, and you’d be comfortable anywhere within the middle 
of it. So you don’t have to talk all the time. You have to watch how the pieces are falling, and 
then give a little nudge to just centre wherever it’s coming to.”329 
 
9.4 Making Demands 
 
There is little evidence of AILAC making overt demands within its submission texts. Corpus-
linguistic analysis produced no tokens for any variants of the verb “insist”, and only 15 tokens 
for variants of the verb “demand”, none being used to make a demand. 3 use the word 
“demand” as a noun e.g. “supply, consumption, and energy demand for decision making and 
investment” in Submission 8 (AILAC, 2015a), and 8 use the word “demands” as either a noun 
in the same way or to emphasise the urgent need for action, e.g. in the in-session statements of 
Submissions 46 (AILAC, 2017x), 52 (AILAC, 2018d), and 55 (AILAC, 2018g) when AILAC 
writes that “…AILAC is willing to continue supporting these efforts…in a constructive spirit 
so that this session provides the progress that urgency demands of us.” At no time does AILAC 
use “demands” in the third-person singular, i.e. to write “AILAC demands…” “Demanded” 
produces 3 tokens – one is used in the same way to emphasise urgency, while Submission 58 
(AILAC, 2018j), another statement, uses “demanded” on 2 occasions to emphasise the need 
for ambition levels to match the evidence provided by scientific reports, e.g. “Katowice gives 
us the opportunity to achieve a robust manual of rules that responds to the urgency of the action 
demanded by the IPCC special report…” “Demanding” produces one token, again used in a 
context of timescales, as Submission 2 (AILAC, 2013b) begins a sentence with “Given the 
demanding timeline that has been set under the ADP for the definition of the new legally 
 
329 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018 
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binding agreement…” to justify an argument that means of implementation commitments 
needed to be defined quickly. 
 Variants of the verb “require” produced 128 tokens, while variants of the verb “expect” 
produced 61. Between them, variants of these 2 verbs produced 4 tokens which could be 
interpreted as demands. Submission 52 (AILAC, 2018d) states: 
“Considering the importance of the agenda of finance for the G77/China, we also require that 
during this session sufficient time be given for deliberations regarding the development of 
accounting modalities for mobilised and provided finance through public interventions, given 
that this is a critical element for the effective implementation of the Agreement.” 
Whether this can be counted as a demand is a matter of interpretation. Use of the first-person 
plural voice makes the sentence feel like a demand, as it is stating specifically that AILAC 
wants sufficient time. Situating AILAC as aligning with the view of the G77 & China may 
suggest greater confidence, as seen in some submissions from the same year made jointly with 
other parties, e.g. in the confrontational tone adopted in the joint submission with the AGN 
(AILAC, 2018f), or the implications of the non-negotiable status of proposals in the submission 
made jointly with AOSIS, the EU, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, and Switzerland (AILAC, 
2018l). However, the second clause in the sentence provides a justification for the desire for 
sufficient time, which presents the sentence more as a rational argument, and thus would fall 
under the umbrella of a persuasion attempt.  
The same question of interpretation applies to the possible use of “require” in Submission 48 
(AILAC, 2017z), a statement delivered in Spanish at COP23 in 2017, where the verb is used 
in the first-person plural: 
“Señor Presidente, requerimos que el reporte de esta sesión refleja nuestra solicitud de que en 
esas consultas se tomen en cuenta las circunstancias y necesidades especiales de todos los 
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países en desarrollo, incluyendo los nuestros.” / “Mr President, we require/request that the 
report of this session reflects our request that in these meetings the special circumstances and 
needs of all developing countries are taken into account, including ours.” 
Here, the verb “requerimos” could be translated as “require” or “request”; however, that the 
sentence then references the group’s “request” (“solicitud”) for consideration of special 
circumstances and needs suggests the tone is one of supplication rather than confrontation. As 
such, “request” is a more appropriate translation, and this should not be considered a demand. 
These are the only examples of “require” being used in the first-person plural; the other 
35 “require” tokens are used to explain the practicalities of proposals or parties’ current 
challenges. For example, Submissions 20 (AILAC, 2016k) and 27 (AILAC, 2017e) state “The 
new reporting responsibilities for developing countries will require new and enhanced technical 
capabilities…” while Submission 37 (AILAC, 2017o) on the Committee to Facilitate 
Implementation and Promote Compliance states “This reporting function of the Committee 
should encompass communicating the conclusions adopted by the Committee in specific 
situations examined by it, as well as making recommendations to the CMA for specific actions 
that may require decisions by the CMA…” The 19 tokens for “Requires” are used for the same 
explanatory function, such as Submission 9’s (AILAC, 2015b) sentence that “Responding to 
the challenge of climate change requires co-operative action by all countries and 
communities…”, also with no uses of the verb in the third-person singular to write “AILAC 
requires…”, while the 3 tokens for “requiring”, all in Submission 7 (AILAC, 2014e), perform 
the same explanatory function, such as the statement on the Paris Agreement’s legal 
architecture: “In other words, it permits countries to ratify an Agreement, which creates an 
internationally legally binding obligation, without requiring that country A ratifies the content 
of the country contribution document of country B.” The 69 tokens for “required” are also used 
either descriptively or in an explanatory manner, e.g. as in Submission 24’s (AILAC, 2017b) 
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explanation of how parties formulate their adaptation needs: “As Parties develop their national 
adaptation planning processes a series of required adaptation measures are designed…”; as part 
of proposals and/or rational arguments themselves, such as Submission 1’s (AILAC, 2013a) 
argument for greater UNFCCC consideration of agriculture: “Thus, further discussion within 
the UNFCCC is required in order to promote agricultural systems…”; or to refer to existing 
legal requirements under the UNFCCC, such as in Submission 28 (AILAC, 2017f), which reads 
“This consideration would serve as a further input for the GST, as required by paragraph 14(b) 
of Article 7 of the Paris Agreement.” 
  The 2 variants of the verb “expect” which could be interpreted as demands are 
found in Submission 2 (AILAC, 2013b) and 58 (AILAC, 2018j) respectively. Submission 2 
states: 
“AILAC expects that these and all the other recent reports made by scientists and practitioners 
of the adaptation area are taken into account in the technical paper on the assessment costs 
and benefits of adaptation that the Secretariat will prepare for the resumed second session of 
the ADP.” 
Submission 58 states: 
“We recognize that the time remaining for the technical negotiations under COP24 is very 
short, and draw the attention of Parties to this, as there are many essential matters that will be 
negotiated in Katowice, including loss and damage where we expect real progress enhancing 
the Warsaw International Mechanism.” 
The choice of the verb in each example could have been more forceful if designed to be 
interpreted as demands; “expect(s)” is open to interpretation e.g. as to whether AILAC is 
insisting on the incorporation of scientific reports or progress on loss & damage or merely what 
it assumes will or would like to happen. Had the group wished to imply the former, it could 
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have used more forceful language, such as writing that scientific reports “must be taken into 
account” or that progress on loss & damage “must be made”. As discussed in Chapter 7, the 
group has done this repeatedly elsewhere, although even then it has tempered the demand-like 
nature of the text by couching uses of the word “must” with justifications for the idea AILAC 
is putting forward and/or qualifying phrases to lessen the force of the language. Given the 
precedent set by this use of language, and AILAC’s apparent reluctance to make demands in 
its submissions and favour less aggressive strategies such as persuasion and proposals, it seems 
reasonable not to view the above example as a threat. 
 The remaining 4 tokens for “expect” and 3 tokens for “expects” are used to explain 
what the group forecasts will or can happen in future, either in negotiations or in domestic 
action. For example, Submission 12 (AILAC, 2016g), a statement at a subsidiary bodies’ 
meeting plenary, states “We expect that further progress can be made in Marrakech following 
a round of submissions leading to COP22”, while Submission 28 (AILAC, 2017f) states that 
“…AILAC expects LT-LEDS [Long Term Low-Emission and Resilient Development 
Strategies] developed by Parties to provide valuable input into this work” on linkages between 
capacity-building and technology transfer to the Global Stocktake. The past participle 
“expected” is mostly used adjectively – in 43 of 51 cases - to provide greater detail to AILAC 











However, 8 tokens for “expected” use this word as a passive verb – e.g. something(s) 
“is/was/are expected” – yet these still do not constitute demands. 7 of these either explain 
AILAC ideas, such as Submission 2 (AILAC, 2013b) stating that “These two spheres [the 
international and national levels] are expected to be based on the central platform of the regime: 




science”, or provide forecasts, such as Submission 15’s (AILAC, 2016f) note that “In the 
medium term, it is expected that the Assessment Cycles and their timings as well as the 
Assessment Reports themselves will be articulated to the information and contribution 
dynamics of the Agreement…” Finally, the word “expecting” produced only one token, in 
Submission 55 (AILAC, 2018g), where AILAC expresses disappointment at the lack of 
negotiating progress rather than demanding more: 
“AILAC was expecting greater progress in relation to the modalities for the accounting of 
financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions in accordance with 
Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Paris Agreement.” 
While AILAC rarely made overt demands in submissions, it did use the auxiliary verb “shall” 
on 105 occasions. While some of these were references to established negotiating texts rather 
than being used strategically, “shall” verbs were also used to emphasise the importance of a 
small number of issues designated as priorities by AILAC, as discussed in Chapter 6330. Given 
“shall” is associated with obligation and mandatory action in treaty texts (D’Acquisto and 
D’Avanzo, 2009; Krapivkina, 2017) AILAC’s use of this verb could be interpreted as making 
demands, as it effectively stipulates that certain actions must be performed or conditions met 
by other parties as part of an overall agreement under the UNFCCC. However, both D’Acquisto 
and D’Avanzo (2009) and Krapivkina (2017) note that use of “shall” in legal contexts is not 
clear-cut, and it can create ambiguity about the expected consequences of the point it is making. 
It is, therefore, a matter of interpretation whether AILAC’s uses of “shall” in these cases count 
as genuine demands. AILAC’s self-proclaimed (and internally formalised) identity as bridge-
builder and its favouring of “should” verbs over “shall” at a rate of almost 9:1 suggests that 
within the overall discourse of AILAC submissions, these uses of “shall” are designed to 
 
330 In particular, 82.86% of all “shall” tokens were used in relation to transparency issues or the legal status of 
the Paris Agreement. 
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emphasise topics’ importance rather than to impose conditions on negotiating partners. A 
notable exception to this is some of the 6 joint submissions, in which the rhetoric departs from 
the usual AILAC patterns of cushioning forceful language and avoiding more aggressive 
language. Submission 60 (AILAC, 2018l), for example, with AOSIS, the EU, Japan, Mexico, 
South Africa, and Switzerland on Article 6.4, lists 21 bullet points of proposals. All bar 4 of 
these use a “shall” verb rather than “should”, signifying their non-negotiable nature. That these 
are made by AILAC in a different context, i.e. when it speaks with the same voice as other 
parties and can thus “borrow” their power, suggests these may be intended to be seen as 
demands. 
 
9.4.1 Reasoning for Not Making Many Demands 
 
That AILAC makes few demands in its technical submissions tallies with its pattern of utilising 
less aggressive strategies like proposals and persuasion to put forward its ideas, in particular 
the group’s preference for making suggestions with “should sentences” to avoid appearing 
dictatorial, allowing other parties to give views and consent to AILAC proposals. When asked 
about the group’s tendency not to make demands interviewees cited the same reasons as 
mentioned above for why AILAC refrains from using more aggressive strategies – i.e. lack of 
leverage, and these strategies’ incongruity with the established AILAC identity and rôle of an 
ambitious bridge-building group331. As one former support unit advisor stated, “AILAC always 
works under the premise that the group never takes hostage an issue…It’s never, it has never 
 
331 Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; 
interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th 
September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC 
delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with 
AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018 
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been a very aggressive tactic.”332 Once again, geopolitical considerations outside of the 
UNFCCC were not deemed key in negotiators’ considerations of whether to attempt making 
demands, with delegates viewing the UNFCCC as a stand-alone negotiation arena. Only one 
interviewee specified a different factor in making such decisions, namely the impact of which 
party is the president of a session. As an example , they cited AILAC’s feeling that while the 
COP presidency was held by Poland at COP24 in 2018, the group could “ask [the EU] directly 
that they have to be stronger, and their political messages have to be stronger, and they have 
to take the lead…when we talk to the commissioners of the European Union, and when we talk 
to, err, the HoDs [Heads of Delegation] of the European Union, those are the kind of messages 
we give them.”333 However, this appears more as a request, especially considering the group’s 
established patterns of constructive behaviour, and given interviewees reported that AILAC 
enjoys a good relationship with the EU on a wide variety of issues and across numerous 
relationships between individual negotiators. 
This aside, only 3 interviewees recalled any example of the group’s delegates making 
demands in face-to-face sessions, and even these were made with the group’s expectation – 
and indeed willingness - to bargain down in order to secure compromise outcomes334. As a 
result, whilst these examples may have looked like demands to an outsider, in practice they 
ended up being proposals for negotiation, and depended on the dynamics of the room as to 
whether they were viable in the first place335. One support unit advisor recalled AILAC being 
aware of the visibility of the technology room of the UNFCCC negotiations, meaning that it 
was able to put out initial demands: 
 
332 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018 
333 Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018 
334 Interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; 
interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018 
335 Interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018 
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“…technology is the room where, since Paris, people really try to be nice to each other. We 
are the good news story. When everybody complains in their closing statements that the world 
is coming to an end, at least they celebrate that technology did something. And so AILAC has 
occasionally won ground by just being stubborn to make them realise, ‘Gosh, we’ll have no 
good news story at all unless we listen to what AILAC has to say!’”336  
 
9.5 Coercion & Threats 
 
There is also very little evidence of AILAC attempting to force other parties into any behaviour 
through a threat. The submissions contain no threats to any parties to adapt their behaviour 
according to AILAC’s preferences, nor any overt suggestion that AILAC may retaliate in 
response to other parties’ actions. However, as stated in the section on blocking, there is an 
implicit threat to the UNFCCC process as a whole when the group states in Submission 61 
(AILAC, 2018m) that it “cannot work” with a particular set of language in a draft text, as the 
implication is that if negotiations proceed with this language, AILAC will veto it. Furthermore, 
the only example of AILAC making a threat in the UNFCCC negotiations that interviewees 
could identify was before the aforementioned vetoing of the AGN’s proposals for a review of 
African special needs and circumstances at COP21337, although the AGN was not the subject 
of threats in the submission texts subsequently, as Submission 48 (AILAC, 2017z) merely 
states that AILAC “note[s] with concern the intention to continue the informal consultations 
focused on the circumstances and special needs of Africa”. As stated above, AILAC has 
continued to exercise caution and use persuasion to change the behaviour of the AGN instead.
 
336 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018 
337 Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC support unit 
advisor, 13th November 2018 
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 However, several interviewees remarked that AILAC may soon need to engage in 
threats, like walking out of negotiation rooms, given the current state of negotiations but only 
as a last resort if desired results cannot be achieved through their preferred strategies338.  
 As with other more aggressive strategies, interviewees felt the 2 main impediments to 
AILAC using threats were the group’s lack of leverage, rendering the threats implausible, and 
that threats would undermine the constructive, bridge-building image – found in the AILAC 
rule book (AILAC, date unknown) - that the group is trying to portray to the UNFCCC. One 
support unit advisor neatly summarised the link between these 2 factors: 
“So, part of the AILAC position is that AILAC is a bunch of countries that plays by the rules. 
You know, we broadly recognise, err, things like the World Trade Organisation and whatever, 
right? We’re not Venezuela…AILAC, as a group of countries, is trying to show that they play 
by the rules. So they will not be the spoilers. They will not do what China has been known to 
do, or what some of the African countries are willing to do, or what Saudi Arabia is willing to 
do, and say ‘No, because…’ So, as minor countries that don’t invest in other countries, who 
are unwilling to throw their toys out of the crib, there is no leverage whatsoever. Except for 
any credibility you have perhaps built in the room…and so the conversation moves on. That’s 
the only thing that AILAC can possibly bring. Because the lower weight countries, all they 
really have is throwing their toys out of the pram…AILAC, when it comes to the crunch, won’t 
do that.”339 
As such, the group tends to express concern or disappointment in its submissions rather than 
actively threatening other parties in a bid to change their behaviour. Corpus-linguistic analysis 
 
338 Interview with AILAC delegate, 10th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview 
with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018 
339 Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018 
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identified 8 examples across 6 submissions340 of the group doing this; for example, Submission 
36 (AILAC, 2017n) states that “…we would like to express how disappointing it has been for 
our group to work in an environment without transparency or flexibility so that the observers 
could be part of our deliberations in this session, nor to invite them to contribute to our future 
work.” Rather than follow through with this sentiment, and make a threat to instigate change, 
the submission continues by expressing hope for change: “We therefore hope that in our session 
at the end of the year we will be able to work in an open spirit, with political commitment and 
faithful to what we agreed in Paris.” Likewise, in Submission 47 (AILAC, 2017y), the group 
writes that “…we note with great concern the slow progress in the work on the modalities for 
the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions, in 
accordance with paragraph 7, Article 9 of the Paris Agreement.” Later in the same paragraph, 
this sentiment is resolved simply with the statement that “We trust, Mr Chairs, that under your 
leadership we can conclude this work during the following sessions of the subsidiary bodies.” 
This feeds into the group’s discourse of positivity, discussed in Chapter 5, as when AILAC 








340 Submissions 10 (AILAC, 2016a), 36 (AILAC, 2017n), 47 (AILAC, 2017y), 55 (AILAC, 2018g), 57 
(AILAC, 2018i), and 61 (AILAC, 2018m) 
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Chapter 10 discusses the findings in the context of the existing literature on strategies and 
influences on their selection, determining whether they support or contradict previous research. 
It begins by noting the relevance of power dynamics to the main finding of AILAC’s preference 
for less aggressive over more aggressive strategies, albeit in a way differing from the 
interpretation of power dynamics set out in rational choice theories. Instead, a governmentality 
perspective reveals AILAC’s power/knowledge resources as key in boosting the attractiveness 
of strategies such as persuasion, constructive proposals, and coalition-building, and recognises 
the group’s technical and tactical knowledge sources residing within its delegation dynamics. 
The domestic politics section also recognises the influence of the bloc’s bridge-building 
identity and vulnerability to climate change, the former contributing to the attractiveness of 
less aggressive strategies while AILAC members’ vulnerability in fact deterred it from exerting 
moral pressure, making it unwilling to jeopardise a future agreement by criticising negotiation 
partners. Chapter 10 then discusses the nuanced influence of intra-bloc dynamics and timings 
on AILAC strategy choice, with its policy of individual negotiators’ strategic decision-making 
making delegation dynamics even more influential and timings resulting in particular less 
aggressive strategies’ use in combination. Finally, institutional influences are seen largely as 
modest in their impact on AILAC strategy; while the UNFCCC’s consensus rule did contribute, 





10.2 Power Resources 
 
10.2.1 Material Power Resources & Leverage 
 
Analysis of AILAC submission texts and interviewees’ responses shows the group has utilised 
some form of 11 of the 12 strategies identified in the literature review, at least to a very modest 
degree, with the exception of coercion & threats. However, the analysis also reveals a clear 
preference from AILAC to focus efforts, regardless of the target parties or groups, on less 
obviously aggressive strategies, i.e. constructive proposals, compromises, coalition-building, 
and persuasion far more often than demands, blocking, or making threats. Even blocking – the 
only one of the  more aggressive strategies -  that  a majority of AILAC interviewees considered 
acceptable – was only a last resort to avoid outcomes violating AILAC red lines, once all other 
less aggressive strategies had been exhausted, and instances of blocking in the group’s 
technical submissions are scarce. These findings tally with expectations from orthodox theories 
of power relations between parties. For example, Bailer (2012) found parties to the UNFCCC 
with greater material power resources – economic strength, military prowess, population size 
etc. – were more likely to use more aggressive strategies, and weaker parties were less likely 
to do so because of a lack of leverage. Dür and Mateo (2008:7-8) explain, “The hard bargaining 
tactics used by weak actors will hardly be credible; and public commitments that are not 
credible have negative consequences not only in the negotiations with third actors but also for 
the reputation of the government in the domestic arena.” AILAC interviewees frequently cited 
a lack of credible leverage as a major reason for preferring less aggressive strategies. This is 
borne out by economic data, which show that AILAC is composed of states with relatively low 
levels of material power resources – their contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions 
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equated to only 0.80% of the global total in 2018 (Carbon Atlas, 2019), while their combined 
military spending represents only 1.12% of the global outlay in 2018 (World Bank, 2018c). 
This is even low in comparison to other developing country party blocs; for example, the 
AGN’s member states comprised 3.83% of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2018 (Carbon 
Atlas, 2019) while the LMDCs contributed at least 46.27% of the global total in 2017 (Ritchie 
and Roser, 2019), and even the LDCs contributed 4% of the global total as far back as 2005 
(Bowen and Fankhauser, 2011).  
 
10.2.2 Relative Attractiveness of Strategy Options 
 
A reasonable assumption in strategy decision-making is that a party is intuitively most likely 
to select an option with the greatest prospect of success in the circumstances. AILAC 
interviewees overwhelmingly confirmed that this held true for the group. Relative power 
relations and dynamics between parties is one such circumstance. However, if, as under 
orthodox conceptualisations of power relations, comparative levels of traditional power 
resources are the key determinant of agency in such relations, it follows that weak parties with 
fewer power resources should not expect less aggressive strategies to have much – if any – 
chance of achieving their desired outcomes either. Therefore, their reason for selecting less 
aggressive strategies is not because they think they are inherently likely to yield successful 
outcomes; rather these are the only strategies which they can utilise with any credibility at all. 
Put simply, they are the only remaining options. This explains Dür and Mateo’s (2008:7-8) 
interpretation, when they write: 
“By contrast, weak actors should opt for soft bargaining tactics, as they have little to gain from 
giving the impression of being aggressive. The hard bargaining tactics used by weak actors 
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will hardly be credible…Moreover, weak actors fear that hard bargaining tactics will make 
more powerful ones respond in kind. In the context of an iterated game, they will therefore opt 
for soft tactics to “ingratiate” themselves with the more powerful actors (Pruitt, 1983:175). 
Finally, weak actors tend to be in need of a negotiated agreement, and the use of hard 
bargaining tactics by many actors may reduce the likelihood of an agreement.” 
Following this logic, AILAC should have adopted less aggressive strategies, e.g. constructive 
proposals and persuasion, because aggressive strategies such as demands or threats, would not 
appear credible, and could trigger retribution by more powerful parties, potentially jeopardising 
the possibility of a global agreement on climate change that its vulnerable member states 
desperately need. However, by merely attributing the decision to the group’s lack of other 
viable options, this viewpoint neglects the possibility that AILAC might have deliberately 
selected less aggressive strategies by preference. Even coalition-building is not afforded this 
possibility. If choice of strategy depends on comparative levels of traditional power resources, 
then it makes sense for smaller and/or weaker parties to pool resources, which in turn would 
allow them collectively to attempt more aggressive strategies against stronger parties more 
credibly (Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012). This less aggressive strategy may be desirable, 
therefore, but only because it facilitates AILAC’s ability as part of a greater collective to act as 
if it has greater levels of material power resources. In addition, it runs the same risk as more 
aggressive strategies in that it could provoke more powerful parties to do the same (Deitelhoff 
and Wallbott, 2012), restoring the initial power imbalance and potentially damaging relations 
with these stronger parties, which is a strong deterrent. Thus even for coalition-building, the 
overall logic regarding the centrality of material power resources on strategy selection remains 
the same. 
 Analysis of the AILAC data partially supports this logic. Interviewees frequently cited 
the group’s rôle as a bridge-builder to explain why the group shied away from more aggressive 
311 
 
strategies - i.e. because their use could damage goodwill the group had developed over time 
from efforts to be a reasonable and constructive negotiating partner - and could prompt its own 
negotiating partners to resort to more aggressive strategies. This would be a considerable risk 
if used by parties with greater levels of traditional power resources, e.g. a higher proportion of 
global greenhouse gas emissions, as without their co-operation an effective global agreement 
to combat the effects of climate change could not be finalised. Indeed, on the rare occasions 
more aggressive strategies were utilised by AILAC, they were either last resort options to 
prevent problematic outcomes, where less aggressive strategies had failed to produce 
satisfactory outcomes, for example, a threat followed by veto on the AGN’s proposal for 
African special needs and circumstances; or for the sole purpose of facilitating the subsequent 
use of less aggressive strategies, such as making demands before quickly switching to offering 
constructive compromises. Even blocking strategies, guaranteed to succeed because each party 
is afforded a veto over Convention outputs by the UNFCCC decision-making process 
(UNFCCC, 1992), were only utilised by AILAC sparingly and as a last resort, with 
interviewees citing the risk of repercussions from other parties as a major deterrent, as they 
could deny AILAC access to an effective global agreement on climate change. Blocking might 
prevent a negative situation in the short-term, but would risk jeopardising satisfactory outcomes 
in the longer-term. Thus the analysis shows some support for concerns resembling Axelrod’s 
(1984:13) “shadow of the future” effect, with AILAC aware that it will need to maintain as 
positive a relationship as possible with negotiating partners given the recurring need to 
negotiate with those same parties. 
  However, the vast majority of AILAC interviewees (30 of 35) also stated that 
their decisions on strategy in a given situation depend on the aforementioned intuitive 
assumption, i.e. they select the strategy they believe, based on their levels of tactical 
knowledge, provides the greatest chance of yielding what AILAC would consider to be a 
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satisfactory outcome. Coupled with these results, that AILAC overwhelmingly favoured less 
aggressive strategies in the analysis period suggests AILAC negotiators actively believed that 
less aggressive strategies would be most able to provide satisfactory outcomes for the group. 
In other words, they were attractive options for AILAC negotiators not just because more 
aggressive strategies were considered unviable, but also because these less aggressive 
strategies held some inherent appeal and value in providing the group with satisfactory 
outcomes. Yet with orthodox conceptualisations of power relations, this should not be the case, 
given the group’s lack of material power resources. 
 
10.2.3 Knowledge as an Immaterial Power Resource  
  
The analysis findings can be better explained, therefore, with a conceptualisation of power 
relations not solely based on comparative levels of material power resources. A 
governmentality-based understanding of power, like that provided by Litfin (1994) can provide 
such an interpretation. Governmentality does not ignore material power resources and thus 
acknowledges that certain strategies, such as making demands or threats, are more heavily 
dependent on possessing such resources in greater volume. This is because the status and value 
ascribed to them by actors in social relations elicits certain reactions from others, e.g. fear, 
respect, or envy. From this perspective, that AILAC uses more aggressive strategies very little 
is unsurprising, given the bloc’s concerns over a lack of leverage. Governmentality’s 
insistence, however, on including knowledge as a power resource – conceptualised by Foucault 
(1978) as power/knowledge – can help explain AILAC’s overwhelming preference for less 
aggressive strategies, as the group is rich in knowledge-based power resources, both technical 
and tactical. The discursive nature of power/knowledge (Litfin, 1994) means  its deployment 
313 
 
relies on the process of communication between parties, which in turn is affected by their 
choice of language and ways of interpreting information based on the context of their social 
relationship. The attribution of status and value to such knowledge by AILAC and its 
negotiating partners as a result of this social context produces its effect of “powerfulness” – for 
example, other groups valuing AILAC’s technical proficiency in the negotiations, or AILAC 
valuing information discovered by the support unit on the red lines of other groups. This 
explains why AILAC could reasonably have expected such less aggressive strategies, with their 
foundations in technical and tactical knowledge, to be capable of yielding satisfactory 
outcomes, and why they were inherently appealing options. This was predicated upon a 
concerted effort to “stack the deck” in AILAC’s favour and bring this power/knowledge 
resource – of which AILAC was aware it had plenty - into play, through particular discourses 
in the group’s technical submissions designed to make expert knowledge the lingua franca of 
the negotiations, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
  The discursive nature of power relations can also explain why some AILAC 
interviewees were prepared to exert moral pressure on their negotiating partners should 
climate-related natural disasters occur in any of the group’s member countries. The group was 
much more reluctant to use naming & shaming strategies given the aforementioned lack of 
leverage and usual comparative lack of moral power resources versus more vulnerable parties 
such as AOSIS. However, if the group were able to portray the severity of the effects of any 
such event on AILAC countries, AILAC’s vulnerability would be heightened in the eyes of the 
group’s negotiating partners. This would imbue AILAC with temporary moral power, making 
the strategy viable for a limited period, for those AILAC negotiators who were prepared to use 
it at all but for whom it would be unviable under normal circumstances. A governmentality-
based understanding of power relations can accommodate this alternative power resource of 
moral power, as its discursive effects provide bargaining utility, allowing small blocs like 
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AILAC and AOSIS to use moral pressure strategies despite their lack of material power 
resources. 
 
10.2.4 Relationship to Existing Literature 
 
As such, the findings of this thesis accord more with the arguments of Deitelhoff and Wallbott 
(2012) and Betzold (2010) than Bailer (2012) with regard to the ability of parties traditionally 
regarded as weak to wield significant power in climate negotiations; i.e. such parties’ strategic 
options were broader because they were able to draw on different power resources besides 
material resources. However, AILAC did not “borrow” power to facilitate its strategic choices 
in the ways used by AOSIS as documented by Betzold (2010) and identified by Deitelhoff and 
Wallbott (2012), namely appealing to principles of equity via vulnerability discourses, 
appealing to the self-interest of partners, using the knowledge resources of NGOs, and learning 
from them how to “play the game” of negotiations skilfully. AILAC negotiators were generally 
reluctant to employ explicit discourses of vulnerability or equity as a strategy, while the group’s 
technical knowledge derived from its own skilled negotiators and in-house expert support unit. 
The tactical knowledge required to “play the game” adeptly likewise was provided by the 
support unit and the relationships between the group’s and other negotiators. This knowledge, 
with AILAC’s technical expertise, was the basis upon which the group was able to devote much 
of its negotiating efforts towards submissions, persuasion and rational argument, constructive 
proposals, and compromise solutions, which appeal to their negotiating partners’ self-interest. 
AILAC did borrow power, however, by building coalitions with others, identified for AOSIS 
by Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012), including with those more powerful by orthodox measures, 
such as the EU or Umbrella Group members. Again, though, ability to “play the game” skilfully 
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and secure strategic alliances is based upon AILAC’s own internal power/knowledge resources 
as provided by the tactical intelligence of the support unit and its own negotiators, which in 
turn enables the group to borrow power from other parties to the negotiations. The findings of 
this thesis thus place greater emphasis on the centrality of the bloc’s own power/knowledge as 
a vital resource for the case of AILAC than is found by either Betzold (2010) or Deitelhoff and 
Wallbott (2012) for AOSIS. 
 
10.3 Delegation Dynamics 
 
10.3.1 Individual Negotiators’ Agency 
 
The analysis suggests individual AILAC negotiators have a significant rôle in selecting 
strategies to use in the negotiations, and thus were responsible for the group largely favouring 
less aggressive options. How the group organises itself and makes decisions in negotiation 
sessions allows a relatively high degree of strategic autonomy for its delegates, albeit that 
outcomes must remain within the boundaries of the group’s overall red lines. This is as much 
because of the complexity of the climate negotiations as anything; with so many issues for 
negotiation amongst so many parties, and the status of negotiations often changing daily at 
formal sessions, AILAC considers that attempting to micromanage every strategic decision by 
its negotiators would prove impractical. This is exacerbated by the fact that AILAC delegates 
have little time to devote to their UNFCCC work as it is, as they also have jobs in their member 
states’ domestic environment and foreign affairs ministries. While not a point made in the 
literature for other similarly-sized/similarly-resourced blocs like AOSIS, it seems reasonable 
to expect that these blocs would operate in a similar manner given they face the same pressures 
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of  engaging in a complex, ever-changing negotiating arena while (presumably) also lacking 
the economic power to employ delegates to focus solely on the UNFCCC negotiations without 
a parallel domestic work portfolio. 
 AILAC negotiators stated also that they adapt their choice of strategy according to 
circumstances, such as the specific issue(s) or the negotiating parties they face. For example, 
the group’s negotiators frame their persuasion approaches differently depending on how 
receptive to AILAC’s position they believe their negotiating partners to be, while coalition-
building attempts are viable for some combinations of issues and parties and not others. As 
such, AILAC reacts according to the prevailing situation, which can change rapidly in the 
UNFCCC. Given the autonomy of AILAC negotiators in strategic decision-making, a process-
based understanding of power relations is particularly apt as these individuals are ultimately 
responsible for communicating information and ideas to other parties. This is dependent on the 
linguistic and discursive choices they make – e.g. particular framings - which in turn are 
socially constructed according to the context in which the negotiators are situated (Litfin, 
1994). Here knowledge can again be seen as supremely influential as a power resource, as the 
technical knowledge of the expert negotiators, and the tactical knowledge provided to them by 
the support unit inform their interpretation of the negotiating context and affect the strategic 
choices they make. Reducing strategic choices to pre-existing relative quantities of parties’ 
material power resources thus overlooks how power/knowledge can be deployed through 







10.3.2 Partisan Bias 
 
As a result of this high level of individual negotiators’ agency, the analysis can comment on 
discussions in the literature regarding the influence of individual negotiators’ characteristics  
on strategy selection, as these can contribute to the discursive choices negotiators make 
regarding which strategies to use and how to deploy them. Odell’s (2010) arguments regarding 
the effect of partisan bias do not appear borne out for AILAC negotiators. While the support 
unit advises and drafts the initial submissions for the group, the AILAC member states’ national 
delegates actually negotiate for the bloc in sessions. Such national delegates could reasonably 
be included in Odell’s (2010:623) definition of those likely to evidence effects of partisan bias, 
being “negotiator[s] framed to take the perspective of one side in a dispute” and thus could be 
expected to “overestimate the value of [their] outside option, underestimate the degree to which 
the other side’s objectives are compatible with [theirs], and use a self-serving definition of 
fairness”. In fact, AILAC negotiators were acutely aware of their group’s lack of leverage to 
employ more aggressive strategies, the bloc regularly offered constructive proposals and 
compromises, and it was loath to try and exert moral pressure on its negotiating partners 
precisely because of concerns relating both to more legitimate equity-based arguments from 
parties such as AOSIS and the LDCs, and to its own member states’ continuing extraction of 
fossil fuels, which could garner accusations of hypocrisy. That AILAC’s national negotiators, 
endowed with considerable individual agency, chose to use mainly less aggressive strategies 
does not provide evidence that there was partisan bias; if it was present, this suggests that its 
effects did not determine strategy choice. 
It would seem reasonable to expect partisan bias to be present because AILAC’s 
national delegates from its member states’ environment and foreign affairs ministries are 
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rotated on a fairly regular basis. AILAC negotiators expressed concerns over a lack of 
negotiating experience resulting from being rotated out; therefore it is plausible that partisan 
bias would have influenced their strategy selection. Their lack of experience could have led 
them to underestimate the potential for co-operation between parties and instilled in them a 
prejudice towards AILAC positions borne out of a lack of perspective for other parties’ 
positions. However, following Odell’s logic (2010), it would also seem reasonable to have 
expected fewer effects of partisan bias in less experienced negotiators as such bias would not 
have been reinforced from prior experiences. In fact, whether partisan bias was present for 
AILAC negotiators is unknowable because its detection requires the use of more aggressive 
strategies, whereas they largely opted for less aggressive approaches. If it was present, then 
clearly it did not have a decisive effect, which suggests that other influences on strategy 
selection overrode it. The fact that AILAC negotiators cited the bloc’s lack of material leverage 
to use more aggressive strategies credibly and effectively, and recognised the group’s relative 
abundance of power/knowledge for credible and potentially effective use of less aggressive 
strategies, also suggests the power dynamics of the group versus other parties in the UNFCCC 
were more influential on negotiators’ strategy choices than individual partisan bias. 
 
10.3.3 Negotiators’ Experience 
 
The analysis can better inform conceptualisations of the influence of individual negotiators’ 
negotiating experience levels on strategy selection. The effect of the overriding power relations 
between AILAC and others remains in place, in that more aggressive strategies are considered 
unattractive and unviable, with less aggressive strategies seen as appealing and capable of 
delivering satisfactory outcomes. However, the results show interviewees felt that when 
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autonomous AILAC negotiators have higher levels of negotiating experience, it boosts the 
viability – and chances for selection – of the full range of less aggressive strategies, from 
coalition-building and constructive proposals to persuasion and concessions trading, as it 
results in greater tactical knowledge of how to “play the game” skilfully to produce satisfactory 
outcomes. For example, the experience brought to the AILAC delegation by delegates from 
member states’ foreign affairs ministries and members of the support unit,  provided the group 
with knowledge of how to frame persuasion attempts towards parties with whom diplomatic 
relations are especially sensitive for certain issues, such as the LMDCs, to maximise the 
strategy’s chance of success while avoiding diplomatic pitfalls. 
 Furthermore, the results demonstrate interviewees felt high levels of UNFCCC-
specific experience are important in most cases for a negotiator’s ability to foster trust and good 
working relationships with delegates from other groups and parties, which in turn opens the 
door for negotiators to use less aggressive strategies with greater expectation of success. This 
is because, as Chasek (2011) notes, trust and good relationships between negotiators originate 
from long periods of time spent together. Greater experience means more time spent in the 
UNFCCC negotiations, and thus greater potential for such relationships to develop; this in turn 
can lead to co-operation and problem-solving approaches between parties resulting from a 
more relaxed atmosphere in formal sessions (Chasek, 2011). Interviewees felt that 
inexperienced negotiators, unless through sheer force of personality, found it much harder – 
and thus were generally less likely - to use strategies where a pre-existing network of 
negotiating contacts from other parties and groups was especially advantageous, such as 
coalition-building, arranging bilateral meetings, and using informal spaces. Coalition-building 
is heavily influenced by trust between negotiators, while the latter two must be arranged by 
invitation with other negotiators and are not UNFCCC-organised. Despite this negotiator 
inexperience, AILAC demonstrated strong usage of all 3 of these strategies. To overcome this 
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problem, AILAC negotiators placed strong emphasis on developing trust and good working 
relationships with other parties’ negotiators; indeed, promotion of trust between parties is even 
cited in the group’s formal objectives (AILAC, date unknown). However, that such strategies 
were used so frequently by AILAC can be explained by the fact that interviewees repeatedly 
signalled that the AILAC delegation is composed of vocal, outgoing personalities who by their 
very nature are enough to overcome social inhibitions derived from lack of experience, 
allowing AILAC negotiators to develop good relationships with their colleagues quickly. It 
also suggests that experience may have been gained elsewhere, as without it, inexperienced 
negotiators would not have pursued these strategies as they could not have reasonably expected 
them to result in satisfactory outcomes before they had developed sufficient trust. 
 Therefore, the analysis suggests the support unit, whose members accompany 
national delegates to both formal and informal negotiations and offer advice and assistance, 
has a strong influence on strategy selection.  The experience of the support unit’s members, 
and the extensive network of relationships they have developed over their time in the 
UNFCCC, can compensate for the inexperience of AILAC member states’ delegates, thus 
making these strategies viable and evidently used frequently. These findings run counter to 
Bailer’s (2012) that experienced delegations are more likely to use more aggressive strategies; 
the AILAC delegation benefitted from the support unit’s high levels of negotiating experience 
and yet the group barely used any more aggressive strategies at all. The support unit’s influence 
is most clearly seen in the group’s regular use of corridor conversations, especially after the 
adoption of the Paris Agreement at the end of 2015, when the lack of some newer AILAC 
delegates’ UNFCCC experience actually led to an increased use of the strategy. This was down 
to encouragement from the support unit, which recognised these individuals were less confident 
on the microphone in formal settings though still a generally outgoing, personable group. They 
used their own experience of the UNFCCC negotiations to reason that their newer delegates’ 
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interactions with other negotiators were more likely to be successful when conducted in 
informal settings, and thus encouraged them to pursue this strategy. As per Chasek’s (2011) 
reasoning, the support unit were able to use their networks to make it possible for AILAC 
national delegates to use the informal spaces, thus also following Montville’s (1990) pattern of 
two-track diplomacy. 
By contrast, concession trading, on the comparatively infrequent occasions when it was 
considered potentially beneficial, was used by AILAC only in cases of pre-existing good 
working relationships with other negotiators. Support unit members supported use of this 
strategy more than national delegates, but its comparative lack of use versus that of coalition-
building, bilateral meetings, and informal spaces demonstrates that even support unit members’ 
experience compensating for the inexperience of national delegates was not enough to override 
delegates’ reluctance to use this strategy. Therefore, the analysis suggests that (an)other 
factor(s) was more influential in selection decisions for concessions trading, namely that of 
identity within the UNFCCC, which will be addressed later in the chapter. 
  Use of other less aggressive strategies which relied less on networks of contacts, 
such as persuasion and using constructive rhetoric, was less influenced by negotiators’ 
experience, as their credibility can be assessed based on strength of argument even without 
good relationships with other parties’ negotiators, although high levels of trust are still 
advantageous. With the mixed composition of the AILAC delegation, interviewees felt 
inexperienced members from environment ministries could still provide the technical 
knowledge fundamental to rational argument and specific proposals, while foreign affairs 
delegates inexperienced in the UNFCCC often had prior negotiating experience in other 
settings and thus had the tactical knowledge to deploy this technical knowledge effectively. 
Furthermore, both could benefit from the technical and tactical expertise and experience of the 
AILAC support unit in the aforementioned ways, which made these strategic choices stronger 
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options still, resulting in their frequent use in both submission texts and face-to-face 
negotiations. 
 
10.3.4 Negotiators’ Expert Knowledge 
 
As well as experience of individual negotiators, the analysis reveals that for some strategies, 
interviewees felt their level of expert knowledge was influential in shaping strategy selection. 
Elgström and Jönsson’s (2000) findings from a study of intra-EU negotiations are partially 
borne out for AILAC within the UNFCCC. They write that having technical experts as 
negotiators leads to greater use of co-operative and integrative strategies because they view 
such strategies as leading to “technically optimal”, substantive solutions, and because they 
are less concerned with “national political concerns”. On one hand, the AILAC delegation 
was aware of its own strengths and weaknesses, namely an abundance of technical expertise 
and material power resources respectively.  It clearly used its technical submissions to 
attempt to establish technical knowledge as the bedrock of the negotiations, with the intention 
of bringing its resources into play via the legitimisation of strategies reliant on such technical 
knowledge, such as constructive proposals, compromise offers, persuasion, and rational 
argument. On the other hand, AILAC’s delegation, mostly comprising delegates from 
environment ministries, did not discount their member states’ political contexts, as they were 
aware of the group’s lack of leverage stemming from its member states’ lack of material 
power resources. It was this concern, rather than viewing more aggressive strategies as 
leading to solutions which were less substantive and “technically optimal”, that led to the 
group almost entirely focusing on more co-operative, less aggressive strategies. Thus, the 
effect outlined by Elgström and Jönsson is similar, although the reasoning behind it is 
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different, with the level of negotiators’ expert knowledge impacting on strategy selection 
through its perception as a power resource.  
 
10.3.5 Negotiators’ Skill 
 
The analysis demonstrates that AILAC interviewees felt negotiators’ skill levels were more 
of a relevant influence on decisions about the use of persuasion and rational argument than 
any other of the group’s available options. However, even here, skill level was less seen as an 
issue regarding whether to use persuasion strategies, as it was still shown to be a commonly-
used strategy, but rather a limiting factor on how effectively persuasion could be deployed. 
Interviewees expressed concerns that the relative lack of negotiating skills training they had 
received from their governments was hampering their ability to use the strategy to its fullest, 
as doing so involves considerations of the framing of issues and arguments, and the 
accompanying discursive and linguistic choices. Nevertheless, the technical knowledge of the 
majority of AILAC’s national delegates, with the diplomatic tactical skills from its foreign 
affairs delegates and the AILAC support unit, was still felt sufficient to ensure that 
persuasion was a viable and appealing strategy, hence its repeated use by AILAC. As such 
the group again perceived its substantial technical and tactical knowledge as a valuable power 
resource in the UNFCCC. 
Though not mentioned in relation to the use of constructive proposals and rhetoric by 
interviewees, logically the level of skill should also be relevant for these strategies. 
Negotiation skill was not a factor identified by interviewees regarding whether to employ 
strategies like coalition-building, use of bilateral meetings and informal spaces, and thus it 
does not seem to have been a determining factor for their use. This is not surprising, as these 
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rely more on a contact network and interpersonal relationships than tactical knowledge 
relating to framings and particular linguistic constructions. Skill was mentioned as a 
prerequisite for concessions trading, but only by one interviewee. This suggests that for the 
majority of negotiators skill was not a determining factor of whether or not to employ 
concessions trading. These overall results suggest the premise based on Weiler’s (2012) point 
that skilled negotiators are better prepared and more exploratory in their negotiations, namely 
that a higher skill level may influence strategy selection based on an awareness of the 
viability of strategies in different circumstances, is only valid when equating this awareness 
to an understanding of the power dynamics between AILAC and other parties, given its 
aforementioned importance for AILAC negotiators’ strategic choices. 
 
10.3.6 Negotiators’ Personalities 
 
The analysis did reveal a rôle for the personalities of individual AILAC negotiators in their 
choices of strategy selection. While the group’s delegation was conscious of the effects of the 
power dynamics between AILAC and its negotiating partners and veered towards less 
aggressive strategies accordingly, interviewees felt that for one more aggressive strategy, a 
negotiator’s personality could act as a sort of wild card in bucking the pattern caused by power 
dynamics. In most normal negotiating scenarios, AILAC delegates were loath to try to exert 
moral pressure on others, either by using vulnerability discourses or by naming & shaming 
their less progressive negotiating partners. Some interviewees did state, however, that they 
would deem such strategies worthwhile where a negotiator was more confident and outgoing. 
This could involve use of vulnerability discourses in circumstances where AILAC is imbued 
with temporary moral power resources, e.g. in the event of a climate-related natural disaster in 
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AILAC member states, or the use of naming & shaming where all other strategies have been 
exhausted. In the former, the strategy’s use is still dependent on the availability of a different 
type of power resource; while in the latter, the number of delegates who responded that naming 
& shaming could ever be a viable strategy even in such circumstances was still a minority. 
Furthermore, interviewees did not consider a negotiator’s personality accounted even for the 
very small number of instances where the group’s negotiators had used strategies such as 
making demands or threats, as these were used either as a precursor to transition into a less 
aggressive strategy such as persuasion, or as a last resort to avoid situations which risked 
breaching AILAC positional red lines.  This suggests that negotiators’ personalities, at least in 
the case of AILAC, do not generally affect decisions regarding the use of more aggressive 
strategies. 
 By contrast, negotiators’ personalities were seen to influence the choice of strategy 
within the less aggressive options available to AILAC. Data from the support unit revealed the 
group has been more likely to use informal spaces such as corridor conversations and social 
meetings because its delegates are more comfortable speaking in these environments than on 
the microphone in formal sessions post-Paris. Furthermore, the viability of coalition-building 
attempts and use of bilateral meetings was identified by one delegate as being reliant on 
compatibility of negotiators’ personalities, allowing development of trust and good working 
relationships with those of other parties. Logically, this takes precedence over negotiators’ 
experience in terms of the importance to these strategies’ viability, as interviewees felt that by 
force of personality negotiators could – and did - overcome the disadvantages of inexperience, 
i.e. lacking pre-existing social networks, by being friendly and vocal. In addition, it seems 
reasonable to think that if a negotiator were experienced and yet was not compatible 
personality-wise with other negotiators, this would lessen the expected viability of using these 
strategies, and therefore the likelihood of using them at all.  
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  The impact of negotiators’ personalities on persuasion strategies seems to be 
less a question of whether they were used at all – clearly the group did use them frequently 
because of the perceived power resources of AILAC – and more of where and how they were 
utilised. As mentioned, the support unit encouraged AILAC delegates in the post-Paris 
delegation to use informal spaces to play to the strengths of their outgoing personalities in these 
situations, minimising the effect of their lack of confidence in formal sessions. It was therefore 
within these informal spaces that persuasion could be used, in a more relaxed setting. In 
addition, because the confidence of AILAC negotiators increased in these spaces, persuasion 
could then be used with more tactical variation, e.g. via unplanned deviations from the talking 
points provided by the support unit, or by using particular framings in terms of linguistic choice 
or tone of voice.  
 An interesting potentially related variable is the high proportion of women within the 
AILAC delegation as a whole. 21 of the 35 interviewees (60%) were female, which differs 
significantly from the UNFCCC average for female party delegates of 37% at COP23 and 38% 
at COP24 (UNFCCC, 2019c). One interviewee did suggest the gender imbalance within 
AILAC could be linked to the personable and engaging personalities of the delegates, which in 
turn could account for the fact that AILAC has generally favoured less aggressive and more 
constructive strategic choices. Ruane (2012:343) comments that while existing literature has 
demonstrated a “small but significant influence” of negotiator gender on their strategic choices 
“consistent with stereotypes, with women in aggregate behaving more co-operatively and men 
in aggregate behaving more competitively”, these results “are full of inconsistencies without 
context” and have identified “conditions under which negotiator sex promotes negotiation 
behaviour that is either consistent, neutral, or contrary to gender stereotypes.” It seems unwise, 
then, to infer any definitive link between the gender composition of the AILAC delegation and 
its strategic choices given the lack of comparable studies exploring this relationship. 
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10.3.7 Delegation Size 
 
The fact that no interviewees identified the AILAC delegation’s size as an influence on their 
strategic choices suggests that AILAC conforms to the findings of Bailer (2012) that the 
delegation size has no significant impact on a party’s tendency to use more or less aggressive 
strategies. Interviewees did say, however, that they felt their negotiating capacity was limited 
by also having domestic work portfolios to address, leaving less time to devote to the UNFCCC 
negotiations. It seems reasonable that a larger delegation, even composed of similarly time-
pressured delegates, would lead to an increase in the individual negotiator’s capacity, as the 
amount of UNFCCC work could be spread across more people and individuals would have 
comparatively less to do. This could free up some negotiator time, meaning that strategies 
relying heavily on activity outside of formal negotiation sessions, i.e. bilateral meetings and 
using informal spaces, become more viable given negotiators have more time. This could mean 
that AILAC would even more strongly favour such less aggressive strategies over more 
aggressive options, although without data from larger delegations as to whether their size 
influences strategy choice, this is hard to conclude definitively. 
 
10.3.8 Delegation Dynamics’ Relationship to Power Dynamics 
 
From a governmentality perspective, the influence of delegation dynamics on strategy selection 
is part of the underlying power dynamics between parties. Greater levels of individual 
negotiators’ skill and experience are a non-material power resource for a delegation in the form 
of tactical knowledge – the fact that these negotiators know how to negotiate in particular ways 
because of their skill and experience provides them with a wider array of credibly viable 
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strategic options to choose from. Likewise, negotiators’ technical knowledge is a non-material 
power resource which can be utilised credibly through strategies reliant upon it, e.g. 
constructive proposals and persuasion if, as AILAC has attempted to ensure, legitimacy is 
based on science and expertise in the negotiation arena. The governmentality perspective runs 
counter to the reasoning of Dür and Mateo (2008) therefore, that a delegation’s experience has 
any significant impact on strategy choice because determination of strategy choice results from 
the power dynamics between parties. While a governmentality perspective would agree that 
strategy choice is a result of power dynamics, it would include delegation factors such as 
experience and skill within the resources upon which power dynamics depend, given the rôle 
of power/knowledge. This is not to the exclusion of the importance of material power 
resources, however; delegation size can be seen as an effect of a delegation’s economic power, 
as greater financial resources can support bigger delegations, and therefore impact on strategy 
choice as outlined above. Finally, a governmentality-based understanding of power relations 
places great emphasis on the processes by which these take place, as a result of the discursive 
choices made by delegates actually doing the negotiating. Considering the characteristics of 
negotiators as relevant to strategic choice is important, as power relations depend on the ways 
in which negotiators communicate and interpret information (Frenhoff Larsen, 2007); these in 









10.4 Domestic Politics 
 
10.4.1 Political Identity 
 
AILAC’s member states’ political identity did have a significant impact on the group’s strategy 
choices in the UNFCCC, albeit not in the way one might have assumed from the literature. 
While AILAC did recognise the importance of equity as a negotiating issue within the 
UNFCCC, this did not, as per Costantini et al (2016), lead to the group utilising blocking 
strategies or making demands on a regular basis. Interviewees did note that equity was a tool 
to be used when interacting with ALBA, and the group’s submissions do make reference to the 
concept at various points, but it was not the focal point of AILAC’s strategic decision-making 
such that it was prioritised above all other outcomes. Instead, AILAC’s strategic choices were 
predominantly made up of less aggressive strategies, particularly use of technical submissions, 
constructive proposals, persuasion, and coalition-building.  
While the underlying power dynamics of the UNFCCC negotiations make these 
strategies that AILAC can use more credibly, as discussed above, there are also reasons for 
AILAC to find them attractive in their own right because they can be viable. Another reason is 
one identified by Weiler (2012), albeit for more powerful parties, that less aggressive strategies 
might be chosen in order to take on a leadership rôle, such as Japan’s use of constructive 
proposals and persuasion as the host of COP3 (Hattori, 1999). AILAC interviewees did not 
describe the group as a leader in the UNFCCC, but the vast majority cited the group’s identity 
as a bridge-builder, and identified it as a key influence on their strategy selections. For example, 
the group shied away from blocking or exerting moral pressure through naming & shaming 
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specifically because it would have been out of keeping with this identity, and was keen to make 
constructive proposals specifically because they could further the bridge-building agenda.  
 Furthermore, AILAC outlines its aim of occupying a bridge-building rôle in its 
rulebook (AILAC, date unknown), and evidence of its efforts to achieve this is plentiful in the 
group’s technical submissions, through frequent use of discourses of universal participation. 
Whether this bridge-building effort can be equated to leadership depends on the definition of 
leadership used; however, the end result is certainly similar. Leadership is typically associated 
with more powerful parties attempting to effect positional change in others, such as the EU 
leading calls for progressive climate action in the 2000s (Oberthür, 2011). AILAC attempted 
to shepherd all parties to a middle ground which could lead to an acceptable compromise. 
Whether this can be described as leadership might perhaps be assessed by analysing whether 
AILAC achieved its objective. However if leadership is determined by self-serving motivation, 
as in the case of China which adopted less aggressive, more constructive strategies to cultivate 
a more positive international image (Godbole, 2016; Dong, 2017), then AILAC does not fit 
with this. AILAC interviewees repeatedly stated that bridge-building is simply in the “DNA” 
and the “heritage” of the group’s member states, which embrace multilateral approaches to 
solving transboundary problems. As such, AILAC was set up in 2012 specifically with this 
attitude to multilateralism in climate change politics. AILAC’s identity as bridge-builder does 
not appear to be a product of the power relations in which it finds itself in the UNFCCC - it 
has not adopted this rôle simply because it lacks the material power resources to use more 
aggressive strategies credibly. The ALBA group comprises similar Latin American states, 
which also lack these power resources, yet it has adopted a very different persona in the 





10.4.2 Salience & Vulnerability 
 
The analysis demonstrates that for AILAC, the reasoning of Costantini et al (2016) and 
Weiler (2012) on the impacts of vulnerability and climate change salience on strategic 
behaviour appears borne out. Highly vulnerable parties – of which AILAC is composed - are 
more “impatient” for an agreement in the UNFCCC, and thus more likely to prefer less 
aggressive strategies - which AILAC certainly did – to avoid creating any risks to agreements 
from confrontation. This runs directly counter to the findings of Bailer (2012), who argued 
that greater climate change salience derived from high vulnerability results in more 
aggressive strategies in the UNFCCC because of their potential to accelerate progress 
towards an agreement despite the risks. The only connection between AILAC’s rare use of 
more aggressive strategies and the group’s vulnerability was that they were used as last resort 
options to prevent outcomes which could heighten the AILAC member states’ vulnerability, 
as in the case of vetoing an AGN proposal on African special needs & circumstances; this 
would have seen Latin American states excluded from priority funding from the UNFCCC 
and less able to carry out climate action to protect themselves from climate change risks. 
 AILAC recognises its member states are highly vulnerable to the effects of climate 
change, and this is evident from the fact that the group refers to its own vulnerability 13 times 
in its technical submissions. Furthermore, all interviewees recognised the highly vulnerable 
nature of AILAC member states to the effects of climate change in the coming century. 
Therefore AILAC needs an effective agreement, which, because climate change is a 
collective action problem, requires universal participation among parties. As discussed above, 
the underlying power dynamics of the UNFCCC meant that AILAC generally did not feel it 
could credibly use more aggressive strategies, and instead, used less aggressive options, 
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although not merely because it had no choice. Less aggressive strategies still held some 
innate appeal, e.g. the ability of AILAC to play to its strengths with power/knowledge 
resources for persuasion and constructive rhetoric. The high vulnerability of AILAC member 
states led the group to make extensive use of technical submissions with strong universality 
discourses, as well as to use coalition-building; these strategies were attempts to garner 
maximum support for the progressive positions supported by AILAC and to involve all 
parties in any finalised outcomes from the UNFCCC, given AILAC’s need for universal 
participation. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 9, one AILAC delegate stated that “We’re 
getting closer to the point where a bad deal is worse than no deal”, which shows that so far, 
the priority has been to ensure an agreement based on universal participation, however 
imperfect it may be.  
However, it is likely the group would have used universality discourses in 
submissions and coalition-building strategies even if vulnerability concerns of its member 
states had not been so pressing, given AILAC’s identity as bridge-builder and its members’ 
affinity for multilateralism, as well as the benefits of borrowing power from other parties to 
boost any strategic option’s chance of success.  These less aggressive strategies are more 
attractive because AILAC needs an effective universal agreement, although they were already 
attractive given the group’s proficiency in the use of its rich power/knowledge resources. 
Whether the group’s enthusiasm for multilateral co-operation and its bridge-building identity 
in the UNFCCC would have existed if AILAC member states not been highly vulnerable to 
climate change is unknowable. It seems reasonable to assume, however, given the 
distribution of material power resources among parties, that AILAC would have retained this 
identity given its members’ comparative lack of power in other international negotiation 
arenas and their consequent need to avoid “shadow of the future” effects therein. Therefore, it 
further seems reasonable to conclude that, while serving to make less aggressive strategies 
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even more attractive options, AILAC vulnerability was less influential on strategy choice 
than the power dynamics of the UNFCCC and the group’s identity.  
 Interestingly, AILAC member states’ vulnerability to climate change was not 
sufficient an influence on strategic decision-making that the group attempted to exert moral 
pressure on other parties on a regular basis. This runs counter to Weiler’s (2012) suggestion 
about highly vulnerable parties’ strategy choices that a party’s vulnerability to climate 
change, and thus reliance on effective international action, would result in it using its moral 
power resources. If anything, the group’s vulnerability only deterred them from doing so 
overtly, as interviewees felt that, while AILAC member states are highly vulnerable, there are 
other parties which face an even greater existential threat, such as members of AOSIS or the 
LDCs. The only exception to this was at the time of climate change-induced natural disasters 
in AILAC member states, as these events imbued the group with sufficient temporary moral 
power resources to exert pressure credibly through vulnerability discourses.  
 
10.4.3 NGOs and Lobby Groups 
 
Unsurprisingly, textual analysis revealed no influence of NGOs or lobby groups on AILAC’s 
strategic decision-making. Furthermore, such an influence was not identified by any AILAC 
delegates in interviews, which makes it difficult to assess the comparability with Michaelowa 
and Michaelowa’s (2012) and Bailer’s (2012) arguments on the influence on strategy of such 
domestic actors in combination with the degree to which parties are more democratically-
inclined. This is likely because AILAC delegates possess relative strategic autonomy, without 
strong governmental oversight - albeit within the confines of the group’s positional red lines 
set out at pre-session meetings - through which the influence of domestic groups could be 
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more easily detected. Furthermore, all AILAC’s delegates were employed by their respective 
national government ministries to negotiate on their behalf as opposed to being recruited 
from civil society, as has been the case for groups such as AOSIS (Betzold, 2010). This 
would obviously have provided lobbyists with much greater influence over AILAC strategy 
choice given the group’s negotiator autonomy, and even being part of the delegation could 
have given them influence over strategic decisions (Rietig, 2016), yet it was only the support 
unit members aside from national delegations who were permitted to plan strategy. Though 
employed by the AILAC group rather than national governments, even they were not 
permitted actually to negotiate.  
 




The analysis evidences nuanced impact of intra-bloc dynamics on AILAC’s strategic choices. 
The group allows its individual negotiators to make the majority of strategy decisions within 
negotiation sessions, as mentioned above, because of the complexity of the UNFCCC 
negotiations and the limited resources AILAC possesses to support its delegation. 
Responsibility for decision-making is not discussed in the literature for other similarly-sized 
and -resourced blocs such as AOSIS, and it seems reasonable to assume that because they 
face similar resourcing challenges, they are also likely to allow their individual negotiators to 
make most decisions on strategy. Parallels can be drawn from Oberthür’s (2011) work with 
the EU, however, as since 2004, the EU has delegated strategic decision-making to expert 
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negotiators and the European Commission, so these expert negotiators may have similar 
levels of autonomy to AILAC delegates. 
Despite individual negotiators’ autonomy, AILAC holds pre-session meetings to 
discuss possible strategies, and the group has daily meetings of its issue-specific technical co-
ordinations for negotiators to update the group on actions taken and get consensus approval 
for particular tactics for use later that day. Here intra-bloc dynamics can come into play, as 
consensus decision-making in theory allows each member state to exercise influence on 
strategy choice by requiring every party’s consent to outcomes. Differences in funding and 
training provision between AILAC member states means some states can support multiple, 
well-trained delegates for each issue, while others’ delegates do not feel able to participate as 
effectively, or these states are unable even to propose a delegate for each technical co-
ordination. This means that they miss the chance to participate in forging a consensus on 
these tactics, and the opportunity to suggest alternatives. This disparity crudely divides 
AILAC in half, with Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru able to put forward delegates to 
participate in more technical co-ordinations, and better able to support their negotiators 
effectively than Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and Paraguay. Thus, while individual 
negotiators still ultimately decide on most strategic choices rather the whole group choosing 
particular strategies such as persuasion or using informal spaces, the individuals in a position 
to decide are influenced by the relative resources of AILAC member states, and still require 
consensus-based approval for particular tactics.  
   The analysis did, however, reveal a particularly interesting example of the 
intra-bloc dynamics of AILAC impacting on strategy use as a result of the overall group’s 
way of making decisions. AILAC had planned to issue a statement condemning the 
withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement in 2017, but the actual use of this strategy 
was vetoed by Honduras in internal discussions. Disagreements over the group’s position on 
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US withdrawal, and that its decision-making process for group positions is by consensus at 
the Governance Committee level, meant that AILAC did not use the strategy at all. Similarly, 
an awareness of AILAC red lines led to occasional use of more aggressive strategies in a bid 
to prevent them from being breached, such as blocking the AGN’s proposals relating to 




The analysis can also inform thought on the level of influence of AILAC’s internal cohesion 
on its strategic decision-making. Wagner (1999) suggests highly cohesive coalitions tend 
towards more aggressive strategies because the differences between their members and other 
parties are more sharply defined, resulting in a “we-they” dichotomy in their negotiating 
perspective. AILAC interviewees did not specifically mention the group’s cohesion, though 
they did make clear that AILAC possesses a shared identity of supporting multilateralism and 
a progressive bridge-building agenda. If this is counted as evidence of cohesion, which seems 
reasonable given cohesion is taken to be a group’s members sharing negotiating opinions 
(Wagner, 1999), then this means that evidence from AILAC runs counter to Wagner’s 
findings; the shared AILAC identity interviewees mentioned specifically focused on common 
negotiating principles rather than on other characteristics such as geographical proximity of 
members or comparable strength of economies. AILAC adopted discourses of universality 
and inclusion while attempting to forge a consensus among all parties through less aggressive 
strategies. The group did not adopt a “we-they” mentality; if anything, the clear rôle AILAC 
assumed was designed to bring the maximum number of parties together to produce as 





10.6.1 Temporal Relationships Between Different Strategies 
 
The analysis showed timings had a significant impact on AILAC’s use of strategies in two 
main ways. Firstly, use of some strategies was temporally dependent on use of others, either 
affecting their efficacy or facilitating their use at all. AILAC used very few of the more 
aggressive strategies such as exerting moral pressure through naming & shaming, or blocking. 
On the rare occasions they were prepared to use them, however, it was as a last resort, once all 
other less aggressive options had been exhausted. Furthermore, interviewees stated they would 
only do so when there was a genuine possibility of AILAC’s positional red lines being breached 
by proposals from parties. AILAC’s use of demands, another more aggressive strategy, was 
only ever as an initial strategic move, with the expectation and willingness to switch to less 
aggressive options once a starting point was reached from which the group could attempt to 
persuade other parties towards its own positions, or present constructive proposals or 
compromises. The group did not consider making demands as a stand-alone strategy and thus 
any use at all was predicated on immediate follow-ups with others. Timing demands at the 
beginning of a negotiation session matches what Odell (2005) found at WTO meetings, with 
more aggressive strategies compromising parties’ initial strategic moves. 
 Less aggressive strategies also had temporal relationships with each other. AILAC’s 
regular use of strong discourses of the primacy of technical knowledge in its technical 
submissions meant the group could also include constructive proposals and attempts at 
persuasion concurrently within these submissions with a greater expectation of their success, 
which they did regularly. Attempting to underpin the UNFCCC negotiations with scientific and 
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technical knowledge, as discussed above, legitimises AILAC’s use of these strategies, as the 
group is well equipped with power/knowledge resources. The analysis also shows that within 
formal sessions, constructive proposals and persuasion strategies were used in tandem, with a 
strategy cycle beginning with persuasion and moving onto proposals when the initial ideas are 
not accepted in their original form, and then repeating until a new proposal is agreed, or a 
compromise solution is found.  
 In addition, the analysis suggests that submissions made jointly with other 
parties or groups depend on the creation of formal communication channels, which often stem 
from formal bilateral meetings between AILAC and other parties or groups. These bilateral 
meetings are mostly arranged during meetings between negotiators in informal spaces, such as 
at external forums, or in as corridor conversations or social meetings. These various informal 
meetings also provide spaces where other less aggressive strategies can be used, e.g. 
negotiating compromises within Secretariat informal informals, or using more “blunt” 
persuasion in more relaxed social contexts where negotiators can speak plainly off the record. 
Use of informal spaces is particularly beneficial because they enable AILAC negotiators to 
improve their tactical knowledge resources and to develop and expand networks which are 
needed for strategies which rely more heavily on contacts e.g. coalition-building and arranging 
bilateral meetings. They also play to the strengths of AILAC’s delegation in the post-Paris 
negotiation period, given negotiators’ more natural affinity for negotiating in informal spaces 







 10.6.2 Timeframe Considerations Across the Year 
 
Secondly, AILAC considered timeframes longer than a single negotiating session when 
deciding to use certain strategies in the UNFCCC. The group’s main strategies - constructive 
rhetoric & proposals, compromises, persuasion, and coalition-building - were facilitated by 
regular use of technical submissions where AILAC attempted to make scientific and technical 
knowledge the bedrock of the UNFCCC. Making these submissions, containing strong 
discourses of the primacy of technical knowledge, between negotiating sessions throughout the 
calendar year meant that by the time the subsidiary body meetings in May or the COPs in 
November/December arrived, AILAC could credibly expect to use successfully these other less 
aggressive strategies reliant on knowledge, which the analysis shows they did as the majority 
of their in-session strategic choices. Furthermore, as seen in the previous sub-section, offering 
compromises as a strategy obviously only works after initial proposals (or demands) are made 
from which to negotiate towards a centre ground. As well as the follow-on between these 
proposals/demands and compromises within negotiating sessions, the same temporal 
relationship between these strategies occurred between proposals made during the calendar 
within submissions, and compromises stemming from them being offered in formal sessions 
such as COPs. 
 Timings were also relevant for the group’s sporadic use of concessions trading as a 
strategy. Interviewees recognised that because the UNFCCC is organised around all-or-nothing 
package deals at the end of COP sessions, concessions trading can become the way in which 
agreements are finalised as time runs out at the end of a COP. This can only happen, however, 
after proposals have actually been made and parties have attempted to steer consensus towards 
their own preferences. Because AILAC recognises this is how UNFCCC negotiations can 
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develop, using in particular the support group’s expertise and experience, in the run-up to 
formal sessions the group plans for the sorts of concessions that could be made in exchange for 
particular gains from other parties. Planning in the months before the COP is vital given the 
complexity of the UNFCCC negotiations, and the numerous permutations it presents, which 
AILAC must understand if its negotiators are to have a chance of obtaining satisfactory 
outcomes and using the strategy in the first place. 
  The pattern of AILAC’s strategy use in the UNFCCC corresponds to a hybrid 
of the arguments of Odell (2005) and Wagner (1999) on variations in strategy choice during a 
negotiation cycle. Odell’s findings suggest more aggressive strategies are used at the 
beginning, while Wagner’s research on UNCSD negotiations suggest these are more likely to 
be used at the end in combination with concessions trading. In fact, when AILAC did make 
demands, this strategy was used at the beginning to provide a starting point for negotiations 
towards a consensus, while blocking and naming & shaming strategies were used only as last 
resorts. For less aggressive strategies, evidence from AILAC suggests at face value a similarity 
with Wagner’s (1999) analysis, with these being used mostly at the start of sessions; however, 
it is hard to ascertain whether this comparison is fair, given AILAC overwhelmingly used less 
aggressive strategies at every stage of the negotiations anyway, especially with persuasion-
proposals cycles throughout sessions. Therefore, an argument that the group specifically used 
them in the initial stages is reasonable – the group made technical submissions throughout the 
year containing proposals and rational argument, as well as the same strategies at the beginning 
of sessions - but not, as in the pattern identified by Wagner, that their use declined as 
negotiations progressed. Likewise, AILAC’s strategy use in a negotiation cycle matches 
Odell’s (2005) findings that less aggressive strategies are used especially at the end of sessions, 
with the group continuing to make proposals and offer compromises, and occasionally trading 
concessions; but AILAC used almost all of these throughout negotiations anyway. Putnam et 
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al’s (1990) broader depiction of changing strategy use by negotiation phase is perhaps the best 
comparison precisely because of its less specific description; in the early stages, parties define 
the issue, before moving to persuading other parties of their views in the second phase, and 
finally more problem-solving and collaboration in the third phase. 
 AILAC interviewees did not distinguish between the group’s strategy use at COPs 
versus SB meetings, which means that conclusions between AILAC and the findings Wagner 
(1999) makes about differences between official conferences and intersessional meetings are 
difficult. She notes intersessional meetings tend to feature a more relaxed atmosphere and do 
not require delegates to deliver concrete outcomes there and then, meaning greater levels of 
less aggressive, problem-solving strategies are used. While the analysis did not reveal a 
difference between COPs and SB meetings specifically, it showed that this point seems to be 
true for AILAC delegates negotiating in informal spaces versus formal sessions, the former of 
which saw greater uses of persuasion, coalition-building, and constructive proposals & rhetoric 
as a result. This was evident in AILAC negotiators’ participation in external forums such as 
the Cartagena Dialogue, for which meetings take place earlier in the year than the annual 
UNFCCC COP and do not require formal outcomes, a feature which interviewees connected 
with greater use of less aggressive strategies.  
 
10.6.3 Strategy Use Over the Longer Term 
 
AILAC has consistently preferred use of less aggressive strategies over more aggressive 
strategies within the timeframe of this study, namely 2013 to 2018. The group exerted moral 
pressure, made demands and threats, and blocked sparingly, often only as a last resort to avoid 
breaching AILAC positional red lines, and favoured technical submissions, persuasion, 
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constructive proposals and rhetoric, as well as coalition-building and the use of informal 
spaces. As discussed above, this was primarily because of power dynamics between the 
UNFCCC parties and the group’s self-determined bridge-building identity. This study also 
spans the introduction of the Paris Agreement in 2015, which provided a framework for 
implementation towards which parties could work. That AILAC has been consistent in its 
strategic approach both pre- and post-Paris seems to run counter to Spector and Zartman’s 
(2003) argument that once overarching goals of an international organisation have been 
established – here, the implementation of the Paris Agreement’s rule book – the proportion of 
more aggressive to less aggressive strategies  tends to decrease. If anything, interviewees 
remarked that because of frustrations with implementation from 2017, they are beginning to 
see little option but to increase use of more aggressive strategies to prevent unacceptable 
outcomes being locked in place for the long-term.  
However, the group’s strategy use did show some signs of variation over time. One 
example is the use of vulnerability discourses to exert moral pressure; while AILAC shied away 
from using this strategy mainly because of the aforementioned factors, some individual 
negotiators were prepared to use it when any AILAC member states had been affected by a 
climate-related natural disaster, as it afforded the group greater levels of moral power derived 
from its member states’ exposed vulnerability. In addition, AILAC’s use of submissions 
markedly increased after the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015, which is likely due to 
two factors. Firstly, the establishment of the support unit gave AILAC a full-time group of 
dedicated specialists in the UNFCCC negotiations, responsible for drafting the group’s 
submissions before approval first by topic-specific national negotiators from each technical co-
ordination, as well as the Governance Committee. Given the volume of domestic work of 
AILAC’s national delegates for their governmental ministries, having the support unit means 
that AILAC can produce far more submissions, and this could partly explain the increase in the 
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number of AILAC submissions once the support unit became operational, albeit with a small 
lag time. Secondly, post-Paris, the framework of the Paris Agreement was in place, allowing 
specific features to be assessed, critiqued, and developed according to AILAC’s positions. Use 
of constructive rhetoric increased markedly from 2017 onwards, probably because there had 
been more progress towards the implementation of the Paris rule book, and the number of 
submissions increased as one vector through which AILAC could use their strategy of 
constructive proposals and rhetoric. In addition, that several AILAC interviewees judged the 
negotiations to have become more frustrating in 2017 and 2018 means that AILAC probably 
has to work harder to maintain their discourse of positivity, to sustain momentum towards the 
rule book implementation and continue to build bridges with other parties in keeping with the 
group’s identity. 
  Temporal variation can also be seen in AILAC’s strategy choice, in its decision 
to focus particularly on use of informal spaces since 2017. This was encouraged by the support 
unit, which recognised individual AILAC negotiators’ comparative discomfort in participating 
on the microphone in formal sessions versus their ability to engage other parties’ negotiators 
in social contexts and corridor conversations using the power of their personalities. This 
recognition, as explained above, can be seen as AILAC once again understanding its power 
resources lay in the technical knowledge and particular negotiating skills of its national 
delegates, and playing to its strengths. In a similar vein, increasing the number of technical 
submissions following establishment of the support unit allowed AILAC to take advantage of 






10.7 Institutional Dynamics of the UNFCCC 
 
10.7.1 UNFCCC Consensus & Complexity 
 
The nature of the negotiating process in the UNFCCC can account for some of AILAC’s 
strategic behaviour. Each party has a veto over Convention outputs by the UNFCCC’s 
consensus-based decision-making process (UNFCCC, 1992) and thus blocking strategies were 
available to AILAC. The group took advantage of this on rare occasions - one of these 
corresponding to Odell’s (2010) identification of a minority coalition blocking -  when AILAC 
made a joint submission with the AGN to block work on the APA’s transparency agenda from 
progressing without addressing adaptation issues. Nevertheless, although AILAC could have 
been sure that blocking would be guaranteed to succeed on other occasions as well, overcoming 
the problem of a lack of leverage, blocking was only utilised sparingly and as a last resort 
because of “shadow of the future” concerns and damage to AILAC’s bridge-building identity. 
This implies the aforementioned case of the APA agenda was deemed close enough to violating 
AILAC’s red lines to merit blocking and jeopardising the positive image the group had 
cultivated for itself from its bridge-building identity. 
These identity-based concerns also sufficed to deter the group from using concessions 
trading as a main strategy, as interviewees were concerned it could present AILAC as a cynical 
negotiator only concerned with its own gains rather than trying to forge a consensus to produce 
an agreement. This runs counter to Da Conceicao-Heldt’s (2006) argument that consensus-
based arenas with multiple negotiating topics will favour concessions trading to allow package 
deals to provide all parties involved with benefits sufficient to override losses and make 
agreeing to a consensus worthwhile. If anything, AILAC felt that concessions trading, rather 
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than allowing parties to see a way through multi-issue negotiations, could lead to even greater 
levels of complexity, potentially hampering resolution of differences between parties and 
impeding progress towards an agreement. 
 The UNFCCC’s consensus requirement, however, was a big reason for 
AILAC’s frequent use of universality discourses within its technical submissions; with 
AILAC’s vulnerability to climate change meaning that the group needs an effective agreement, 
and the only way to achieve that enshrined in UNFCCC rules as being with the consent of all 
parties involved, AILAC’s incentive to encourage universal participation is strong. The same 
reasoning contributes towards AILAC’s propensity to engage in coalition-building, to 
formalise as big a consensus as possible for positions proposed or supported by the group – in 
other words, to borrow other parties’ power to make AILAC positions more likely the basis for 
a future consensus. A simplification of the negotiations to facilitate more concessions trading, 
however, as could have been expected from the arguments of Da Conceicao-Heldt (2006), was 
not identified by interviewees as an impetus behind coalition-building.  
While the UNFCCC’s decision-making process can account for AILAC’s use of these 
less aggressive strategies in particular, which they did on a regular basis, it is harder to see the 
requirement for consensus as a determinant of AILAC’s preference for less aggressive rather 
than more aggressive options generally. Had power resource distribution been different and 
AILAC had had the leverage to ensure other parties would back the positions they put forward 
or supported, there is no guarantee that the group would not have demanded the acquiescence 
of others, or threatened them with repercussions if they were unwilling to do so. It seems 
unlikely AILAC would have taken this more aggressive route, but this is more attributable to 
AILAC’s bridge-building and pro-multilateralism identity in its member states. There are 
numerous ways to achieve consensus, thus the fact that consensus was the end goal does not 
necessarily preclude the use of more aggressive strategic pathways to achieve it. As such, it 
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seems power dynamics and domestic identity concerns influenced AILAC’s choice of strategy 
more than the consensus nature of the UNFCCC or its complexity. This broadly seems to 
confirm Elgström & Jönsson’s (2000:691) argument that no decision rules “per se can be 
logically linked to creative problem-solving” given the complexity of factors in deciding to use 
less aggressive strategies. 
 
10.7.2 The Annex I/Non-Annex I “Firewall” 
 
The analysis casts doubt on the validity of Castro et al’s (2011) constructed peer group 
hypothesis in the case of AILAC’s strategic behaviour. AILAC mostly avoided using more 
aggressive strategies regardless of the intended target because of power and identity concerns, 
and clearly utilised less aggressive strategies with parties from both sides of the “firewall” 
created by grouping parties into either Annex I or non-Annex I categories, evidenced by the 
wide range of parties with whom the group put forward submissions. These included developed 
country parties such as the EU, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland, and 
developing country parties and groups such as Mexico, AOSIS and the AGN. That AILAC 
made these joint submissions shows it was able to build issue-specific coalitions with them and 
did not confine its coalition-building efforts to its own side of the firewall. The group’s bridge-
building identity is specifically designed to interact with the widest range of parties possible to 
develop a universally acceptable consensus; this necessitates participation by developed 
country parties and therefore AILAC’s attempts to interact with them. AILAC’s strong use of 
universality discourses in submissions, as well as constructive proposals and compromise 
offers operationalise this bridge-building identity further. 
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 Furthermore, Castro et al’s (2011:8) argument - that more meetings mean a “more 
trustful atmosphere conducive to more fruitful deliberations” between parties on the same side 
of the Annex I/non-Annex I divide, and that this leads to less aggressive strategies’ use between 
them -  is contradicted by evidence from AILAC interviewees. The analysis revealed a good 
working relationship and strategy partnerships between AILAC and the EU, and ability to find 
common ground on a number of issues with the Umbrella Group, whereas interviewees 
provided a decidedly more mixed picture of AILAC’s relationship with the AGN and noted a 
virtually non-existent relationship with ALBA, despite positive interactions between the two 
groups’ individual negotiators. Differences in the political ideologies of the groups were cited 
as a major reason for this breakdown, while the “love/hate” relationship with the AGN was 
attributed to sharing positions on issues such as adaptation despite being at odds on others such 
as Africa’s special needs and circumstances. This meant AILAC was not able to deploy any 
less aggressive strategies towards ALBA given their failed attempts to arrange bilateral 
meetings with them, while AILAC actively blocked the AGN proposal on African special 
needs and circumstances.  
 
10.7.3 Secretariat & Presidency Influences 
 
The influence of the UNFCCC architecture – structures such as the Secretariat, the presidency 
of a COP, or particular negotiation groupings and their chairs341 – seems to have had only a 
modest impact on AILAC’s strategy choice. The group puts forward its technical submissions 
throughout the year via the UNFCCC Submissions Portal as responses to calls from these 
 




bodies on particular negotiation issues, rather than submitting them uninvited, as the group is 
wary of showing its hand before attending formal sessions. By contrast, AILAC makes 
statements at formal COPs or subsidiary body meetings. However, the difference in strategies 
within the submissions and statements is not great; both contain numerous examples of 
constructive rhetoric and positivity discourses as well as persuasion strategies. Furthermore, 
coalition-building attempts are evident in both types, albeit in different ways. All AILAC’s in-
session statements make clear that the group is associating itself with other parties e.g. the G77 
& China, and there is also reference to a joint presentation by AILAC, the EIG, and CARICOM 
in the group’s opening statement at COP24. All AILAC’s submissions with other parties, 
however, are technical submissions rather than statements at formal sessions. The only marked 
difference between AILAC’s technical submissions in response to calls and its in-session 
statements is greater evidence of the group offering compromises in its statements. This is 
hardly surprising, given these were made in the actual sessions where AILAC’s delegates could 
work on compromise solutions with other parties and groups. As such, this seems more 
attributable to the environment in which the statements are made than the fact that they are not 
directly responding to calls for input. 
 The clearest impact of the UNFCCC’s architectural structure on AILAC’s strategy use 
was on its use of bilateral meetings and informal spaces. The analysis shows AILAC 
volunteered to lead negotiation groupings on various topics in order to use the chair positions 
to try to build coalitions for the positions it supported or had proposed. Furthermore, AILAC 
used the informal meetings set up by the COP president or Subsidiary Body meeting chairs to 
gather tactical information about the positions or tendencies of other parties, as well as to  put 
forward constructive proposals or compromise solutions to specific parties. However, this was 
dependent on being invited by the president or chair in the first place, which was not always 
guaranteed; the fact that AILAC consistently sought to make constructive proposals and 
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compromises towards a middle-ground, universally acceptable solution to a deadlock, and its 
ever-present bridge-building identity, was sometimes an obstacle to invitation, as it was 
assumed AILAC would accept the outcome of the informal meeting anyway. On other 
occasions, AILAC would invite the presidency or chair to an informal meeting or a formal 
bilateral themselves, thus avoiding this obstacle which would then provide similar 
opportunities to gather intelligence or use other strategies such as proposals or compromises.  
 Influence of the presidency or chair on AILAC’s strategy choice resembles a 
mixture of two forms of chair/presidency mediation identified by Odell (2005:431, 433-434):  
more passive “observation, diagnosis, and communication tactics”, allowing parties to share 
views on the causes of hindrances to consensus; and “formulation tactics”, where the chair 
invites particular parties into small groups so they can negotiate more directly. AILAC was 
given opportunities in these informals and bilaterals to present proposals and compromises, 
such as draft texts suitable for wider negotiations, and to negotiate with other parties in small 
groups. The analysis showed no evidence of Odell’s (2005:441-442) third category of chair 
mediation – “manipulation tactics” – where chairs push parties to accept outcomes just before 
a deadline after most parts have been already agreed. As stated, AILAC’s natural tendency to 
compromise and be constructive means that there is usually little need to push the group to 
agree a solution. Likewise, the analysis did not produce evidence of AILAC being persuaded 
into accepting consensus solutions or compromises by the presidency or chair, as Japan tried 
to do to parties when host of COP3 at Kyoto (Hattori, 1999).  
 The identity of the party holding the presidency or chairing a session was not deemed 
an important factor in strategy selection by almost all interviewees. Only one identified an 
example where AILAC made quasi-demands because of the nationality of a COP president, 
(the Polish COP24 presidency) because it is a member of the EU, with whom AILAC enjoys a 
good working relationship. Even here, however, the interaction presented more as a request 
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than a demand, and so the identity of the presidency clearly did not lead AILAC to use more 

























Chapter 11 presents the overall conclusions of the thesis. It discusses the multi-factorial 
influence on AILAC’s strategy choice and deployment, but recognises power dynamics as the 
main driver of the overall strategic pattern of preference for less aggressive strategies. The 
second section evaluates the thesis in several contexts. It considers the overall scope of the 
research questions, before reflecting on how appropriate both the theoretical perspective of 
governmentality and its accompanying methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis were to 
the questions. The final section builds on the findings of the thesis to suggest 3 avenues of 
future research. Firstly, it suggests analysis of the strategic choices, and the reasons behind 
them, of other blocs in the UNFCCC to determine whether influences on AILAC are 
common across the negotiations or if AILAC is an unusual case. Next, the study of 
alternative factors not considered in this thesis is proposed, such as the gender balance of 
delegations. Finally, a study of AILAC’s levels of influence in the UNFCCC post-Paris 










11.2.1 Multi-Factorial Influence on Strategy Choice 
 
The findings of this thesis suggest that for AILAC in the UNFCCC negotiations, a range of 
factors were involved in the bloc’s choice of strategies. AILAC’s identity as a bridge-building 
group, composed of member states with an affinity for multilateral approaches to solving 
transboundary problems, made the use of more aggressive strategies less appealing, as it would 
conflict with the group’s desired image and the stipulation in its rule-book to build bridges and 
foster consensus wherever possible. Instead, AILAC’s identity enhanced the appeal of less 
aggressive strategies, such as coalition-building, proposals, compromise offers, and persuasion, 
because of their coherence with this constructive, internationalist approach. AILAC member 
states’ vulnerability to climate change, and the UNFCCC’s requirement for consensus 
decision-making, also made certain less aggressive strategies more appealing, such as 
coalition-building, compromise offers, and universality discourses within submissions. That is 
to say, a global agreement is required to minimise the severity of climate change impacts within 
AILAC member states, and every party must consent for a global agreement to be forged in 
the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC’s consensus rule did allow AILAC to use blocking strategies 
with guarantee of success, although blocking and other more aggressive strategies were used 
sparingly, only to prevent the bloc’s pre-determined positional red lines from being breached 
and after every less aggressive strategy option was exhausted. Timings also visibly influenced 
the use of certain strategies in combination, with AILAC making submissions containing 
discourses of the primacy of technical knowledge throughout the year to try and make such 
knowledge the bedrock of the negotiations, thereby giving greater credibility to its main 
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strategies of constructive proposals and persuasion, which were also used in cycles together. 
Informal meetings and bilaterals were used as the precursors to other strategies’ use, such as 
submissions with other parties, and strategies more reliant on negotiators’ social networks, such 
as coalition-building. 
 
11.2.2 Primacy of Power Dynamics 
 
However, the findings also clearly demonstrate that power dynamics between AILAC and other 
parties are the driving force behind their strategy choices in the UNFCCC negotiations. 
AILAC’s relative lack of material and moral power resources stopped the group utilising more 
aggressive strategies on a regular basis because of lack of leverage and “shadow of the future” 
concerns, despite blocking remaining a viable option because of the UNFCCC’s decision-
making rules. Only when AILAC was temporarily imbued with moral power resources, due to 
climate change-related natural disasters in its member states, did the group countenance 
exerting moral pressure on parties through vulnerability discourses or naming & shaming, and 
even then this was because confident individual negotiators believed they could use these 
strategies successfully. By contrast, AILAC’s depth of power/knowledge resources, derived 
from its delegation dynamics, made less aggressive strategies attractive, either relying on its 
negotiators’ technical knowledge to make credible arguments, or using their tactical knowledge 
to utilise strategies dependent on good working relationships between delegates. Had AILAC 
not possessed these rich power/knowledge resources, the group would have considered 
themselves unable to use these strategies with any realistic prospect of success, which 
interviewees cited as a key consideration in their strategic decision-making. Consequently, 
since any proposed strategy needed to have a realistic chance of “success”, none of the other 
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factors which made these less aggressive strategies appealing, e.g. the group’s identity, AILAC 
member states’ vulnerability, or UNFCCC consensus rules, would have been sufficient for 
AILAC to justify actual use. The only exceptions to this arose through force of personality of 
individual negotiators, which permitted a small number of confident AILAC delegates to use 
more aggressive strategies considered unviable by most; or allowed outgoing delegates to use 
less aggressive strategies reliant on social networks despite a lack of negotiating experience 




11.3.1 Thesis Scope 
 
This thesis is the first study identified to date to investigate multiple potential influences on an 
individual bloc’s strategy choices within the UNFCCC; prior research has either examined 
multiple factors on strategy choice patterns across the entire UNFCCC (e.g. Castro et al, 2011; 
Bailer, 2012; Costantini et al, 2016), or focused on specifics, such as power dynamics or 
domestic politics, within individual parties or blocs (e.g. Hattori, 1999; Betzold, 2010; 
Godbole, 2016). Furthermore, the thesis is the first to focus on AILAC’s strategic behaviour, 
with prior research on the group more concerned with its positions rather than strategies. As 
such, the thesis has been an exploratory study, breaking considerable new ground in this 
particular context. However, the disadvantage is this limits the amount of attention that can be 
given to research and discussion of individual factors in strategy choice. In hindsight, limiting 
the thesis scope to a smaller number of specific potential factors behind AILAC’s strategy 
choice, to provide deeper analysis and perspectives from other disciplines, may have been 
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better. For example, the project’s entire focus could have been the relationship between power 
dynamics and individual negotiators’ agency; examining whether, and if so how, the individual 
negotiators’ psychology and their perceptions of power dynamics played a part in their strategic 
decisions. Existing research suggests powerful individuals do not process and take into account 
individuating information about their negotiating partners as much as less powerful actors, 
resorting instead to stereotypes (Hogeveen et al, 2014). Given AILAC negotiators’ high levels 
of strategic autonomy in the UNFCCC, closer examination of their perceptions of their own 
power could have been used to determine whether this research also holds true for this group. 
 
11.3.2 Applicability of Governmentality 
 
Nevertheless, the thesis has shown governmentality, as a theory of power relations, can help 
make sense of how actors interact with each other at spatial scales greater than the local, and 
why they do so in particular ways. Governmentality’s attention to what Foucault (1983; in 
Litfin, 1994:20) terms the “microphysics of power”, i.e. choices made in the processes of 
interactions between actors as to representation and communication of information, does not 
mean it is restricted to any particular spatial scale (Okereke and Bulkeley, 2009). Indeed, this 
thesis shows linguistic and discursive choices were made by AILAC, a supranational bloc, as 
part of particular strategies which explicitly factored in the relative distribution of power 
resources between parties to the UNFCCC. This brings these processes of negotiation to the 
forefront of analysis, addressing a key critique of Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012) about power 
approaches to international negotiations. This thesis could be critiqued for adopting a 
governmentality approach to understanding AILAC’s motivations in strategy choice, thereby 
predisposing the analysis to identify power dynamics as the overriding driver. However, as 
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governmentality is a theory of power relations and encourages focus on the process of 
negotiation, this exposed other factors in interviewees’ responses, as they were the ones making 
the final strategy decisions. Had factors such as domestic politics or intra-bloc dynamics proved 
most influential, these would have been revealed, and accommodated by governmentality as 
influences on the social contexts in which the negotiators found themselves. As it was, 
responses identified power dynamics as the main driver. 
Furthermore, a governmentality understanding is beneficial here because it makes no 
assumptions about the distribution of power among different spaces and spatial scales 
(Lövbrand and Stripple, 2014). As such, understanding of power is not limited to material 
resources such as economic and military strength, and expands beyond traditional rational 
choice perspectives to include immaterial sources of power, such as power/knowledge and 
moral power. Power is exercised in the representation and communication of information, 
which in turn depends on the social contexts in which actors interact. As such, intangible 
resources like these can be powerful if the actors consider them as such, e.g. if, as AILAC 
intended within the UNFCCC, technical, scientific knowledge was perceived as the bedrock of 
the negotiations and as the final arbiter of the credibility of ideas exchanged by parties. Such 
an understanding of power resources can explain neatly why AILAC favoured less aggressive 
strategies so strongly. 
 
11.3.3 Applicability of Methodology 
 
The tripartite approach of CDA ensured attention was given to multiple potential factors on 
AILAC’s strategy choices. Strategic decisions within the texts of AILAC submissions, e.g. use 
of particular discourses or framings, could then be considered within the contexts of both 
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AILAC as a bloc of 8 member states, and the UNFCCC as an institution with its own decision-
making rules and spaces of interaction. The methodology was particularly useful for 
considering AILAC’s power relations with others, unsurprising given CDA is a well-
established methodological approach for examining power relations between actors 
(Fairclough, 2010). Furthermore, use of a CDA methodology fits naturally with studies 
grounded in governmentality theory, as CDA often takes a Foucauldian explanation of the 
nature of power relations (Wodak and Meyer, 2009), and sees power as inherently language-
based (Van Dijk, 2008). A limitation of using CDA, however, may have been that its 
predisposition for analysis of power relations led to overstatement of the importance of power 
dynamics for AILAC’s strategy choices. 
Furthermore, in practice, analysis at the second (discoursal practice) level revealed the 
importance which CDA assumes of text as the medium through which power dynamics are 
played out is not necessarily appropriate for the UNFCCC negotiations. While interviews with 
AILAC negotiators helped to explain the reasons for strategies the group deployed in its 
technical submissions, they also showed the group utilises numerous strategies in spaces 
beyond submission texts which cannot be seen from textual analysis alone. Thus the value of 
the intermediary analysis level was not solely to understand the processes behind text 
production and interpretation but to broaden the spatiality of analysis of AILAC’s strategic 
behaviour within the thesis. 
  Corpus-linguistic analysis provided a useful form of triangulation to the textual 
analysis of CDA. By utilising CLA software after initial textual analysis, linguistic patterns 
and devices, such as AILAC’s differing use of  “shall” and “should” in submission texts, were 
revealed without relying entirely on interpretation and judgement of the author, necessarily 
subject to human error, thus avoiding problems of cherry picking (Baker and Levon, 2015).  In 
addition, using the two methodologies in this order avoided predisposing the author to looking 
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for evidence already identified by CLA, exposing the thesis to justified criticisms of 
confirmation bias. However, CLA was not problem-free; the #LancsBox software which 
analysed the AILAC corpus required all documents be Notepad files, whereas almost all 
AILAC submissions were accessed as PDF files. Copying the content of submissions into 
Notepad files did not work, however, as they contained a lot of background code e.g. for page 
layout. Consequently, the author had to type submissions into Notepad files, and while care 
was taken to ensure accuracy, human error cannot be entirely ruled out of this process. The 
#LancsBox software listed some entire sentences as one-word results, probably because of 
error in determining page layout during the transcription to Notepad files; again, while care 
was taken in manually calculating totals for particular keywords searches and including any 
faulty hits as appropriate, human error cannot be entirely ruled out. 
 
11.4 Suggestions for Future Research 
 
11.4.1 Strategies and Selection Reasons of Other UNFCCC Blocs 
 
How far are the thesis findings on strategy selection and the underpinning rationale 
representative for other blocs within the UNFCCC? It seems likely that this combination of 
strategy use and determining factors, i.e. generally favouring less aggressive strategies because 
of power dynamics supplemented by additional factors – in particular identity - is unique to 
AILAC, given that  other blocs are unlikely to be subject to  exactly the same circumstances as 
AILAC. However, without research on other blocs’ strategy choices and their underlying 
rationale, this cannot be stated definitively. Very few individual blocs’ strategies have been 
analysed in depth, if at all, aside from AOSIS (Larson, 2003; Betzold, 2010; Deitelhoff and 
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Wallbott, 2012; Oculi and Stephenson, 2018), the MLDCs (Bhandary, 2017), and the EU 
(Oberthür, 2011; Belis and Schunz, 2013), although the EU studies did not focus specifically 
on strategies. This provides numerous questions for further research, e.g. how common is the 
pattern of strategy use identified in this thesis for AILAC – favouring less aggressive strategies 
– among other blocs in the UNFCCC negotiations? Which blocs follow this pattern and which 
deviate, and how far? Research may also focus on particular characteristics of blocs - for 
example, whether AILAC’s disregard for more aggressive, and general preference for less 
aggressive strategies is common among developing world blocs; how does this compare with 
strategy choices for developed world blocs like the EU and the Umbrella Group, or a bloc of 
both developed and developing world parties like the EIG? Furthermore, studies on AOSIS 
and the MLDCs suggest AILAC is unusual among developing country blocs in not using moral 
pressure in particular more extensively. Investigations into the strategies of other developing 
world blocs, such as the AGN, LDCs, ALBA, or the LMDCs, could also reveal how true this 
suggestion is. 
 Other blocs’ rationale for strategy use can be examined once the patterns of use have 
been clarified. Again, barring a small number of studies on AOSIS considering power 
dynamics (Betzold, 2010; Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012), blocs’ reasons for strategy selection 
have been largely ignored. This too provides plentiful research opportunities, as previous 
research in the UNFCCC tended to assess either arena-wide trends rather than identifying the 
reasons behind particular parties’ – and especially blocs’ – strategic choices (e.g. Castro et al, 
2011; Bailer, 2012; Costantini et al, 2016), or the reasons behind specific individual parties’ – 
as distinguished from blocs - strategy choices (e.g. Hattori, 1999; Bang et al, 2005; Andonova 
and Alexieva, 2012; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2012; Godbole, 2016; Bang, 2017). There 
are numerous questions along the same axes of differentiation as for research identifying blocs’ 
patterns of strategy use, e.g. do power dynamics influence strategy selection in developed 
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world blocs, or as-yet-unstudied developing world blocs? If so, how, and how far are they the 
primary determinant of strategy choice? Do other developing world blocs use alternative power 
resources like AOSIS utilises moral power (Betzold, 2010; Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012) and 
AILAC utilises its internal power/knowledge resources? Per Edwards et al (2017), AOSIS, the 
LDCs, and the LMDCs also possess support units, making their respective rôles in their blocs’ 
strategic choices as sources of power/knowledge, a fruitful avenue of research. Further, as 
green technology grows globally, will a party’s economic strength continue to serve as a power 
resource once decoupled from its contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions?  
 Are other factors, such as intra-bloc dynamics, important in determining blocs’ 
strategy selection? If so, how does this make blocs differ from individual parties in the 
UNFCCC? Would a bloc’s larger delegation evidence better financial resource and greater 
ability to co-ordinate its negotiators’ strategy use through training or better logistical oversight, 
or would more delegates only add negotiating complexity and increase individual negotiators’ 
agency in strategy choice? Does identity influence other blocs’ strategy choices? Brief 
consideration of the literature suggests this may apply for ALBA, which comprises other Latin 
American countries with similar material power resources, facing similar problems of 
vulnerability to AILAC states (Watts and Depledge, 2018). Given ALBA is known to have 
made considerably different strategic choices to AILAC, regularly acting as “minority 
dissenting voices blocking a consensus” (Watts & Depledge, 2018:7), is this attributable to 
variations in non-material power resources between the two blocs? Might ALBA’s identity 
within the UNFCCC, with the group using ideas of climate justice as a “discursive weapon 
against industrialised countries” (Audet, 2013:376), alone suffice to override its lack of 
leverage and make regular use of more aggressive strategies worthwhile? Finally, how far do 
individual negotiators’ personalities affect blocs’ strategy choices – as exceptions to the 
dominance of power dynamics as for AILAC, or by being influential for other blocs’ delegates? 
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11.4.2 Alternative Factors 
 
This thesis explores AILAC’s strategy choices but for practical reasons has not investigated all 
potential factors in depth. Gender balance of the AILAC delegation is one such factor, although 
some interviewees hinted that AILAC’s high proportion of female delegates may have been 
influential in steering it towards less aggressive strategies. Ruane (2012:343) states that 
notwithstanding widely varying conclusions in literature to date around stereotypes of female 
co-operative approaches and male confrontational strategy choices within negotiations, there 
is a “small but significant influence” consistent with these regarding gender influences on 
negotiating behaviour. Further research could examine whether AILAC evidences this pattern 
and/or whether gender balance of a delegation also influences other blocs’ strategy choices. 
 Deception in negotiations could be usefully investigated as research appears extremely 
limited within any international relations context, and practically non-existent for the 
UNFCCC, falling mainly within fields such as ethics (e.g. White, 1980; Burr, 2001; Fulmer et 
al, 2009), mathematical game theory (e.g. Zlotkin and Rosenschein, 1993), or  behavioural 
sciences (e.g. Aquino and Becker, 2005). The thesis did not consider whether AILAC was 
truthful or bluffing in its negotiation strategies. These tactics are difficult to detect when the 
primary data source consists of written submissions. It may therefore be useful to investigate 
whether this was the case for AILAC, and its prevalence within overall UNFCCC negotiations. 
This would be especially interesting as the analysis reveals AILAC’s national delegations tend 
to rotate fairly frequently, which could override the fact that bluffing is less likely in 
information-rich environments (Bailer, 2010) such as the UNFCCC. Deception could have 
wide-ranging ramifications for strategy choices and their underpinning rationales. For example, 
bluffing could entirely alter the concessions trading process if a concession strongly desired by 
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one party is presented by the other as violating a red line, potentially prompting greater 
concessions still to secure it. Many AILAC interviewees cited trust between negotiators as key 
in strategy use, especially for strategies reliant on social contacts, so it may be the case that 
delegates do not consider deception at all for fear of damaging relationships or even shadow of 
the future effects.  Alternatively, a known “bluffer” from another party may find themselves 
subject to other parties’ bluffs to “play them at their own game”, depending on the relative skill 
levels of the negotiators in question. 
 
11.4.3 AILAC’s Negotiating Success? 
 
Aside from posing questions raised in this thesis within the different contexts of other blocs in 
the UNFCCC, numerous related opportunities for future research also present themselves. As 
stated, AILAC delegates required any strategy selected to be reasonably capable of delivering 
a satisfactory outcome in the UNFCCC negotiations. Therefore, an obvious question in the 
light of the findings of this thesis is whether the strategies used by AILAC actually led to such 
outcomes. This could be investigated through methodologies derived from Political Science, 
such as process tracing methodologies discussed by Collier (2011). Edwards et al (2017) 
suggest AILAC contributed significantly to the eventual content of the Paris Agreement in 
2015, although given some interviewees’ growing frustrations with the state of the UNFCCC 
negotiations, as identified by this thesis, this may not have continued.  Negotiations now focus 
on implementing the Paris rule book rather than drafting the Agreement. Furthermore, even in 
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Appendix I: AILAC Submissions by Chronology 
 
Number Title Year 
1 Agenda Item: Matters related to Agriculture 2013 
2 Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) Workstream 1 2013 
3 Adaptation in the ADP: Joint Submission of AILAC, Mexico and 
Dominican Republic 
2014 
4 ADP Ad-Hoc Working Group: Submission on Workstream 2: 
Enhancing Pre-2020 Mitigation Ambition 
2014 
5 Submission on Ex-Ante Information Requirements for the 
Communication of INDCs and Ex-Ante Assessment Process 
2014 
6 Submission on the Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform 
(ADP) 
2014 
7 Submission on the Legal Architecture and Structure of the Elements 
of the 2015 Agreement 
2014 
8 AILAC and EIG Submission for Organization of an In-Session 
Workshop on Gender, Mitigation and Technology; Advancing 
Actions under the Lima Work Program on Gender 
2015 
9 Submission of Chile on behalf of AILAC to the ADP on Human 
Rights and Climate Change 
2015 
10 Submission of Colombia on Behalf of the Independent Association 
of Latin America and the Caribbean, AILAC, on Opportunities for 




11 Views on the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris 
Agreement 
2016 
12 Statement for the Stocktaking Plenary at the SB44 and APA1 
Session 
2016 
13 SBSTA44 Closing Plenary Statement 2016 
14 Submission on the Modalities for the Accounting of Financial 
Resources Provided and Mobilized Through Public Interventions in 
Accordance with Article 9, Paragraph 7, of the Paris Agreement 
2016 
15 SBSTA Agenda Item 6 (b): Advice on How the IPCC can Inform the 
Global Stocktake Referred to Article 14 of the Paris Agreement 
2016 
16 Guidance on Cooperative Approaches Referred to in Article 6, 
Paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement; Rules, Modalities and 
Procedures for the Mechanism Established by Article 6, Paragraph 
4, of the Paris Agreement; Work Programme under the Framework 
for Non-Market Approaches Referred to in Article 6, Paragraph 8, of 
the Paris Agreement 
2016 
17 APA Agenda Item 6: Matters Relating to the Global Stocktake 
Referred to in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement 
2016 
18 Views on Possible Elements and Guiding Principles for Continuing 
and Enhancing the Lima Work Programme on Gender, Taking into 
Account Recommendations and Insights Resulting from Activities 
Already Completed under the Work Programme; and, Information 
on Progress Made in Meeting the Goals of Achieving Gender 
Balance and Gender-Responsive Climate Policy 
2016 
19 Submission on the Technology Framework 2016 
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20 Item 5 Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines of the Transparency 
Framework on Action and Support Pursuant Article 13 of the Paris 
Agreement 
2016 
21 Item 4 Further Guidance in Relation to the Adaptation 
Communication, Including Inter Alia, as a Component of Nationally 
Determined Contributions, Referred to in Article 7, Paragraphs 10 
and 11, of the Paris Agreement 
2016 
22 Item 3 Further Guidance in Relation to the Mitigation Section of 
Decision 1/CP/21 
2016 
23 Mandates of Adaptation Committee and LDC Expert Group Based 
on Paragraphs 41, 42 (b) and 45 of Decision 1/CP.21 
2017 
24 Mandates of Adaptation Committee Based on Paragraph 42 of 
Decision 1/CP.21 
2017 
25 Submission on Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and 
Damage (WIM) 
2017 
26 Views on How to Progress the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on the Paris Agreement (APA) Following the Third Part of its 
Resumed First Session 
2017 
27 Item 5 Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines of the Transparency 
Framework on Action and Support Pursuant Article 13 of the Paris 
Agreement 
2017 
28 APA Agenda Item 6: Matters Relating to the GST Referred to in 




29 Review of the Functions of the Standing Committee on Finance 
(SCF), Based on the Terms of Reference Contained in the Annex to 
Decision 9/CP.22 
2017 
30 APA Agenda Item 7: Modalities and Procedures for the Effective 
Operation of the Committee to Facilitate Implementation and 
Promote Compliance Referred to in Article 15, Paragraph 2, of the 
Paris Agreement 
2017 
31 Paris Committee on Capacity-Building (PCCB) 2017 
32 Guidance, Rules, Modalities, Procedures, and Work Programme for 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement 
2017 
33 Item 3 Further Guidance in Relation to the Mitigation Section of 
Decision 1/CP/.21 
2017 
34 APA Agenda Item 4 – Further Guidance in Relation to the 
Adaptation Communication, Including, Inter Alia, as a Component 
of Nationally Determined Contributions, Referred to in Article 7, 
Paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement 
2017 
35 Principles and Structure of the Technology Framework and Scope 
and Modalities for the Periodic Assessment of the Technology 
Mechanism 
2017 
36 Closing Statement for the SBSTA46 Closing Plenary 2017 
37 APA Agenda Item 7: Modalities and Procedures for the Effective 
Operation of the Committee to Facilitate Implementation and 





38 APA Agenda Item 4 – Further Guidance in Relation to the 
Adaptation Communication, Including, Inter Alia, as a Component 
of Nationally Determined Contributions, Referred to in Article 7, 
Paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement 
2017 
39 Further Guidance in Relation to the Mitigation Section of Decision 
1/CP.21 
2017 
40 APA Agenda Item 6: Matters Relating to the GST Referred to in 
Article 14 of the Paris Agreement 
2017 
41 SBI Item 7 Development of Modalities and Procedures for the 
Operation and Use of a Public Registry Referred to in Article 7, 
Paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement 
2017 
42 Development of Modalities and Procedures for the Operation and 
Use of a Public Registry Referred to in Article 4, Paragraph 12, of 
the Paris Agreement 
2017 
43 Item 5 Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines of the Transparency 
Framework on Action and Support Pursuant Article 13 of the PA 
2017 
44 Guidance on Cooperative Approaches Referred to in Article 6, 
Paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement; Rules, Modalities and 
Procedures for the Mechanism Established by Article 6, Paragraph 
4, of the Paris Agreement; Work Programme under the Framework 
for Non-Market Approaches Referred to in Article 6, Paragraph 8, of 
the Paris Agreement 
2017 
45 SBI Agenda Item 7: Common Time Frames for Nationally 
Determined Contributions Referred to in Article 4, Paragraph 10, of 




46 SBSTA47 and SBI47 Opening Plenary Statement 2017 
47 SB47 Closing Plenary Statement 2017 
48 Closing Plenary Statement of the COP/CMP/CMA 2017 
49 Inputs to SBSTA 48 on Further Improving the Relevance and 
Effectiveness of the Nairobi Work Programme (NWP) 
2018 
50 SBI Agenda Item 7: Common Time Frames for Nationally 
Determined Contributions Referred to in Article 4, Paragraph 10, of 
the Paris Agreement 
2018 
51 7th Durban Forum for Capacity Building (Joint Submission with the 
Environmental Integrity Group) 
2018 
52 APA 1-5, SBSTA48 and SBI48 Opening Plenary Statement 2018 
53 APA 1-5, SBSTA48, SBI48 Heads of Delegation Statement 2018 
54 Conference Room Paper (CRP) Submission on APA Agenda Items 
4 and 5 (Joint Submission with African Group of Negotiators) 
2018 
55 APA 1-5, SBSTA48 and SBI48 Closing Plenary Statement 2018 
56 APA 1-6, SBSTA48.2 SBI48.2 Opening Plenary Statement 2018 
57 APA 1-6, SBSTA48.2 and SBI48.2 Closing Statement 2018 
58 COP24 CMP14 APA 1-7, SBSTA49 and SBI49 Opening Statement 2018 
59 Views on the Need for Corresponding Adjustments in Connection 
with Transfers of Mitigation Outcomes and Emission Reductions 
under Article 6 (Joint Submission with Australia, Canada, the 
European Union, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand and Switzerland) 
2018 
60 Views on Baselines and Ensuring Additional Emission Reductions 




6, Paragraph 4 (Joint Submission with the Alliance of Small Island 
States, the European Union, Japan, Mexico, South Africa and 
Switzerland) 
61 APA Critical Elements on Last Iteration 2018 



















Appendix II: Interview Questionnaire 
 
Context of the UNFCCC Negotiations 
- How would you describe the UNFCCC as a forum for negotiations? 
- How has it changed over time? 
- What has been the impact of new coalitions? 
 
AILAC Participation 
- What is your view of the rôle of AILAC in the UNFCCC negotiations? How has this 
changed over time? 
- How active is AILAC? 
- With which parties or groups does AILAC have good/bad relationships? Why? 
 
AILAC Positions 
- Which are the most important topics for AILAC in the negotiations? Why? 
- Which are the easiest/most difficult topics in which to make progress? 
 
AILAC Decision-Making 
- How would you describe AILAC’s decision-making process for its positions and 
strategies in the negotiations? 
- How much variety is there in AILAC’s strategic behaviour? 
o Potential prompts of strategy examples e.g. persuasion, coalition-building etc 
395 
 
Influences on AILAC Strategy 
- What have been the most important factors to consider in selecting a strategy? 
- How important in strategy selection is: 
o The domestic political context of AILAC member states? 
o AILAC’s decision-making process and intra-bloc dynamics? 
o AILAC’s delegation dynamics – the size, experience, personalities, preferences, 
values, skill of its delegates? 
o The relative power of AILAC to other parties? 
o The institutional culture and architecture of the UNFCCC? 
o The vulnerability of AILAC member states to climate change? 
o The geopolitical context of AILAC member states relative to other parties, e.g. 
international trade, politics etc? 
o The principle of equity, and climate justice considerations? 
o AILAC’s knowledge of other parties? 
 
Timings of AILAC Strategic Behaviour 
- How does AILAC’s strategic behaviour vary over time? 
- Which strategies were used in different stages of the negotiations? 
 
 
